

# Ribbon Communications, Inc.

SBC 5400 Session Border Controller

Firmware Version: 10.01.06

## FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

FIPS Security Level: 2

Document Version: 0.6

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# 1. General

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## 1.1 Overview

## 1.2 Security Levels

The SBC 5400 Session Border Controller is validated at the FIPS 140-3 section levels shown in the table below.

Section	Title	Security Level
1	General	2
2	Cryptographic module specification	2
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	2
4	Roles, services, and authentication	3
5	Software/Firmware security	2
6	Operational environment	N/A
7	Physical security	2
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	2
10	Self-tests	2
11	Life-cycle assurance	2
12	Mitigation of other attacks	N/A
	Overall Level	2

**Table 1: Security Levels**

The module has an overall security level of 2.

## 2. Cryptographic Module Specification

### 2.1 Description

#### 2.1.1 Purpose and Use

Ribbon Communications, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Ribbon) is a leader in IP<sup>1</sup> networking with proven expertise in delivering secure, reliable and scalable next-generation infrastructure and subscriber solutions. The Ribbon line of Session Border Controllers (SBC 5400) help mid-sized and large enterprises take advantage of cost-saving SIP<sup>2</sup> trunking services by securing their network from IP-based attacks, unifying SIP-based communications and controlling traffic in the network.

Ribbon's SBC 5400 Session Border Controller (see Figure 1 below) is a high-performance air-cooled, 2U, IP encryption appliance that features a unique architecture design that differs from other session border controllers on the market today by aggregating all of the session border functionality – security, encryption, transcoding, call routing, and session management – into a single device, and then distributing those functions to embedded and modular hardware within the device. The SBC 5400 provides secure SIP-based communications with robust security, reduced latency, real-time encryption (VOIP<sup>3</sup> signaling and media traffic), media transcoding, flexible SIP session routing, and policy management.



Figure 1 – SBC 5400 Session Border Controller

The SBC 5400 is designed to fully address the next-generation need of SIP communications by delivering embedded media transcoding, robust security and advanced call routing in a high-performance, medium form-factor device. The SBC 5400 is designed to accommodate up to 75,000 call sessions. Some of the network and security features provided by the module include:

<sup>1</sup> IP – Internet Protocol

<sup>2</sup> SIP – Session Initiation Protocol

<sup>3</sup> VOIP – Voice Over Internet Protocol

- Session-aware firewall, split DMZ<sup>4</sup>, bandwidth & QoS<sup>5</sup> theft protection, topology hiding, DoS<sup>6</sup>/DDoS<sup>7</sup> detection/blocking, rogue RTP<sup>8</sup> protection, IPsec<sup>9</sup> and TLS<sup>10</sup> encryption
- Embedded media transcoding hardware
- H.323 and SIP-I/T interworking
- Stateful call-handling even during overload/attack/outages
- Embedded localized or centralized call-routing options
- Far-end NAT<sup>11</sup> traversal
- TLS, IPsec (IKEv1<sup>12</sup>) for signaling encryption
- Secure RTP/RTCP<sup>13</sup> for media encryption
- Support for large number of protocols including IPv4, IPv6, IPv4/IPv6 interworking, SSH<sup>14</sup>, SFTP<sup>15</sup>, SNMP<sup>16</sup>, HTTPS<sup>17</sup>, RTP/RTCP, UDP<sup>18</sup>, TCP<sup>19</sup>, DNS<sup>20</sup>, and ENUM<sup>21</sup>
- Exceptional scalability even under heavy workloads
- Device management using encrypted and authenticated device management messages
- Controlled menu access and comprehensive audit logs
- Integrated Baseband Management Controller (BMC)

The validated module is a solution that delivers end-to-end SIP session control and a networkwide view of SIP traffic and policy management. The module can be deployed as a peering SBC, access SBC, or enterprise SBC.

Figure 2 below illustrates a typical deployment scenario of the module.

---

<sup>4</sup> DMZ – Demilitarized Zone

<sup>5</sup> QoS – Quality of Service

<sup>6</sup> DoS – Denial of Service

<sup>7</sup> DoS/DDoS – Denial-of-Service/Distributed Denial-of-Service

<sup>8</sup> RTP – Real-time Transport Protocol

<sup>9</sup> IPsec – Internet Protocol Security

<sup>10</sup> TLS – Transport Layer Security

<sup>11</sup> NAT – Network Address Translation

<sup>12</sup> IKEv1 – Internet Key Exchange version 1

<sup>13</sup> RTCP – RTP Control Protocol

<sup>14</sup> SSH – Secure Shell

<sup>15</sup> SFTP – SSH File Transport Protocol

<sup>16</sup> SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol


<sup>17</sup> HTTPS – Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure

<sup>18</sup> UDP – User Datagram Protocol

<sup>19</sup> TCP – Transmission Control Protocol

<sup>20</sup> DNS – Domain Name System

<sup>21</sup> ENUM – E.164 Number Mapping



**Figure 2 – Typical Deployment of SBC 5400 in a Network**

Management of the SBC 5400 is accomplished using the following tools:

- Command Line Interface (CLI), which is accessible remotely via SSH over Ethernet management ports.
- Web-based Graphical User Interface (GUI) called Embedded Management Application (EMA), which is accessible remotely via HTTPS over Ethernet management ports.

The module also provides an SNMPv3<sup>22</sup> interface for remote management and non-security relevant information about the module's state and statistics. In addition, the module provides an SFTP interface for transferring the Security Event log, the System Event log, release packages, tone and announcement files, CDR<sup>23</sup> logs, and configuration files over the module's Ethernet management ports.

These management interfaces provide authorized operators access to the module for configuration and management of all facets of the module's operation, including system configuration, troubleshooting, security, and service provisioning. Using any of the management interfaces, an operator is able to monitor, configure, control, receive report events, and retrieve logs from the SBC 5400.

To support TLS, the module employs the following certificate management techniques:

- Local – Local certificates are credentials belonging to the SBC 5400 itself, which it presents to peers in order to prove its identity. Local certificate files must be downloaded to the module before installing the certificates.
- Local-Internal – The SBC 5400 generates its RSA public/private key pairs and Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) internally. The certificate request is signed with SBC 5400's private key and then sent to a CA. The CA-signed certificate is received back from the CA, verified using the CA public key, and then installed on the SBC 5400.

<sup>22</sup> SNMPv3 – Simple Network Management Protocol version 3

<sup>23</sup> CDR – Call Detail Records

- Remote – Remote certificates are credentials belonging to CAs. The CA certificates contain public keys only; they do not contain the associated private keys. The CA certificates are Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) format files.

## 2.1.2 Module Type

The SBC 5400 Session Border Controller 10.01.06 is a Hardware module.

## 2.1.3 Module Embodiment

The SBC 5400 Session Border Controller has a MultiChipStand embodiment.

## 2.1.4 Module Characteristics

The module does not have any additional characteristics. .

## 2.1.5 Cryptographic Boundary

The module's cryptographic boundary is defined by its hard enclosure (shown in Figure 1). The main hardware components contained within the enclosure include integrated circuits, processors, memories, SSD<sup>24</sup>, flash, DSP cards, power supplies, and fans. The primary executing components are:

- SBC SWe application firmware
- Ribbon's proprietary ConnexIP operating system (with crypto libraries)
- SonusDB (with configuration files and PostGRES)
- HMAC digest files (for integrity checking)

## 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

### 2.2.1 Tested Module Identification – Hardware

The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-3 requirements on the hardware versions listed in the table below.

Model and/or Part Number	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Processors	Features
SBC 5400	5400	10.01.06	Intel Xeon CPU E5 v2 (Ivy Bridge EP) and Cavium OCTEON II CN6880 media processor	N/A

Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware

<sup>24</sup> SSD – Solid-State Drive

## 2.2.2 Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)

The module does not have any executable code sets.

N/A for this module.

## 2.2.3 Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware

The module does not have hybrid disjoint hardware.

N/A for this module.

## 2.2.4 Tested Operational Environments – Software, Firmware, Hybrid

This section is only applicable to software, firmware, and hybrid modules.

N/A for this module.

## 2.2.5 Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments – Software, Firmware, Hybrid

There are no vendor-affirmed operational environments claimed.

N/A for this module.

## 2.3 Excluded Components

The module also includes components that are excluded from the requirements of this standard:

- ASPEED Technology's onboard AST2400 Server Management Processor (referred to as the Baseboard Management Controller or "BMC") provides remote monitoring and management functions. This component is excluded from the security requirements of this standard, along with all supporting chips, circuitry and external ports connected to the BMC. Although it physically resides within the cryptographic boundary, the BMC is a completely independent computing platform, with its own CPU, RAM, flash, ports, and operating system.
- The module includes two removable power supplies at the rear of the device (see Figure 5 below). These power supplies provide no security to the module and offer no way to compromise the module in the event of a malfunction. Module opacity is maintained when no power supplies are installed.

## 2.4 Modes of Operation

### 2.4.1 Modes List and Description

When installed, configured, and operated according to this Security Policy, the module supports the Approved mode of operation only; non-Approved operations are not supported.

