



# PAN-OS 10.1 Next-Generation Hardware Firewalls

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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**Palo Alto Networks, Inc.**

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# Table of Contents

1. General	3
2. Cryptographic Module Specification	4
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces	20
4. Roles, Services, and Authentication	21
5. Software/Firmware Security	28
6. Operational Environment	29
7. Physical Security	29
8. Non-Invasive Security	29
9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management	30
10. Self-Tests	34
11. Life-Cycle Assurance	36
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks	37
13. Definitions and Acronyms	37
14. Reference Documents	38
Appendix A - PA-220 - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (6 Seals)	38
Appendix B - PA-220R- FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (5 Seals)	42
Appendix C - PA-800 series - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (11 Seals)	43
Appendix D – PA-3200 Series – FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (19 Seals)	46
Appendix E - PA-5200- FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (28 Seals)	48
Appendix F - PA-7050 - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (24 Seals)	52
Appendix G - PA-7080 - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (10 Seals)	60
Appendix H - PA-5450 FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (12 Seals)	66
Appendix I - PA-410 FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (4 Seals)	67
Appendix J - PA-440/450/460 FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (4 Seals)	68

# 1. General

Palo Alto Networks offers a full line of next-generation security appliances that range from the PA-220, designed for enterprise remote offices, to the PA-7080, which is a modular chassis designed for high-speed datacenters. Our platform architecture is based on our single-pass engine, PAN-OS, for networking, security, threat prevention, and management functionality that is consistent across all platforms. The devices differ only in capacities, performance, and physical configuration.

The Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS 10.1 Next-Generation Hardware Firewalls (hereafter referred to as the modules) are multi-chip standalone hardware modules that provide network security by enabling enterprises to see and control applications, users, and content – not just ports, IP addresses, and packets – using three unique identification technologies: App-ID, User-ID, and Content-ID. These identification technologies, found in Palo Alto Networks' enterprise firewalls, enable enterprises to create business-relevant security policies – safely enabling organizations to adopt new applications, instead of the traditional “all-or-nothing” approach offered by traditional port-blocking firewalls used in many security infrastructures.

## Features and Benefits

- **Application visibility and control:** Accurate identification of the applications traversing the network enables policy-based control over application usage at the firewall, the strategic center of the security infrastructure.
- **Visualization tools:** Graphical visibility tools, customizable reporting and logging enables administrators to make a more informed decision on how to treat the applications traversing the network.
- **Application browser:** Helps administrators quickly research what the application is, its’ behavioral characteristics and underlying technology resulting in a more informed decision making process on how to treat the application.
- **User-based visibility and control:** Seamless integration with enterprise directory services (Active Directory, LDAP, eDirectory) facilitates application visibility and policy creation based on user and group information, not just IP address. In Citrix and terminal services environments, the identity of users sitting behind Citrix or terminal services can be used to enable policy-based visibility and control over applications, users and content. An XML API enables integration with other, 3rd party user repositories.
- **Real-time threat prevention:** Detects and blocks application vulnerabilities, viruses, spyware, and worms; controls web activity; all in real-time, dramatically improving performance and accuracy.
- **File and data filtering:** Taking full advantage of the in-depth application inspection being performed by App-ID, administrators can implement several different types of policies that reduce the risk associated with unauthorized file and data transfer.
- **Legacy firewall support:** Support for traditional inbound and outbound port-based firewall rules mixed with application-based rules smooth the transition to a Palo Alto Networks next generation firewall.
- **Networking architecture:** Support for dynamic routing (OSPF, RIP, BGP), virtual wire mode and layer 2/layer 3 modes facilitates deployment in nearly any networking environment.
- **Policy-based Forwarding:** Forward traffic based on policy defined by application, source zone/interface, source/destination address, source user/group, and service.
- **Virtual Systems:** Create multiple virtual “firewalls” within a single device as a means of supporting specific departments or customers. Each virtual system can include dedicated administrative accounts, interfaces, networking configuration, security zones, and policies for the associated network traffic.
- **VPN connectivity:** Secure site-to-site connectivity is enabled through standards-based IPSec VPN support while remote user access is delivered via SSL VPN connectivity.
- **Quality of Service (QoS):** Deploy traffic shaping policies (guaranteed, maximum and priority) to enable positive policy controls over bandwidth intensive, non-work related applications such as streaming media while preserving the performance of business applications.
- **Real-time bandwidth monitor:** View real-time bandwidth and session consumption for applications and users within a selected QoS class.
- **Purpose-built platform:** combines single pass engine with parallel processing hardware to deliver the multi-Gbps performance necessary to protect today’s high-speed networks.

The cryptographic modules meet the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of FIPS 140-3.

Table 1 - Security Levels

ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6.	FIPS 140-3 Section Title	Security Level
1	General	2
2	Cryptographic Module Specification	2
3	Cryptographic Module Interfaces	2
4	Roles, Services, Authentication	3
5	Software/Firmware Security	2
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Physical Security	2
8	Non-Invasive Security	N/A
9	Sensitive Security Parameter Management	2
10	Self-Tests	2
11	Life-Cycle Assurance	3
12	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
Overall Level		2

## 2. Cryptographic Module Specification

The configurations for this validation are highlighted in Table 2.

Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration

Model	Hardware	Firmware Version	Distinguishing Features
PA-220	910-000128, Physical Kit: 920-000084	10.1.5	RJ45 Ports, Micro-USB, LEDs, USB, Power Supply
PA-220R	910-000147, Physical Kit: 920-000226	10.1.5	RJ-45 Ports, SFP, USBs, Micro-USB, LEDs, Power Supply
PA-410	910-000231, Physical Kit: 920-000454	10.1.5	RJ45 interfaces, USB, LED, Power supply, Ground stud
PA-440	910-000212, Physical Kit: 920-000454	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, USB, LEDs, 1 Micro USB
PA-450	910-000232, Physical Kit: 920-000454	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, USB, LEDs, 1 Micro USB
PA-460	910-000230, Physical Kit: 920-000454	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, USB, LEDs, 1 Micro USB
PA-820	910-000120, Physical Kit: 920-000185	10.1.5	RJ45 Ports, Micro-USB, SFP, SFP/SFP+, Power, LEDs, USB
PA-850	910-000119, Physical Kit: 920-000185	10.1.5	RJ45 Ports, Micro-USB, SFP, SFP/SFP+, Power, LEDs, USB
PA-3220	910-000162, Physical Kit: 920-000212	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, SFP/SFP+ ports, QSFP+ ports, HSCI ports, USB ports, Micro-USB, LED, Power
PA-3250	910-000163, Physical Kit: 920-000212	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, SFP/SFP+ ports, QSFP+ ports, HSCI ports, USB ports, Micro-USB, LED, Power
PA-3260	910-000164, Physical Kit: 920-000212	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, SFP/SFP+ ports, QSFP+ ports, HSCI ports, USB ports, Micro-USB, LED, Power
PA-5220	910-000132, Physical Kit: 920-000186	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, SFP/SFP+, QSFP28 port, QSFP+

			ports, HSCI ports, SFTP+ ports, Power supply, LEDs, USB
PA-5250	910-000131, Physical Kit: 920-000186	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, SFP/SFP+, QSFP28 port, QSFP+ ports, HSCI ports, SFTP+ ports, Power supply, LEDs, USB
PA-5260	910-000125, Physical Kit: 920-000186	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, SFP/SFP+, QSFP28 port, QSFP+ ports, HSCI ports, SFTP+ ports, Power supply, LEDs, USB
PA-5280	910-000157, Physical Kit: 920-000186	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, SFP/SFP+, QSFP28 port, QSFP+ ports, HSCI ports, SFTP+ ports, Power supply, LEDs, USB
PA-5280-K2-EXP	910-000257, Physical Kit: 920-000186	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, SFP/SFP+, QSFP28 port, QSFP+ ports, HSCI ports, SFTP+ ports, Power supply, LEDs, USB
PA-5280-K2-SEC	910-000357, Physical Kit: 920-000186	10.1.5	RJ45 ports, SFP/SFP+, QSFP28 port, QSFP+ ports, HSCI ports, SFTP+ ports, Power supply, LEDs, USB
PA-5450*	910-000223, Physical Kit: 920-000309	10.1.5	Networking cards, Data processing cards, Base cards, Management processor cards, Electrostatic Discharge, LEDs, Logging Drive Corner, USB, Console port, HSCI-A/B, Logging ports, Management Ports, HA ports, Ejector Tabs, RJ45, QSFP28, SFP/SFP+, Ground Studs, Fans, Power
PA-7050**	910-000102, Physical Kit: 920-000112	10.1.5	Networking cards, Log/Data processing cards, Log forwarding cards, Management processor cards, RJ45 ports, SFP ports, SFP+ ports, HSCI ports, QSFP+ ports, Power supply, Power Switch, LEDs, USB
PA-7080**	910-000122, Physical Kit: 920-000119	10.1.5	Networking cards, Log/Data processing cards, Log forwarding cards, Management processor cards, RJ45 ports, SFP+, HSCI, QSFP+, Power Switch, LEDs, USB

