

**FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy for:**

**KIOXIA FIPS TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138GTC**

**Crypto Sub-Chip**



**KIOXIA CORPORATION**

**Rev 3.3.0**

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## Section 1 - General

This document explains precise specification of the security rules about KIOXIA FIPS TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138GTC Crypto Sub-Chip. The Cryptographic Module (CM) meets the requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 2 Overall. The Table below shows the security level detail.

Section	Level
1. General	2
2. Cryptographic Module Specification	2
3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces	2
4. Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
5. Software/Firmware Security	2
6. Operational Environment	N/A
7. Physical Security	2
8. Non-invasive Security	N/A
9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management	2
10. Self-tests	2
11. Life-cycle Assurance	2
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
<b>Overall Level</b>	<b>2</b>

Table 1 - Security Levels

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### Section 1.1 - Acronyms

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CM	Cryptographic Module
SSP	Sensitive Security Parameter
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
HMAC	The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication code
KAT	Known Answer Test
POST	Power on Self-Test
CAST	Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
PSID	Printed SID
SED	Self-Encrypting Drive
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SID	Security ID
TCG	Trusted Computing Group

## Section 2 – Cryptographic Module Specification

KIOXIA FIPS TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138GTC Crypto Sub-Chip (listed in Section 2.1 Product Version) is used for solid state drive (SSD) data security. The CM is a single chip hardware module implemented as a sub-chip compliant with IG 2.3.B in the TC58NC1137GTC 0001 SoC and TC58NC1138GTC 0001 SoC (see Figure 1 in Section 7). Overall Security Rating of the CM is Level2 (See Table 1 in Section 1 for individual security area levels). The CM is embedded in TCG OPAL compliant SSD controllers which provides user data encryption/decryption through build-in HW engines.

The CM provides various cryptographic services using approved algorithms. The CM has multiple functions, but they do not support the degraded operation. The physical boundary of the CM is the TC58NC1137GTC 0001 SoC and TC58NC1138GTC 0001 SoC, and the logical boundary of the CM is TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138GTC CRPT module.

The CM has one approved mode of operation and CM is always in approved mode of operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11). In approved mode, the CM provides services defined in Table 7 in Section 4.2.

### Section 2.1 – Product Version

The CM is validated with the following versions:

Physical single-chip	The sub-chip cryptographic subsystem soft circuitry core	The associated firmware
TC58NC1137GTC 0001 TC58NC1138GTC 0001	TC58NC1137GTC/TC58NC1138GTC CRPT module 0001	SC01DN

Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration

### Section 2.2 – Security Functions

The CM executes following approved algorithms:

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/ Method	Description/Key Size(s)/ Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
#A2837	AES256 (FIPS 197 / SP800-38A)	CBC	Key Size: 256 bits/ Key Strength: 256 bits	Data and Key Encryption/ Decryption

#A2837	AES256 (FIPS 197 / SP800-38E)	XTS <sup>1</sup>	Key Size: 256 bits/ Key Strength: 256 bits	Data Encryption/ Decryption (only be used for storage)
#A2837	SHA2-256/SHA2-384 (FIPS 180-4)	N/A	N/A	Hashing messages
#A2837	HMAC-SHA2-256 (FIPS 198-1)	N/A	Key Size: 256 bits/ Key Strength: 256 bits	Message Authentication Code
#A2837	RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5 (FIPS 186-4)	N/A	Key Size: 3072 bits/ Key Strength: 128 bits	Signature verification
#A2883	ECDSA (FIPS 186-4)	N/A	Curve: P-384/ Key Strength: 192 bits	Signature generation/ verification
#A2862	Hash_DRBG (SP800-90A Rev.1)	N/A	Hash based: SHA2-256	Deterministic Random Bit Generation
#A2861	KBKDF (SP800-108 Revised)	Counter	MACs: HMAC-SHA2-256/ Key Size: 256 bits/ Key Strength: 256 bits	Key derivation
#A2837	KTS (IG D.G)	N/A	Combination of AES256 CBC Mode and HMAC-SHA2-256 / Key Size: 256 bits/ Key Strength: 256 bits	Key Transport Scheme
Vendor Affirmation	CKG (SP800-133 Rev.2)	N/A	Methods described in section 4 of the SP800-133 Rev.2	Cryptographic Key Generation
ENT(P)	Entropy Source (SP800-90B)	N/A	N/A	Hardware RNG used to seed the approved Hash_DRBG.

Table 3 - Approved Algorithm

The CM does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation.

<sup>1</sup> ECB mode is used as a prerequisite of XTS mode. ECB is not directly used in services of the Cryptographic Module. The CM performs a check that the XTS Key1 and XTS Key2 are different according to IG C.I.

## Section 2.3 – Module Configuration

Overview block diagram of the CM is shown below.