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved	When the module is installed, initialized, and operated as directed in the Security Policy section 11.1, the module supports an Approved mode of operation only.	Approved	Global FIPS status indicator

Table 3: Modes List and Description

## 2.5 Algorithms

### 2.5.1 Approved Algorithms

The module employs cryptographic algorithm implementations from the following sources:

- Ribbon Cryptographic Library version 10 (Cert. [A5066](#))
- Ribbon Entropy Library version 10 (Cert. [A4087](#))
- Ribbon IKE KDF<sup>25</sup> Library version 10 (Cert. [A5067](#))
- Ribbon SRTP<sup>26</sup> KDF Library (OCTEON) version (Cert. [A5068](#))
- Ribbon SSH KDF Library version 10 (Cert. [A5069](#))
- Ribbon TLS KDF Library version 10 (Cert. [A5070](#))

The module implements the Approved algorithms listed in the table below.

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A5066	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A5068	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128	SP 800-38A
AES-CFB1	A5066	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128	A5066	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8	A5066	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CTR	A5066	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A5066	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38D

<sup>25</sup> KDF – Key Derivation Function

<sup>26</sup> SRTP – Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-GCM	A5068	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG	A5066	Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - AES-128 Derivation Function Enabled - No, Yes	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	A5066	L - 2048, 3072 N - 224, 256	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	A5066	Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A5066	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4)	A5066	Curve - B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5)	A5066	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	A5066	Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A5066	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	A5066	Curve - B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A5066	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1	A5066	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA-1	A5068	Key Length - Key Length: 8-256 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A5066	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A5066	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A5066	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A5066	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC CDH-Component SP800-56Ar3 (CVL)	A5066	Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A5066	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A5066	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - FB, FC Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDF IKEv1 (CVL)	A5067	Authentication Method - Digital Signature, Pre-shared Key, Public Key Encryption Preshared Key Length - Preshared Key Length: 64-512 Increment 8 Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 2048 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF IKEv2 (CVL)	A5067	Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224-4096 Increment 8 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 160-4096 Increment 8 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
KDF SRTP (CVL)	A5068	AES Key Length - 128	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL)	A5069	Cipher - AES-128 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF TLS (CVL)	A5070	TLS Version - v1.2 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KTS-IFC	A5066	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic Scheme - KTS-OAEP-basic - KAS Role - initiator, responder Key Transport Method - Key Length - 768	SP 800-56B Rev. 2
PBKDF	A5066	Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 10-1000 Increment 1 Password Length - Password Length: 8-128 Increment 1	SP 800-132
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	A5066	Key Generation Mode - B.3.3 Modulo - 2048 Primality Tests - Table C.2 Private Key Format - Standard	FIPS 186-4
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A5066	Key Generation Mode - probable Modulo - 2048 Primality Tests - 2powSecStr Private Key Format - standard	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	A5066	Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 2048	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A5066	Modulo - 2048 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	A5066	Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 1024, 2048	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A5066	Modulo - 2048 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5	FIPS 186-5
SHA-1	A5066	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA-1	A5068	Message Length - Message Length: 8-51200 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A5066	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A5066	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A5066	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A5066	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA3-256	A4087	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 202
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL)	A5070	Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1

**Table 4: Approved Algorithms**

## 2.5.2 Vendor Affirmed Algorithms

The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security methods in the table below:

Name	Properties	Implementation	Reference
CKG	CKG:Symmetric	Ribbon Cryptographic Library	Per SP 800-133 Rev. 2, section 4.

**Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms**

## 2.5.3 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms

The table below lists the non-Approved algorithms implemented by the module that are allowed for use in the Approved mode of operation.

N/A for this module.

## 2.5.4 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed

The module does not offer any non-Approved algorithms allowed in the Approved mode of operation with no security claimed.

N/A for this module.

## 2.5.5 Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms

The module does not offer non-Approved algorithms not allowed in the Approved mode of operation.

N/A for this module.

## 2.6 Security Function Implementations

The table below lists the security function implementations for this module.

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
DRBG for Random Password Generation	DRBG	DRBG for generating random passwords.		Counter DRBG: (A5066)
SHA for Password Storage	SHA	SHA2-512 for hashing stored password values.		SHA2-512: (A5066)
RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading	DigSig-SigVer	RSA digital signature verification, used for certificate loading.		SHA2-224: (A5066) SHA2-256: (A5066) SHA2-384: (A5066) SHA2-512: (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066)
RSA SigVer for Software/Firmware Load Integrity	DigSig-SigVer	RSA 2048-bit digital signature verification, used for integrity tests.		SHA2-224: (A5066) SHA2-256: (A5066) SHA2-384: (A5066) SHA2-512: (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
CKG for CDB Key Generation	CKG	CKG for the Config Database (CDB) Key, which is used for the encryption/decryption of RSA or ECDSA private keys and pre-shared secrets for RADIUS.		

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
IPsec IKE	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen AsymKeyPair-KeyVer BC-Auth BC-UnAuth DigSig-SigGen DigSig-SigVer DRBG KAS-135KDF KAS-Full MAC	Key Agreement for IKE. Key exchange is performed using ECDH or DH. Public/private keys generation is performed using RSA.		AES-CBC: (A5066) AES-CTR: (A5066) AES-GCM: (A5066) Counter DRBG: (A5066) DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5066) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5066) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5066) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5066) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5066) KAS-ECC CDH-Component SP800-56Ar3: (A5066) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5066) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5066) KDF IKEv1: (A5067) KDF IKEv2: (A5067) SHA-1: (A5066) SHA2-224: (A5066) SHA2-256: (A5066) SHA2-384: (A5066) SHA2-512: (A5066) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
SRTP	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen AsymKeyPair-KeyVer BC-Auth BC-UnAuth DRBG KAS-135KDF KAS-Full MAC	Key Agreement for SRTP. Key exchange is performed using ECDH or DH. Public/private keys generation is performed using ECDSA or RSA.		AES-CBC: (A5068) Counter DRBG: (A5066) DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5068) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5066) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5066) KAS-ECC CDH-Component SP800-56Ar3: (A5066) KDF SRTP: (A5068) SHA-1: (A5068) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) AES-GCM: (A5068)
AES for SNMPv3	BC-UnAuth	AES-CFB for SNMPv3 packet encryption/decryption.		AES-CFB1: (A5066) AES-CFB8: (A5066) AES-CFB128: (A5066)
HMAC for SNMPv3	MAC	HMAC for SNMPv3 packet authentication.		HMAC-SHA-1: (A5066) SHA-1: (A5066)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
SSH	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen AsymKeyPair-KeyVer BC-Auth BC-UnAuth DigSig-SigGen DigSig-SigVer DRBG KAS-135KDF KAS-Full MAC	Key Agreement for SSH. Key exchange is performed using ECDH or DH. Public/private keys generation is performed using ECDSA or RSA.		AES-CBC: (A5066) AES-CTR: (A5066) AES-GCM: (A5066) Counter DRBG: (A5066) DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5066) KAS-ECC CDH-Component SP800-56Ar3: (A5066) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5066) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5066) KDF SSH: (A5069) SHA-1: (A5066) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) SHA2-224: (A5066) SHA2-256: (A5066) SHA2-384: (A5066) SHA2-512: (A5066)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
TLS v1.2	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen AsymKeyPair-KeyVer BC-Auth BC-UnAuth DigSig-SigGen DigSig-SigVer DRBG KAS-135KDF KAS-Full KTS-Encap KTS-Wrap MAC	Key Agreement for TLS v1.2. Key exchange is performed using ECDH or DH. Public/private keys generation is performed using ECDSA or RSA.		AES-CBC: (A5066) AES-GCM: (A5066) Counter DRBG: (A5066) DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) KAS-ECC CDH-Component SP800-56Ar3: (A5066) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5066) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5066) KDF TLS: (A5070) KTS-IFC: (A5066) SHA2-256: (A5066) SHA2-384: (A5066) TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A5070) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066)
DRBG (Random bits)	DRBG	Get random bits from the DRBG.		Counter DRBG: (A5066)
PBKDF	PBKDF	PBKDF for decrypting certificates		PBKDF: (A5066)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
ECDSA or RSA SigVer for Public Key Certificate Authentication	DigSig-SigVer	ECDSA or RSA signature verification for public key certificate authentication.		ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5066) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5066) SHA-1: (A5066) SHA2-224: (A5066) SHA2-256: (A5066) SHA2-384: (A5066) Counter DRBG: (A5066)
Entropy Source Conditioner	ENT-Cond	SHA3-256 entropy source conditioner		SHA3-256: (A4087)

**Table 6: Security Function Implementations**

## 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

The following is algorithm-specific information related to the module:

- **AES-GCM**: The AES-GCM IV<sup>27</sup> is used in the following protocols:
  - For TLS v1.2, the module supports acceptable AES-GCM cipher suites from section 3.3.1 of *NIST SP 800-52rev2*. Per scenario 1 in *FIPS 140-3 IG C.H*, the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with *RFC 5288*. The counter portion of the IV is strictly increasing. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, a failure in encryption will occur and a handshake to establish a new encryption key will be required. The module will then trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key.
  - For SRTP, the AES-GCM IV is constructed at its entirety internally deterministically per section 8.2.1 of *NIST SP 800-38D*. In compliance with *RFC 7714*, the 96-bit IV is formed by first concatenating 16 bits of zeroes, the 32-bit Synchronization Source identifier, the 32-bit rollover counter, and the 16-octet sequence number. As described in scenario 3 of *FIPS 140-3 IG C.H* and, the (key, IV) collision probability does not exceed  $2^{-32}$  for a given key distributed to one or more cryptographic modules.