\* Palo Alto Networks PA-5450 firewalls are tested with the following cards that can be configured for use in the Approved mode of operation

#### PA-5450 Cards

- Base Card (BC): PA-5400 BC-A P/N: 920-000293
- Management Processor Card (MPC): PA-5400 MPC-A P/N: 910-000195
- Networking Card (NC): PA-5400 NC-A P/N: 910-000194
- Data Processor Card (DPC): PA-5400 DPC-A P/N: 910-000204

\*\*PA-7050/7080 uses the following cards below

#### Network Processing Cards:

- PAN-PA-7000-20GXM-NPC: P/N: 910-000137
- PAN-PA-7000-20GQXM-NPC: P/N: 910-000136
- PAN-PA-7000-100G-NPC-A: P/N: 910-000156
- PAN-PA-7000-100G-NPC-A-K2-EXP: P/N: 910-000256
- PAN-PA-7000-100G-NPC-A-K2-SEC: P/N: 910-000356

#### Log Forwarding Card:

- PAN-PA-7000-LFC-A: P/N: 910-000183

**Log/Data Processing Card:**

- PAN-PA-7000-LPC: P/N: 910-0000014
- PAN-PA-7000-DPC-A: P/N: 910-000169

**Switch Management Cards:**

**PA-7050**

- PAN-PA-7050-SMC-B: P/N: 910-000185
- PAN-PA-7050-SMC-B-K2-EXP: P/N: 910-000285
- PAN-PA-7050-SMC-B-K2-SEC: P/N: 910-000385
- PA-7050-SMC: P/N: 910-000013

**PA-7080**

- PAN-PA-7080-SMC-B: P/N: 910-000186
- PAN-PA-7080-SMC-B-K2-EXP: P/N: 910-000286
- PAN-PA-7080-SMC-B-K2-SEC: P/N: 910-000386
- PA-7080-SMC: P/N: 910-000012

### Approved Mode of Operation

The following procedure will put the modules into the Approved mode of operation:

- Install physical kit opacity shields and tamper evidence seals according to the Physical Security Policy section. FIPS kits must be correctly installed to operate in the Approved mode of operation. The tamper evidence seals and opacity shields shall be installed for the module to operate in the Approved mode of operation.
- During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by pressing the maint button when instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
- Select “Continue.”
- Select the “Set FIPS-CC Mode” option to enter the Approved mode.
- Select “Enable FIPS-CC Mode”.
- When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re-initialize and continue into “FIPS-CC” mode (Approved mode).
- The module will reboot.
- In “FIPS-CC” mode, the console port is available as a status output port.
- Once the module has finished booting, the Crypto Officer can authenticate using the default credentials that come with the module
  - Once authenticated, the module will automatically require the operator to change their password; and the default credential is overwritten

The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:

- Status output interface will indicate “\*\*\*\* FIPS-CC MODE ENABLED \*\*\*\*” via the CLI session.
- Status output interface will indicate “FIPS-CC mode enabled successfully” via the console port.
- The module will display “FIPS-CC” at all times in the status bar at the bottom of the web interface.

Should one or more power-up self-tests fail, the Approved mode of operation will not be achieved. Feedback will consist of:

- The module will output “FIPS-CC failure”
- The module will reboot and enter a state in which the reason for the reboot can be determined.
- To determine which self-test caused the system to reboot into the error state, connect the console cable and follow the on-screen instructions to view the self-test output.

Note: Disabling FIPS-CC mode causes a complete factory reset, which is described in the Zeroization section below.

## Non-Compliant State

Failure to follow the directions in the Approved Mode of Operation above or rules noted in Section 11 will result in the module operating in a non-compliant state, which is considered out of scope of this validation.

## Zeroization

The following procedure will zeroize the module:

- Access the module's CLI via SSH, and command the module to enter maintenance mode; the module will reboot
  - Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
- After reboot, select "Continue."
- Select "Factory Reset"
- The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once complete:
  - "Factory Reset Status: Success"

## Approved and Allowed Algorithms

The following table details the cryptographic algorithms and their algorithm certificates. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes specified in this table are used by the module. The CAVP certificate may contain more tested options than listed in this table.

Table 3 - Approved Algorithms

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s)	Use / Function
A1791	Conditioning Component AES-CBC-MAC SP 800-90B	AES-CBC-MAC	128 bits	Vetted conditioning component for ESV Cert. #E129
A2137	AES-CBC [SP 800-38A]	CBC	128, 192 and 256 bits	Encryption Decryption
A2137	AES-CCM [SP 800-38C]	CCM	128 bits	Encryption Decryption
A2137	AES-CFB128 [SP 800-38A]	CFB128	128 bits	Encryption Decryption
A2137	AES-CTR [SP 800-38A]	CTR	128, 192 and 256 bits	Encryption Decryption
A2137	AES-GCM [SP 800-38D]	GCM**	128 and 256 bits	Encryption Decryption
A2137	Counter DRBG [SP 800-90Arev1]	CTR DRBG	AES 256 bits with Derivation Function Enabled	Random Bit Generator
A2137	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA KeyGen	P-256, P-384, P-521	Key Generation
A2137	ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA KeyVer	P-256, P-384, P-521	Public Key Validation

A2137	ECDSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA SigGen	P-256, P-384, P-521 with SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512	Signature Generation
A2137	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA SigVer	P-256, P-384, P-521 with SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512	Signature Verification
A2137	HMAC-SHA-1 [FIPS 198-1]	HMAC	HMAC-SHA-1 with $\lambda=160$	Authentication for protocols
A2137	HMAC-SHA2-224 [FIPS 198-1]	HMAC	HMAC-SHA2-224 with $\lambda=224$	Authentication for protocols
A2137	HMAC-SHA2-256 [FIPS 198-1]	HMAC	HMAC-SHA2-256 with $\lambda=256$	Authentication for protocols
A2137	HMAC-SHA2-384 [FIPS 198-1]	HMAC	HMAC-SHA2-384 with $\lambda=384$	Authentication for protocols
A2137	HMAC-SHA2-512 [FIPS 198-1]	HMAC	HMAC-SHA2-512 with $\lambda=512$	Authentication for protocols
A2137	KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	KAS	P-256/P-384/P-521	Key Exchange
A2137	KAS-FFC-SSC SP 800-56Ar3	KAS	MODP-2048	Key Exchange
A2137	KDF IKEv2 [SP 800-135rev1] (CVL)	IKEv2 KDF	SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	IKEv2
A2137	KDF SNMP [SP 800-135rev1] (CVL)	SNMPv3 KDF	Engine ID: 80001F880430303030303439353236 30	SNMPv3
A2137	KDF SSH [SP 800-135rev1] (CVL)	SSHv2 KDF	SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-512	SSH
A2137	KDF TLS [SP 800-135rev1] (CVL)	TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS1.2 KDF	TLS v1.0/1.1 TLS v1.2 Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256, SHA2-384	TLS
A2137	RSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4)	RSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4)	2048, 3072, and 4096 bits	Key Pair Generation
A2137	RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	(ANSI X9.31, RSASSA-PKCS1_v1-5, RSASSA-PSS): 2048, 3072, and 4096-bit with hashes SHA2-256/384/512	Signature Generation
A2137	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	(ANSI X9.31, RSASSA-PKCS1_v1-5, RSASSA-PSS): 2048, 3072, 4096-bit (per IG C.F) with hashes SHA-1 and SHA2-224+++/256/384/512 (Signature Verification)  +++ This Hash algorithm is not supported for ANSI X9.31	Signature Verification
A2137	SHA-1 [FIPS 180-4]	SHA	SHA-1	Digital Signature Verification  Non-Digital Signature Applications (e.g. component of HMAC)
A2137	SHA2-224 [FIPS 180-4]	SHA2	SHA-224	Digital Signature Generation/Verification  Non-Digital Signature Applications (e.g. component of HMAC)
A2137	SHA2-256 [FIPS 180-4]	SHA2	SHA-256	Digital Signature Generation/Verification  Non-Digital Signature Applications (e.g. component of HMAC)

