

AudioCodes Ltd.

Mediant 800 Session Border Controller/Media Gateway,
Mediant 2600/4000B/9080B Session Border Controllers, and
MediaPack 1288 Media Gateway

Hardware Models: Mediant 800 (P/N GGWC00001), Mediant 2600 (P/N GTPM00769), Mediant 4000B (P/N GTPM00894), Mediant 9080B (P/N GGWZ00047), and MediaPack 1288 (P/N GTPM01021)

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Abstract

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Mediant 800 Session Border Controller/Media Gateway, Mediant 2600/4000B/9080B Session Border Controllers, and MediaPack 1288 Media Gateway (firmware version: 7.6) from AudioCodes Ltd. (AudioCodes). This Security Policy describes how the Mediant SBCs and Media Gateways meet the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which details the U.S. and Canadian government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the [Cryptographic Module Validation Program \(CMVP\) website](#), which is maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS).

This document also describes how to run the module in an Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-3 validation of the module. The Mediant SBCs and Media Gateways are referred to in this document collectively as the module.

References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:

- The AudioCodes website (www.audicodes.com) contains information on the full line of products from AudioCodes.
- The search page on the CMVP website (<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/Validated-Modules/Search>) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact information for technical or sales-related questions about the module.

Document Organization

ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B uses the same section naming convention as *ISO/IEC 19790* section 7 - Security requirements. For example, Annex B section B.2.1 is named “General” and B.2.2 is named “Cryptographic module specification,” which is the same as *ISO/IEC 19790* section 7.1 and section 7.2, respectively. Therefore, the format of this Security Policy is presented in the same order as indicated in Annex B, starting with “General” and ending with “Mitigation of other attacks.” If sections are not applicable, they have been marked as such in this document.

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1. General

AudioCodes Ltd. (hereafter referred to as AudioCodes) is a leading vendor of advanced networking and media processing solutions for the digital workplace. The AudioCodes Mediant family of Session Border Controllers (SBCs) and Media Gateways (GWs) offer a line of versatile IP¹ communications platforms that connect VoIP² and TDM³ networks, built on years of carrier-grade VoIP deployments and expertise. AudioCodes's SBCs and Media Gateway provide the interoperability, security and quality assurance that service providers need to connect their enterprise and residential customers reliably and securely to SIP⁴ trunk and hosted telephony services.

The Mediant SBCs and Media Gateways form an effective demarcation point between a business's VoIP network and the service provider's SIP trunk, performing SIP protocol mediation and media handling (interoperability), and securing the enterprise VoIP network. They can function as a peering SBC, access SBC, or enterprise SBC.

- The Mediant 800 (see Figure 1) is a hybrid SBC and media gateway that offers a complete connectivity solution for small-to-medium sized enterprises. It supports up to 400 SBC sessions.



Figure 1 – Mediant 800

- The Mediant 2600 (see Figure 2) is an enterprise session border controller (E-SBC) designed to serve medium-sized businesses. It supports up to 600 concurrent sessions.



Figure 2 – Mediant 2600

- The Mediant 4000 (see Figure 3) is a mid-to-high scale capacity SBC designed for deployment in large organizations and as an access SBC for service providers. It supports up to 5,000 concurrent SBC sessions.

¹ IP – Internet Protocol

² VoIP – Voice Over Internet Protocol

³ TDM – Time-Division Multiplexing

⁴ SIP – Session Initiation Protocol



Figure 3 – Mediant 4000

- The Mediant 9080 (see Figure 4) is a high-capacity SBC designed for deployment in large enterprise and contact center locations, and as access and peering SBCs for service provider environments. It supports up to 70,000 SBC sessions.



Figure 4 – Mediant 9080

- The MediaPack 1288 (see Figure 5) is a hybrid SBC that provides a high-density analog media gateway. It offers a cost-effective solution for organizations transitioning to all-IP that need to integrate large numbers of analog devices (such as legacy phones, fax machines and modems) into their new infrastructure. It supports 300 SBC sessions.



Figure 5 – MediaPack 1288

The Mediant 800, Mediant 2600, Mediant 4000B, and Mediant 9080B are 1U⁵ devices; the MediaPack 1288 is a 3U device. The Mediant SBCs and Media Gateways are IP encryption appliances with proven performance, resiliency, and security featuring real-time encryption (VoIP signaling and media traffic), DSP⁶-based media

⁵ U – Rack Unit

⁶ DSP – Digital Signal Processing

transcoding, a flexible and intuitive SIP routing engine, and an integrated WebRTC gateway. Some of the network and security features provided by the SBCs include:

- SIP B2BUA⁷
- SIP Interworking
- Extensive PBX⁸ interoperability
- Transport Mediation between SIP over UDP⁹/TCP¹⁰/TLS¹¹/WebSocket, IPv4/IPv6, RTP¹²/SRTP¹³ SDES¹⁴/DTLS¹⁵
- Header Manipulation
- Local and far-end NAT¹⁶ traversal
- Integrated WebRTC gateway with support for WebSocket, Opus, VP8¹⁷ video coder, lite ICE¹⁸, DTLS, RTP multiplexing, and secure RTCP¹⁹ with feedback
- Denial of service protection with DoS²⁰/DDoS²¹ line rate protection,
- VOIP firewall and deep packet inspections with rogue RTP detection and prevention
- Encryption and authentication with support for TLS, DTLS, SRTP, HTTPS²², SSH²³, SFTP²⁴, and SNMP²⁵
- Topology hiding and user privacy
- Traffic separation with VLAN²⁶/physical interface separation for multiple media, control and OAMP²⁷ interfaces
- Call Admission Control
- Full Quality of Experience (QoE) monitoring: Jitter, Packet Loss, Delay and MOS²⁸

Management of the module is accomplished via the following methods:

- Command Line Interface (CLI), which is accessible using the following means:
 - remotely via SSH over Ethernet management ports
 - locally via direct attachment to the RS-232 serial port using a VT100 terminal or a general-purpose computer with a terminal emulation program
 - locally via direct attachment using a VGA monitor and USB-enabled keyboard (Mediant 9080B only)

⁷ B2BUA – Back-to-Back User Agent

⁸ PBX – Private Branch Exchange

⁹ UDP – User Datagram Protocol

¹⁰ TCP – Transport Control Protocol

¹¹ TLS – Transport Layer Security

¹² RTP – Real-time Transport Protocol

¹³ SRTP – Secure Real-time Transport Protocol

¹⁴ SDES – Session Description Protocol Security Descriptions

¹⁵ DTLS – Datagram Transport Layer Security

¹⁶ NAT – Network Address Translation

¹⁷ VP8 – Video coding format developed by Google

¹⁸ ICE – Interactive Connectivity Establishment

¹⁹ RTCP – Real-Time Transport Control Protocol

²⁰ DoS – Denial of Service

²¹ DoS/DDoS – Denial-of-Service/Distributed Denial-of-Service

²² HTTPS – Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure

²³ SSH – Secure Shell

²⁴ SFTP – SSH (or Secure) File Transfer Protocol

²⁵ SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol

²⁶ VLAN – Virtual Local Area Network

²⁷ OAMP – Operations, Administration, Maintenance, and Provisioning

²⁸ MOS – Mean Opinion Score

- Web-based Graphical User Interface (GUI) called the Web Interface, which is accessible remotely via HTTPS over Ethernet management ports.
- SNMPv3 operations, which are used for remote configuration and obtaining information about the module's state and statistics.
- INI Configuration file, which is a text-based file with .ini file extension containing configuration settings. This file may be loaded to the SBC using SNMPv3 or by using the CLI (over SSH) or Web Interface for automatic configuration/commissioning.

These management interfaces provide authorized operators access to the module for configuration and management of all facets of the module's operation, including system configuration, troubleshooting, security, and service provisioning. Using any of the management interfaces, an operator is able to monitor, configure, control, receive report events, and retrieve logs from the modules.

To support TLS and SSH, the following types of RSA certificates may be imported to the module using the module's Web Interface (over TLS) or CLI (over SSH):

- X.509 certificate file – plaintext base64 encoded PEM²⁹ format. These files contain public keys only, while the matching private key is contained in the associated RSA private key file.
- RSA private key file – plaintext base64 encoded PEM format. These files contain the private key associated with the RSA public key in the X.509 certificate file.
- Root certificate file (CA Public keys) – chains of X.509 certificates in plaintext base64 encoded PEM format. These are used to validate peer certificates and serve as a possible chain used for self-signed certificates to be sent to the peer. The Root certificate file contains public keys only; they do not contain the associated private keys.

The module generates RSA keypairs and Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs). The CSR is signed with the module's private key and then sent to a CA. The CA then signs the certificate and sends it back, where it is then installed for use. The module also generates self-signed certificates corresponding to the internally generated RSA keypairs.

The module provides the option to import certain CSPs by loading a text-based file with a *.ini file extension (INI file) in encrypted form using the module's Web Interface (over TLS) or CLI (over SSH). The module also supports an Automated Update mechanism whereby an INI file is downloaded from a server over HTTPS. The CSPs that may be imported through an INI file are indicated as such in Table 12.

The Mediant SBCs and Media Gateways are validated at the FIPS 140-3 section levels shown in Table 1.

Table 1 – Security Levels

| ISO/IEC 24579 Section 6. [Number Below] | FIPS 140-3 Section Title | Security Level |
|--|------------------------------------|----------------|
| 1 | General | 1 |
| 2 | Cryptographic Module Specification | 1 |

²⁹ PEM – Privacy Enhanced Mail

| ISO/IEC 24579 Section 6. [Number Below] | FIPS 140-3 Section Title | Security Level |
|--|---|----------------|
| 3 | Cryptographic Module Interfaces | 1 |
| 4 | Roles, Services, and Authentication | 1 |
| 5 | Software/Firmware Security | 1 |
| 6 | Operational Environment | 1 |
| 7 | Physical Security | 1 |
| 8 | Non-Invasive Security | N/A |
| 9 | Sensitive Security Parameter Management | 1 |
| 10 | Self-tests | 1 |
| 11 | Life-Cycle Assurance | 1 |
| 12 | Mitigation of Other Attacks | N/A |

The module has an overall security level of 1.

2. Cryptographic Module Specification

The Mediant SBCs and Media Gateways represent a hardware module with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The sections below describe the operational environments, algorithm implementations, module boundary, and modes of operation.

2.1 Operational Environments

Table 2 below lists the module configuration(s) used for validation testing.