In the event that the module's power is lost and then restored, the CO shall establish a new key for use with AES-GCM encryption/decryption.

- **PBKDF2**: The module uses PBKDF2 option 1a from section 5.4 of *NIST SP 800-132*. This function takes an input salt that is 128 bits in length with a passphrase containing at least eight characters (in accordance with the module's password complexity requirements) and produces a random value of 128 bits. The underlying pseudorandom function used in this derivation is SHA-1.

---

<sup>27</sup> IV – Initialization Vector

The function has an iteration count of 2048. This iteration count allows for user-acceptable key generation times while still doubling the recommended minimum count (1000).

The length of the password/passphrase used in the PBKDF shall be at least 20 characters, and shall consist of lowercase, uppercase, and numeric characters. The upper bound for the probability of guessing the value is estimated to be  $1/62^{20} = 10^{-36}$ , which is less than  $2^{-112}$ .

As specified in *NIST SP 800-132*, keys derived from passwords/passphrases may only be used in storage applications.

- **DH and ECDH:** The module implements the DH and ECDH key agreement schemes specified in *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*. This specification requires that certain checks are performed to provide assurance regarding the keys being used. The following assurance checks are performed by the cryptographic module:
  - Assurances of domain parameter validity (section 5.5.2 of *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*)
  - Assurances required by the key pair owner (section 5.6.2.1 of *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*)
  - Assurances required by the public key recipient (section 5.6.2.2 of *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*)
- **ECDSA:** Per *FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance C.K*, there is currently no scheduled transition away from elliptic curves over binary fields (i.e., K-233, B-233, K-283, B-283, K-409, B-409, K-571, B-571). However, these curves are now deprecated, and it is strongly recommended to use the SP-800-186-defined prime curves (i.e., P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521) for the generation of the ECDSA signatures. Despite their deprecation status, these curves are still considered Approved.

## 2.8 RNG and Entropy

The module uses its Approved DRBG to generate cryptographic keys and seeds used to generate cryptographic keys. The resulting symmetric key or generated seed is an unmodified output from the DRBG.

The table below specifies the module's entropy certificates.

Cert Number	Vendor Name
E101	Ribbon Communications

Table 7: Entropy Certificates

The table below specifies the module's entropy sources.

Name	Type	Operational Environment	Sample Size	Entropy per Sample	Conditioning Component
Ribbon Entropy Library	Non-Physical	Ribbon ConnexIP OS 10 running on Intel Xeon CPU E5 v2 (Ivy Bridge EP)	64	Full entropy	SHA3-256 (A4087)

Table 8: Entropy Sources

## 2.9 Key Generation

The following is a list of key generation methods that the module implements:

- CKG
- ECDSA KeyGen
- RSA KeyGen

## 2.10 Key Establishment

### 2.10.1 Key Agreement Information

The following is a list of key agreement methods that the module implements:

- IKEv1 with DH or ECDH for Key Agreement
- IKEv2 with DH or ECDH for Key Agreement
- SRTP with DH or ECDH for Key Agreement
- SSH with DH or ECDH for Key Agreement
- TLS v1.2 with DH or ECDH for Key Agreement

The module implements the DH and ECDH key agreement schemes specified in *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*. This specification requires that certain checks are performed to provide assurance regarding the keys being used. The following assurance checks are performed by the cryptographic module:

- Assurances of domain parameter validity (section 5.5.2 of *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*)
- Assurances required by the key pair owner (section 5.6.2.1 of *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*)
- Assurances required by the public key recipient (section 5.6.2.2 of *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*)

Key confirmation is not supported by the module.

### 2.10.2 Key Transport Information

Key transport information does not apply to the module.

## 2.11 Industry Protocols

The module employs the following industry protocols:

- IPsec (IKEv1 and IKEv2)
- SRTP
- SSH
- TLS v1.2

The KDFs associated with these protocols shall only be used within the context of their respective protocols. No parts of these protocols, other than the Approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

## 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces

### 3.1 Ports and Interfaces

FIPS 140-3 defines the following logical interfaces for cryptographic modules:

- Data Input
- Data Output
- Control Input
- Status Output

The physical ports/interfaces found on the front bezel of the SBC 5400 Session Border Controller are shown in Figure 3 below. The physical ports/interfaces found behind the front bezel of the module are shown in Figure 4 below (note that the front bezel LEDs can also be seen on the module's front panel when the bezel is not in place).



Figure 3 – Front Bezel LEDs on Bezel




Figure 4 – Front Panel LEDs Behind Bezel

The physical ports and interfaces found on the rear panel of the SBC 5400 Session Border Controller are shown in Figure 5 below.




Figure 5 – Rear Panel Ports/Interfaces

A mapping of the module's ports and interfaces to the defined logical interfaces is provided in the table below. Note that the module does not output control information, and thus has no specified control output interface.

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
Front Power LED	Status Output	Power status indicator: GREEN: all power on OFF: BMC power on or chassis power off
Front Active LED	Status Output	Module Redundancy State indicator: GREEN: active and protected AMBER: active but unprotected OFF: not active
Front Alarm LED	Status Output	Module critical/major failure indicator: RED: critical alarm AMBER: major alarm OFF: no alarm conditions
Front Locator LED	Status Output	Module identifier indicator (ON or BLINKING, depending on the "ipmitool chassis identify" command)

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
Fan Control LED (1 per fan)	Status Output	Fan module indicator: GREEN: fan module is working OFF: fan module is not working
Management Ports	Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output	Encrypted management traffic over TLS (GUI) and SSH (CLI)
Management Port LED (2 per port)	Status Output	Management port status information
Locator LED	Status Output	Module identifier information
Media Ports 4 x 1 Gbps (2 ports are 10 Gbps-capable)	Data Input Data Output	Media port status information
Media Port LEDs	Status Output	Media port link and activity status information
High Availability Ports (2x1Gbps)	Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output	Redundancy synchronization traffic information
High Availability Port LEDs	Control Input	HA port link status and activity information
Power LED	Status Output	Power supply status
Front Status LED	Status Output	Module status indicator: GREEN: application is running AMBER: application startup has not completed, or the application has been shutdown OFF: application is not running
Power Ports	Power	Input power

**Table 9: Ports and Interfaces**

Also identified in Figure 5 are the BMC Serial Port (an RS-232 serial port) and the Field Service Port (a 1 Gbps Ethernet port). These ports are used to connect with the BMC (serial for local connections, Ethernet for remote connections), and the CO must use these ports in order to perform the module's initial setup and configuration as described in section 11.1.2. Beyond this, these external ports shall not be used while the module is operational. Use of these external ports is prohibited while the module is operating in its Approved mode.

The module also includes a front-facing USB<sup>28</sup> port that allows for the connection of external devices for firmware image downloads. Use of this port for any purpose is prohibited while the module is operating in its Approved mode. Additionally, the module includes a back panel alarm port. This port is not operational and provides no facility for input or output.

Figure 5 shows a populated SSD slot. The module stores SSPs in both plaintext and ciphertext form on the SSD. The CO shall ensure that the SSD is not removed from the SSD slot.

<sup>28</sup>USB – Universal Serial Bus

## 4. Roles, Services, and Authentication

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### 4.1 Authentication Methods

Module operators are required to authenticate to the module for assumption of an authorized role. The module supports identity-based authentication. Role assumption is implicit, as module operator roles are assigned to their account.

The module can support multiple operator sessions concurrently from multiple client devices. The maximum number of simultaneous sessions allowed per operator can be configured for any number from 1 to 5.

Each session remains active (logged in) and secured until the operator logs out or is automatically logged out from inactivity. When the module is powered off, results of any previous authentication will be cleared. Module operators will need to re-authenticate in order to re-assume their respective roles.

The table below lists the authentication methods and the strength of the authentication mechanisms.

Method Name	Description	Security Mechanism	Strength Each Attempt	Strength per Minute
Password	For the first-time module access by the CO, the module ships with a factory-set default username ("admin") and password ("admin") for the EMA and the CLI. User accounts are assigned randomly generated passwords upon account activation. Following first-time login using default/assigned credentials, module operators are prompted to set new passwords.	Username/Password	1:16,889,161,502,720	6:16,889,161,502,720
Public Key Certificate	The module supports RSA and ECDSA digital certificate authentication of users during Web GUI/HTTPS (TLS) access.	ECDSA or RSA SigVer for Public Key Certificate Authentication	$1:5.19 \times 10^{33}$	$1:96.92 \times 10^{23}$

Table 10: Authentication Methods

The strength objectives of the authentication mechanisms are as follows:

- For each attempt to use an authentication mechanism, the probability shall be less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur.
- For multiple attempts to use an authentication mechanism during a one-minute period, the probability shall be less than one in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur.

To meet the stated strength objectives for password-based authentication, password policies shall be configured such that all passwords shall require:

- Between 8 and 24 characters

- At least one lowercase letter
- At least one uppercase letter
- At least one digit
- At least one special character

The Crypto Officer shall set the module's password policies after the initial setup of the module. Password policies can be set via the EMA or CLI.