A2137	SHA2-384 [FIPS 180-4]	SHA2	SHA-384	Digital Signature Generation/Verification Non-Digital Signature Applications (e.g. component of HMAC)
A2137	SHA2-512 [FIPS 180-4]	SHA2	SHA-512	Digital Signature Generation/Verification Non-Digital Signature Applications (e.g. component of HMAC)
A2137	Safe Primes Key Generation [RFC 3526]	Safe Primes Key Generation	MODP-2048	Safe Primes Key Generation
A2137	Safe Primes Key Verification [RFC 3526]	Safe Primes Key Verification	MODP-2048	Safe Primes Key Verification
A2138	Conditioning Component AES-CBC-MAC SP 800-90B	AES-CBC-MAC	128 bits	Vetted conditioning component for ESV Cert. #E129
A2153	Conditioning Component AES-CBC-MAC SP 800-90B	AES-CBC-MAC	128 bits	Vetted conditioning component for ESV Cert. #E129
A2165	Conditioning Component AES-CBC-MAC SP 800-90B	AES-CBC-MAC	128 bits	Vetted conditioning component for ESV Cert. #E129
AES Cert. #A2137 and HMAC Cert. #A2137	KTS [SP 800-38F]	SP 800-38A, FIPS 198-1, and SP 800-38F. KTS (key wrapping and unwrapping) per IG D.G.	128, 192, and 256-bit keys providing 128, 192, or 256 bits of encryption strength	Key Wrapping. AES-CBC or AES-CTR with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, or HMAC-SHA2-512
AES-CCM Cert. #A2137	KTS [SP 800-38F]	SP 800-38C and SP 800-38F. KTS (key wrapping and unwrapping) per IG D.G.	128-bit keys providing 128 bits of encryption strength	Key Wrapping. AES-CCM.
AES-GCM Cert. #A2137	KTS [SP 800-38F]	SP 800-38D and SP 800-38F. KTS (key wrapping and unwrapping) per IG D.G.	128 and 256-bit keys providing 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength	Key Wrapping. AES-GCM
ESV Cert. #128	SP 800-90B	ESV	Octeon III Entropy Source	Entropy
ESV Cert. #129	SP 800-90B	ESV	Palo Alto Networks DRNG RDSEED Entropy Source	Entropy
KAS-ECC-S SC Cert. #A2137, KDF IKEv2 Cert. #A2137	KAS [SP 800-56Arev3]	SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-ECC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2).	P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves providing 128, 192, or 256 bits of encryption strength	Key Exchange with protocol KDF
KAS-ECC-S SC Cert. #A2137, KDF SSH Cert. #A2137	KAS [SP 800-56Arev3]	SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-ECC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2).	P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves providing 128, 192, or 256 bits of encryption strength	Key Exchange with protocol KDF
KAS-ECC-S SC Cert. #A2137,	KAS [SP 800-56Arev3]	SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-ECC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2).	P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves providing 128, 192, or 256 bits of encryption strength	Key Exchange with protocol KDF

KDF TLS Cert. #A2137				
KAS-FFC-S SC Cert. #A2137, KDF IKEv2 Cert. #A2137	KAS [SP 800-56Rev3]	SP 800-56Rev3. KAS-FFC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2).	2048-bit key providing 112 bits of encryption strength	Key Exchange with protocol KDF
KAS-FFC-S SC Cert. #A2137, KDF SSH Cert. #A2137	KAS [SP 800-56Rev3]	SP 800-56Rev3. KAS-FFC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2).	2048-bit key providing 112 bits of encryption strength	Key Exchange with protocol KDF
KAS-FFC-S SC Cert. #A2137, KDF TLS Cert. #A2137	KAS [SP 800-56Rev3]	SP 800-56Rev3. KAS-FFC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2).	2048-bit key providing 112 bits of encryption strength	Key Exchange with protocol KDF
Vendor Affirmed	CKG (SP 800-133rev2)	Section 5.1, Section 5.2, and Section 6.1	Cryptographic Key Generation; SP 800-133 and IG D.H (symmetric keys and asymmetric seeds).	Key Generation  Note: The symmetric keys and seeds used for asymmetric key pair generation are produced using the unmodified/direct output of the DRBG

The module is compliant to IG C.H: GCM is used in the context of TLS, IPsec/IKEv2, SSH:

- For TLS, the GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with SP 800-52 and in accordance with Section 4 of RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment, and ensures when the nonce\_explicit part of the IV exhausts all possible values for a given session key, that a new TLS handshake is initiated per sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 of RFC 5246. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly
  - From this RFC, the GCM cipher suites in use are  
TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256,  
TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384,  
TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256, and  
TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384.
- For IPsec/IKEv2, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a manner compliant with RFCs 4106 and 7296 (RFC 5282 is not applicable, as the module does not use GCM within IKEv2 itself). During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of IPsec with IKEv2 and found to behave correctly.
- For SSH, the module meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H. The module conforms to RFCs 4252, 4253, and 5647. The fixed field is 32 bits in length and is derived using the SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique for any given GCM session. The invocation field is 64 bits in length and is incremented for each invocation of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the entire invocation field space of  $2^{64}$  is exhausted. (It would take hundreds of years for this to occur.)

In all of the above cases, the nonce\_explicit is always generated deterministically. AES GCM keys are zeroized when the module is power-cycled. For each new TLS or SSH session, a new AES GCM key is established.

The module is compliant to IG C.F:

The module utilizes Approved modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for RSA signatures. This functionality has been CAVP tested as noted above. The minimum number of Miller Rabin tests for each modulus size is implemented according to Table C.2 of FIPS 186-4. For modulus size 4096, the module implements the largest number of Miller-Rabin tests shown in Table C.2. RSA SigVer is CAVP tested for all three supported modulus sizes as noted above. The module does not perform FIPS 186-2 SigVer. All supported modulus sizes are CAVP testable and tested as noted above. The module does not implement RSA key transport in the approved mode.

The module does not have any algorithms that fall under:

- Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
- Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation

The following table documents the module's algorithms that are non-approved and not allowed for use in the approved mode of operation.

Table 4 - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed

Algorithm	Caveat	Use / Function
MD5	Only allowed as the PRF in TLSv1.1 per IG 2.4.A	Message digest used in TLSv1.0 / v1.1 KDF only


Table 5 - Supported Protocols in the Approved Mode

TLSv1.1, v1.2
SSHv2
IPSec and IKEv2
SNMPv3

Note: These protocols were not reviewed or tested by the CMVP or CAVP.


### Module Diagrams

Figure 1 depicts the logical block diagram for the modules. The cryptographic boundary includes the physical perimeter of the enclosure of the appliance with the physical kit installed and all logical components within.




*Figure 1 - Logical Diagram*

Figures 2 - 24 depict the modules and their interfaces. Please refer to the appendices for depictions of the modules with the physical kits installed.



*Figure 2 - PA-220 Front Interfaces*



*Figure 3 - PA-220 Rear Interfaces*




Figure 4 - PA-220R Front Interfaces



Figure 5 - PA-220R Rear Interfaces




Figure 6 - PA-820 / PA-850 Front Interfaces




Figure 7 - PA-820 Rear Interfaces




Figure 8 - PA-850 Rear Interfaces




Figure 9 - PA-3200 Series Front Interfaces




Figure 10 - PA-3200 Series Rear Interfaces




Figure 11 - PA-5200 Series Front Interfaces




Figure 12 - PA-5200 Rear Interfaces




Figure 13 - PA-7050 Front Interfaces




Figure 14 - PA-7050 Back Interfaces




Figure 15 - PA-7080 Front (on Left) and Back (on Right) Interfaces




Figure 16 - PA-410 Front Interfaces




Figure 17 - PA-410 Rear Interfaces




Figure 18 - PA-400 Front Interfaces (PA-440/450/460 front panels are identical)




Figure 19 - PA-400 Rear Interfaces (PA-440/450/460 rear panels are identical)




Figure 20 - PA-5450 Front Interfaces




Figure 21 - PA-5450 Management Processor Card




Figure 22 - PA-5450 Networking Card




Figure 23 - PA-5450 Data Processing Card




Figure 24 - PA-5450 Rear Interfaces

### 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces

The modules are multi-chip standalone modules with ports and interfaces as shown below. The modules do not implement a control output interface.

Table 6 - Ports and Interfaces<sup>1</sup>

Physical Interface	Logical Interface	Data that passes over port/interface
HSCI (PA-3200 Series, PA-5200 Series, PA-5450, PA-7000 Series)	Data input, control input, data output, status output	SSH
LED	Status output	Module status via LED indicators
Micro USB Console (PA-220, PA-220R, PA-800 Series, PA-3200 Series,	Status output	Self-test output

<sup>1</sup> Interfaces depicted in Figures 2-25 above, but not listed in this table are disabled or do not transfer any data.