Table 2 – Cryptographic Module Tested Configurations

| Model | Hardware [Part Number and Version] | Firmware Version | Distinguishing Features |
|----------------|------------------------------------|------------------|--|
| Mediant 800 | GGWC00001 | 7.6 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPU: Cavium OCTEON PLUS CN50XX • LAN Interfaces: 4 GE or 4 GE + 8 FE interfaces configured in 1+1 redundancy or as individual ports |
| Mediant 2600 | GTPM00769 | 7.6 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPU: Cavium OCTEON II CN66XX • LAN Interfaces: 8 x 100/1000 Base-T Ethernet ports • Power: Dual AC power supplies |
| Mediant 4000B | GTPM00894 | 7.6 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPU: Cavium OCTEON II CN66XX • LAN Interfaces: 8 x 100/1000 Base-T Ethernet ports • Power: Dual AC power supplies |
| Mediant 9080B | GGWZ00047 | 7.6 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPU: Intel Xeon Gold 6226R • LAN Interfaces: 1Gb/10Gb Ethernet ports |
| MediaPack 1288 | GTPM01021 | 7.6 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPU: Cavium OCTEON PLUS CN50XX • LAN Interfaces: Dual Redundant 10/100/1000 Base-T Ethernet ports |

2.2 Algorithm Implementations

The module employs the cryptographic algorithm implementations from the sources listed in Table 3 below.

Table 3 – Cryptographic Algorithm Sources

| Certificate Number | Implementation Name | Version | Use |
|-----------------------|---|---------|--|
| A2389 | AudioCodes Mediant Session Border Controller KDF Library | 7.6 | Provides implementations for TLS, SNMP, SRTP, and SSH key derivation functions |
| A2390 | AudioCodes Mediant Session Border Controller Entropy Library | 7.6 | Provides SHA3 for entropy generation |
| A2391 | AudioCodes Mediant Session Border Controller Cryptographic Accelerator Module | 7.6 | Provides hardware-accelerated implementations for AES, RSA, and SHA |

| Certificate Number | Implementation Name | Version | Use |
|-----------------------|--|---------|---|
| A2392 | AudioCodes Mediant Session Border Controller Cryptographic Accelerator KDF | 7.6 | Provides hardware-accelerated implementations for TLS, SNMP, SRTP, and SSH key derivation functions |
| A2544 | AudioCodes Mediant Session Border Controller Cryptographic Library | 7.6 | Provides implementations for general-purpose cryptographic primitives |

*The Crypto Accelerator and KDF Accelerator implementations are provided by the Cavium chip; they are not available on the Intel-based M9080.

Validation certificates for each Approved security function are listed in Table 4. The module also includes implementations that are used solely to support self-tests; only the implementations in the table below are used by the module during operation.

Table 4 – Approved Algorithms

| CAVP Cert ³⁰ | Algorithm and Standard | Mode / Method | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function |
|---|--|----------------------------|---|--|
| AudioCodes Mediant Session Border Controller KDF Library | | | | |
| A2389 | KDF³¹ SNMP CVL ³² SP 800-135rev1 | SNMP KDF | Password Length: 64-800 Increment 8 | Key Derivation <i>No part of the SNMP protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.</i> |
| A2389 | KDF SRTP CVL SP 800-135rev1 | SRTP KDF | 128, 256 | Key Derivation <i>No part of the SRTP protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.</i> |
| A2389 | KDF SSH CVL SP 800-135rev1 | SSH KDF | AES-128 (SHA-1, SHA2-256) | Key Derivation <i>No part of the SSH protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.</i> |
| A2389 | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC³³ 7627 CVL SP 800-135rev1 RFC 7627 | TLS ³⁴ v1.2 KDF | SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | Key Derivation <i>No part of the TLS protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.</i> |

³⁰ This table includes vendor-affirmed algorithms that are approved but CAVP testing is not yet available.

³¹ KDF – Key Derivation Function

³² CVL – Component Validation List

³³ RFC – Request for Comments

³⁴ TLS – Transport Layer Security

| CAVP Cert ³⁰ | Algorithm and Standard | Mode / Method | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function |
|--|---|---------------|---|--|
| A2389 | TLS v1.3 KDF CVL <i>SP 800-135rev1</i> <i>RFC 8446</i> | TLS v1.3 KDF | SHA2-256, SHA2-384 | Key Derivation <i>No part of the TLS protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.</i> |
| AudioCodes Mediant Session Border Controller Entropy Library | | | | |
| A2390 | SHA3-256 <i>FIPS PUB 202</i> | SHA3-256 | Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | Conditioning function for entropy |
| AudioCodes Mediant Session Border Controller Cryptographic Accelerator Module | | | | |
| A2391 | AES³⁵-CBC³⁶ <i>FIPS PUB 197</i> <i>NIST SP 800-38A</i> | CBC | 128, 256 | Encryption/Decryption |
| A2391 | AES-CFB128³⁷ <i>FIPS PUB 197</i> <i>NIST SP 800-38A</i> | CFB128 | 128, 192, 256 | Encryption/Decryption |
| A2391 | AES-CTR³⁸ <i>FIPS PUB 197</i> <i>NIST SP 800-38A</i> | CTR | 128, 256 | Encryption/Decryption |
| A2391 | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) <i>FIPS PUB 186-4</i> | PKCS#1 v1.5 | 2048, 3072, 4096 (SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) | Digital Signature Generation |
| A2391 | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) <i>FIPS PUB 186-4</i> | PKCS#1 v1.5 | 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 (SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) | Digital Signature Verification |
| A2391 | SHA-1 <i>FIPS PUB 180-4</i> | SHA-1 | Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | Message Digest |
| A2391 | SHA2-256 <i>FIPS PUB 180-4</i> | SHA2-256 | Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8 | Message Digest |
| AudioCodes Mediant Session Border Controller Cryptographic Accelerator KDF | | | | |
| A2392 | KDF SNMP CVL <i>SP 800-135rev1</i> | SNMP KDF | Password Length: 64-800 Increment 8 | Key Derivation <i>No part of the SNMP protocol, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.</i> |
| A2392 | KDF SRTP CVL <i>SP 800-135rev1</i> | SRTP KDF | 128, 256 | Key Derivation <i>No part of the SRTP protocol, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.</i> |

³⁵ AES – Advanced Encryption Scheme³⁶ CBC – Cipher Book Chaining³⁷ CFB – Cipher Feedback³⁸ CTR – Counter

| CAVP Cert ³⁰ | Algorithm and Standard | Mode / Method | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function |
|-------------------------|--|---------------|---|---|
| A2392 | KDF SSH CVL <i>SP 800-135rev1</i> | SSH KDF | AES-128 (SHA-1, SHA2-256) | Key Derivation <i>No part of the SSH protocol, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.</i> |
| A2392 | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC 7627 CVL <i>SP 800-135rev1</i> <i>RFC 7627</i> | TLS v1.2 KDF | SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | Key Derivation <i>No part of the TLS protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.</i> |
| A2392 | TLS v1.3 KDF CVL <i>SP 800-135rev1</i> <i>RFC 8446</i> | TLS v1.3 KDF | SHA2-256, SHA2-384 | Key Derivation <i>No part of the TLS protocol, other than the KDF, has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.</i> |

AudioCodes Mediant Session Border Controller Cryptographic Library

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|---------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| A2544 | AES-CBC <i>FIPS PUB 197</i> <i>NIST SP 800-38A</i> | CBC | 128, 256 | Encryption/Decryption |
| A2544 | AES-CCM³⁹ <i>NIST SP 800-38C</i> | CCM | 128, 256 | Encryption/Decryption |
| A2544 | AES-CFB128 <i>FIPS PUB 197</i> <i>NIST SP 800-38A</i> | CFB128 | 128, 192, 256 | Encryption/Decryption |
| A2544 | AES-CTR <i>FIPS PUB 197</i> <i>NIST SP 800-38A</i> | CTR | 128, 256 | Encryption/Decryption |
| A2544 | AES-GCM⁴⁰ <i>NIST SP 800-38D</i> | GCM | 128, 256 | Encryption/Decryption |
| A2544 | Counter DRBG⁴¹ <i>NIST SP 800-90Arev1</i> | Counter-based | 256-bit AES-CTR | Deterministic random bit generation |
| A2544 | DSA⁴² KeyGen (FIPS186-4) <i>FIPS PUB 186-4</i> | DSA KeyGen | 2048/256 | Key Pair Generation |
| A2544 | ECDSA⁴³ KeyGen (FIPS186-4) <i>FIPS PUB 186-4</i> | ECDSA KeyGen | P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Secrets generation mode: Testing candidates | Key Pair Generation |
| A2544 | ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4) <i>FIPS PUB 186-4</i> | ECDSA KeyVer | P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 | Public Key Verification |
| A2544 | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) <i>FIPS PUB 186-4</i> | ECDSA SigVer | P-256 (SHA2-256) | Digital Signature Verification |

³⁹ CCM – Counter with Cipher Block Chaining - Message Authentication Code⁴⁰ GCM – Galois Counter Mode⁴¹ DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator⁴² DSA – Digital Signature Algorithm⁴³ ECDSA – Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

| CAVP Cert ³⁰ | Algorithm and Standard | Mode / Method | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function |
|---|---|------------------------------|---|--|
| A2544 | HMAC-SHA-1 <i>FIPS PUB 198-1</i> | SHA-1 | MAC: 32, 80, 160 Key Length: 160 | Message Authentication <i>The module also supports HMAC SHA-1-32 and HMAC SHA-1-80.</i> |
| A2544 | HMAC-SHA2-256 <i>FIPS PUB 198-1</i> | SHA2-256 | MAC: 256 Key Length: 256 | Message Authentication |
| A2544 | HMAC-SHA2-384 <i>FIPS PUB 198-1</i> | SHA2-384 | MAC: 384 Key Length: 384 | Message Authentication |
| A2544 | KAS-ECC-SSC⁴⁴ SP800-56Arev3 <i>NIST SP 800-56Arev3</i> | ephemeralUnified | P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 | Shared Secret Computation |
| A2544 | KAS-FFC-SSC⁴⁵ SP800-56Arev3 <i>NIST SP 800-56Arev3</i> | dhEphem | FC (2048/256), ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, MODP-2048 | Shared Secret Computation |
| A2544 | RSA⁴⁶ KeyGen (FIPS186-4) <i>FIPS PUB 186-4</i> | RSA KeyGen | Key generation mode: B.3.3 2048, 3072, 4096 | Key Pair Generation |
| A2544 | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) <i>FIPS PUB 186-4</i> | PKCS#1 v1.5 | 2048, 3072, 4096 (SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) | Digital Signature Generation |
| A2544 | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) <i>FIPS PUB 186-4</i> | PKCS#1 v1.5 | 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 (SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) | Digital Signature Verification |
| A2544 | Safe Primes Key Generation <i>NIST SP 800-56Arev3, Appendix D</i> | Safe Primes Key Generation | ffdhe2048, fdhe3072, MODP-2048 | Key Generation |
| A2544 | Safe Primes Key Verification <i>NIST SP 800-56Arev3, Appendix D</i> | Safe Primes Key Verification | ffdhe2048, fdhe3072, MODP-2048 | Key Verification |
| A2544 | SHA-1 <i>FIPS PUB 180-4</i> | SHA | SHA-1 | Message Digest |
| A2544 | SHA2-224 <i>FIPS PUB 180-4</i> | SHA2 | SHA2-224 | Message Digest |
| A2544 | SHA2-256 <i>FIPS PUB 180-4</i> | SHA2 | SHA2-256 | Message Digest |
| A2544 | SHA2-384 <i>FIPS PUB 180-4</i> | SHA2 | SHA2-384 | Message Digest |
| A2544 | SHA2-512 <i>FIPS PUB 180-4</i> | SHA2 | SHA2-512 | Message digest |
| Security Function Implementations (SFIs) | | | | |