Figure 1 – Configuration of module and peripheral components

Components of the CM is shown with gray background include processor and memories (volatile and non-volatile memory) and HW circuitry for cryptographic processing. Physical ports bordering outside the CM's boundary and the data passing over them are also indicated (see Section 3 for details on physical ports and interfaces).

## Section 3 – Cryptographic Module Interface

Physical port	Logical Interface	Data that passes over port/interface
Mailbox AES circuit DMAC Lock Checker	Data Input	Mailbox input parameter. User data. Read/Write destination address information.
Mailbox AES circuit DMAC	Data Output	Mailbox output parameter. User data.
Mailbox Lock Checker	Control Input	Mailbox command information. Lock status confirmation request signal.
Mailbox Lock Checker	Status Output	Mailbox command result. Lock status confirmation result signal.
Power PIN	Power Input	Power

Note: Control output is omitted in the table above because the CM does not implement this type of interface.

Table 4 - Ports and Interface

## Section 4 – Roles Services and Authentication

The relation between Roles and Services in this CM is shown below.

Role	Service	Input	Output
FIPS Crypto Officer (AdminSP.SID)	Download Port Lock/Unlock Firmware Download <sup>2</sup> Set PIN (for AdminSP.SID and AdminSP.Admin1) Authority Enable/Disable Revert Data Locking protection Enable Sanitize Format Namespace Namespace Create/Delete	Mailbox command	Mailbox command result
FIPS Crypto Officer (AdminSP.Admin1)	Set PIN (for AdminSP.Admin1) Revert Sanitize Format Namespace Namespace Create/Delete	Mailbox command	Mailbox command result
FIPS Crypto Officer (LockingSP.Admin1-4)	Band Lock/Unlock Cryptographic Erase Cryptographic Erase and Initialize Band State Set Band position and Size, Set Band position and Size for Band of Single User Mode Set PIN(for LockingSP.Admin1-4 and LockingSP.User1-192) Authority Enable/Disable Revert Data Locking protection Enable Sanitize Format Namespace Namespace Create/Delete Band Set Enable Band Set Disable Data Read/Write	Mailbox command	Mailbox command result
FIPS Crypto Officer (LockingSP.User1)	Band Lock/Unlock for Band of Single User Mode (for GlobalRange) Cryptographic Erase for Band of Single User Mode (for GlobalRange)	Mailbox command	Mailbox command result

<sup>2</sup> “Firmware Download” service is controlled by AdminSP.SID role and signature of downloaded external firmware is verified (RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1\_5).

	Cryptographic Erase and Initialize Band State (for GlobalRange)		
	Set Band position and Size for Band of Single user Mode (for GlobalRange)		
	Set PIN (for LockingSP.User1), Set PIN for Band of Single User Mode (for LockingSP.Use1)		
	Format Namespace		
	Namespace Create/Delete		
	Data Read/Write	Encrypted/Decrypted data	Decrypted/Encrypted data
FIPS Crypto Officer (LockingSP.User2)	Band Lock/Unlock for Band of Single User Mode (for Band1)		
	Cryptographic Erase for Band of Single User Mode (for Band1)		
	Cryptographic Erase and Initialize Band State (for Band1)		
	Set Band position and Size for Band of Single user Mode (for Band1)		
	Set PIN (for LockingSP.User2), Set PIN for Band of Single User Mode (for LockingSP.User2)		
	Format Namespace		
	Data Read/Write	Encrypted/Decrypted data	Decrypted/Encrypted data
...	...	...	...
FIPS Crypto Officer (LockingSP.User192)	Band Lock/Unlock for Band of Single User Mode (for Band191)		
	Cryptographic Erase for Band of Single User Mode (for Band191)		
	Cryptographic Erase and Initialize Band State (for Band191)		
	Set Band position and Size for Band of Single user Mode (for Band191)		
	Set PIN (for LockingSP.User192), Set PIN for Band of Single User Mode (for LockingSP.User192)		
	Format Namespace		
	Data Read/Write	Encrypted/Decrypted data	Decrypted/Encrypted data
None	Firmware Verification		
	Random Number Generation		
	Show Status		
	Zeroisation		
	Signature Generation		
	Signature Verification		
	Calculate Hash Digest		
	Check Lock State	Read/Write Command	Lock state of each Band

	Reset	Power	N/A
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Table 5 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and output

The CM supports the configuration of roles and services. The authenticated operator is expected to configure locked bands for data storage, the associated role and the lock-based authentication data (PIN) per Table 5 (refer to section 11 for detail settings to maintain secure operation). Bands that are not configured are considered unprotected or plaintext. This configuration enables Data Read/Write service using the lock-based authentication model (IG 4.1.A). To Read/Write data from/to each band, an operator must unlock the bands with appropriate authenticated roles. Once the bands are unlocked, Read and Write access to the bands must be controlled by a trusted operator outside of the module who has authenticated the associated role until powered off. The module prevents Data read/write service for locked bands. If Read and Write access needs to be inhibited prior to power off, the operator who authenticates the role must set the bands to the locked state again.