PA-440/PA-450/PA-460, PA-5450, PA-7050, PA-7080)		
Power	Power	N/A
Power switch (PA-7000 Series)	Control input	Power input switch
QSFP+ (PA-3260, PA-5250, PA-5260, PA-5280, PA-7000 Series)	Data input, control input, data output, status output	TLS, IPsec, or SSH
QSFP28 (PA-5200 Series, PA-5450, PA-7000 Series)	Data input, control input, data output, status output	TLS, IPsec, or SSH
RJ45 Console	Status output	Self-test output
RJ45 Ethernet	Data input, control input, data output, status output	TLS, IPsec
RJ45 HA (PA-3200 Series, PA-5200 Series, PA-5450, PA-7050, PA-7080)	Data input, control input, data output, status output	SSH
RJ45 Log (PA-5450)	Data input, control input, data output, status output	TLS, IPsec
RJ45 MGT (PA-400 Series, PA-3200 Series, PA-440/PA-450/PA-460, PA-5450, PA-7000 Series)	Data input, control input, data output, status output	TLS, SSH
SFP (PA-220R, PA-800 Series, PA-3200 Series, PA-5200 Series, PA-7000 Series)	Data input, control input, data output, status output	TLS, IPsec, or SSH
SFP+ (PA-800 Series, PA-3200 Series, PA-5200 Series, PA-5450, PA-7050, PA-7080)	Data input, control input, data output, status output	TLS, IPsec, or SSH

## 4. Roles, Services, and Authentication

### Services

While in the Approved mode of operation, all CO and User services are accessed via SSH or TLS sessions. Approved and allowed algorithms, relevant CSPs, and public keys related to these protocols are accessed to support the following services. CSP access by services is further described in the following tables.

Table 7 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output

Role	Service	Input	Output
Crypto Officer	Show Version	Query module for version	Module provides version
Crypto Officer, User	Security Configuration Management	Configuring and managing cryptographic parameters and setting/modifying security policy, including creating User accounts and additional CO accounts via CLI or WebUI	Confirmation of service via Configuration Logs
Crypto Officer	Other Configuration	Networking parameter configuration, logging configuration, and other non-security relevant configuration via CLI or WebUI	Confirmation of service via Configuration Logs
Crypto Officer, User	View Other Configuration	Query module for current non-security relevant configuration via WebUI or CLI	Confirmation of service via Configuration Logs
Crypto Officer, User, RA VPN, S-S VPN	Show Status	Query status of the module via WebUI or CLI	Module status information via CLI or System Logs
RA VPN, S-S VPN	VPN	Initialize VPN connection	Confirmation of service via System Logs
Crypto Officer	Firmware Update	Loading new image	Message output noting version updated successfully
Unauthenticated	Zeroize	Initiate zeroization command	Console Output
Unauthenticated	Self-Tests	Power removal	Console Output
Unauthenticated	Show Status (LEDs)	N/A	LEDs

#### Assumption of Roles

The modules support four distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO), Remote Access VPN, and Site-to-site VPN. The cryptographic modules enforce the separation of roles using unique authentication credentials associated with operator accounts. The modules support concurrent operators.

The modules do not provide a maintenance role or bypass capability.

The modules all support the use of a password (i.e. Memorized Secret as per SP 800-140E). Upon first boot, the module requires that the Cryptographic Officer change the password from the default one to a custom one. The module automatically enforces a minimum password length of at least 8 characters. In FIPS-CC mode, the module automatically enforces a maximum of 10 failed attempts. Passwords stored in the module are hashed using SHA-256, and any passwords that are transported into/out of the module are protected via TLS 1.2.

Table 8 - Roles and Authentication

Role	Authentication Method	Authentication Strength
Cryptographic Officer	Memorized Secret (Unique Username/password) and/or Single-Factor Cryptographic Software (certificate common name / public key-based authentication)	<p><u>Password-based</u></p> <p>The minimum length is eight (8) characters<sup>2</sup> (95 possible characters). The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is <math>1/(95^8)</math> which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is <math>10/(95^8)</math>, which is less than 1/100,000. The firewall's configuration supports at most ten failed attempts to authenticate in a one-minute period.</p>
User	Memorized Secret (Unique Username/password) and/or Single-Factor Cryptographic Software (certificate common name / public key-based authentication)	<p><u>Certificate/Public key-based</u></p> <p>The security modules support public-key based authentication using RSA 2048 and certificate-based authentication using RSA 2048, RSA 3072, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, P-384, or P-521.</p>
Remote Access VPN (RA VPN)	Memorized Secret (Unique Username/password) and/or Single-Factor Cryptographic Software (certificate common name / public key-based authentication)	<p>The minimum equivalent strength supported is 112 bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is <math>1/(2^{112})</math> which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is <math>288,000,000/(2^{112})</math>, which is less than 1/100,000. The firewall supports at most 4,800,000 new sessions per second.</p>
Site-to-Site VPN (S-S VPN)	IKE/IPSec Pre-shared keys - Identification with the IP Address and authentication with the Pre-Shared Key or certificate based authentication	<p>The pre-shared key authentication method has a minimum security strength<sup>3</sup> of 95<sup>6</sup>. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module is <math>1/(95^6)</math>, which is less than 1/1,000,000. The number of authentication attempts is limited by the number of new connections per second supported (4,800,000) on the fastest platform of the Palo Alto Networks firewalls. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is <math>288,000,000/(95^6)</math>, which is less than 1/100,000.</p> <p>The security modules support public-key based authentication using RSA 2048 and certificate-based authentication using RSA 2048, RSA 3072, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, P-384, or P-521.</p> <p>The minimum equivalent strength supported is 112 bits. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is <math>1/(2^{112})</math> which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is <math>288,000,000/(2^{112})</math>, which is less than 1/100,000. The fastest firewall supports at most 288,000,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period.</p>

<sup>2</sup> In FIPS-CC Mode, the module checks and enforces the minimum password length of eight (8) as specified in SP 800-63B. Passwords are securely stored hashed with salt value, with very restricted access control, and rate limiting mechanism for authentication attempts.

<sup>3</sup> Note: The security strength (95<sup>6</sup>) is based on the use of ASCII characters that are utilized, which surpasses the 6 character random number password allowance that sets a baseline minimum acceptable strength of 10<sup>6</sup>.

## CSP Access Rights

The table below defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:

**G = Generate:** The module generates or derives the SSP.

**R = Read:** The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).

**W = Write:** The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.

**E = Execute:** The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.

**Z = Zeroise:** The module zeroeses the SSP.

Table 9 - Approved Services

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs	Indicator
Show Version	Query the module to display the version	N/A	N/A	CO	N/A	Version displayed via System Logs / CLI / UI
Security Configuration Management	Configuring and managing cryptographic parameters and setting/modifying security policy, including creating User accounts and additional CO accounts	CKG RSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4) RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	RSA Private Keys	CO	G/W/E	Configuration/System Logs
		CKG ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA Private Keys	CO	G/W/E	Configuration/System Logs
		KAS KDF TLS, MD5	TLS Pre-Master Secret	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		KDF TLS, MD5	TLS Master Secret	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		CKG, ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS 186-4), KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC, Safe Primes Key Generation, Safe Primes Key Verification	TLS DHE/ECDHE Private Components TLS DHE/ECDHE Public Components	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		AES-CBC AES-GCM	TLS HMAC Keys		G/E/R/W/Z	
		KTS HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-384	TLS Encryption Keys	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		KTS HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-512	SSH Session Authentication Keys	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		AES-CBC, AES-CTR	SSH Session Encryption Keys	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		KTS AES-GCM				
		KAS KDF SSH KAS-ECC-SSC KAS-FFC-SSC Safe Primes Key Generation, Safe Primes	SSH DHE/ECDHE Private Components SSH DHE/ECDHE Public Components	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs

		Key Verification					
	N/A	CO, User, RA VPN Password	CO	G/E/W	Configuration/System Logs		
	Counter DRBG	Entropy Input String DRBG Seed DRBG V DRBG Key	CO	G/E	Configuration/System Logs		
	KDF SNMP	SNMPv3 Authentication Secret	CO	W/E	Configuration/System Logs		
	KDF SNMP	SNMPv3 Privacy Secret	CO	W/E	Configuration/System Logs		
	HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-224 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-384 HMAC-SHA2-512	Authentication Key	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs		
	AES-CFB	Session Key	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs		
	N/A	Protocol Secrets	CO	W/E	Configuration/System Logs		
	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	CA Certificates	CO	G/R/E/W	Configuration/System Logs		
	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA Public Keys	CO	G/R/E/W	Configuration/System Logs		
	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	RSA Public Keys	CO	G/R/E/W	Configuration/System Logs		
	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	SSH Host Public Key	CO	G/R/E/W	Configuration/System Logs		
	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	SSH Client Public Key	CO	W/E	Configuration/System Logs		
	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	Public key for Firmware load test	CO	W/E	Configuration/System Logs		
Other Configuration	Networking parameter configuration, logging configuration, and other non-security relevant configuration	RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	RSA Private Keys	CO	G/W/E	Configuration/System Logs	
		ECDSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA Private Keys	CO	G/W/E	Configuration/System Logs	
		KAS	KDF TLS, MD5	TLS Pre-Master Secret	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
			KDF TLS, MD5	TLS Master Secret	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
			CKG, ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS 186-4), KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC, Safe Primes Key Generation, Safe Primes Key Verification	TLS DHE/ECDHE Private Components	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
				TLS DHE/ECDHE Public Components		G/E/R/W/Z	
			HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-384	TLS HMAC Keys	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
			AES-CBC or AES-GCM	TLS Encryption Keys	CO	G/E/Z G/Z	Configuration/System Logs
			HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-512	SSH Session Authentication Keys	CO		Configuration/System Logs
			AES-CBC, AES-CTR, or AES-GCM	SSH Session Encryption Keys	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		KAS	KDF SSH	SSH DHE/ECDHE Private Components	CO	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
			CKG, ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS 186-4),			G/E/R/W/Z	

		KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC, Safe Primes Key Generation, Safe Primes Key Verification	SSH DHE/ECDHE Public Components			
		N/A	CO, User, RA VPN Password	CO	G/E/W	Configuration/System Logs
		RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	CA Certificates	CO	G/R/E/W	Configuration/System Logs
		ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA Public Keys	CO	G/R/E/W	Configuration/System Logs
		RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	RSA Public Keys	CO	G/R/E/W	Configuration/System Logs
		RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	SSH Host Public Key	CO	G/R/E/W	Configuration/System Logs
		RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	SSH Client Public Key	CO	W/E	Configuration/System Logs
		Counter DRBG	DRBG Seed	CO	G/E	Configuration/System Logs
			DRBG V			
			DRBG Key			
			Entropy Input String			
View Other Configuration	Read-only of non-security relevant configuration	N/A	CO, User, RA VPN Password  Note: includes all items in "Other Configuration"	CO, User	W/E	Configuration/System Logs
Show Status	Provides status information of the module	RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	RSA Private Keys	CO, User	E	Configuration/System Logs
		ECDSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA Private Keys	CO, User	E	Configuration/System Logs
		KAS  KDF TLS, MD5  KDF TLS, MD5  CKG, ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS 186-4), KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC, Safe Primes Key Generation, Safe Primes Key Verification	TLS Pre-Master Secret	CO, User	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
			TLS Master Secret	CO, User	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
			TLS DHE/ECDHE Private Components	CO, User	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
			TLS DHE/ECDHE Public Components		G/E/R/W/Z	
		HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-384	TLS HMAC Keys	CO, User	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		AES-CBC or AES-GCM	TLS Encryption Keys	CO, User	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-512	SSH Session Authentication Keys	CO, User	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		AES-CBC, AES-CTR, or AES-GCM	SSH Session Encryption Keys	CO, User	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs

		KAS	KDF SSH CKG, ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS 186-4), KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC, Safe Primes Key Generation, Safe Primes Key Verification	SSH DHE Public/Private Components SSH ECDHE Public/Private Components	CO, User	G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		Counter DRBG		DRBG Seed DRBG V DRBG Key Entropy Input String		G/E	
VPN	Provide network access for remote users or site-to-site connection			S-S VPN IPSec/IKE Authentication Keys	S-S VPN	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
	KTS	HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-384 HMAC-SHA2-512	S-S VPN IPSec/IKE Session Keys	G/E/Z			
	KTS	AES-CBC	S-S VPN IPSec/IKE DHE/ECDHE Private Components	S-S VPN	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs	
	KTS	AES-CCM					
	KTS	AES-GCM					
	KAS	KDF IKEv2		S-S VPN IPSec/IKE DHE/ECDHE Public Components	G/E/Z G/E/R/W/Z	Configuration/System Logs	
		CKG, ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS 186-4), KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC, Safe Primes Key Generation, Safe Primes Key Verification					
		N/A	S-S VPN IPSec Pre-Shared Keys	S-S VPN	W/E	Configuration/System Logs	
		ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA Public Keys	S-S VPN	W/E	Configuration/System Logs	
		RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	RSA Public Keys	S-S VPN	W/E	Configuration/System Logs	
		RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	RSA Private Keys	RA VPN	E	Configuration/System Logs	
		ECDSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA Private Keys	RA VPN	E	Configuration/System Logs	
		KAS	KDF TLS, MD5	TLS Pre-Master Secret	G/E/Z G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs	
		KDF TLS, MD5	TLS Master Secret				
		CKG, ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS 186-4), KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC, Safe Primes Key Generation,	CKG, ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4), ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS 186-4), KAS-ECC-SSC, KAS-FFC-SSC, Safe Primes Key Generation,	TLS DHE/ECDHE Public Components TLS DHE/ECDHE Private Components	RA VPN	G/E/R/W/Z G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs Configuration/System Logs

		Safe Primes Key Verification				
	KTS	HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2- 256 HMAC-SHA2- 384	TLS HMAC Keys	RA VPN	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
		AES-CBC	TLS Encryption Keys	RA VPN	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs
	KTS	AES-GCM				
	CKG, AES-CBC or AES-GCM	RA VPN IPSec Session Keys	RA VPN	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs	
	CKG, HMAC-SHA-1	RA VPN IPSec Authentication	RA VPN	G/E/Z	Configuration/System Logs	
	Counter DRBG	Entropy Input String	RA VPNRA VPN	G/E	Configuration/System Logs	
		DRBG Seed	RA VPN	G/E	Configuration/System Logs	
		DRBG V	RA VPN	G/E	Configuration/System Logs	
		DRBG Key				
	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	CA Certificates	RA VPN	W/E	Configuration/System Logs	
	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	ECDSA Public Keys	RA VPN	W/E	Configuration/System Logs	
	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	RSA Public Keys	RA VPN	W/E	Configuration/System Logs	
Firmware Update	Provides a method to update the firmware of the module	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	Public key for firmware content load test  Note: Includes all keys from Other Configuration	CO	E	Configuration/System Logs
Zeroize	Destroys all keys in the module	N/A	All keys and SSPs	CO	Z	Zeroization indicator
Self-Test	Initiates self-tests and integrity test	HMAC-SHA2-256, ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)	Software integrity verification key	CO	E	System Logs
Show Status	Provides status of the module	N/A	N/A	All	R	LEDs

Note: Configuration/System Logs for Approved services above will indicate FIPS-CC mode is enabled, configuration requirements from Section 11 are followed, and that the service succeeded.

## 5. Software/Firmware Security

The module performs the Firmware Integrity test by using HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA signature verification (HMAC and ECDSA Cert. #A2137) during the Pre-Operational Self-Test. In addition, the module also conducts the firmware load test by using RSA 2048 with SHA-256 (Cert. #A2137) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module via the Firmware Update service. The Firmware Integrity Verification key and Public key for Firmware Content Load Test used for the Firmware Integrity and Firmware Load test, respectively, are generated externally and delivered as part of the module firmware image.

The pre-operational self-tests can be initiated by power cycling the module. When this is performed, the module automatically runs the cryptographic algorithm self-tests in addition to the pre-operational firmware integrity test.

The module's executable code is in the form of the compiled firmware image loaded onto the module.

## 6. Operational Environment

The FIPS 140-3 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the module does not contain a modifiable operational environment. The operational environment is limited since the modules include a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into these modules is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.

## 7. Physical Security

The multi-chip standalone modules are production quality containing standard passivation. Chip components are protected by an opaque enclosure. There are tamper evident seals that are applied on the modules by the Crypto-Officer. All unused seals are to be controlled by the Crypto-Officer. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without evidence. The Crypto-Officer must ensure that the module surface is clean and dry. Tamper evident seals must be pressed firmly onto the adhering surfaces during installation and once applied the Crypto-Officer shall permit 24 hours of cure time for all tamper-evident seals. The Crypto-Officer should inspect the seals and shields for evidence of tamper every 30 days. If the seals show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the modules have been compromised and contact Customer Support.

Note: For ordering information, see tables in Cryptographic Module Specification for Kit part numbers and versions. Opacity shields and Tamper Seals are included for the kits.

*Table 10 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines*

Physical Security Mechanisms	Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test	Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper-Evident Seals (PA-7080, PA-7050, PA-5220, PA-5250, PA-5260, PA-5280, PA-3220, PA-3250, PA-3260, PA-820, PA-850, PA-220R, PA-220, PA-410/440/450/460, PA-5450)	30 days	Verify integrity of tamper-evident seals in the locations identified in the FIPS Kit Installation Guide. Seal integrity to be verified within the modules operating temperature range.
Top, Bottom, Front and Rear Opacity Shields (PA-7050 PA-5450)	30 days	Verify that the plenums and opacity shields have not been deformed from their original shape, thereby reducing their effectiveness
Front and Rear Covers (PA-3220, PA-3250, PA-3260)	30 days	Verify that front and rear covers have not been deformed from their original shape, thereby reducing their effectiveness
Front Cover (PA-7080, PA-5450)	30 days	Verify that front cover has not been deformed from its original shape thereby reducing its effectiveness
Front cover and Cage Enclosure (PA-220)	30 days	Verify that front cover and cage enclosure have not been deformed from their original shape, thereby reducing their effectiveness

## 8. Non-Invasive Security

No approved non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics are defined at this time.