⁴⁴ KAS-ECC-SSC – Key Agreement Scheme - Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation⁴⁵ KAS-FFC-SSC – Key Agreement Scheme - Finite Field Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation⁴⁶ RSA – Rivest Shamir Adleman

| CAVP Cert ³⁰ | Algorithm and Standard | Mode / Method | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function |
|---|---|---|--|--|
| AES-CBC A2391 | KTS <i>NIST SP 800-38F</i> | SP 800-38A, FIPS 198-1, and SP 800-38F. KTS (key wrapping and unwrapping) per IG D.G. | 128, 192, and 256-bit keys providing between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | Key Wrap/Unwrap (Encryption with message authentication) |
| HMAC A2544 | | | | AES-CBC with HMAC (SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384) |
| AES-CBC A2544 | KTS <i>NIST SP 800-38F</i> | SP 800-38A, FIPS 198-1, and SP 800-38F. KTS (key wrapping and unwrapping) per IG D.G. | 128, 192, and 256-bit keys providing between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | Key Wrap/Unwrap (Encryption with message authentication) |
| HMAC A2544 | | | | AES-CBC with HMAC (SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384) |
| AES-CCM A2544 | KTS⁴⁷ <i>NIST SP 800-38F</i> | SP 800-38C and SP 800-38F. KTS (key wrapping and unwrapping) per IG D.G. | 128 and 256-bit keys providing 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength | Key Wrap/Unwrap (Authenticated Encryption) |
| AES-CFB128 A2391 | KTS <i>NIST SP 800-38F</i> | SP 800-38A, FIPS 198-1, and SP 800-38F. KTS (key wrapping and unwrapping) per IG D.G. | 128, 192, and 256-bit keys providing between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | Key Wrap/Unwrap (Encryption with message authentication) |
| HMAC A2544 | | | | AES-CFB128 with HMAC (SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384) |
| AES-CFB128 A2544 | KTS <i>NIST SP 800-38F</i> | SP 800-38A, FIPS 198-1, and SP 800-38F. KTS (key wrapping and unwrapping) per IG D.G. | 128, 192, and 256-bit keys providing between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength | Key Wrap/Unwrap (Encryption with message authentication) |
| HMAC A2544 | | | | AES-CFB128 with HMAC (SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384) |
| AES-GCM A2544 | KTS <i>NIST SP 800-38F</i> | SP 800-38D and SP 800-38F. KTS (key wrapping and unwrapping) per IG D.G. | 128 and 256-bit keys providing 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength | Key Wrap/Unwrap (Authenticated Encryption) |
| KAS-ECC-SSC A2544 | KAS⁴⁸ <i>NIST SP 800-56Arev3</i> <i>NIST SP 800-135rev1</i> | SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-ECC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2). | P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves providing between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength. | Key Agreement |
| KDF SSH A2389 A2392 | | | | |
| KAS-ECC-SSC A2544 | KAS <i>NIST SP 800-56Arev3</i> <i>NIST SP 800-135rev1</i> <i>RFC 7627</i> | SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-ECC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2). | P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves providing between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength. | Key Agreement |
| TLS v1.2 KDF RFC 7627 A2389 A2392 | | | | |

⁴⁷ KTS – Key Transport Scheme⁴⁸ KAS – Key Agreement Scheme

| CAVP Cert ³⁰ | Algorithm and Standard | Mode / Method | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function |
|---|---|---|--|------------------------------|
| KAS-ECC-SSC A2544 TLS v1.3 KDF A2389 A2392 | KAS <i>NIST SP 800-56Arev3</i> <i>NIST SP 800-135rev1</i> <i>RFC 8446</i> | SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-ECC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2). | P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves providing between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength. | Key Agreement |
| KAS-FFC-SSC A2544 KDF SSH A2389 A2392 | KAS <i>NIST SP 800-56Arev3</i> <i>NIST SP 800-135rev1</i> | SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-FFC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2). | 2048-bit key providing 112 bits of encryption strength. | Key agreement |
| KAS-FFC-SSC A2544 TLS v1.2 KDF RFC 7627 A2389 A2392 | KAS <i>NIST SP 800-56Arev3</i> <i>NIST SP 800-135rev1</i> <i>RFC 7627</i> | SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-FFC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2). | 2048-bit key providing 112 bits of encryption strength. | Key Agreement |
| KAS-FFC-SSC A2544 TLS v1.3 KDF A2389 A2392 | KAS <i>NIST SP 800-56Arev3</i> <i>NIST SP 800-135rev1</i> <i>RFC 8446</i> | SP 800-56Arev3. KAS-FFC per IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2). | 2048-bit key providing 112 bits of encryption strength. | Key Agreement |
| Entropy Source | | | | |
| N/A | ENT (NP) <i>NIST SP 800-90B</i> | - | - | Entropy input for DRBG |
| Vendor Affirmed | | | | |
| Vendor Affirmed | CKG⁴⁹ <i>NIST SP 800-133rev2</i> | - | - | Cryptographic Key Generation |

The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security methods:

- Cryptographic key generation – As per sections 5.1 and 5.2 of *NIST SP 800-133rev2*, the module uses its Approved DRBG to generate seeds for generation of asymmetric keys. The resulting generated seed is an unmodified output from the DRBG. The module's DRBG is seeded via entropy generated from a CPU jitter-based entropy source which is internal to the module (the module requests a minimum of 256 bits of entropy per call).

⁴⁹ CKG – Cryptographic Key Generation

Table 5 – Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed

| Algorithm | Caveat | Use / Function |
|-------------------------|---|---|
| RSA SigVer (FIPS 186-4) | Only allowed for non-security relevant use of unclaimed authentication mechanism with SSH and SFTP per IG 2.4.A, Scenario 2 | Non-legacy use of RSA Signature Verification: $1024 \leq \text{len}(n) < 2048$ (provides < 112 bits of security strength) |

The module does not include any non-Approved algorithms allowed in the Approved mode of operations.

The module does not include any non-Approved algorithms not allowed in the Approved mode of operations.

2.3 Cryptographic Boundary

The cryptographic boundary is defined by the physical enclosure of the Mediant SBCs and Media Gateways and includes all internal hardware as well as the Mediant SBCs and Media Gateways 7.6 firmware.

The main hardware components consist of integrated circuits, processors, memories, SSD⁵⁰, SAS⁵¹ HDD⁵², flash, DSP cards, power supplies, fans, and the enclosure containing all of these components.

The bulleted list below specifies the hardware and firmware components of the cryptographic module that are excluded from the security requirements, as well as the rationale for exclusion.

- Excluded Hardware Components
 - The power supply modules are excluded from the security requirements. The power supply modules only supply power. They cannot be used to cause a compromise. The module's physical security is maintained in the absence of these components. Thus, these components have been excluded from the module validation.
- Excluded Firmware Components
 - There are no excluded firmware components.

2.4 Modes of Operation

The module supports the Approved mode of operation only. When installed, configured, and operated according to Section 11 of the Security Policy, the module does not support a non-Approved mode of operation.

⁵⁰ SSD – Solid State Drive

⁵¹ SAS – Serial Attached Small Computer System Interface

⁵² HDD – Hard Disk Drive

3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces

FIPS 140-3 defines the following logical interfaces for cryptographic modules:

- Data Input
- Data Output
- Control Input
- Control Output
- Status Output

Note that the module does not output control information, and thus has no specified control output interface.

The Mediant 800 contains the physical ports and interfaces shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7.



Figure 6 – Mediant 800 Front Ports and Interfaces



Figure 7 – Mediant 800 Rear Ports and Interfaces

Table 6 provides the mapping of the FIPS-defined interfaces and the module's physical and logical interfaces for the Mediant 800.

Table 6 – Ports and Interfaces (Mediant 800)

| Physical Port | Logical Interface | Data That Passes Over Port/Interface |
|---|---|--|
| LEDs | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status output | Operational/system status information <i>Refer to Mediant 800 Hardware Installation Manual</i> |
| Telephony port interfaces | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data input • Data output | Telephony traffic |
| Ethernet Ports (10/100/1000Base-T GbE) QTY: 12 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data input • Data output • Control input • Status output | Management traffic; media and signaling traffic; operational/system status information; HA configuration |
| RS-232 Serial Port | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data input • Data output • Control input • Status output | Management traffic via CLI |

| Physical Port | Logical Interface | Data That Passes Over Port/Interface |
|----------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Reset Pinhole Button | Control Input | Button used to reset the module |
| USB | N/A | Unused |

The Mediant 2600 and Mediant 4000B include the physical ports and interfaces shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9.




Figure 8 – Mediant 2600/Mediant 4000B Front Ports and Interfaces




Figure 9 – Mediant 2600/Mediant 4000B Rear Ports and Interfaces

Table 7 provides the mapping of the FIPS-defined interfaces and the module's physical and logical interfaces for the Mediant 2600 and Mediant 4000B.