## Section 4.1 – Roles and Authentication

This section describes roles, authentication method, and strength of authentication.

Role Name	Role Type	Type of Authentication	Authentication	Authentication Strength	Multi Attempt strength
AdminSP.SID	Crypto Officer	Role	PIN	$1 / 2^{64} < 1 / 1,000,000$	$60,000 / 2^{64} < 1 / 100,000$
AdminSP.Admin1	Crypto Officer	Role	PIN	$1 / 2^{64} < 1 / 1,000,000$	$60,000 / 2^{64} < 1 / 100,000$
LockingSP.Admin1-4	Crypto Officer	Role	PIN	$1 / 2^{64} < 1 / 1,000,000$	$60,000 / 2^{64} < 1 / 100,000$
LockingSP.User1	Crypto Officer	Role	PIN	$1 / 2^{64} < 1 / 1,000,000$	$60,000 / 2^{64} < 1 / 100,000$
LockingSP.User2	Crypto Officer	Role	PIN	$1 / 2^{64} < 1 / 1,000,000$	$60,000 / 2^{64} < 1 / 100,000$
...	...	...	...	...	...
LockingSP.User192	Crypto Officer	Role	PIN	$1 / 2^{64} < 1 / 1,000,000$	$60,000 / 2^{64} < 1 / 100,000$

Table 6 - Identification and Authentication Policy

The CM performs role authentication by comparing whether the PIN entered by the user matches the information stored inside the CM. PINs are hashed with SHA2-256 to store them on the CM. The PIN entered by the user is hashed and compared to the stored PIN hash. PINs can be changed by executing the Set PIN Service (see Section4.2) with appropriate roles authenticated. The CM refuses to set a PIN less than 8 bytes, and responds with an error if such

a setting is attempted. Therefore, the probability that a random attempt will succeed is  $1 / 2^{64} < 1 / 1,000,000$  (the CM accepts any value (0x00-0xFF) as each byte of PIN). The CM waits 1ms when authentication attempt fails, so the maximum number of authentication attempts is 60,000 times in 1 min. Therefore, the probability that random attempts in 1min will succeed is  $60,000 / 2^{64} < 1 / 100,000$ .

The Roles of AdminSP.Admin1, LockingSP.Admin2-4 and LockingSP.User1-192 are set initial authentication data to null (means data of length 0). These role's authentication data are need to be replaced upon the first-time authentication. Otherwise, the operator who assumes these roles cannot execute services except Set PIN and services that does not need authorized roles.

## Section 4.2 – Services

This section describes services which the CM provides.

Service	Description	Approved Security Function	Keys and/or SSPs	Role(s)	Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs <sup>3</sup>	Indicator
Band Lock/Unlock	Lock or unlock read / write of user data in a band.	KBKDF HMAC-SHA2-256	KDK MEKs System MAC Key	LockingSP.Admin 1-4	E G E	Mailbox command result
Band Lock/Unlock for Band of Single User Mode	Lock or unlock read / write of user data in band "X" of single user mode.			LockingSP.User"X +1"		
Check Lock State	Check a lock state of band that read / write user data.	N/A	N/A	None	N/A	Band Lock state
Data Read/Write	Encryption / decryption of user data to/from unlocked band of SSD <sup>4</sup> .	AES256-XTS	MEKs	LockingSP.Admin 1-4 LockingSP.User1-192	E	Readable/Writable signal from lock check module
Cryptographic Erase	Erase user data (in cryptographic means) by changing the key that derives the data encryption key.	CKG (Hash_DRBG) KBKDF HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	KDK KDK MEKs System MAC Key System Enc Key KDK	LockingSP.Admin 1-4	G, Z E G, Z E E W, R	Mailbox command result
Cryptographic Erase for Band of Single User Mode	Erase user data in band "X" of single user mode (in cryptographic means) by changing the key that derives the data encryption key.			LockingSP.user"X +1"		

<sup>3</sup> The letters (G, R, W, E, Z) mean Generate, Read, Write, Execute and Zeroise respectively.

<sup>4</sup> The band has to be unlocked by the corresponding role beforehand.