- Using the CLI, password policies are configured using the following command:

```
% set system admin <SYSTEM NAME> passwordRules
```

- Using the EMA, password policies are configured by navigating to **Administration -> Users and Application Management -> Application Management** from the SBC main screen. The CO shall ensure that the checkbox for "Use Separate Password Rules for Administrators" is unchecked.

Once set, the module enforces the password policies on all subsequent attempts to change a password.

The CO shall also ensure that the default brute force password attack mitigation remains enabled. Per the default settings, the module will lock an account for 30 seconds after three (3) consecutive failed login attempts. The CO can view and/or configure the brute force password attack settings by navigating to the **Administration -> Users and Application Management -> Application Management** window from the Using the EMA SBC main screen. Using the CLI, the CO can view and/or configure the brute force password attack settings using the following command:

```
% show system admin <systemName> accountManagement bruteForceAttack
```

## 4.2 Roles

The module supports the following vendor-defined groups and capabilities:

- Administrator – Read-Write access to all commands and data spaces.
- Calea – Read-write access to Lawful Intercept tables and Read access to other tables. Only an Admin user can add or remove user from this group. Only one user named "Calea" is allowed in this group, and the "Calea" user cannot be part of any other group.
- Field Service – Read-write access to all commands and data spaces excluding some administrative functions only available to admin users.
- Guest – Read-only access to all commands and data spaces except commands that deal with user accounts, logging and audit controls, the TOD clock and sensitive administrative items. They do not have access to the Security Event logs and management audit logs.
- Operator – Read-write access to all commands and data spaces except commands that deal with user accounts, logging and audit controls, the TOD clock, and sensitive administrative items. They do not have access to the

Security Event logs and management audit logs and cannot execute any commands stopping or starting these audit log services.

- Security Auditor – Read-only access to view the security logs and management audit logs. The commands executed by the Security Auditor are logged in the Management Audit log.

The module supports two defined roles that operators may assume:

- Crypto Officer – The CO is responsible for initializing the module for first use, which includes the configuration of passwords, public and private keys, and other SSPs. The CO is also responsible for the management of all keys and SSPs, including their zeroization, and is the only operator that can install and configure the module for Approved mode of operation. The CO has access to all User services. The CO role consists of the vendor-defined roles “Administrator”, “Calea”, “Field Service”, and “Operator”.
- User – The User has read-only privileges and can show the status and statistics of the module, show the current status of the module, and connect to the module remotely using HTTPS and SSH. Users can also change their own passwords. The User role consists of the vendor-defined roles “Guest” and “Security Auditor”.

The table below lists the supported roles.

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer	Identity	CO	Password Public Key Certificate
User	Identity	User	Password Public Key Certificate

**Table 11: Roles**

## 4.3 Approved Services

Descriptions of the services available are provided in the table below.

The keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation:

- G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
- R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
- W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
- E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
- Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Commission the module	Commission the module by following the Security Policy guidelines	n/a	n/a	none	None	Crypto Officer

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Manage SBC license	Installs the license to enable SBC features; delete or update license; view current license status	n/a	Command	Status output	None	Crypto Officer
Configure the SBC system	Define network interfaces and settings; set protocols; configure authentication information; define policies and profiles	n/a	Command and parameter	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer
Configure routing policy and control services	Configure IP network parameters and profiles for signaling, media, call routing, call services, zone, IP ACL rules, NTP and DNS servers	n/a	Command and parameter	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer
Configure Crypto Suite Profile	Select crypto suites for SRTP, SRTCP, and SIP communication	n/a	Command and parameter	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer
Configure Call Data Record (CDR)	Configure log file behavior	n/a	Command and parameter	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer
Perform backup and restore services	Back up the current system configuration; restore the system configuration from a backup file; import and export backup files	n/a	Command and parameter	Command response, status output	TLS v1.2	Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Privacy Key: R,W - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: R,W
Manage users	Create, edit, and delete users; define user accounts and assign permissions.	n/a	Command and parameter	Command response, status output	DRBG for Random Password Generation SHA for Password Storage DRBG (Random bits) Entropy Source Conditioner	Crypto Officer - User password: R,W - DRBG Entropy Input String: G,E - DRBG Seed: G,E - DRBG 'V' Value: G,E - DRBG 'Key' Value: G,E
Manage user sessions	Terminate User sessions	n/a	Command and parameter	Command response, status output	SSH TLS v1.2	Crypto Officer - SSH Session Key: Z - TLS Session Key: Z
Change password	Modify existing login passwords	n/a	Command and parameter	Command response, status output	SHA for Password Storage	Crypto Officer - Crypto Officer password: W User - User password: W

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Load certificate	Load new certificates	Global FIPS status indicator	Command	Command response, status output	RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading PBKDF	Crypto Officer - Certificate Load Key: W - TLS Private Key: W - TLS Public Key: W - CA Public Key: W
Run script	Run a script file (a text file containing a list of CLI commands to execute in sequence)	Global FIPS status indicator	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer
Perform on-demand self-tests	Perform self-tests on-demand using CLI/EMA command	n/a	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer
Perform network diagnostics	Monitor connections (e.g., ping)	n/a	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer User
Show system status	Show the system status (including Approved mode status)	n/a	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer User
Show system versioning	Show operational status information about module components (including hardware type and application version)	n/a	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer User
View Event Log	View event status messages	n/a	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer
Zeroize keys	Zeroize all SSPs (using CLI/EMA command to zeroize)	Completion indicator (message/log)	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer - Config Database (CBD) Key: Z User - Config Database (CBD) Key: Z
Upgrade firmware	Load new firmware and performs an integrity test using an RSA digital signature	Global FIPS status indicator	Command, firmware image	Command response, status output	RSA SigVer for Software/Firmware Load Integrity	Crypto Officer - Image Verify Key: E
Perform keying of CDB Key	Generate CDB key	Global FIPS status indicator	Command and parameters	Command response, status output	CKG for CDB Key Generation	Crypto Officer - Config Database (CBD) Key: G
Reboot/Reset	Reboot or reset the module	Global FIPS status indicator	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer - Config Database (CBD) Key: Z

Establish IPsec connection	Establish an IPsec session using IKE	Global FIPS status indicator	Command and parameters	Command response, status output	IPsec IKE	Crypto Officer - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,E - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,E - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - IKE RSA Private Key: G,E - IKE RSA Public Key: G,R - IKE Shared Secret: W,E - IKE SKEYID: G,E - IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,E - IKE Encryption Key: G,E - IKE Authentication Key: G,E - IPsec Shared Secret: G,E - IPsec Encryption Key: G,E - IPsec Authentication Key: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E - IKE Key Derivation Key: G,E User - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,E - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,E - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - IKE RSA Private Key: G,E - IKE RSA Public Key: G,R - IKE Shared Secret: W,E - IKE SKEYID: G,E - IKE Pre-shared
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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Secret: G,E - IKE Encryption Key: G,E - IKE Authentication Key: G,E - IKE Key Derivation Key: G,E - IPsec Shared Secret: G,E - IPsec Encryption Key: G,E - IPsec Authentication Key: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E
Establish SRTP connection	Establish a SRTP session using SIP/TLS protocols	Global FIPS status indicator	Command and parameters	Command response, status output	SRTP	Crypto Officer - SRTP Master Key: W,E - SRTP Authentication Key: G - SRTP Session Key: G - AES GCM IV: G,E User - SRTP Master Key: W,E - SRTP Authentication Key: G - SRTP Session Key: G - AES GCM IV: G,E
Manage SNMPv3 services	Manage keys, trap targets, users, and traps for SNMPv3	Global FIPS status indicator	Command and parameters	Status output	None	Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Privacy Key: W - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: W User - SNMPv3 Privacy Key: W - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: W

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Perform SNMPv3 services	Perform SNMPv3 services	Global FIPS status indicator	Command and parameters	Status output	AES for SNMPv3 HMAC for SNMPv3	Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Privacy Key: E - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: W User - SNMPv3 Privacy Key: E - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: W

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Establish SSH connection	Establish SSH connection	Global FIPS status indicator	Command and parameters	Command response, status output	SSH	Crypto Officer - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH Public Key: G,R - SSH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Key: G - SSH Authentication Key: G - SSH Shared Secret: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E User - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH Public Key: G,R - SSH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Key: G - SSH Authentication Key: G - SSH Shared Secret: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E

Establish TLS connection	Establish TLS connection	Global FIPS status indicator	Command and parameters	Command response, status output	TLS v1.2	Crypto Officer - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - TLS Private Key: G,W,E - TLS Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer Public Key: W,E - TLS Session Key: G - TLS Authentication Key: G - TLS Pre-Master Secret: G,E - TLS Master Secret: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E User - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - TLS Private Key: G,W,E - TLS Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer Public Key: W,E - TLS Session Key: G - TLS Authentication Key: G - TLS Pre-Master Secret: G,E - TLS Master Secret: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E
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Perform SFTP functions	Perform FTP functions over SSH	Global FIPS status indicator	Command and parameters	Command response, status output	SSH	Crypto Officer - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH Public Key: G,R - SSH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Key: G - SSH Authentication Key: G - SSH Shared Secret: G,E - SFTP Private Key: G,E - SFTP Public Key: G,E - SFTP Peer Public Key: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E User - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH Public Key: G,R - SSH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Key: G,E - SSH Authentication Key: G,E - SSH Shared Secret: G,E
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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- SFTP Private Key: G,E - SFTP Public Key: G,E - SFTP Peer Public Key: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E
Logout	Logout of active session	n/a	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer User
Perform manual zeroization	Zeroize ephemeral SSPs via power-cycle or reboot of host device	n/a	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer
Perform manual on-demand self-tests	Perform pre-operational self-tests on demand via power-cycle or reboot of host device	n/a	Command	Command response, status output	None	Crypto Officer
Authenticate via password	Authenticate to the module by password	n/a	Command and parameters	Command response, status output	SHA for Password Storage	Crypto Officer - Crypto Officer password: W - RADIUS Shared Secret: W,E User - User password: W - RADIUS Shared Secret: W,E
Authenticate via public key certificate	Authenticate to the module by ECDSA or RSA signature verification	n/a	Command	Command response, service access.	ECDSA or RSA SigVer for Public Key Certificate Authentication	Unauthenticated

**Table 12: Approved Services**

## 4.4 Non-Approved Services

The module does not offer any non-Approved services.