Table 7 – Ports and Interfaces (Mediant 2600/Mediant 4000B)

| Physical Port | Logical Interface | Data That Passes Over Port/Interface |
|---|---|---|
| LEDs | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Status output | Operational/system status information <i>Refer to Mediant 800 Hardware Installation Manual</i> |
| Ethernet Ports (1000Base-T GbE) QTY: 8 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data input Data output Control input Status output | Data ports for management; media and signaling traffic; HA configuration |
| RS-232 Serial Port (Micro-USB) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data input Data output Control input Status output | Serial communication via the CLI |
| Reset Pinhole Button | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Control input | N/A |

The Mediant 9080B contains the physical ports and interfaces shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11.



Figure 10 – Mediant 9080B Front Ports and Interfaces




Figure 11 – Mediant 9080B Rear Ports and Interfaces

Table 8 provides the mapping of the FIPS-defined interfaces and the module's physical and logical interfaces for the Mediant 9080B.

Table 8 – Ports and Interfaces (Mediant 9080B)

| Physical Port | Logical Interface | Data That Passes Over Port/Interface |
|---|---|---|
| LEDs | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Status output | Operational/system status information Refer to <i>Mediant 800 Hardware Installation Manual</i> |
| USB 2.0 Port | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data input Control input | CLI management traffic (via USB-enabled keyboard) |
| USB 3.0 Port | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data input Control input | CLI management traffic (via USB-enabled keyboard) |
| Display Port | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data input Status output | Analog video output port |
| iLO Service Port | N/A | Used for field service only |
| Slot 1: Quad 1-GbE copper ports QTY: 4 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data input Data output Control input Status output | Management traffic; media and signaling traffic |
| Slot 2: Quad 10-GbE SFP+ ports QTY: 4 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data input Data output Control input Status output | Management traffic; media and signaling traffic |
| Slot 3 | N/A | Unused slot |
| NIC Ports Unused (dust covered) | N/A | Unused NIC ports |
| Video (VGA) Port | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data output Status output | Analog video output |
| iLO Management Port | N/A | Used for field service only |
| Serial Port | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data input Data output Control input Status output | CLI management traffic (via serial-enabled input device) |
| USB 3.0 ports QTY: 2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data input Control input | CLI management traffic (via USB-enabled keyboard) |

| Physical Port | Logical Interface | Data That Passes Over Port/Interface |
|------------------------------|---|---|
| 1 GbE copper ports | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data input • Data output • Control input • Status output | Management traffic; media and signaling traffic |
| 1 GbE copper ports QTY: 3 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data input • Data output | Media and signaling traffic |

The MediaPack 1288 contains the physical ports and interfaces shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13.




Figure 12 – MediaPack 1288 Front Ports and Interfaces




Figure 13 – MediaPack 1288 Rear Ports and Interfaces

Table 9 provides the mapping of the FIPS-defined interfaces and the module's physical and logical interfaces for the MediaPack 1288.

Table 9 – Ports and Interface (MediaPack 1288)

| Physical Port | Logical Interface | Data That Passes Over Port/Interface |
|---------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| LEDs | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status output | Operational/system status information |

| Physical Port | Logical Interface | Data That Passes Over Port/Interface |
|---|---|--|
| Ethernet Ports (100/1000Base-T GbE) QTY: 2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data input • Data output • Control input • Status output | Management traffic; media and signaling traffic; operational/system status information; HA configuration |
| RS-232 Serial Port | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data input • Data output • Control input • Status output | CLI management traffic (via serial-enabled input device) |
| FXS ⁵³ Port Interfaces QTY: 72 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data input • Data output | Analog voice data; FXS data traffic |
| Reset Pinhole Button | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Control input | N/A |
| USB | N/A (unused) | N/A (unused) |
| Power Input | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power | N/A |

⁵³ FXS – Foreign Exchange Subscriber

4. Roles, Services, and Authentication

The sections below describe the module's authorized roles, services, and operator authentication methods.

4.1 Authorized Roles

The module supports two roles that operators may assume:

- Crypto Officer (CO) role – The CO is responsible for initializing the module for first use, which includes the configuration of passwords, public and private keys, and other CSPs. The CO is also responsible for the management of all keys and CSPs, including their zeroization, and is the only operator that can configure the module for Approved mode operation. The CO has access to all User services and can also perform services via SNMPv3.
- User role – The User has read-only privileges and can show the status and statistics of the module, show the current status of the module, and connect to the module remotely using HTTPS or SSH. Users can also change their own passwords.

The CO and User roles are tied to administrative roles supported by the module. The CO role is equivalent in terms of privileges to the AudioCodes-defined “Security Administrator” and “Master” administrative role. The User role is equivalent to the AudioCodes-defined “Monitor” role. Both roles can access the Web Interface and CLI.

Table 10 below lists the supported roles, along with the services (including input and output) available to each role.

Table 10 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output

| Role | Service | Input | Output |
|----------|---|------------------------|--|
| CO | Show Module Versioning Information | None | Model and firmware version information |
| CO | Commission the Module | None | None |
| CO | Load License Key File | Command | Status output |
| CO | Configure the SBC System | Command and parameter | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Configure VOIP Network, Media and SIP Settings, and Routing Rules | Command and parameters | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Manage Users | Command and parameters | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Manage User Sessions | Command and parameters | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Change Password | Command and parameters | Command response/ Status output |
| CO, User | Change Own Password | Command and parameters | Command response/ Status output |

| Role | Service | Input | Output |
|----------|--|--|------------------------------------|
| CO | Manage Certificates/Keypairs | Command and parameters | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Configure TLS Contexts | Command and parameters | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Perform On-Demand Self-Tests | Command | Command response/ Status output |
| CO, User | Show Status | Command | Command response/ Status output |
| CO, User | Show System Security Status | Command | Command response/ Status output |
| CO, User | View Syslog | Command | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Zeroize Keys and CSPs | Command | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Upgrade Image | Command | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Load a .ini File and Perform Automatic Updates | Command | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Save a .ini File of the Module's Configuration | Command | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Reset | Command | Command response/ Status output |
| CO, User | Establish TLS Session | Command | TLS session established |
| CO, User | Establish SSH Session | Command | SSH session established |
| CO | Configure SNMPv3 Users | Command and parameters | Command response/ Status output |
| CO | Establish SNMPv3 Session | Command and parameters | SNMP session established |
| CO | Establish SRTP Session | Command and parameters | SRTP session established |
| CO | Establish SFTP Session | Command and parameters | SFTP session established |
| CO | Restore Default Configuration | Command | Factory default settings restored |
| N/A | Perform Manual Zeroization | Power cycling using power connectors, power button (Mediant 9080 SBC only) or reset pinhole button (Mediant 4000 SBC only) | Status output |

| Role | Service | Input | Output |
|------|-------------------------------------|--|---------------|
| N/A | Perform Manual On-Demand Self-Tests | Power cycling using power connectors, power button (Mediant 9080 SBC only) or reset pinhole button (Mediant 4000 SBC only) | Status output |
| N/A | Authenticate | Command | Status output |

4.2 Authentication Methods

Each operator has their own account with a username and password, which are used to authenticate to the module. Passwords are stored on non-volatile storage media in hashed form using SHA2-256. For SSH/SFTP, operators can also utilize RSA or ECDSA Public keys.

Note that, while the module supports authentication mechanisms, no claims are being made with regards to compliance to the Level 2/3 role-based and identity-based authentication requirements since it is being certified at Level 1.

4.3 Externally Loaded Firmware

The module has the capability to load firmware in the form of a complete image replacement from an external source. As such a replacement will constitute a new module, only FIPS-validated firmware may be loaded to maintain the module's validation.

Services and functions provided by the newly loaded firmware image are not performed until the pre-operational self-tests have executed successfully via a power-on reset. All firmware images are digitally signed, and a conditional self-test (using an ECDSA signature verification with P-256 curve) is performed during the reset. If the signature test fails, the new firmware image is ignored and the previous-loaded firmware image remains current.

SSP zeroization takes place prior to execution of the new image. The module's versioning information is updated to reflect the addition/update of the newly loaded firmware.

4.4 Services

Descriptions of the services available to the authorized roles are provided in Table 11 below.

As allowed per section 2.4.C of *FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance*, the module provides indicators for the use of Approved services through a combination of an explicit indication (via a global Approved mode indicator) and an implicit indication (via the successful completion of the service).

Please note that the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation:

- G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
- R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
- W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
- E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
- Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.

Table 11 – Approved Services

| Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Roles | Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs | Indicator |
|---|---|--|------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| Show Module Versioning Information | Show the model and firmware version. | None | None | CO | N/A | N/A |
| Commission the Module | Commission the module by following the Security Policy guidelines | None | None | CO | N/A | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Load License Key File | Load a License Key file to change or upgrade features | None | None | CO | N/A | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Configure the SBC System | Configure IP address, Web Interface and CLI, LAN and WAN settings, and date and time; save and load configuration files; save and load CLI script files | None | None | CO User (view only) | N/A | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Configure VOIP Network, Media and SIP Settings, and Routing Rules | Configure IP network topology, media and SIP settings, and routing rules | None | None | CO User (view only) | N/A | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Manage Users | Create, edit, or delete user accounts; assign passwords and roles; import SSH public key | SHA-1 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544) | SSH Public Key | CO | SSH Public Key – W | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Manage User Sessions | Terminate specific user's CLI session | None | None | CO | N/A | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Change Password | Modify CO or User account passwords | SHA-1 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544) | None | CO | N/A | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |

| Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Roles | Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs | Indicator |
|------------------------------|---|---|--|----------|--|---|
| Change Own Password | Modify existing login passwords | SHA-1 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544) | None | CO, User | N/A | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Manage Certificates/Keypairs | Generate RSA/ECDSA keypairs for certificate signing requests, generate RSA private keys, load certificates and private keys via TLS/SSH | CKG (Vendor Affirmed) Counter DRBG (Cert. A2544) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) ENT (NP) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA-1 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA3-256 (Cert. A2390) | Entropy Input String DRBG Seed DRBG 'Key' Value DRBG 'V' Value RSA Private Key RSA Public Key ECDSA Private Key ECDSA Public Key CA Public Key | CO | Entropy Input String – G/E DRBG Seed – G/E DRBG 'Key' Value – G/E DRBG 'V' Value – G/E RSA Private Key – G RSA Public Key – G ECDSA Private Key – G ECDSA Public Key – G CA Public Key – W | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Configure TLS Contexts | Define TLS version and cipher suites for management and data TLS connections | None | None | CO | None | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Perform On-Demand Self-Tests | Perform on-demand self-tests | None | Firmware Integrity Test Key | CO | Firmware Integrity Test Key – E | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Show Status | Show the system status, Ethernet status, alarms, user activity logs, system identification and configuration settings of the module | None | None | CO, User | None | N/A |
| Show System Security Status | Show the system security status: "FIPS Approved mode" | None | None | CO, User | None | N/A |
| View Syslog | View event status messages in the syslog | None | None | CO, User | None | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |

| Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Roles | Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs | Indicator |
|--|--|--|---|---|---|---|
| Zeroize Keys and CSPs | Zeroize keys and CSPs | None | All persistent CSPs | CO | All persistent CSPs – Z | N/A |
| Upgrade Image | Load new firmware image | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544 , A2391) SHA-1 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544) | Image Verification Key | CO | Image Verification Key – E | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Load a .ini File and Perform Automatic Updates | Load the module's configuration as a .ini file and perform automatic updates | None | ECDSA Private Key ECDSA Public Key RSA Private Key RSA Public Key CA Public Key SSH Private Key SSH Public Key SNMPv3 Authentication Password SNMPv3 Privacy Password | CO | ECDSA Private Key – W ECDSA Public Key – W RSA Private Key – W RSA Public Key – W CA Public Key – W SSH Private Key – W SSH Public Key – W SNMPv3 Authentication Password – W SNMPv3 Privacy Password – W | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Save a .ini File of the Module's Configuration | Save a .ini file of the module's configuration | None | None | CO | N/A | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Reset | Reset the module | None | SSPs stored in RAM | CO | SSPs stored in RAM – Z | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Establish TLS Session | Establish web session using TLS protocol | AES-CBC (Certs. A2544 , A2391) AES-GCM (Certs. A2544 , A2391) CKG (Vendor Affirmed) Counter DRBG (Cert. A2544) DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) ENT (NP) HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544) KAS (Certs. A2544 , A2389 , A2392) KAS-ECC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544) KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544) | CO, User | Entropy Input String – G/E DRBG Seed – G/E DRBG 'Key' Value – G/E DRBG 'V' Value – G/E DH Public Key – G/R DH Private Key – G/E DH Peer Public Key – G/W/E ECDH Public Key – G/R ECDH Private Key – G/E ECDH Peer Public Key – G/W/E TLS Private Key – G/W/E TLS Public Key – G/W/R TLS Pre-Master Secret – G/R/E TLS Master Secret – G/E TLS Session Key – G/E TLS Authentication Key – G/E | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") | |

| Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Roles | Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs | Indicator |
|-----------------------|---|--|--|----------|--|---|
| | | KTS (AES-CCM) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) KTS (AES-GCM) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) KTS (AES-CBC/HMAC) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) Safe Primes Key Generation (Cert. A2544) Safe Primes Key Verification (Cert. A2544) SHA-1 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA3-256 (Cert. A2390) TLS v1.2 KDF RFC 7627 (Certs. A2389 , A2392) TLS v1.3 KDF (Certs. A2389 , A2392) | | | | |
| Establish SSH Session | Establish remote session using SSH protocol | AES-CBC (Certs. A2544 , A2391) CKG (Vendor Affirmed) DRBG (Cert. A2544) DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) ENT (NP) (N/A) HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544) KAS (Certs. A2544 , A2389 , A2392) KAS-ECC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 | Entropy Input String DRBG Seed DRBG 'Key' Value DRBG 'V' Value DH Public Key DH Private Key ECDH Public Key ECDH Private Key SSH Private Key SSH Public Key SSH Shared Secret SSH Session Key SSH Authentication Key | CO, User | Entropy Input String – G DRBG Seed – G/E DRBG 'Key' Value – G/E DRBG 'V' Value – G/E DH Public Key – G/R/E DH Private Key – G/E ECDH Public Key – G/R/E ECDH Private Key – G/E SSH Private Key – G/W/E SSH Public Key – G/W/R SSH Shared Secret – G/E SSH Session Key – G/E SSH Authentication Key – G/E | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |

| Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Roles | Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs | Indicator |
|--------------------------|---|--|--|-------|---|---|
| | | <p>(Cert. A2544)</p> <p>KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544)</p> <p>KDF SSH (Certs. A2389, A2392)</p> <p>KTS (AES-GCM) (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>KTS (AES-CBC/HMAC) (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>Safe Primes Key Generation (Cert. A2544)</p> <p>Safe Primes Key Verification (Cert. A2544)</p> <p>SHA-1 (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>SHA3-256 (Cert. A2390)</p> | | | | |
| Configure SNMPv3 Users | Configure SNMPv3 users | <p>AES-CFB128 (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. A2544)</p> <p>HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A2544)</p> <p>HMAC-SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544)</p> <p>SHA-1 (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> | SNMPv3 Authentication Password SNMPv3 Privacy Password SNMPv3 Privacy Key SNMPv3 Authentication Key | CO | <p>SNMPv3 Authentication Password – W/E</p> <p>SNMPv3 Privacy Password – W/E</p> <p>SNMPv3 Session Key – W/E</p> <p>SNMPv3 Authentication Key – W/E</p> | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Establish SNMPv3 Session | Establish non-security-related monitoring session using SNMPv3 protocol | <p>AES-CFB128 (Certs. A2544, A2391)</p> <p>HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. A2544)</p> <p>HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A2544)</p> <p>HMAC-SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544)</p> | SNMPv3 Authentication Password SNMPv3 Privacy Password SNMPv3 Authentication Key SNMPv3 Privacy Key | CO | <p>SNMPv3 Authentication Password – E</p> <p>SNMPv3 Privacy Password – E</p> <p>SNMPv3 Session Key – G/E</p> <p>SNMPv3 Privacy Key – G/E</p> | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |

| Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Roles | Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs | Indicator |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--|-------|--|---|
| | | KDF SNMP (Certs. A2389 , A2392) KTS (AES-CFB128/HMAC) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA-1 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | | | | |
| Establish SRTP Session | Establish session using SRTP protocol | AES-CTR (Certs. A2544 , A2391) HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544) KDF SRTP (Certs. A2389 , A2392) SHA-1 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | SRTP Master Key SRTP Session Key SRTP Authentication Key | CO | SRTP Master Key – G/W SRTP Session Key – G/E SRTP Authentication Key – G/E | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Establish SFTP Session | Establish session using SFTP protocol | AES-CBC (Certs. A2544 , A2391) CKG (Vendor Affirmed) Counter DRBG (Cert. A2544) DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) ENT (NP) (N/A) HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544) KAS (Certs. A2544 , A2389 , A2392) KAS-ECC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544) | Entropy Input String DRBG Seed DRBG 'Key' Value DRBG 'V' Value DH Public Key DH Private Key DH Peer Public Key ECDH Public Key ECDH Private Key ECDH Peer Public Key SFTP Private Key SFTP Public Key SSH Shared Secret SSH Session Key SSH Authentication Key | CO | Entropy Input String – G DRBG Seed – G/E DRBG 'Key' Value – G/E DRBG 'V' Value – G/E DH Public Key – G/R/E DH Private Key – G/E DH Peer Public Key – G/W/E ECDH Public Key – G/R/E ECDH Private Key – G/E ECDH Peer Public Key – G/W/E SFTP Private Key – G/E SFTP Public Key – G/R SSH Shared Secret – G/E SSH Session Key – G/E SSH Authentication Key – G/E | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |

| Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Roles | Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs | Indicator |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|--|-------|--|---|
| | | KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544) | | | | |
| | | KDF SSH (Certs. A2389 , A2392) | | | | |
| | | KTS (AES-GCM) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | | | | |
| | | KTS (AES-CBC/HMAC) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | | | | |
| | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | | | | |
| | | RSA SigVer(FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | | | | |
| | | Safe Primes Key Generation (Cert. A2544) | | | | |
| | | Safe Primes Key Verification (Cert. A2544) | | | | |
| | | SHA-1 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | | | | |
| | | SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | | | | |
| | | SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | | | | |
| | | SHA3-256 (Cert. A2390) | | | | |
| Restore Default Configuration | Restore settings to factory defaults | None | All persistent SSPs | CO | All persistent CSPs – Z | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| Perform Manual Zeroization | Zeroize keys and CSPs | None | All ephemeral keys and CSPs | - | All ephemeral keys and CSPs – Z | N/A |
| Perform Manual On-Demand Self-Tests | Perform power-up self-tests on demand | None | Firmware Integrity Test Key All ephemeral keys and CSPs | - | Firmware Integrity Test Key – E All ephemeral keys and CSPs – Z | N/A |
| Authenticate | Use to log into the module | SHA-1 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | None | - | N/A | Global Indicator ("FIPS mode: Enabled") |
| | | SHA2-256 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | | | | |
| | | SHA2-384 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | | | | |

*Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance 2.4.C, the **Show Status**, **Zeroize**, and **Show Versioning Information** services do not require an Approved security service indicator.

The module does not provide any non-Approved services.

5. Software/Firmware Security

The module firmware takes the form of a single firmware image that includes multiple files (configuration files, executable files, packages, and other associated files). The image is verified using an approved integrity technique implemented within the cryptographic module itself. The module implements an ECDSA P-256 (SHA2-256) digital signature verification for the integrity test of the firmware. The approved integrity technique consists of single ECDSA signature verification; failure of the integrity check will cause the module to enter a critical error state.

The CO can initiate the pre-operational tests on demand by resetting or power-cycling the module (see section 11.4.2 for details).

6. Operational Environment

The module employs a limited operational environment (as it is designed to accept only controlled firmware changes that successfully pass the software/firmware load test). The module does not provide a general-purpose operating system (OS). All services provided by the module are provided by the module's firmware and external interfaces. The module's processor executes the firmware on the tested configurations specified in section 2.1 of this document.

7. Physical Security

As a multi-chip standalone hardware module, the module includes an enclosure composed of hard, production-grade, metal components necessary to meet FIPS 140-3 level 1 physical security requirements. The module enclosure completely encloses all of its internal components, and all integrated circuits are coated with commercial standard passivation.

8. Non-Invasive Security

This section is not applicable. There are currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques referenced in *ISO/IEC 19790:2021 Annex F*.

9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management

9.1 Keys and SSPs

The module supports the keys and other SSPs listed in Table 12 below.