## 9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management

The following table details all the sensitive security parameters utilized by the module.

"TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted" corresponds to the following KTS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table:

- AES Cert. #A2137, HMAC Cert. #A2137
- AES-GCM Cert. #A2137

"IPSec/IKE, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3" corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table:

- KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF IKEv2 Cert. #A2137
- KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF IKEv2 Cert. #A2137

"SSH, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3" corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table:

- KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF SSH Cert. #A2137
- KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF SSH Cert. #A2137

"TLS, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3" corresponds to the following KAS entries listed in the Approved Algorithms table:

- KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF TLS Cert. #A2137
- KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2137, KDF TLS Cert. #A2137

Table 11 - SSPs

Key/SSP/Name/Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import/Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroization	Use & Related Keys
CA Certificates	112 - 256 bits	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)  Cert. #A2137	DRBG, FIPS 186-4	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	HDD – Zeroize Service RAM - Zeroize at session termination	ECDSA/RSA Public key - Used to trust a root CA intermediate CA and leaf /end entity certificates (RSA 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits) (ECDSA P-256, P-384, and P-521)
RSA Public Keys	112 - 150 bits	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) Cert. #A2137	DRBG, FIPS 186-4	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted or Plaintext TLS handshake	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	Zeroize Service	RSA public keys managed as certificates for the verification of signatures, establishment of TLS, operator authentication and peer authentication. (RSA 2048, 3072, or 4096-bit)

RSA Private Keys	112 - 150 bits	RSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4) Cert. #A2137	DRBG, FIPS 186-4	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	HDD – Zeroize Service RAM - Zeroize at session termination	RSA Private keys for generation of signatures, authentication or key establishment. (RSA 2048, 3072, or 4096-bit)
ECDSA Public Keys	128 - 256 bits	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) Cert. #A2137	DRBG, FIPS 186-4	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted or Plaintext TLS handshake	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	Zeroize Service	ECDSA public keys managed as certificates for the verification of signatures, establishment of TLS, operator authentication and peer authentication. (ECDSA P-256, P-384, or P-521)
ECDSA Private Keys	128 - 256 bits	ECDSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4) Cert. #A2137	DRBG, FIPS 186-4	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	HDD – Zeroize Service RAM - Zeroize at session termination	ECDSA Private key for generation of signatures and authentication (P-256, P-384, or P-521)
TLS DHE/ECDHE Private Components	128 - 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SS C KAS-FFC-SS C Cert. #A2137	DRBG, SP 800-56A Rev. 3	N/A	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private FFC or EC component used in TLS (DHE 2048, ECDHE P-256, P-384, P-521)
TLS DHE/ECDHE Public Components	128 - 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SS C KAS-FFC-SS C Cert. #A2137	DRBG, SP 800-56A Rev. 3	Plaintext - TLS handshake	N/A	N/A	Zeroize at session termination	Diffie_Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral values used in key agreement (DHE 2048, ECDHE P-256, P-384, P-521)
TLS Pre-Master Secret	112 bits minimum	KDF TLS Cert. #A2137, MD5 (No Security Claimed)	KAS-ECC-SS C or KAS-FFC-SS C, SP 800-56A Rev. 3	N/A	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	Secret value used to derive the TLS Master Secret along with client and server random nonces
TLS Master Secret	384 bits	KDF TLS Cert. #A2137, MD5 (No Security Claimed)	KDF TLS	N/A	N/A	RAM – plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	Secret value used to derive the TLS session keys
TLS Encryption Keys	128 or 256 bits	AES-CBC or AES-GCM Cert. #A2137	KDF TLS	N/A	TLS, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	AES (128 or 256 bit) keys used in TLS connections (GCM; CBC)
TLS HMAC Keys	160 - 256 bits	HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-384 Cert. #A2137	KDF TLS	N/A	TLS, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	HMAC keys used in TLS connections (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256/384) (160, 256, 384 bits)
SSH DHE/ECDHE Private Components	112 - 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SS C KAS-FFC-SS C Cert. #A2137	DRBG, SP 800-56A Rev. 3	N/A	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	Diffie Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman private (DH Group 14, ECDH P-256, ECDH P-384, ECDH P-521)
SSH DHE/ECDHE Public Components	112 - 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SS C	DRBG, SP 800-56A Rev. 3	Plaintext SSH handshake	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	Diffie Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman public component

		KAS-FFC-SS C Cert. #A2137						(DH Group 14, ECDH P-256, ECDH P-384, ECDH P-521)
SSH Host Public Key	112 - 256 bits	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4)  Cert. #A2137	DRBG, FIPS 186-4	N/A	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	Zeroize Service	SSH Host Public Key (RSA 2048, RSA 3072, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, P-384, or P-521)
SSH Client Public Key	112 - 150 bits	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) Cert. #A2137	N/A	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	Zeroize Service	Public RSA key used to authenticate client. (RSA 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits)
SSH Session Encryption Keys	128 - 256 bits	AES-CBC, AES-CTR, or AES-GCM Cert. #A2137	KDF SSH	N/A	SSH, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	Used in all SSH connections to the security module's command line interface. (128, 192, or 256 bits: AES CBC or CTR) (128 or 256 bits: AES GCM)
SSH Session Authentication Keys	160 - 256 bits	HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-512 Cert. #A2137	KDF SSH	N/A	SSH, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	Authentication keys used in all SSH connections to the security module's command line interface (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-512) (160, 256, 512 bits)
S-S VPN IPSec/IKE DHE or ECDHE Private Components	112 - 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SS C KAS-FFC-SS C Cert. #A2137	DRBG, SP 800-56A Rev. 3	N/A	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Power cycle	Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman private component used in key establishment (DHE 2048, ECDHE P-256, P-384)
S-S VPN IPSec/IKE DHE or ECDHE Public Components	112 - 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SS C KAS-FFC-SS C Cert. #A2137	DRBG, SP 800-56A Rev. 3	N/A	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Power cycle	Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman public component used in key agreement (DHE 2048, ECDHE P-256, P-384)
S-S VPN IPSec/IKE Session Keys	128 - 256 bits	AES-CBC, AES-CCM, AES-GCM Cert. #A2137	KDF IKEv2	N/A	IPSec/IKE, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	Used to encrypt IKE/IPSec data. These are AES (128, 192, or 256 CBC) IKE keys and (128, 192 or 256 CBC, 128 CCM, 128 or 256 GCM) IPSec keys
S-S VPN IPSec/IKE Authentication Keys	160 - 256 bits	HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-384 HMAC-SHA2-512 Cert. #A2137	KDF IKEv2	N/A	IPSec/IKE, KAS SP 800-56A Rev. 3	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	(HMAC-SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512) Used to authenticate the peer in an IKE/IPSec tunnel connection. (160, 256, 384, 512 bits)

S-S VPN IPSec Pre-Shared Keys	N/A	N/A	N/A	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	Zeroize Service	PSK used in conjunction with HMAC listed above for authentication. Entered into the module by the Crypto Officer once authenticated
RA VPN IPSec Session Keys	128 or 256 bits	AES-CBC or AES-GCM Cert. #A2137	CKG, DRBG	N/A	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	Used to encrypt remote access sessions utilizing IPSec. (AES 128-CBC, 128/256-GCM)
RA VPN IPSec Authentication	160 bits	HMAC-SHA-1 Cert. #A2137	CKG, DRBG	N/A	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Zeroize at session termination	(HMAC-SHA-1, 160 bits) Used in authentication of remote access IPSec data.
Firmware integrity verification key	128 bits	HMAC-SHA2 -256, ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) Cert. #A2137	Factory preload	Import only, TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD - plaintext	N/A	Used to check the integrity of all software code (HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256)
Public key for firmware content load test	112 bits	RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) Cert. #A2137	Factory preload	Import only, TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD - plaintext	N/A	Used to authenticate firmware and content to be installed on the firewall (RSA 2048 with SHA-256)
CO, User, RA VPN Password	N/A	SHA2-256 Cert. #A2137	External	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD - a password hash (SHA2-256)	Zeroize Service	Authentication string with a minimum length of eight (8) characters.
Protocol Secrets	N/A	N/A	External	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	Zeroize Service	Secrets used by RADIUS or TACACS+ (8 characters minimum)
Entropy Input String	194 bits	CKG (vendor affirmed), Counter DRBG Cert. #A2137	Entropy as per SP 800-90B	N/A	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Power cycle	Entropy input string coming from the entropy source Input length = 384 bits
DRBG Seed	194 bits	CKG (vendor affirmed), Counter DRBG Cert. #A2137	Entropy as per SP 800-90B	N/A	N/A	RAM - Plaintext	Power cycle	DRBG seed coming from the entropy source Seed length = 384 bits
DRBG Key	256 bits	CKG (vendor affirmed), Counter DRBG Cert. #A2137	Entropy as per SP 800-90B	N/A	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Power cycle	AES 256 CTR DRBG state Key used in the generation of a random values
DRBG V	128 bits	CKG (vendor affirmed), Counter DRBG	Entropy as per SP 800-90B	N/A	N/A	RAM - plaintext	Power cycle	AES 256 CTR DRBG state V used in the generation of a random values