N/A for this module.

## 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded

The cryptographic module has the capability of loading firmware from an external source.

Upon load, the module will verify the integrity of the load package with a 2048-bit RSA signature verification (the public key is loaded in write-protected flash at the factory). If the check fails, the new firmware is ignored and the current firmware remains loaded. If successful, the module will force an automatic reboot and will perform the required pre-operational integrity test using HMAC SHA digests. Per FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.F, the integrity test inherently meets the firmware load test requirement when the load constitutes a full image replacement.

Only validated firmware may be loaded to maintain the module's validation. The new image shall include updated versioning information to represent the newly loaded image. Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.

Prior to any execution of the new image, module operators shall zeroize all persistent keys using one of the methods described in section 9.3. All ephemeral keys are zeroized on module reboot.

## 5. Software/Firmware Security

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### 5.1 Integrity Techniques

At module start-up, the integrity of all firmware components within the cryptographic boundary is checked automatically using an approved integrity technique implemented within the cryptographic module itself. The module employs a series of HMAC SHA2-256 digests to test each firmware component; unsuccessful verification of any of the digest values will cause the module to enter a critical error state.

### 5.2 Initiate on Demand

The CO can initiate the pre-operational integrity tests on demand by issuing a reset/reboot command over the module's management interfaces. Also, the module can be made to perform pre-operational self-tests by rebooting or power-cycling the module manually. When using this method, the operator is not required to assume an authorized role.

## 6. Operational Environment

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### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

The SBC 5400 Session Border Controller is a hardware cryptographic module with a Limited operational environment and compliant with level 2 physical security requirements. Therefore, per section 7.5 of the *CMVP Management Manual*, requirements for this section are not applicable.

# 7. Physical Security

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## 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required

The SBC 5400 is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module. All SSPs are stored and protected within the module's production-grade enclosure. All components within the module are production grade with standard passivation.

The module's chassis is opaque within the visible spectrum. The chassis' front bezel and rear panel provide only a limited set of ventilation holes, obscuring visual access to the module's internal components. Tamper-evident labels must be applied to the chassis to provide physical evidence of attempts to remove protected components.

Mechanism	Inspection Frequency	Inspection Guidance
Tamper-evident labels	Every six (6) months	Visual inspection of tamper-evident labels to ensure none are compromised

Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required

## 7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals

### 7.2.1 Number

The module ships with six (6) vendor-branded serialized labels. For the module to operate in its Approved mode, the CO shall place five (5) of the labels on the appliance.

### 7.2.2 Placement

The figures **Error! Reference source not found.** provide the label placement locations.



Figure 6 – Label Placement (Label 1)




Figure 7 – Label Placement (Label 2)



Figure 8 – Label Placement (Label 3)




Figure 9 – Label Placement (Labels 4 and 5)

## 7.2.3 Surface Preparation

Prior to affixing the labels, the front bezel must be attached, and the appliance surfaces must first be cleaned as follows:

- The label application areas on the grey faceplate must be cleaned with mild soap and water to remove any surface oils that may be present.
- The label application areas on the black enclosure and plated steel mesh can be cleaned in the same manner or with isopropyl alcohol.

After applying the labels, allow at least 72 hours for the label adhesive to cure.

## 7.2.4 Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals

The CO is responsible for:

- securing and having control at all times of any unused labels.
- maintaining direct control and observation of any changes to the module where the tamper-evident labels are removed or installed to ensure that the security of the module is maintained during such changes and that the module is returned to its Approved state.
- performing periodic inspection of the module for evidence of tampering (see the table in section 7.1) for details). The CO must visually inspect the tamper-evident labels for tears, rips, dissolved adhesive, and other signs of attempted tampering. If evidence of tampering is found during periodic inspection, the CO must zeroize the keys and contact Ribbon Customer Support.

## 7.2.5 Part Numbers

Additional labels can be requested directly from Ribbon (FIPS Physical Security Kit part no. 550-06508). To request additional labels, the CO can contact Ribbon Customer Service. The CO must be sure to include contact information and the shipping address, as well as the appliance serial number.

## 8. Non-Invasive Security

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This section is not applicable. There are currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques referenced in Annex F of *ISO/IEC 19790:2012*.

# 9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management

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## 9.1 Storage Areas

The table below lists sensitive security parameters (SSPs) storage areas for this module. Section 9.4 selects from the storage areas listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the “Storage” column if applicable to a specific SSP.

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
Flash Memory	Persistent storage of SSPs on flash memory	Static
RAM	Dynamic storage of SSPs on RAM	Dynamic
Spinning Media	Persistent storage of SSPs on spinning media	Static
SSD	Persistent storage of SSPs on SSD	Static
CDB on SSD	Persistent storage of SSPs in CDB on SSD	Static

Table 14: Storage Areas

## 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

The table below lists SSP input and output methods for this module. Section 9.4 selects from the input and output methods listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the “Inputs/Outputs” column if applicable to a specific SSP.

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
External to RAM via DER file format	External	RAM	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	
RAM to External via Encrypted Form	RAM	External	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	TLS v1.2
External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate	External	RAM	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading
RAM to External via Plaintext	RAM	External	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	TLS v1.2
External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH)	External	CDB on SSD	Encrypted	Manual	Electronic	SSH
External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS)	External	CDB on SSD	Encrypted	Manual	Electronic	TLS v1.2
RAM to External via Plaintext Certificate	RAM	External	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	TLS v1.2
Backup to External via TLS	CDB on SSD	External	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	TLS v1.2

Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods

## 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

The table below lists SSP zeroization methods for this module. Section 9.4 selects from the zeroization methods listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the “Zeroization” column if applicable to a specific SSP.

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Command via CLI or EMA	Zeroization upon command via CLI or EMA	Zeroize all SSPs (using CLI/EMA command to zeroize)	CLI or EMA
Reboot	Zeroization upon rebooting the module	Reboot to zeroize RAM	Reboot
Session Termination	Upon Session Termination	Upon Session Termination to zeroize session based SSPs	Terminate session

Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods

## 9.4 SSPs

The module supports the keys and other SSPs listed in the tables below. Note that all SSP imports and exports are electronic and performed within the module’s TOEPP.