Table 12 – SSPs

| Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation ⁵⁴ | Use & Related Keys |
|--|--|---|--|---|---------------|--|---|---|
| Keys | | | | | | | | |
| Firmware Integrity Test Key (not an SSP) | 128 bits | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) | Hardcoded in the module image | - | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Not subject to zeroization requirements | Pre-operational verification of module's firmware image |
| CA Public Key (CSP) | (ECDSA) Between 128 and 256 bits (RSA) Between 112 and 150 bits | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | - | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Exported in PEM file format in encrypted form | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only) | Verification of CA signatures |
| RSA Private Key (CSP) | Between 112 and 150 bits | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Generated internally via approved DRBG | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Exported in PEM file format in encrypted form | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only) | Used for certificate signing requests |

⁵⁴ The indicators provided by zeroization methods specified in this column are implicit as the normal, non-error, status output of the function performing zeroization.

| Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation ⁵⁴ | Use & Related Keys |
|--|--------------------------|--|--|---|---------------|---|-----------------------------------|---|
| RSA Public Key (PSP) | Between 112 and 150 bits | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Generated internally via approved DRBG | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Exported in PEM file format in encrypted form | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only) | Used for certificate signing requests |
| ECDSA Private Key (CSP) | Between 128 and 256 bits | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) | Generated internally via approved DRBG | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Exported in PEM file format in encrypted form | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only) | Used for certificate signing requests |
| ECDSA Public Key (PSP) | Between 128 and 256 bits | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) | Generated internally via approved DRBG | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Exported in PEM file format in encrypted form | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only) | Used for certificate signing requests |
| ECDH Private Key (CSP) | Between 128 and 256 bits | KAS-ECC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544) | Generated internally via approved DRBG | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Computation of KAS-ECC-SSC shared secrets during TLS/SSH key exchange |
| ECDH Public Key (PSP) | Between 128 and 256 bits | KAS-ECC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544) | Generated internally via approved DRBG | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Computation of KAS-ECC-SSC shared secrets during TLS/SSH key exchange |
| ECDH Peer ⁵⁵ Public Key (PSP) | Between 128 and 256 bits | KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544) Safe Primes Key Generation (Cert. A2544) Safe Primes Key Verification (Cert. A2544) | - | Imported in plaintext Never exported | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Computation of KAS-ECC-SSC shared secrets during TLS/SSH key exchange |

⁵⁵ Peer refers to either a SIP User Agent or the management workstation.

| Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation ⁵⁴ | Use & Related Keys |
|--------------------------|-----------------|--|---|--|---------------|--|--|--|
| DH Private Key (CSP) | 112 bits | KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544) Safe Primes Key Generation (Cert. A2544) Safe Primes Key Verification (Cert. A2544) | Generated internally via approved DRBG | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Computation of DH shared secrets during TLS/SSH key exchange |
| DH Public Key (PSP) | 112 bits | KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544) Safe Primes Key Generation (Cert. A2544) Safe Primes Key Verification (Cert. A2544) | Generated internally via approved DRBG | Never imported Exported in plaintext form | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Computation of DH shared secrets during TLS/SSH key exchange |
| DH Peer Public Key (PSP) | 112 bits | KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56Arev3 (Cert. A2544) Safe Primes Key Generation (Cert. A2544) | - | Imported in plaintext Never exported | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Computation of DH shared secrets during TLS/SSH key exchange |
| SSH Private Key (CSP) | 112 or 128 bits | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Generated internally via Approved DRBG | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Never exported | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only); zeroization command | Authentication during SSH session negotiation |
| SSH Public Key (PSP) | 112 or 128 bits | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Generated internally via Approved DRBG as part of CSR or self-signed certificate generation | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Imported by CO via CLI (over serial port) in plaintext Exported in plaintext form | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only) | Authentication during SSH session negotiation |

| Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation ⁵⁴ | Use & Related Keys |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|--|---|---|---------------|--|--|---|
| SSH Session Key (CSP) | 128 and 256 bits | AES-CBC (Certs. A2544 , A2391) AES-GCM (Cert. A2544) KTS (AES-GCM) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) KTS (AES-CBC/HMAC) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Derived internally via SSH KDF | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Encryption and decryption of SSH session packets Wrapping of keying material (when keys are part of the payload) |
| SSH Authentication Key (CSP) | Between 160 and 384 bits | HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544) | Derived internally via SSH KDF | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Authentication of SSH session packets Wrapping of keying material (when keys are part of the payload) |
| TLS Private Key (CSP) | Between 112 and 150 bits | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Generated internally via Approved DRBG | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Imported by CO via CLI (over serial port) in plaintext form Never exported | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only); zeroization command | Authentication during TLS session negotiation |
| TLS Public Key (PSP) | Between 112 and 150 bits | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Generated internally via Approved DRBG as part of CSR or self-signed certificate generation | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Exported via digital certificate in plaintext form | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only) | Authentication during TLS session negotiation |

| Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation ⁵⁴ | Use & Related Keys |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|---|--|---|---------------|------------------|---------------------------|---|
| TLS Session Key (CSP) | 128 or 256 bits | AES-CBC (Certs. A2544 , A2391) AES-CCM (Cert. A2544) AES-GCM (Cert. A2544) KTS (AES-CCM) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) KTS (AES-GCM) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) KTS (AES-CBC/HMAC) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Derived internally using the TLS Master Secret via TLS KDF | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Encryption and decryption of TLS session packets Wrapping of keying material (when keys are part of the payload) |
| TLS Authentication Key (CSP) | Between 160 and 384 bits | HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544) KTS (AES-CBC/HMAC) (Cert. A2544) | Derived internally using the TLS Master Secret via the TLS KDF | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Authentication of TLS session packets Wrapping of keying material (when keys are part of the payload) |
| SNMPv3 Privacy Key (CSP) | Between 128 and 256 bits | AES-CFB128 (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Derived internally using SNMP KDF | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Never exported | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Encryption and decryption of SNMPv3 session packets |
| SNMPv3 Authentication Key (CSP) | Between 160 and 384 bits | HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544) | Derived internally using SNMP KDF | Imported in PEM file format via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in PEM file format via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Exported via TLS or SSH in encrypted form | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Authentication of SNMPv3 session packets |
| SRTP Session Key (CSP) | 128 or 256 bits | AES-CTR (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Derived internally using SRTP Master Key via the SRTP KDF | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Encryption and decryption of SRTP session packets |

| Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation ⁵⁴ | Use & Related Keys |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|---|---|--|---------------|---|--|---|
| SRTP Authentication Key (CSP) | Between 160 and 384 bits | HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert. A2544) HMAC-SHA2-384 (Cert. A2544) | Derived internally via SRTP KDF using SRTP Master Key | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Authentication of SRTP session packets |
| SFTP Private Key (CSP) | Between 112 and 150 bits | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Generated internally via Approved DRBG | - | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext on hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only); zeroization command | Authentication during SFTP session negotiation |
| SFTP Public Key (PSP) | Between 112 and 150 bits | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Certs. A2544 , A2391) | Generated internally via Approved DRBG as part of CSR or self-signed certificate generation | Never imported Exported in plaintext form | - | [for all models] Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext on hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only) | Authentication during SFTP session negotiation |
| Image Verification Key (PSP) | 128 bits | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (Cert. A2544) | Hardcoded in the application binary | - | - | [for the 4000, 9080] Plaintext in RAM [for the 4000] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the 9080] Plaintext on hard disk | N/A | Verification of new firmware upgrade image |
| Other SSPs | | | | | | | | |
| SSH Shared Secret (CSP) | Between 112 and 256 bits | KDF SSH (Certs. A2389 , A2392) | Computed internally by KAS-ECC-SSC and KAS-FFC-SSC | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Input to SSH KDF for derivation of the SSH Session Key and SSH Authentication Key |
| TLS Pre-Master Secret (CSP) | Between 112 and 256 bits | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC 7627 (Certs. A2389 , A2392) TLS v1.3 KDF (Certs. A2389 , A2392) | [for KAS-ECC-SSC / KAS-FFC-SSC cipher suites] Computed internally by KAS-ECC-SSC and KAS-FFC-SSC | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Input to KAS-ECC-SSC/KAS-FFC-SSC for computation of the TLS Master Secret |
| TLS Master Secret (CSP) | 384 bits | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC 7627 (Certs. A2389 , A2392) TLS v1.3 KDF (Certs. A2389 , A2392) | Derived internally via TLS KDF using the TLS Pre-Master Secret | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Input to TLS KDF for derivation of the TLS Session Key and TLS Authentication Key |

| Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation ⁵⁴ | Use & Related Keys |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|--|--|---|---------------|---|---|--|
| SRTP Master Key (CSP) | 128 and 256 bits | KDF SRTP (Certs. A2389 , A2392) | [when module is calling side] Generated internally via Approved DRBG | [when module is calling side] Never imported Exported via SIP/TLS in encrypted form [when module is answering side] Imported via SIP/TLS in encrypted form Never exported | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Input to SRTP KDF for derivation of the SRTP Session Key and SRTP Authentication Key |
| Entropy Input String (CSP) | 384 bits | CKG (Vendor Affirmed) SHA3-256 (Cert. A2390) | Generated internally | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | End of DRBG function, soft reset/power cycle | Random number generation |
| DRBG Seed (CSP) | 384 bits | CKG (Vendor Affirmed) Counter DRBG (Cert. A2544) | Generated internally using entropy input string | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Random number generation |
| DRBG 'Key' Value (CSP) | 256 bits | CKG (Vendor Affirmed) Counter DRBG (Cert. A2544) | Generated internally | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Random number generation |
| DRBG 'V' Value (CSP) | 128 bits | CKG (Vendor Affirmed) Counter DRBG (Cert. A2544) | Generated internally | - | - | Plaintext in RAM | Soft reset/power cycle | Random number generation |
| SNMPv3 Authentication Password (CSP) | - | KDF SNMP (Certs. A2389 , A2392) | - | Imported via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Imported via CLI (over serial port) in plaintext form Imported in an INI file via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in an INI file via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Exported in an INI file via TLS or SSH in encrypted form | - | Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only) The CO entering an all-zero value using the Web Interface or CLI Importing a new .ini file with a zero-value SNMPv3 Authentication Password | Used to derive the SNMPv3 Authentication Key |

| Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation ⁵⁴ | Use & Related Keys |
|-------------------------------|----------|--|------------|---|---------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| SNMPv3 Privacy Password (CSP) | - | KDF SNMP (Certs. A2389 , A2392) | - | Imported via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Imported via CLI (over serial port) in plaintext form Imported in an INI file via Web Interface (over TLS) in encrypted form Imported in an INI file via CLI (over SSH) in encrypted form Exported in an INI file via TLS or SSH in encrypted form | - | Plaintext in RAM [for the M4000, M2600, M800, MP1288] Plaintext in non-volatile flash [for the M9080] Plaintext in non-volatile hard disk | Soft reset/power cycle (RAM only) The CO entering an all-zero value using the Web Interface or CLI Importing a new .ini file with a zero-value SNMPv3 Privacy Password | Used to derive the SNMPv3 Privacy Key |

AES GCM encryption is used in the context of several secure communications protocols. The module meets the (key/IV) pair uniqueness requirements from *NIST SP 800-38D* as follows:

- For TLS v1.2, the module supports acceptable AES GCM cipher suites from section 3.3.1.1 of *NIST SP 800-52rev2*.

The mechanism for IV generation falls into scenario 1 in *FIPS 140-3 IG C.H* and is compliant with *RFC 5288*. The counter portion of the IV is strictly increasing. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, a failure in encryption will occur and a handshake to establish a new encryption key will be required. It is the responsibility of the module operator (i.e., the first party, client, or server) to trigger this handshake in accordance with *RFC 5246* when this condition is encountered.

- For TLS v1.3, the module supports acceptable AES GCM cipher suites from section 3.3.1.2 of *NIST SP 800-52rev2*. The protocol's implementation is contained within the boundary of the module, and the generated IV is only used in the context of the AES GCM encryption executing the provisions of the TLS 1.3 protocol.

The mechanism for IV generation falls into scenario 5 in *FIPS 140-3 IG C.H* and is compliant with *RFC 8446*. Each session employs a “per-record nonce”, a 64-bit sequence number (or IV) maintained separately for reading and writing records. Each sequence number is set to 0 at the beginning of a connection and whenever the key is changed (the first record transmitted under a particular traffic key uses sequence number 0), and the appropriate sequence number is incremented by one after reading or writing each record. Because the size of sequence numbers is 64 bits, they should not wrap. If a sequence number needs to wrap, it is the responsibility of the module operator to either rekey or terminate the connection.

- For SSH v2, the mechanism for IV generation falls into scenario 1 in *FIPS 140-3 IG C.H* and is compliant with *RFC 5647*.

A new IV parameter is generated by the module for each AES GCM encryption. The IV consists of a 4-byte fixed field and an 8-byte invocation counter. The fixed field of the IV remains the same for the duration of the session, while the invocation counter is treated as a 64-bit integer and is incremented by one when performing an encryption of a new binary packet. If the invocation counter reaches its maximum value $2^{64} - 1$, the next encryption is performed with the invocation counter set to either 0 or 1. No more than $2^{64} - 1$ encryptions are performed in the same session. When a session is terminated for any reason, it is the responsibility of the module operator to derive a new key and a new initial IV.

The module also complies with the following RFCs:

- RFC 4252
- RFC 4253
- RFC 5647

9.2 RGB Entropy Sources

Table 13 below specifies the module's entropy sources.

Table 13 – Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

| Entropy Sources | Minimum Number of Bits of Entropy | Details |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|
| CPU Time Jitter Based Non-Physical TRNG | 384 bits | <p>The min-entropy (per 4 bits of data) of the tests for each device was:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M800 = 3.548147 bits • M2600 = 3.562489 bits • M4000 = 3.481019 bits • M9080 = 3.507044 bits • MP1288 = 3.667660 bits <p>As long as there is at least one bit of entropy per four bits of raw noise data, the entropy provided by each call to CPU Jitter entropy can be considered to contain full entropy. When the DRBG requests 384 bits of entropy for seeding, the function is called four times and returns 384 bits of entropy, thus exceeding the FIPS requirement of at least 112 bits of entropy.</p> |

10. Self-Tests

Both pre-operational and conditional self-tests are performed by the module. Pre-operational tests are performed between the time the cryptographic module is powered up and before the module transitions to the operational state. Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and the error resolutions.

10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The module performs the following pre-operational self-test(s):

- Firmware Integrity Test on the module firmware image (using ECDSA P-256 with SHA2-256 digital signature verification)

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module performs the following conditional self-tests:

- Conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs)
 - Crypto Library:
 - AES ECB encrypt KAT⁵⁶ (128-bit length)
 - AES ECB decrypt KAT (128-bit length)
 - AES CCM encrypt KAT (128-bit length)
 - AES CCM decrypt KAT (128-bit length)
 - AES GCM encrypt KAT (256-bit length)
 - AES GCM decrypt KAT (256-bit length)
 - CTR DRBG instantiate/generate/reseed KAT (AES, 256-bit, with derivation function)
 - ECDSA sign KAT (P-256 curve)
 - ECDSA verify KAT (P-256 curve)
 - HMAC KATs (SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384)
 - RSA sign KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme)
 - RSA verify KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme)
 - SHA-2 KATs (SHA2-224, SHA2-512)
 - SHA-3 KATs (SHA3-256)
 - FFC DH Shared Secret “Z” Computation KAT (2048-bit)
 - ECC CDH Shared Secret “Z” Computation KAT (P-256 curve)
 - Entropy Library:
 - SHA3-256 KAT
 - Entropy “Stuck” Test
 - Entropy Repetition Count Test (performed over 1024 samples)
 - Entropy Adaptive Proportion Test (performed over 1024 samples)

⁵⁶ KAT – Known Answer Test

- KDF Library:
 - TLS v1.2 KDF KAT
 - TLS v1.3 KDF KAT
 - SSH KDF KAT
- Crypto Accelerator:
 - AES ECB encrypt and decrypt KATs⁵⁷ (128-bit length)
 - RSA sign KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme)
 - RSA verify KAT (2048-bit; SHA2-256; PKCS#1.5 scheme)
 - SHA KATs (SHA1, SHA2-256)
- KDF Accelerator:
 - TLS v1.2 KDF KAT
 - TLS v1.3 KDF KAT
 - SSH KDF KAT

To ensure all conditional CASTs are performed prior to the first operational use of the associated algorithm, all CASTs are performed during the module's initial power-up sequence. The CASTs for algorithms used in the pre-operational firmware integrity test are performed prior to the integrity test itself; all other CASTs are executed immediately after the successful completion of the firmware integrity test.

- Conditional pair-wise consistency tests (PCTs)
 - ECDSA key generation PCT (upon generation of a key pair for ECDSA digital signature functions)
 - RSA sign/verify PCT (upon generation of a key pair for RSA digital signature functions)
 - DH key generation PCT (upon generation of a key pair for DH key agreement functions)
 - ECDH key generation PCT (upon generation of a key pair for ECDH key agreement functions)
- Conditional manual SSP entry test (upon direct entry of an SSP)
- Conditional Critical Functions Tests
 - Image Verification Test using ECDSA P-256 signature verification (upon loading of a new image)

10.3 Self-Test Failure Handling

Upon failure of a pre-operational self-test, conditional CAST, or conditional PCT, the module enters a “Fatal” error state, keys are zeroized, and the module is automatically reset, with reset reason of “FIPS Failure”. An error is written to syslog. All access to the cryptographic functionality and CSPs is disabled. All data outputs via data output interfaces are inhibited (with the exception of syslog status messages) and the management interfaces will not respond to any commands while the module is in this state. A successful reboot is needed to clear the error condition and return to a normal operational state.

Upon failure of the conditional firmware load test, the module enters a “Soft Error” state and with error status logged in syslog and the load process aborted. The error state is then automatically cleared, and the module resumes normal operation.

⁵⁷ KAT – Known Answer Test

11. Life-Cycle Assurance

The sections below describe how to ensure the module is operating in its validated configuration, including the following:

- Procedures for secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module
- Maintenance requirements
- Administrator and non-Administrator guidance

Operating the module without following the guidance herein (including the use of undocumented services) will result in non-compliant behavior and is outside the scope of this Security Policy.

11.1 Secure Installation

The CO shall be responsible for receiving, installing, initializing, and maintaining the module. To operate the module in the Approved mode, the CO shall configure the module via the Web Interface or the CLI as directed by this Security Policy.

After the CO has finished installation of the module, the management interfaces can be accessed to configure the module in the Approved mode of operation, which is outlined in section 11.2 below.

11.2 Initialization

The CO shall configure the module for the Approved mode. This ensures that the system will use only Approved cryptographic algorithms and key strengths. To configure the module for Approved operation, the CO may use the CLI or the Web Interface. Please refer to the following documents for general information on the use of the module's management interfaces:

- *AudioCodes Reference Guide, Command-Line Interface for Media Gateways & SBCs, Version 7.6*
- *AudioCodes User's Manual, Mediant 800, Version 7.6*
- *AudioCodes User's Manual, Mediant 2600 Enterprise SBC, Version 7.6*
- *AudioCodes User's Manual, Mediant 4000 SBC, Version 7.6*
- *AudioCodes User's Manual, Mediant 9000 SBC Series, Mediant 9000 Rev. B / Mediant 9030 / Mediant 9080, Version 7.6*
- *AudioCodes User's Manual, MediaPack 1288 Analog Gateway, Version 7.6*

To configure the module for Approved operation, the CO must perform the following actions:

- The CO must enable Approved mode. Using the CLI, the CO must issue the `FIPS mode: Enabled` command. Using the Web Interface, the module's Approved mode can be set on the **Security Settings** page (**Setup** menu -> **IP Network** tab -> **Security** folder -> **Security Settings**) and clicking the `<Enable FIPS>` button.

- General information for configuring TLS contexts (settings that define the TLS parameters used for management and other TLS applications) using the Web Interface is addressed in the “Configuring TLS Certificates” chapter of the applicable device User’s Manual.