		Cert. #A2137						
SNMPv3 Authentication Secret	N/A	KDF SNMP Cert. #A2137	N/A	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	Zeroize Service	Used to support SNMPv3 services (Minimum 8 characters)
SNMPv3 Privacy Secret	N/A	KDF SNMP Cert. #A2137	N/A	TLS or SSH Session Key Encrypted	N/A	HDD/RAM – plaintext	Zeroize Service	Used to support SNMPv3 services (Minimum 8 characters)
Authentication Key	160 - 256 bits	HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA2-224 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-384 HMAC-SHA2-512 Cert. #A2137	KDF SNMP	N/A	N/A	HDD/RAM - Plaintext	Zeroize Service	HMAC-SHA-1/224 /256/384/512 Authentication protocol key (160 bits)
Session Key	128 - 256 bits	AES-CFB Cert. #A2137	KDF SNMP	N/A	N/A	HDD/RAM - Plaintext	Zeroize Service	Privacy protocol encryption key (AES 128/192/256 CFB)

Note: SSPs are implicitly zeroized when power is lost, or explicitly zeroized by the zeroize service. In the case of implicit zeroization, the SSPs are implicitly overwritten with random values due to their ephemeral memory being reset upon power loss. For the zeroization service and zeroization at session termination, the SSP's memory location is overwritten with random values.

Table 12 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

Entropy Source	Minimum number of bits of entropy	Details
Palo Alto Networks DRNG RDSEED Entropy Source	194 bits	<p>ESV Cert. #129</p> <p>The entropy source provides at least 0.506 bits of entropy per bit of output. The DRBG is seeded with 384-bits of output from the entropy source. Therefore the DRBG is seeded with at least 194 bits of entropy before generating keys. The module generates SSPs (e.g., keys) whose strengths are modified by available entropy</p>
Octeon III Entropy Source	194 bits	<p>ESV Cert. #128</p> <p>The entropy source provides at least 0.506 bits of entropy per bit of output. The DRBG is seeded with 384-bits of output from the entropy source. Therefore the DRBG is seeded with at least 194 bits of entropy before generating keys. The module generates SSPs (e.g., keys) whose strengths are modified by available entropy</p>

## 10. Self-Tests

The cryptographic module performs the following tests below. The operator can command the module to perform the pre-operational and cryptographic algorithm self-tests by cycling power of the module; these tests do not require any additional operator action.

### Pre-operational Self-Tests

#### Pre-operational Software Integrity Test

- Verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256

*Note: the ECDSA and HMAC-SHA-256 KATs are performed prior to the Software integrity test*

### Conditional self-tests

#### Cryptographic algorithm self-tests

- AES 128-bit ECB Encrypt Known Answer Test\*
- AES 128-bit ECB Decrypt Known Answer Test\*
- AES 128-bit CMAC Known Answer Test\*

*\*Note: Supported by the module cryptographic implementation, but only utilized for CAST*

- AES 256-bit GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
- AES 256-bit GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
- AES 192-bit CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
- AES 192-bit CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
- RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Sign Known Answer Test
- RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 Verify Known Answer Test
- RSA 2048-bit Encrypt Known Answer Test
- RSA 2048-bit Decrypt Known Answer Test

*Note: Encrypt/Decrypt are only used for self-tests*

- ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Sign Known Answer Test
- ECDSA P-256 with SHA-512 Verify Known Answer Test
- HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
- HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
- HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
- HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
- SHA-1 Known Answer Test
- SHA-256 Known Answer Test
- SHA-384 Known Answer Test
- SHA-512 Known Answer Test
- SP 800-90Arev1 CTR DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Known Answer Tests
- SP 800-90Arev1 CTR DRBG Instantiate/Generate/Reseed Section 11.3 Health Tests
- SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-FFC-SSC 2048-bit Known Answer Test
- SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC P-256 Known Answer Test
- SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF Known Answer Test
- SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.2 KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
- SP 800-135rev1 SSH KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
- SP 800-135rev1 IKEv2 KDF with SHA-256 Known Answer Test
- Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) test – performed on DRBG
- SP 800-90B RCT/APT Health Tests on Entropy Source

#### Conditional Pairwise Consistency Self-Tests

- RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- ECDSA/KAS-ECC Pairwise Consistency Test

- KAS-FFC Pairwise Consistency Test

#### Conditional Firmware Load test

- Firmware Load Test – Verify RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature on firmware at time of load

#### Conditional Critical Functions Tests

- SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurance Tests (Based on Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3)

#### Error Handling

In the event of a conditional test failure, the module will output a description of the error. These are summarized below.

Table 13 - Errors and Indicators

Cause of Error	Error State Indicator
Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test or Software Integrity Test Failure	FIPS-CC mode failure. <Algorithm test> failed.
Conditional Pairwise Consistency or Critical Functions Test Failure	System log prints an error message.
Conditional Firmware Load Test Failure	System prints Invalid image message.

## 11. Life-Cycle Assurance

The vendor provided life-cycle assurance documentation describes configuration management, design, finite state model, development, testing, delivery & operation, end of life procedures, and guidance. For details regarding the approved mode of operation, see "Approved Mode of Operation". For details regarding secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module, see below.

Palo Alto Network provides an Administrator Guide for additional information noted in the "Reference Documents" section of this Security Policy.

#### Module Enforced Security Rules

When FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the module runs all the required items noted in Section 10 Self-Tests. The module design corresponds to the module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-3 Level 2 module.

1. The cryptographic module provides four distinct operator roles. These are the User role, Remote Access VPN role, Site-to-site VPN role, and the Cryptographic Officer role.
2. The cryptographic module provides identity-based authentication.
3. The cryptographic module clears previous authentications on each power cycle.
4. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services.
5. Data output is inhibited during power-up self-tests, zeroization and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
7. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
8. The module maintains separation between concurrent operators.
9. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
10. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
11. The module does not enter or output plaintext SSPs.

12. The module does not output intermediate key generation values.
13. Pre-shared keys used for IKE/IPSec must be at least 6 bytes in length, but no more than 255 bytes.

## Vendor imposed security rules

In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply:

1. The operator should not enable TLSv1.0 or use RSA for key wrapping; it is disabled by default.
  - a. Checked via CLI using “show shared” command
2. The operator should not enable TLSv1.3, it is disabled by default.
  - a. Checked via CLI using “show profiles” command
3. If using RADIUS, it must be configured using TLS.
  - a. Checked via CLI using “show shared” command
4. If using TACACS+, configure the service route via an IPSec tunnel, and ensure the TACACS+ server is configured for a minimum password length of eight (8) characters or greater.
  - a. Checked via CLI using “show deviceconfig” command

Failure to follow these Security Rules will cause the module to operate in a non-compliant state.

## 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-3. These requirements are not applicable.

## 13. Definitions and Acronyms

API – Application Programming Interface

App-ID – Application Identification - Palo Alto Networks’ ability to identify applications and apply security policy based on the ID rather than the typical port and protocol-based classification.

BGP – Border Gateway protocol – Dynamic routing protocol

CA – Certificate authority

Content-ID – Content Identification – Palo Alto Networks’ threat prevention features including Antivirus, Antispyware, and Intrusion Prevention.

CO – Cryptographic Officer

DLP – Data loss prevention

Gbps – Gigabits per second

HA – High Availability

HSCI - High Speed Chassis Interconnect

IKE – Internet Key Exchange

IP – Internet Protocol

IPSec – Internet Protocol Security

LDAP – Lightweight Directory Access Protocol

LED – Light Emitting DiodeOCSP – Online Certificate Status Protocol

OSPF – Open Shortest Path First – Dynamic routing protocol

PAN-OS – Palo Alto Networks’ Operating System

QoS – Quality of Service

QSFP - Quad Small Form-factor Pluggable

RA VPN – Remote Access Virtual Private Network

RIP – Routing Information Protocol – Dynamic routing protocol

RJ45 – Networking Connector

RNG – Random number generator

S-S VPN – Site to site Virtual Private Network

SFP – Small Form-factor Pluggable Transceiver

SSL – Secure Sockets Layer

TLS – Transport Layer Security

USB – Universal Serial Bus

User-ID – User Identification – Palo Alto Networks' ability to apply security policy based on who initiates the traffic rather than the typical IP-based approach.