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
Config Database (CBD) Key	Encryption of RSA and ECDSA private keys and pre-shared secrets for RADIUS in CDB	192 - 192	Symmetric Key - CSP	DRBG (Random bits)		CKG for CDB Key Generation
CA Public Key	Verification of Certificate Authority signatures	2048 - 112 bits	Public Key - PSP			RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading
ECDH Private Key	Input to ECDH shared secret computation	Between 224 and 512 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits	Private Key - CSP	IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2		IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2
ECDH Public Key	Used by peer for ECDH shared secret computation	Between 224 and 512 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits	Public Key - PSP	IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2		IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2
ECDH Peer Public Key	Input to ECDH shared secret computation	Between 224 and 512 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits	Public Key - PSP		IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2	IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2
DH Private Key	Input to DH shared secret computation	2048 or 3072 bits - 112 or 128 bits	Private Key - CSP	IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2		IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2
DH Public Key	Used by peer for DH shared secret computation	2048 or 3072 bits - 112 or 128 bits	Public Key - PSP	IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2		IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2
DH Peer Public Key	Input to DH shared secret computation	2048 or 3072 bits - 112 or 128 bits	Public Key - PSP		IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2	IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
IKE RSA Private Key	The key used in IKE authentication	2048 - 112 bits	Private Key - CSP	IPsec IKE		IPsec IKE
IKE RSA Public Key	The key used in IKE authentication	2048 - 112 bits	Public Key - PSP	IPsec IKE		IPsec IKE
IKE Pre-shared Secret	Used in the computation of the SKEYID during IKEv1 Phase 1	n/a - n/a	Shared Secret - CSP			IPsec IKE
IKE SKEYID	Used as input to IKEv1 KDF to derive IPsec Encryption Key and IPsec Authentication Key	112 minimum - 112 minimum	Keying material - CSP		IPsec IKE	IPsec IKE
IKE Shared Secret	Used as input to IKEv1 KDF to derive IPsec Encryption Key and IPsec Authentication Key	n/a - n/a	Shared Secret - CSP		IPsec IKE	IPsec IKE
IKE Encryption Key	Used during IKE Phase 2 to encrypt and decrypt its messages	128, 192, 256 - Between 128 and 256 bits	Secret Key - CSP	IPsec IKE		IPsec IKE
IKE Authentication Key	Used during IKE Phase 2 to authenticate its messages	160 bits - 112 minimum	Symmetric Key - CSP	IPsec IKE		IPsec IKE
IKE Key Derivation Key	Used by IKE KDFs for derivation of IPsec Encryption Key and IPsec Authentication Key	128, 192, 256 - Between 128 and 256 bits	Derivation Key - CSP	IPsec IKE		IPsec IKE
IPsec Shared Secret	Used by IKE KDFs for derivation of IPsec Encryption Key and IPsec Authentication Key	n/a - n/a	Shared Secret - CSP		IPsec IKE	IPsec IKE
IPsec Encryption Key	Used during IPsec for traffic protection	128, 192, 256 - Between 128 and 256 bits	Secret Key - CSP	IPsec IKE		IPsec IKE
IPsec Authentication Key	Used during IPsec for payload traffic verification	160 bits - 112 minimum	Secret Key - CSP	IPsec IKE		IPsec IKE
SSH Private Key	Authentication during SSH session negotiation	Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits	Private Key - CSP	SSH		SSH
SSH Public Key	Authentication by peer during SSH session negotiation	Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits	Public Key - PSP	SSH		SSH
SSH Peer Public Key	Authentication during SSH session negotiation 1024-bit key is used for signature verification only	Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits	Public Key - PSP		SSH	
SSH Session Key	Encryption and decryption of SSH session packets	128 or 256 bits - 128 or 256 bits	Secret Key - CSP		SSH	SSH
SSH Authentication Key	Authentication of SSH session packets	160 bits - 112 minimum	Secret Key - CSP		SSH	SSH
TLS Private Key	RSA/ECDSA certificate-based authentication during TLS key negotiation	Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits	Private Key - CSP	TLS v1.2		TLS v1.2

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
TLS Public Key	RSA/ECDSA certificate-based authentication during TLS key negotiation	Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits	Public Key - PSP	TLS v1.2		TLS v1.2
TLS Peer Public Key	RSA/ECDSA certificate-based authentication during TLS key negotiation	Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits	Public Key - PSP		TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2
TLS Session Key	Encryption and decryption of TLS session packets	128 or 256 bits - Between 128 or 256 bits	Secret Key - CSP		TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2
TLS Authentication Key	Authentication of TLS session packets	160 bits (minimum) - 112 minimum	Secret Key - CSP		TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2
SRTP Session Key	Encryption or decryption of SRTP session packets	128 or 256 bits - Between 128 or 256 bits	Secret Key - CSP		SRTP	SRTP
SRTP Authentication Key	Authentication of SRTP session packets	160 bits - 112 minimum	Secret Key - CSP		SRTP	SRTP
SFTP Private Key	Used for SFTP key negotiation	2048 - 112 bits	Private Key - CSP	SSH		SSH
SFTP Public Key	Used for SFTP key negotiation	1024 or 2048 bits - 112 bits	Public Key - PSP	SSH		SSH
SFTP Peer Public Key	Used for SFTP key negotiation	1024 or 2048 bits - 80 or 112 bits	Public Key - PSP		SSH	SSH
SNMPv3 Privacy Key	Encrypting SNMPv3 packets	128 bits - 128 bits	Secret Key - CSP			
SNMPv3 Authentication Key	SNMPv3 Authentication Key	160 bits (minimum) - 112 minimum	Secret Key - CSP			
Certificate Load Key	Decrypting PKCS #12 certificate files when imported from an external workstation	128 or 256 bits - Between 128 or 256 bits	Secret Key - CSP		PBKDF	RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading
SRTP Master Key	Peer Authentication; Input to SRTP KDF for derivation of the SRTP Session Key and SRTP Authentication Key	n/a - n/a	Secret Key - CSP			
SSH Shared Secret	Input to SSH KDF for derivation of the SSH Session Key and SSH Authentication Key	n/a - n/a	Shared Secret - CSP		SSH	SSH
TLS Pre-Master Secret	Input to TLS KDF for derivation of the TLS Master Secret	n/a - n/a	Pre-Master Secret - CSP	DRBG (Random bits)	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2
TLS Master Secret	Used by TLS KDF for derivation of the TLS Session Key and TLS Authentication Key	n/a - n/a	Master Secret - CSP		TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2
RADIUS Shared Secret	Peer authentication of RADIUS messages	n/a - n/a	Shared Secret - CSP			
DRBG Entropy Input String	Establishment of seed for CTR_DRBG	128 - 128	Entropy Input - CSP			DRBG (Random bits)

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
DRBG Seed	Generation of random number	256 - 256	Seed - CSP			DRBG (Random bits)
DRBG 'V' Value	State value for CTR_DRBG	128 - 128	Working state value - CSP		DRBG (Random bits)	
DRBG 'Key' Value	State value for CTR_DRBG	128 - 128	Working state value - CSP			
Crypto Officer password	Authenticating the Crypto Officer to the module	n/a - n/a	Password - CSP			
User password	Authenticating the User to the module	n/a - n/a	Password - CSP			
Image Verify Key	Verifying the RSA signature of the digest of a new image load package	2048 bits - 112 bits	Public Key - Neither			RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading
AES GCM IV	Initialization vector for the AES GCM key	96 bits - 112 bits	Initialization Vector - CSP	IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2		IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2

Table 17: SSP Table 1

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
Config Database (CBD) Key		SSD:Plaintext		Command via CLI or EMA	
CA Public Key	External to RAM via DER file format	RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot	Reboot	
ECDH Private Key		RAM:Plaintext	Session	Reboot Session Termination	
ECDH Public Key	RAM to External via Plaintext Certificate	RAM:Plaintext	Session	Reboot Session Termination	
ECDH Peer Public Key	External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate	RAM:Plaintext	Session	Reboot Session Termination	
DH Private Key		RAM:Plaintext	Session	Reboot Session Termination	
DH Public Key	RAM to External via Plaintext	RAM:Plaintext	Session	Reboot Session Termination	
DH Peer Public Key	External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate	RAM:Plaintext	Session	Reboot Session Termination	
IKE RSA Private Key		SSD:Encrypted	Until zeroized	Command via CLI or EMA	
IKE RSA Public Key		SSD:Encrypted	Until zeroized	Command via CLI or EMA	
IKE Pre-shared Secret	External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS)	RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
IKE SKEYID		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
IKE Shared Secret		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
IKE Encryption Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
IKE Authentication Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
IKE Key Derivation Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
IPsec Shared Secret		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
IPsec Encryption Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
IPsec Authentication Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
SSH Private Key		SSD:Plaintext		Command via CLI or EMA	
SSH Public Key		SSD:Plaintext		Command via CLI or EMA	
SSH Peer Public Key	External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate	RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
SSH Session Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
SSH Authentication Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
TLS Private Key	External to RAM via DER file format	SSD:Encrypted		Command via CLI or EMA	
TLS Public Key	External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate	SSD:Encrypted		Command via CLI or EMA	
TLS Peer Public Key	External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate	RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
TLS Session Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
TLS Authentication Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
SRTP Session Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
SRTP Authentication Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
SFTP Private Key		SSD:Encrypted		Command via CLI or EMA	

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
SFTP Public Key	External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate	SSD:Plaintext		Command via CLI or EMA	
SFTP Peer Public Key	External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate	RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
SNMPv3 Privacy Key	External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS) Backup to External via TLS	SSD:Encrypted		Command via CLI or EMA	
SNMPv3 Authentication Key	External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS) Backup to External via TLS	SSD:Encrypted		Command via CLI or EMA	
Certificate Load Key		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot	Reboot	
SRTP Master Key	RAM to External via Encrypted Form	RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
SSH Shared Secret		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
TLS Pre-Master Secret		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
TLS Master Secret		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot or session termination	Reboot Session Termination	
RADIUS Shared Secret	External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS)	SSD:Encrypted		Command via CLI or EMA	
DRBG Entropy Input String		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot	Reboot	
DRBG Seed		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot	Reboot	
DRBG 'V' Value		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot	Reboot	
DRBG 'Key' Value		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot	Reboot	
Crypto Officer password	External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS)	SSD:Encrypted		Command via CLI or EMA	
User password	External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS)	SSD:Encrypted		Command via CLI or EMA	
Image Verify Key	RAM to External via Encrypted Form External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate	Flash Memory:Plaintext Spinning Media:Plaintext		Command via CLI or EMA	
AES GCM IV		RAM:Plaintext	Until reboot	Reboot	

**Table 18: SSP Table 2**

## 9.5 Transitions

The following list specifies applicable transition periods or timeframes where an algorithm or key length transitions from Approved to non-Approved:

- SHA-1: The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031.

# 10. Self-Tests

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The module performs pre-operational self-tests and conditional self-tests. Pre-operational tests are performed between the time the cryptographic module is instantiated and before the module transitions to the operational state. Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and the error resolutions.

## 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The module performs the following pre-operational self-tests:

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5066)	HMAC-SHA2-256	Firmware integrity test	SW/FW Integrity	log message	Firmware Integrity Test

Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

## 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module performs the following conditional self-tests:

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-GCM (A5066)	256 bits	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Encrypt/Decrypt	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
Counter DRBG (A5066)	-	stantiate/generate/reseed KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	DRBG	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A5066)	2048-bit	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Sign/Verify	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	-P-224/K-233, SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Signature Generation	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	-P-224/K-233, SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Signature Verification	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
Entropy "Stuck" Test	-	Entropy "Stuck" Test	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	SP800-90B tests	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
Entropy Repetition Count Test	-	Entropy Repetition Count Test	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	SP800-90B tests	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
Entropy Adaptive Proportion Test	-	Entropy Adaptive Proportion Test	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	SP800-90B tests	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
Entropy Lag Test	-	Entropy Lag Test	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	SP800-90B tests	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
HMAC-SHA-1 (A5066)	SHA-1	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Hashed Message Authentication	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5066)	SHA2-224	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Hashed Message Authentication	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5066)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Hashed Message Authentication	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5066)	SHA2-384	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Hashed Message Authentication	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5066)	SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Hashed Message Authentication	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5066)	"Z" computation	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Primitive "Z" Computation	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5066)	"Z" computation	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Primitive 'Z' Computation	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	2048-bit, SHA2-256, PKCS #1	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Signature Generation	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A5066)	2048-bit, SHA2-256, PKCS #1	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Signature Verification	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
SHA3-256 (A4087)	256 bits	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Hashed Message Authentication	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence
KDF SRTP (A5068)	-128-bit	STRP KDF KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	STRP KDF Test	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
HMAC-SHA-1 (A5068)	128 bits	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Hashed Message Authentication	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
AES-CBC (A5068)	128 bits	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	AES CBC Encryption / AES CBC Decryption	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
AES-GCM (A5068)	256 bits	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Encrypt/Decrypt	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
KDF IKEv1 (A5067)	-	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Key Derivation	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
KDF SSH (A5069)	-	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Key Derivation	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
KDF TLS (A5070)	-	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Key Derivation	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	P-256	PCT	PCT	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Sign/Verify	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	2048-bit, SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Sign/Verify and Encrypt/Decrypt	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
DH Key Generation	-	PCT	PCT	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Key Generation	Conditional before first use.
ECDH Key Generation	-	PCT	PCT	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Key Generation	Conditional before first use.
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	2048-bit RSA signature verification	KAT	SW/FW Load	"Package Verification Failed" message upon soft error	RSA signature verification for firmware load integrity	Upon loading firmware from an external source
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A5066)	-	KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface	Encrypt/Decrypt	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.
PBKDF (A5066)		KAT	CAST	Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface.	Key Derivation	Performed during module's initial power-up sequence.

**Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests**

## 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

The operator may perform pre-operational and conditional self-tests on demand by issuing a reset/reboot command over the management interfaces of the module; rebooting the module; or power-cycling the module. On-demand self-test information for pre-operational and conditional self-tests are shown in the tables below.

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5066)	Firmware integrity test	SW/FW Integrity	On Demand	Manually (Reboot/reload)

**Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information**

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-GCM (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
Counter DRBG (A5066)	stantiate/generate/reseed KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
Entropy "Stuck" Test	Entropy "Stuck" Test	CAST	On Demand	Manual
Entropy Repetition Count Test	Entropy Repetition Count Test	CAST	On Demand	Manual
Entropy Adaptive Proportion Test	Entropy Adaptive Proportion Test	CAST	On Demand	Manual
Entropy Lag Test	Entropy Lag Test	CAST	On Demand	Manual
HMAC-SHA-1 (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
SHA3-256 (A4087)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
KDF SRTP (A5068)	STRP KDF KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
HMAC-SHA-1 (A5068)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
AES-CBC (A5068)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
AES-GCM (A5068)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
KDF IKEv1 (A5067)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
KDF SSH (A5069)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
KDF TLS (A5070)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	PCT	PCT	On Demand	Manual
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	PCT	PCT	On Demand	Manual
DH Key Generation	PCT	PCT	On Demand	Manual
ECDH Key Generation	PCT	PCT	On Demand	Manual
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5066)	KAT	SW/FW Load	On Demand	Manual
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual
PBKDF (A5066)	KAT	CAST	On Demand	Manual

Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information

## 10.4 Error States

The table below describes the error states and status indicators of the module.

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Soft Error	Upon failure of the conditional firmware load test	Failure of the conditional firmware load test	Reject firmware load operation.	log file entry / console message

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Critical Error	Upon failure of any other pre-operational self-test or conditional self-test	Failure of any other pre-operational self-test or conditional self-test	Reboot or reload module	log file entry / console message

**Table 23: Error States**

## 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests

The operator may initiate self-tests on demand by issuing a reset/reboot command over the management interfaces of the module; rebooting the module; or power-cycling the module.

# 11. Life-Cycle Assurance

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## 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

### 11.1.1 Secure Installation

The SBC 5400 Session Border Controller is delivered in an uninitialized factory state. The CO shall be responsible for performing all initial setup activities, including configuring the platform and installing the SBC application firmware. For detailed guidance regarding these activities, please see the [SBC Core 10.1.x Documentation](#) webpage on Ribbon's online Documentation and Support Portal and refer to the following document entries:

- [EMA User Guide](#)
- [CLI Reference Guide](#)

The CO shall also be responsible for configuring the module as a FIPS-recognized module, ensuring that it operates in its Approved mode. For these activities, physical access to the module shall be limited to the Crypto Officer.

Before the product can be considered a FIPS-recognized module, the CO must place tamper-evident labels on the module. To apply the labels, the CO must follow the application guidance provided in section 7.2 of this document.

The next setup steps are to configure the management interfaces and to install the SBC application firmware. To setup the SBC 5400, the CO must follow the instructions found under the online document entry "[Installing SBC 5400 Hardware](#)", which provides detailed guidance for installing rack mount kits, mounting the SBC chassis, attaching the front bezel, connecting cables (for media, high availability, and power), and powering on the SBC.

Once these steps have been completed, the Crypto Officer must then perform the FIPS-specific activities required to initialize the module into Approved mode.

### 11.1.2 Initialization

Prior to initializing the module for operation in the Approved mode, SNMPv3 must be reconfigured. All trap targets with securityLevel set for authPriv and authNoPriv must be disabled. The following steps using the CLI provide an example:

```
% show oam snmp trapTarget EMS_-10.54.71.176
ipAddress 10.54.71.176;
port 162;
trapType v3;
targetUsername emstrapuser;
targetSecurityLevel authPriv;
state enabled;

% set oam snmp trapTarget EMS_-10.54.71.176 state disabled
% commit
```

To initialize the module for operation in the Approved mode, the CO may use the CLI or the EMA. The sections below describe these initialization methods.

### **11.1.2.1 Initialization using CLI**

When using the CLI, the CO shall complete the following procedure:

1. Log in to the CLI using the default username “admin” and password “admin”.
2. Switch to “configure private” mode using the following command:

```
> configure private
```

3. Execute the following commands:

```
% set profiles security tlsProfile defaultTlsProfile v1_0 disabled v1_1 disabled v1_2 enabled
% set profiles security EmaTlsProfile defaultEmaTlsProfile v1_0 disabled v1_1 disabled v1_2 enabled
% set profiles security ikeProtectionProfile AesSha1IKEProfile algorithms dhGroup modp2048
% set oam snmp version v3only
% set system admin <system_name> fips-140-3 mode enabled
% commit
```

**NOTE:** Once the “fips-140-3 mode” is set to ‘enabled’, it cannot be disabled through the configuration. A fresh software installation is required to set the operational mode back to ‘disabled’.

Setting “fips-140-3 mode” to ‘enabled’ accomplishes the following:

- regenerates all SSH keys.
- regenerates encryption keys used by the system configuration database.
- zeroizes all persistent CSPs from the system and causes the server to reboot after confirmation.

### **11.1.2.2 Initialization using EMA + CLI**

The EMA does not include all of the commands necessary to enable/disable the Approved mode. The user must use the CLI to complete the procedure. When using the EMA and CLI, the CO shall complete the following procedure:

1. Log in to the EMA using the default username “admin” and password “admin”.
2. Navigate to **All -> Profiles -> Security -> TLS Profile**. The **TLS Profile** window is displayed, with the **TLS Profile List** pane.
3. Select the radio button corresponding to the defaultTlsProfile. The **Edit Selected TLS Profile** pane is displayed.
4. Set the fields V1\_0 and V1\_1 to “Disabled”. Set the field V1\_2 to “Enabled”. Click **Save** to save the changes.
5. Navigate to **All -> Profiles -> Security -> EMA TLS Profile**. The **EMA TLS Profile** window is displayed, with the **EMA TLS Profile List** pane.
6. Select the radio button corresponding to the defaultEmaTlsProfile. The **Edit Selected EMA TLS Profile** pane is displayed.
7. Set the fields V1\_0 and V1\_1 to “Disabled”. Set the field V1\_2 to “Enabled”. Click **Save** to save the changes.
8. Navigate to **All -> OAM -> Snmp**. The **Snmp** window is displayed, with the **Edit Snmp** pane.
9. Set the Version field to “V3only”. Click **Save** to save the changes.
10. Log in to the CLI and execute the following commands:

```
% set system admin <system_name> fips-140-3 mode enabled
% commit
```

Setting “fips-140-3 mode” to ‘enabled’ accomplishes the following:

- regenerates all SSH keys.
- regenerates encryption keys used by the system configuration database.
- zeroizes all persistent CSPs from the system and causes the server to reboot after confirmation.