For Approved operation, the CO shall open the TLS Contexts table on the **TLS Contexts** page (**Setup** menu -> **IP Network** tab -> **Security** folder > **TLS Contexts**) and ensure that the contexts are configured according to the following guidance:

- For the “DH Key Size” parameter, the CO may select any supported size except 1024.
- For “Cipher Server” and “Cipher Client” parameters (applicable to TLS versions 1.0 – 1.2), the CO shall ensure that only Approved ciphers are used by adding the following to the cipher string to the cipher string list:

`!RC4:!aNULL:!eNULL:!AECDH:!ADH:!CAMELLIA:!ARIA128:!SEED:!kRSA:!3DES`

- For “Cipher Server TLS1.3” and “Cipher Client TLS 1.3” parameters (applicable to TLS version 1.3), the CO shall ensure that only Approved ciphers are used by removing the following cipher string from the cipher string list:

`TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256`

- General information for configuring SRTP is addressed in the “Configuring SRTP” chapter of each of the *AudioCodes User’s Manual*. For operation in the Approved mode, the CO shall open the **Media Security** page (**Setup** menu -> **Signaling & Media** tab -> **Media** folder -> **Media Security**) and ensure that the settings are configured according to the following guidance:

- For the “Media Security Behavior” parameter, the CO shall select “Mandatory” from the drop-down list.
- For the “Aria Protocol Support” parameter, the CO shall ensure it is set to “Disable”.
- For secure key transfer, the CO shall ensure that derived session keys are transferred to endpoints using TLS (i.e., force TLS). The CO shall click “New” or “Edit” on the **SIP Interfaces** table (**Setup** menu -> **Signaling & Media** tab -> **Core Entities** folder -> **SIP Interfaces**) and ensure that the settings on the UDP and TCP ports of each SIP interface are configured according to the following guidance:
 - For the “UDP Port” parameter, the CO shall enter “0”.
 - For the “TCP Port” parameter, the CO shall enter “0”.
- General information for configuring remote management is addressed in the “Configuring Secured (HTTPS) Web” chapter of the appropriate User’s Manual. For securing RADIUS⁵⁸ connections for operation in the Approved mode, the CO shall open the **Web Settings** page (**Setup** menu -> **Administration** tab -> **Web & CLI** folder -> **Web Settings**) and ensure that the settings are configured according to the following guidance:

⁵⁸ RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial In User Service

- For the “Secured Web Connection (HTTPS)” parameter, the CO shall select “HTTPS Only” from the drop-down list.

Configuring the module into Approved mode will zeroize all persistent CSPs and reset the module.

11.3 Startup

No additional startup steps are required to be performed by end-users.

11.4 Administrator Guidance

The Crypto Officer is responsible for initialization and security-relevant configuration and management of the module.

Once installed, commissioned, and configured, the CO is responsible for maintaining the status of the module to ensure that it is running in its Approved mode. The Crypto Officer shall monitor the module’s status regularly. If any irregular activity is noticed, or the module is consistently reporting errors, customers should contact AudioCodes Customer Support. Please refer to section 11 for guidance that the Crypto Officer must follow for the module to be considered running in the Approved mode of operation.

11.4.1 Default Login Password

The module provides a default login password for first-time module access for the CO only. The CO is required to change the default login password as part of the initial configuration.

11.4.2 On-Demand Self-Tests

The pre-operational self-tests are automatically performed at power-up. The CO may initiate the pre-operational self-tests by issuing the `reload now` command. Using the Web interface, resetting the module is accomplished from the **Maintenance Actions** page (**Setup** menu -> **Administration** tab -> **Maintenance** folder -> **Maintenance Actions**) and clicking the **<Reset>** button on the toolbar.

11.4.3 Zeroization

There are many CSPs within the module’s cryptographic boundary including symmetric keys, private keys, public keys, and login password hashes. CSPs reside in multiple storage media including RAM, non-volatile flash, and hard disk. All ephemeral keys used by the module are zeroized on reset and power cycle. Private keys and CSPs on the non-volatile flash and hard disk of the module can be zeroized by using a CLI command. The public key used for the image verification test is stored in non-volatile flash and hard disk and cannot be zeroized.

Using the CLI, keys and CSPs are zeroized using the `clear security-files` command. Successful return from this command indicates the completion of the zeroization process.

The SNMPv3 Authentication Password and SNMPv3 Privacy Password, may be zeroized by the CO entering an all-zero value using the Web Interface or CLI or importing a new .ini file with a zero value. Both methods will overwrite and zeroize these CSPs. Completion of the manual entry process or of the .ini file load process indicates the completion of the zeroization process.

11.4.4 Status and Versioning Information

On the first power up, the module is, by default, in an unconfigured operational state. During initial configuration and setup, the module is explicitly set to operate in the Approved mode of operation. An authorized operator can access the module via the CLI and determine the mode of the module.

- Using the CLI, the mode status can be viewed by issuing the `show system security status` command. When the module is properly configured per this Security Policy, the command will return the following message:

```
FIPS mode: Enabled
```

- Using the Web Interface, the module's operational status can also be viewed on the **Security Settings** page (**Setup** menu -> **IP Network** tab -> **Security** folder -> **Security Settings**).

Module operators can also access the module's versioning information and match it to the versioning information shown on the module's FIPS validation certificate.

- Using the CLI, the module version can be viewed by issuing the `show system version` command.
- Using the Web Interface, the version information can be viewed on the **Device Information** page (**Monitor** menu -> **Monitor** tab -> **Summary** folder -> **Device Information**).

11.4.5 Additional Administrator Guidance

The list below provides additional guidance for module administrators:

- The CO shall power-cycle the module if the module has encountered a fatal error and becomes non-operational. If power-cycling the module does not correct the error condition, the module is considered to be compromised or malfunctioned and should be sent back to AudioCodes for repair or replacement.
- The module allows for the loading of new firmware and employs a digital signature verification technique to test the integrity of the image. All SSPs must be zeroized prior to the loading and subsequent execution of new firmware. This can be accomplished via the following CLI command:

```
write factory clear-keys-and-certs
```

This can also be accomplished via the Software Upgrade wizard. When using the wizard, ensure that the “Use existing configuration” checkbox on the **Load ini file** wizard page is cleared and do not select a file to load. This will restore the module configuration back to factory default settings.

- To maintain an Approved mode of operation, the CO must ensure that only FIPS-validated firmware is loaded. Any operation of the module after loading non-validated firmware constitutes a departure from this Security Policy.

11.5 Non-Administrator Guidance

The User does not have the ability to configure sensitive information on the module, with the exception of their password. The User must be diligent to pick strong passwords and must not reveal their password to anyone. Additionally, the User should be careful to protect any secret or private keys in their possession.

The following list provides additional policies below that must be followed by module operators:

- In the event that the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption shall be established.
- In order to comply with the key entry requirements described in section 9.5.A of the *Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the CMVP*, entry of plaintext private keys and CSPs using the CLI via the serial port must be accomplished using a non-networked general-purpose computing device.
- The module implements the KAS-ECC-SSC and KAS-FFC-SSC key agreement schemes specified in *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*. This specification requires that certain checks are performed to provide assurance regarding the keys being used. The following assurance checks are performed by the cryptographic module:
 - Assurances of domain parameter validity (section 5.5.2 of *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*)
 - Assurances required by the key pair owner (section 5.6.2.1 of *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*)
 - Assurances required by the public key recipient (section 5.6.2.2 of *NIST SP 800-56Arev3*)

12. Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements for this validation. Therefore, per *ISO/IEC 19790:2021* section 7.12, requirements for this section are not applicable.

Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations

Table 14 provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document.

Table 14 – Acronyms and Abbreviations

| Term | Definition |
|----------------|--|
| AC | Alternating Current |
| ACL | Access Control List |
| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
| ANSI | American National Standards Institute |
| ASCII | American Standard Code for Information Interchange |
| B2BUA | Back-to-Back User Agent |
| CA | Certificate Authority |
| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining |
| CCCS | Canadian Centre for Cyber Security |
| CFB | Cipher Feedback |
| CKG | Cryptographic Key Generation |
| CLI | Command Line Interface |
| CMVP | Cryptographic Module Validation Program |
| CO | Crypto Officer |
| CPU | Central Processing Unit |
| CSP | Critical Security Parameter |
| CSR | Certificate Signing Request |
| CTR | Counter |
| CVL | Component Validation List |
| DC | Direct Current |
| DDOS | Distributed Denial-of-Service |
| DES | Data Encryption Standard |
| DOS | Denial-of-Service |
| DRBG | Deterministic Random Bit Generator |
| DSA | Digital Signature Algorithm |
| DSP | Digital Signal Processing |
| DTLS | Datagram Transport Layer Security |
| EC | Elliptical Curve |
| ECC | Elliptical Curve Cryptography |
| ECC CDH | ECC Cofactor Diffie Hellman |

| Term | Definition |
|--------------------|--|
| ECDSA | Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm |
| EMC | Electromagnetic Compatibility |
| EMI | Electromagnetic Interference |
| FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standard |
| GbE | Gigabit Ethernet |
| Gbps | Gigabits per second |
| GCM | Galois/Counter Mode |
| GUI | Graphical User Interface |
| HA | High Availability |
| HDD | Hard Disk Drive |
| HMAC | (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code |
| HTTPS | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure |
| ICE | Interactive Connectivity Establishment |
| IEEE | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
| iLO | Integrated Lights Out |
| IP | Internet Protocol |
| IV | Initialization Vector |
| KAS | Key Agreement Scheme |
| KAT | Known Answer Test |
| KAS ECC SSC | Key Agreement Scheme - Elliptical Curve Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation |
| KAS FFC SSC | Key Agreement Scheme - Finite Field Cryptography - Shared Secret Computation |
| KDF | Key Derivation Function |
| LED | Light Emitting Diode |
| MAC | Message Authentication Code |
| Mbps | Megabits per second |
| MOS | Mean Opinion Score |
| N/A | Not Applicable |
| NAT | Network Address Translation |
| NIC | Network Interface Card |
| NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology |
| NTP | Network Time Protocol |
| OAMP | Operations, Administration, Maintenance, and Provisioning |
| OS | Operating System |
| PBKDF2 | Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 |
| PBX | Private Branch Exchange |
| PEM | Privacy Enhanced Mail |

| Term | Definition |
|---------------|--|
| PKCS | Public-Key Cryptography Standards |
| PUB | Publication |
| QoE | Quality of Experience |
| QoS | Quality of Service |
| RADIUS | Remote Authentication Dial In User Service |
| RAM | Random Access Memory |
| RNG | Random Number Generator |
| RSA | Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman |
| RTCP | Real-time Transport Control Protocol |
| RTP | Real-time Transport Protocol |
| SAS | Serial Attached Small Computer System Interface |
| SBC | Session Border Controller |
| SDES | Session Description Protocol Security Descriptions |
| SDRAM | Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory |
| SFP | Small Form-Factor Pluggable |
| SFTP | SSH (or Secure) File Transfer Protocol |
| SHA | Secure Hash Algorithm |
| SHS | Secure Hash Standard |
| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol |
| SP | Special Publication |
| SRTP | Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol |
| SSD | Solid State Drive |
| SSH | Secure Shell |
| TCP | Transport Control Protocol |
| TDM | Time-Division Multiplexing |
| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
| U | Rack Unit |
| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
| U.S. | United States |
| USB | Universal Serial Bus |
| VGA | Video Graphics Array |
| VLAN | Virtual Local Area Network |
| VoIP | Voice Over Internet Protocol |

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