VPN – Virtual Private Network

XML – Extensible Markup Language

## 14. Reference Documents


FIPS 140-3 - FIPS Publication 140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

Palo Alto Networks Administrator's Guide :


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## Appendix A - PA-220 - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (6 Seals)


1. Place the firewall upside down on a flat Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) protected surface and ground yourself by touching a metal surface on the firewall.
2. Slide the firewall in to the FIPS chassis cover and attach it to the cover using a Phillips-head screwdriver to tighten four (4) captive screws (two (2) screws on each side of the cover).




3. Install the front (network, management, and console) cables (you cannot access the front ports after you complete the front-cover install described in the following steps).
4. Place the FIPS front cover onto the FIPS chassis cover and attach it using four (4) #4-40 x .25" screws (two (2) screws on each side of the cover).




5. Route the front-port cables through the front-cover cable-guide openings.



6. Attach the FIPS front-cover panel to the FIPS front cover by sliding the two (2) panel tabs under the FIPS chassis cover and then attach the panel using two (2) #4-40 x .25" screws.




7. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following illustration (six (6) seals total). After all seals are applied, place the firewall right-side up.




1

## Appendix B - PA-220R- FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (5 Seals)

1. Place three tamper-evident seals on the top of the module.




2. Place two tamper-evident seals on the bottom of the module.




## Appendix C - PA-800 series - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (11 Seals)


1. Place the firewall on a flat Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) protected surface and ground yourself by touching a metal surface on the firewall.
2. Place the FIPS back cover onto the back of the firewall and attach it using four #4-40 x 5/16 screws (two screws on each side of the back cover).





3. Insert the front (network, management, and console) cables in to the front ports.
4. Place the FIPS front cover onto the front of the firewall and place the rack-mount brackets over the holes on the front cover. Attach the front cover and rack-mount brackets to the firewall using eight (8) #6-32 x 5/16" rack-mount bracket screws (shipped with the firewall)—use four (4) screws on each side. Route the front cables through the front-cover cable-guide opening.




5. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following illustrations (eleven (11) seals total). The seal placement over the power supply of the PA-820 firewall and PA-850 firewall is slightly different as shown.







## Appendix D – PA-3200 Series – FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (19 Seals)


1. Install the back cover to the back of the firewall



2. Attach the bracket to the firewall that will be used. Note: The firewall can use a mid-mount, front-mount or four-post mount. All seal placement is the same for the various use cases.




3. Place 19 tamper seals on the module. Note: Tamper seal placement is the same for all mount types. Seal #16 is required only for the front-mount of four-post rack installations. It is not required for the mid-mount installation




## Appendix E - PA-5200- FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (28 Seals)


1. Place the firewall upside down on a flat Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) protected surface and ground yourself by touching a metal surface on the firewall.
2. Install power cables: plug the power cords in to the power inlets located on the back of the firewall and connect the ground lug and ground cable to the ground lug bolts (you cannot access these back ports after you attach the FIPS back cover).
3. Place the FIPS back cover onto the back of the firewall and attach it to the firewall using four (4) #8-32 x 1/4" screws (two (2) screws on each side of the cover). Route the power cables through the back-cover cable-guide openings.




4. Attach the FIPS back-cover panel to the FIPS back cover using four (4) #4-40 x 1/4" screws (one (1) screw on each side of the cover and two (2) screws on the back of the cover).




5. Place the FIPS front cover onto the front of the firewall and place the rack-mount brackets over the holes on the front cover. Attach the front cover and rack-mount brackets to the firewall using eighteen (18) #8-32 x 5/16" screws (shipped with the firewall)—use nine (9) screws on each side.




6. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the illustrations (28 seals).






## Appendix F - PA-7050 - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (24 Seals)


1. Attach front right rack mount brackets in 4-post rack position. Do not attach rear rack mount brackets.  
Note that brackets are rotated 180 degrees, so the screw holes lineup and the rack mount holes are now on the front of the chassis.




2. Align right plenum bracket with five (5) open screw holes. Attach air plenum brackets using five (5) of the remaining bracket screws as shown. Repeat for left side.




3. Attach bottom plenum to the front right rack mount bracket. Place only the middle two (2) screws.




4. Attach the bottom plenum to the rearward right plenum bracket.




5. Rotate PA-7050 chassis clockwise 90 degrees onto the bottom plenum.




6. Assemble top plenum and cable guide hardware.




7. Attach top plenum to the front left rack mount bracket




8. Attach front opacity shield using the four (4) captive screws




9. Attach top plenum to the rearward left plenum bracket along with plenum's rear opacity shield as shown




10. Loosen four (4) screws on the panel containing the power supply vent. Insert the power supply vent opacity shield and tighten screws.




11. Facing the front of the module, affix two (2) seals to top of the front opacity shield, one (1) near left edge and one (1) near the right edge. Ensure the seals, when placed, overlap onto the top of the plenum, as shown. (2 total)



12. Facing the front of the module affix one (1) seal centered to the bottom of the front opacity shield to the bottom air plenum, as shown. (1 total)




13. Facing the rear of the module, affix two (2) seals to top of the rear opacity shield, one (1) near left edge and one (1) near the right edge. Ensure the seals, when placed, overlap onto the top of the plenum, as shown.  
(2 total)



14. Facing the rear of the module;

- A. Affix one (1) seal to the top plenum-opacity shield, covering the left and right outermost screws, as shown.
- B. Affix one (1) seal to the left and right edge of the top plenum bracket folding over the outer edge of the module, as shown.
- C. Affix one (1) seal to the top of each rear panel (three (3). Ensure that the seals lap onto the top rear plenum brackets, as shown.


(7 total)



15. Facing the rear of the module,

- A. Affix one (1) seal to the bottom of each rear panel (three (3)). Ensure that the seals laps onto the bottom rear plenum brackets, as shown.
- B. Affix one (1) seal to the left and right edge of the bottom plenum bracket folding over the outer edge of the module, as shown.
- C. Affix one (1) seal to the bottom plenum's rear side and the bottom plenum rear bracket.


(6 total)



16. Facing the rear of the module;


- Affix one (1) seal to cover one (1) screw for each power switch, as shown.
- Affix one (1) seal to the top and bottom of the vent opacity shield, as shown. Please ensure that the captive screw is covered.

(6 total)




## Appendix G - PA-7080 - FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (10 Seals)


1. Using the supplied screws attach the Cable Manger Kit with upper opacity lip to the front of the PA-7080, as shown.




2. Using the supplied screws, attach the Left and Right Front Cover brackets to the sides of the PA-7080, as shown.




- Using the supplied screws attach front opacity shield to the PA-7080 as shown.




- The final assembly for the PA-7080 with the FIPS kit is as shown.



5. Facing the front of the PA-7080:
  - A. Affix one (1) seal to the front and center of the exhaust fan tray. Ensure the seal overlaps the seam with the front PA-7080 branding panel as shown. (1 total)
  - B. Affix one (1) seal to the left and right outer edge of mounting flanges for the front opacity shield. Seals should fold over the edge of the cover flange and mounting bracket onto the side of the PA-7080. (2 total)
  - C. Affix one (1) seal to the front and center of the air intake fan tray. Ensure the seal overlaps the seam with the PA-7080 electrostatic discharge port panel as shown. (1 total)




6. Facing the rear of the PA-7080:
  - D. Affix one (1) seal to the left and right outer edge of the upper back panel. Seals should be placed just below the rear exhaust vent as shown. Seals should wrap around onto the sides of the PA-7080 (2 total).
  - E. Affix one (1) seal to the left and right outer edges of each power entry module as shown. Seals should wrap around onto the sides of the PA-7080 (4 total).




## Appendix H - PA-5450 FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (12 Seals)


The PA-5450 requires twelve tamper seals. Follow the directions below to install the FIPS kit. Affix 7 seals at the locations on the rear of the device:




On the top cover of the module, place one seal at the following location:



Affix the front opacity shield to the front of the device and screw into the locations as below:




Finalize the process by adding four seals at the following locations to secure the screws:




## Appendix I - PA-410 FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (4 Seals)

The PA-410 requires four tamper labels. The placement of these seals are needed in the following areas. Affix one seal to the front of the module that connects to the top/bottom.



The left and right side of the module requires one seal each in the same location, as noted in the following area. This wraps to the top and bottom of the module.



The last seal is placed on the rear side of the module, and wraps to the top and bottom of the module.



## Appendix J - PA-440/450/460 FIPS Accessories/Tamper Seal Installation (4 Seals)

The PA-440/450/460 require four tamper labels that are placed at the same location as the modules have the same enclosure. Affix four seals on the rear of the module as shown below:

