The binary system interface protocol for AI Agents — port 7816, zero shell parsing, deterministic semantics.
中文 | English
SSH was designed for humans. Agents don't need a terminal.
When an AI agent runs ps aux | grep nginx over SSH, it parses free-form text that varies by OS, locale, and tool version. But when agents call ASys's SYS_PROCS instruction, they receive a fixed 44-byte binary frame: total process count, top-5 PIDs, CPU%, memory%, status flags — typed, unambiguous, the same on every node.
ASys is an experiment: what if you designed a system interface specifically for AI agents, from first principles? Binary frames instead of text. A long-lived encrypted connection instead of per-command sessions. Instruction-level capability grants instead of broad SSH access. Built-in audit trail instead of shell history.
It's not a replacement for SSH, Ansible, or Kubernetes operators — those tools are well-suited for their intended users (humans and orchestration pipelines). ASys is an additional option for the case where the operator is an AI agent and you want an interface designed for that from the ground up.
AI Agent (LLM)
│
│ Tool calls
▼
Python SDK (~/.asys/id_curve25519)
│
│ Noise_IK_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2b
│ TCP port 7816
▼
asyd (C daemon, zero dependencies)
│
│ POSIX syscalls
▼
Linux
| INS | Name | Response | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | SYS_CAPS | 36B | Static capabilities: CPU, RAM, disk, ISA bitmap |
| 0x01 | SYS_HELLO | 18B | Node UID + nanosecond timestamp |
| 0x02 | SYS_STATUS | 23B | Load avg, CPU%, available RAM, disk, network, RPI |
| 0x03 | SYS_PROCS | 44B | Total procs + top-5 by CPU (PID, CPU%, MEM%) |
| INS | Name | Response | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0x11 | TASK_QUERY | 3B | Poll async task status by Task_Handle |
| INS | Name | Response | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0x20 | PROC_THROTTLE | SW only | SIGSTOP / SIGCONT a process by PID |
| 0x21 | NET_ISOLATE | — | Isolate process network access (planned) |
| 0x22 | SVC_RESTART | 6B | Restart a named systemd service (async) |
Measured RTT (Noise IK encrypted, RHEL on VirtualBox, Windows Python client):
| Instruction | RTT | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SYS_HELLO | < 1ms | |
| SYS_CAPS | < 1ms | No cache; static data read once at startup |
| SYS_STATUS | < 1ms / ~51ms | Cache hit / cold sample (50ms CPU dual-sample) |
| SYS_PROCS | ~6ms / ~200ms | Warm calls; first call blocks 200ms cold sample |
| PROC_THROTTLE | ~200µs dispatch | |
| SVC_RESTART | ~200µs dispatch | Async; poll result with TASK_QUERY |
- Linux (RHEL/Fedora/Ubuntu/Debian), x86_64
gcc,make- Python 3.8+ with
pip install noiseprotocol cryptography(client only)
git clone https://github.com/vincentping/asys
cd asys
make
sudo bin/asydasyd listens on TCP 7816. On first start it generates a key pair at
/etc/asyd/id_curve25519.
Options:
| Option | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
--port <n> |
7816 | TCP listen port |
--listen <addr> |
0.0.0.0 | Bind address |
--debug |
off | Run in foreground with verbose logging to stderr |
--version |
— | Print version and exit |
--help |
— | Print usage and exit |
# Example: custom port, local-only
sudo bin/asyd --port 8816 --listen 127.0.0.1
# Example: debug mode (foreground, verbose)
sudo bin/asyd --debug# On the client machine — generate agent identity
python3 tools/client/asys_keygen.py
# On the server — add the agent's public key to the whitelist
echo "<pubkey_hex>" | sudo tee -a /etc/asyd/authorized_agentsThe agent public key is printed by asys_keygen.py. It also generates the client key pair at
~/.asys/id_curve25519 used during the Noise IK handshake.
Connections from agents not in /etc/asyd/authorized_agents are rejected with SW=0x6982.
On first connection, the client will prompt you to confirm the server's public key fingerprint
and save it to ~/.asys/known_hosts — see First connection below.
Reload the whitelist without restarting (existing connections are not affected):
sudo kill -HUP $(pidof asyd)On first connect, the client displays the server's public key fingerprint:
ASys server fingerprint (SHA256): a3:f1:2c:...
Connect to localhost:7816? [yes/no]: yes
Fingerprint saved to ~/.asys/known_hosts
Subsequent connections verify the fingerprint automatically. A mismatch aborts
the connection — same model as SSH known_hosts.
All client scripts run on any machine (including Windows) and connect to a remote
asyd over the network. No SSH. No shell. Signed binary instructions over an
encrypted channel.
Connects to asyd, completes the Noise IK handshake, then exercises all four
Core ISA instructions (SYS_CAPS, SYS_HELLO, SYS_STATUS, SYS_PROCS) and runs
a cache timing test.
python3 examples/client_core_isa.py <server-ip>ASys Test Client — localhost:7816
====================================================
Connected to localhost:7816
Handshake OK
── SYS_CAPS (0x00) ─────────────────────────────────
Core bitmap: 0x0002000F active=['0x00', '0x01', '0x02', '0x03', '0x11']
Ext bitmap: 0x00000005
Protocol: v1.0
Kernel hash: 0x06060057
CPUs: 8 arch=x86_64
RAM: 15660 MB swap=4096 MB
Root partition: 1031018 MB fs=ext4
RPI type: NATIVE_KERNEL (PSI)
SW: 0x9000 OK
── SYS_HELLO (0x01) ────────────────────────────────
Magic: 'ASYS'
Node UID: 0xFCAB032F
Server timestamp: 1779912196.304 s (1779912196304227300 ns)
RTT: 0.28 ms
SW: 0x9000 OK
── SYS_STATUS (0x02) ───────────────────────────────
Load avg: 1m=0.0 5m=0.0
CPU usage: 0%
Mem available: 14540 MB
Root disk: 0% used IO wait=0 ms
Network: in=0 Mbps out=0 Mbps
RPI: 0/100
RTT: 51.05 ms
SW: 0x9000 OK
── SYS_PROCS (0x03) ────────────────────────────────
Total processes: 48
Top 5 by CPU (lifetime share):
[0] PID=5964 CPU= 0.07% MEM= 0% flags=Privileged
[1] PID=433 CPU= 0.05% MEM= 0% flags=Zombie
[2] PID=1 CPU= 0.02% MEM= 0% flags=Privileged
[3] PID=6 CPU= 0.00% MEM= 0% flags=Privileged
[4] PID=80 CPU= 0.00% MEM= 0% flags=Privileged
RTT: 2.87 ms
SW: 0x9000 OK
── Cache Timing Test ───────────────────────────────
6 rounds, 200ms interval
# SYS_STATUS SYS_PROCS
──── ──────────── ────────────
0 0.61ms 2.52ms
1 0.85ms 2.92ms
2 0.95ms 2.47ms
3 52.25ms 2.68ms
4 0.95ms 2.68ms
5 1.21ms 2.70ms
====================================================
Done.
Sends a SVC_RESTART instruction, receives a Task_Handle, then polls
TASK_QUERY until the service restart completes.
python3 examples/client_svc_restart.py <server-ip> 7816 sshdASys Phase 3 E2E Test — localhost:7816
Service: sshd
====================================================
Handshake OK
► SVC_RESTART("sshd")
SW: 0x9000 OK
Task_Handle: 0x001D7D05
RTT: 1.0 ms
► TASK_QUERY polling (max 30s) ...
[ 1s] Status = Success ✓
====================================================
PASS SVC_RESTART("sshd") completed with Status=Success
Spawns four independent agents concurrently to validate per-session locking:
concurrent reads don't interleave, cross-session TASK_QUERY leaks no handle
information, and an abrupt disconnect does not affect other sessions.
python3 examples/client_multi_agent.py <server-ip>=== ASys Agent Simulator — localhost:7816 ===
Validates per-session lock correctness (Phase 4 P1)
[Scenario 1: Concurrent Core ISA — 4 agents × 5 SYS_STATUS]
PASS Agent-A2: 5× SYS_STATUS all SW=0x9000
PASS Agent-A3: 5× SYS_STATUS all SW=0x9000
PASS Agent-A1: 5× SYS_STATUS all SW=0x9000
PASS Agent-A4: 5× SYS_STATUS all SW=0x9000
[Scenario 2: Cross-session TASK_QUERY isolation]
PASS Agent-B1: SVC_RESTART crond → SW=0x9000
PASS Agent-B1: obtained valid Task_Handle
PASS Agent-B2 querying B1's handle → Status=0xFF (no info leak)
PASS Agent-B1 querying own handle → Status != 0xFF
[Scenario 3: Concurrent SVC_RESTART — 3 agents, 3 different services]
PASS Agent-C1: SVC_RESTART crond → SW=0x9000 + handle
PASS Agent-C2: SVC_RESTART rsyslog → SW=0x9000 + handle
PASS Agent-C3: SVC_RESTART sshd → SW=0x9000 + handle
PASS All 3 Task_Handles are distinct
FAIL Agent-C1: crond → Status=Success ✓ (Status=Failed)
FAIL Agent-C2: rsyslog → Status=Success ✓ (Status=Failed)
PASS Agent-C3: sshd → Status=Success ✓
[Scenario 4: Disconnect resilience — Agent-D abruptly disconnects]
PASS Agent-D-stable: SYS_HELLO before disrupt → 0x9000
PASS Agent-D-bad: abrupt disconnect (no handshake)
PASS Agent-D-stable: SYS_STATUS after disrupt → 0x9000
PASS Agent-D-new: fresh connect after disrupt → SYS_HELLO 0x9000
====================================================
Summary: 17 passed, 2 failed
SOME TESTS FAILED — check output above
Note on Scenario 3 failures:
Status=Failedforcrond/rsyslogmeanssystemctl restartreturned non-zero — those services are not installed or not running on the test node. The ASys protocol path (dispatch → fork → SIGCHLD → handle update) is exercised correctly regardless;Status=Failedis the expected response when the underlying system operation fails.
The demo uses two machines to show what ASys is actually for: a remote operator observing and controlling a Linux node over the network.
On the server (RHEL/Linux) — start a CPU hog:
python3 examples/server_cpu_hog.pyCPU hog started PID=2644
Press Ctrl+C to stop.
On the client (any machine, e.g. Windows) — connect and throttle:
python3 examples/client_proc_throttle.py <server-ip>ASys Throttle Client — <server-ip>:7816
====================================================
Handshake OK
CPU=100% load1m=3.2 RPI=87/100
# PID CPU% MEM%
--- -------- ------ -----
1 2644 99.87% 0%
2 1281 9.09% 0%
3 1 0.00% 1%
4 9 0.00% 0%
5 17 0.00% 0%
Select # or PID to throttle (blank to cancel): 1
Selected #1 → PID 2644
PROC_THROTTLE STOP PID=2644 ...
SW=0x9000 OK
Waiting 2 s for CPU to settle...
CPU=0% (was 100%, Δ=-100%)
PID 2644 paused. Press Ctrl+C to restore or exit.
^C
Restore PID 2644? (yes/no) [no]: yes
PROC_THROTTLE CONT PID=2644 SW=0x9000 OK
The client runs on Windows. The process being throttled is on RHEL. No SSH. No shell. One signed binary instruction over an encrypted channel.
Transport: Noise IK (Curve25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 + BLAKE2b) — 1-RTT mutual authentication. No passwords. No certificates. No CA. Session content has forward secrecy (session keys are derived from per-handshake ephemeral keys; compromising the static private key does not expose past session content). Known boundary: the agent's static public key is encrypted under the server's static public key during the handshake — a static private key compromise would theoretically allow recovery of agent identities from recorded handshake traffic.
Server identity: on every new connection, asyd sends a 38-byte
Pre-Handshake Frame ([Magic][Version][ServerPubKey]) before the Noise handshake.
The client verifies the server's public key fingerprint against ~/.asys/known_hosts
(SSH-style: confirm on first connect, reject on mismatch thereafter). The public key
is public by definition; security relies on fingerprint confirmation, not secrecy.
Replay protection: signed instructions carry an Epoch_ID
(HMAC-BLAKE2b(recv_key, "asys-epoch-v1")[:4]), derived post-handshake and never
transmitted. Each session produces a unique Epoch_ID; cross-session replay is
cryptographically impossible without breaking the session key. Within a session,
a monotonic sequence number (Seq) prevents replay with 0x6985.
Privilege containment: asyd runs as Caged Root under systemd:
CapabilityBoundingSet limits privileges to exactly what each instruction needs
(CAP_KILL, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH). NoNewPrivileges=true prevents
escalation even if the process is compromised.
Instruction security levels (CLA byte, bits 3–2):
| Level | Applies to | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| Plain | Core ISA | Noise channel encryption only |
| Signed | Standard ISA | HMAC-BLAKE2b Auth Tag per frame |
| Document | Description |
|---|---|
docs/en/asys-whitepaper.md |
Background, design rationale, available options, and where ASys fits |
docs/en/asys-spec.md |
Protocol specification: ISA, security model, APDU frame format |
docs/en/asys-design-notes.md |
Architecture decision records (why not JSON / mTLS / shell) |
docs/en/asys-conformance.md |
Conformance testing guide |
sdk/definitions/asys.isa |
Machine-readable ISA definition (TOML) |
Version numbers:
asydsoftware versions (v0.3.x) and the ASys protocol version (v1.0,0x0100) are managed independently. The protocol version increments only when the wire format or instruction semantics change.
- Client-Speak-First (ADR-22): after TCP connect,
asydwaits for the client to send a 4-byte Magic (0x41535953) before sending anything; 1-second hardcoded timeout; mismatch or timeout → silent close, no response. Reduces exposure to generic port scanners. --helpand--versionflags added toasyd- Conformance:
test_client_magic.c(TC-MAG-001/002/003) added tomake check
asydC daemon, zero external dependencies, static memory pool, zeromallocon the request path- Noise IK (Curve25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 + BLAKE2b) transport, 1-RTT mutual authentication
- Agent public key whitelist (
/etc/asyd/authorized_agents), SSH-style fingerprint verification - Pre-Handshake Frame: server broadcasts public key before handshake,
~/.asys/known_hostsmanagement - HMAC-BLAKE2b Auth Tag verification + Epoch_ID cross-session replay protection
- Core ISA:
SYS_CAPS,SYS_HELLO,SYS_STATUS,SYS_PROCS - Standard ISA:
PROC_THROTTLE,SVC_RESTART(async, withTASK_QUERY) - Per-session concurrency, 60s idle timeout, journald logging, systemd Caged Root deployment
Apache 2.0 — Copyright (c) 2026 Vincent Ping (vincentping@gmail.com)
Monocypher (cryptography library): CC-0 / ISC dual license.