## 11.1.3 Startup

After completion and confirmation of the above steps, the system will reboot. After this reboot, and on all subsequent reboots, the module will be in its Approved mode.

The following steps are required for module startup.

### 11.1.3.1 Restoring EMA in Platform Mode

To restore service to the EMA in Platform Mode after “fips-140-3 mode” is set to ‘enabled’, CA certificates and newly-generated SBC certificates must be imported using the CLI.

- Import CA Certificates – Use the following procedure to import up to twenty CA certificates and associate them with the EmaTlsProfile named "defaultEmaTlsProfile."

```
> configure private
% set system security pki certificate intermediateCaCert fileName intCaCert.der state enabled type
remote
% set system security pki certificate rootCaCert fileName rootCaCert.der state enabled type remote
% commit
% set profiles security EmaTlsProfile defaultEmaTlsProfile ClientCaCert intermediateCaCert
% set profiles security EmaTlsProfile defaultEmaTlsProfile ClientCaCert rootCaCert
% commit
```

- Import SBC Certificates – The SBC enables importing SBC server certificates generated with either of two different methods: those generated externally and those generated locally in the SBC.

Use the following procedure to import an externally-generated SBC key and certificate in PKCS#12 format:

1. Transfer the PKCS#12 formatted key/certificate file to the SBC and save it as opt/sonus/external/<filename>.p12.
2. Install the certificate using the following steps (the following example uses a certificate named "sbxCert.p12" with a passPhrase "sonus"):

```
> configure private
% set system security pki certificate sbxCert fileName sbxCert.p12 passPhrase sonus state
enabled type
local
% commit
% set profiles security EmaTlsProfile defaultEmaTlsProfile serverCertName sbxCert
% commit
```

Use the following procedure to generate an SBC key and CSR locally in the SBC, and then import as a PEM externally-signed certificate: The CO shall ensure that only keys providing at least 112 bits of encryption strength are used for signing certificate requests.

1. Generate a CSR:

```
> configure private
% set system security pki certificate sbxCert type local-internal
% commit
% exit

> request system security pki certificate sbxCert generateCSR keySize keySize2K csrSub
"/C=US/ST=MA/L=Westford/O=Sonus Networks Inc./CN=www.sonusnet.com"
```

2. Copy the CSR output from the request in step 1 and obtain a signed certificate in a PEM formatted file from the appropriate Certificate Authority.
3. Transfer the certificate to the SBC and save it as /opt/sonus/external/<filename>.pem.
4. Install the certificate using the following steps (the following example uses the certificate file name "sbxCert.pem"):

```
> configure private
% set system security pki certificate sbxCert fileName sbxCert.pem
% commit
% set profiles security EmaTlsProfile defaultEmaTlsProfile serverCertName sbxCert
% commit
```

### **11.1.3.2 Reconfiguring SNMP Keys**

After “fips-140-3 mode” is set to ‘enabled’, the SNMP Authentication Keys and SNMPv3 Privacy Keys must be reconfigured for all SNMPv3 users (this applies to all SNMPv3 users for authPriv/authNoPriv security level trap targets).

1. Use the following CLI commands to reconfigure the keys:

```
% set oam snmp users <username> authKey <colon separated hex string>
% set oam snmp users <username> privKey <colon separated hex string>
% commit
```

2. Enable the authPriv/authNoPriv trap targets:

```
% set oam snmp trapTarget <trap_target_name> state enabled
% commit
```

## **11.2 Administrator Guidance**

The Crypto Officer shall receive the module from Ribbon via trusted couriers (e.g., United Parcel Service, Federal Express, and Roadway). On receipt, the Crypto Officer must check the package for any irregular tears or openings. If any such damage exists, the CO shall indicate that on the shipping document of the carrier and contact Ribbon Communications, Inc. immediately for instructions. The CO shall retain the packing list, making sure all items on the list are present (including all the components of the universal rack mount kit that is shipped with the module).

The Crypto Officer is responsible for initialization and security-relevant configuration and management of the module. Once installed, commissioned, and configured, the Crypto Officer is responsible for maintaining and monitoring the status of the module to ensure that it is running in its Approved mode. For additional details regarding the general management of the module, please refer to the appropriate entries on Ribbon’s [SBC Core 10.1.x Documentation](#) webpage.

## 11.2.1 Status Information

Operational mode status of the module can be viewed by navigating to **Administration -> Users and Application Management -> Fips-140-3** from the SBC main screen via the EMA and selecting the desired SBC system from the dropdown menu. When running in Approved mode, the radio button marked “Enabled” will be selected.

The Crypto Officer shall monitor the module’s status regularly. If any irregular activity is noticed, or the module is consistently reporting errors, customers should contact Ribbon Customer Support.

## 11.2.2 Versioning Information

The module’s versioning information can be viewed by navigating to **Monitoring -> Dashboard -> System Status** from the SBC main screen via the EMA. The System Status window display will include the hardware type and SBC application version, which can be correlated with the module name and firmware version (respectively) on the module’s validation record.

## 11.2.3 Firmware Loading

Procedures for loading a new module image can be found under the appropriate entries on Ribbon’s [Upgrading SBC Core Software](#) webpage.

## 11.2.4 High Availability Configuration

When configuring the module for high availability, the active instance and the standby instance must be directly connected with no intervening systems for operation in the Approved mode. For connection details, refer to the instructions found under the online document entry “[Setting Up Physical Connection Between High Availability Nodes](#)”.

## 11.2.5 Additional Administrator Policies and Guidance

This section notes additional policies below that must be followed by the CO:

- Once the “fips-140-3 mode” is set to ‘enabled’, it cannot be disabled through the configuration. A fresh software installation is required to set the operational mode back to ‘disabled’.
- To ensure correct functioning and compliance with this Security Policy, module operators must use phones that support TLS v1.2.
- When using local certificate management mode, certificates are first stored in encrypted form on the external workstation prior to being sent to the module via SSH. To ensure that the certificate file can be properly decrypted and installed once sent to the module, module operators must ensure the following:
  - The encryption algorithm used on the external workstation must be 128-bit AES in CBC mode, and the salt length used on the external workstation as input to the PBKDF2 must be 128 bits.

- As the Certificate Load Key used by the module to decrypt the loaded certificate is established using PBKDF2 as specified in *NIST SP 800-132*, the same passphrase that was used on the external workstation must be entered into the module in order to derive the correct key.

## 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

With the exception of the User password, User role operators do not have the ability to configure sensitive information on the module. The User must be diligent to select strong passwords in adherence to the password complexity policies set by the CO from section 4.1 and must not reveal their password to anyone. Additionally, the User should be careful to protect any secret or private keys in their possession.

## 11.4 Design and Rules

By design, the module follows or enforces the following rules of operation:

- The module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
- An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
- The module performs all self-tests without any operator action required.
- The module inhibits data output during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
- Status information output by the module does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
- The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
- The module does not support manual SSP establishment methods.
- The module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
- The module does not output intermediate key values.
- The module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.

## 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks

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The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 2 requirements for this validation. Therefore, per *ISO/IEC 19790:2012* section 7.12, requirements for this section are not applicable.

# Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations

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Table 24 provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document.

**Table 24. Acronyms and Abbreviations**

Term	Definition
<b>AES</b>	Advanced Encryption Standard
<b>CBC</b>	Cipher Block Chaining
<b>CCCS</b>	Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
<b>CMVP</b>	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
<b>CO</b>	Cryptographic Officer
<b>CPU</b>	Central Processing Unit
<b>CSP</b>	Critical Security Parameter
<b>CTR</b>	Counter
<b>CVL</b>	Component Validation List
<b>DES</b>	Data Encryption Standard
<b>DH</b>	Diffie-Hellman
<b>DRBG</b>	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
<b>ECB</b>	Electronic Code Book
<b>ECC CDH</b>	Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
<b>ECDH</b>	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
<b>ECDSA</b>	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
<b>EMI/EMC</b>	Electromagnetic Interference /Electromagnetic Compatibility
<b>FIPS</b>	Federal Information Processing Standard
<b>GCM</b>	Galois/Counter Mode
<b>GMAC</b>	Galois Message Authentication Code
<b>GPC</b>	General-Purpose Computer
<b>HMAC</b>	(keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
<b>KAS</b>	Key Agreement Scheme
<b>KAT</b>	Known Answer Test
<b>KTS</b>	Key Transport Scheme
<b>KW</b>	Key Wrap
<b>KWP</b>	Key Wrap with Padding
<b>NIST</b>	National Institute of Standards and Technology
<b>OS</b>	Operating System
<b>PCT</b>	Pairwise Consistency Test

Term	Definition
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standard
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS	Secure Hash Standard
SP	Special Publication

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