Cryptographic Erase and Initialize Band State	Erase user data in band "X" of single user mode (in cryptographic means) by changing the key that derives the data encryption key, and initialize the band state.	CKG (Hash_DRBG) KBKDF HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	KDK KDK MEKs System MAC Key System Enc Key KDK	LockingSP.Admin 1-4 LockingSP.user"X +1"	G, Z E G, Z E E W, R	Mailbox command result
Download Port Lock/Unlock	Lock / unlock firmware download.	N/A	N/A	AdminSP.SID	N/A	Mailbox command result
Firmware Verification	Digital signature verification for firmware outside the CM.	RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5	Public Key embedded on the CM's code	None	E	Mailbox command result
Firmware Download	Download a firmware image <sup>5</sup> .	SHA2-384 RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5	PubKey1 PubKey1	AdminSP.SID	W, E E	Mailbox command result
Random Number Generation	Provide a random number generated by the CM.	Hash_DRBG	DRBG Internal Value	None	E	Mailbox command result
Set Band Position and Size	Set the location and size of the band.	CKG (Hash_DRBG) KBKDF HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	KDK KDK MEKs System MAC Key System Enc Key KDK	LockingSP.Admin 1-4	G, Z E G, Z E E W, R	Mailbox command result
Set Band Position and Size for Band of Single User Mode	Set the location and size of the band "X" of single user mode.			LockingSP.Admin 1-4 LockingSP.User"X +1"		
Set PIN	Set PIN (authentication data).	SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	PINs System MAC Key System Enc Key PINs	AdminSP.SID, AdminSP.Admin1 LockingSP.Admin 1-4 LockingSP.User1-192	W, E E E W, R	Mailbox command result
Set PIN for Band of Single User Mode	Set PIN (authentication data) of authority for band "X" of single use mode			LockingSP.User1-192		
Authority Enable/Disable	Enable/Disable the authority.	HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC	System MAC Key System Enc Key	AdminSP.SID LockingSP.Admin 1-4	E E	Mailbox command result
Revert	Initialize the band State and disable band lock setting.	SHA2-256 CKG (Hash_DRBG) KBKDF HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC	PINs KDK KDK MEKs System MAC Key System Enc Key	AdminSP.SID, AdminSP.Admin1 LockingSP.Admin 1-4	G, E G, Z E G, Z E E	Mailbox command result

<sup>5</sup> Only the CMVP validated version is to be used. This service only replaces firmware image (User Code).

		KTS	PINs KDK		W, R W, R	
Data Locking Protection Enable	Enable Data protection with band lock setting.	SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	PINs System MAC Key System Enc Key PINs	AdminSP.SID LockingSP.Admin1-4	G, E E E W, R	Mailbox command result
Sanitize	Erase all user data (in cryptographic means) by changing the key that derives the data encryption key.	CKG (Hash_DRBG) KBKDF HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	KDK KDK MEKs System MAC Key System Enc Key KDK	AdminSP.SID, AdminSP.Admin1 , LockingSP.Admin1-4	G, Z E G, Z E E W, R	Mailbox command result
Format Namespace	Erase user data (in cryptographic means) on Namespace by changing the key that derives the data encryption key.	CKG (Hash_DRBG) KBKDF HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	KDK KDK MEKs System MAC Key System Enc Key KDK	AdminSP.SID, AdminSP.Admin1 LockingSP.Admin1-4 LockingSP.User1-192	G, Z E G, Z E E W, R	Mailbox command result
Namespace Create/Delete	Create and delete Namespace.	CKG (Hash_DRBG) KBKDF HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	KDK KDK MEKs System MAC Key System Enc Key KDK	AdminSP.SID AdminSP.Admin1 LockingSP.Admin1-4 LockingSP.User1	G, Z E G, Z E E W, R	Mailbox command result
Band Set Enable	Set the location, size and lock state of the band.	CKG (Hash_DRBG) KBKDF HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	KDK KDK MEKs System MAC Key System Enc Key KDK	LockinSP.Admin1-4	G, Z E G, Z E E W, R	Mailbox command result
Band Set Disable	Initialize the location, size and lock state of the band.	CKG (Hash_DRBG) KBKDF HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	KDK KDK MEKs System MAC Key System Enc Key KDK	LockingSP.Admin1-4	G, Z E G, Z E E W, R	Mailbox command result
Signature Generation	Generate a signature of the data by using a private key entered from outside of the CM.	ECDSA	Key Pair Private Key	None	W, E, Z	Mailbox command result
Signature Verification	Verify input signature by using a public key entered from outside of the CM.	ECDSA	Key Pair Public Key	None	W, E, Z	Mailbox command result
Calculate Hash Digest	Hash the data entered from outside of the CM.	SHA2-256 or SHA2-384	N/A	None	N/A	Mailbox command result
Show Status	Report status of the CM and versioning information.	N/A	N/A	None	N/A	Mailbox command result

Zeroisation	Erase SSPs.	N/A	RKey KDK MEKs PINs System MAC Key System Enc Key DRBG Internal Value	None <sup>6</sup>	Z Z Z Z Z Z Z	Mailbox command result
Reset	<u>Power-OFF:</u>  Delete SSPs in RAM.	N/A	System MAC Key System Enc Key KDK MEKs PINs DRBG Internal Value PubKey1	None	Z Z Z Z Z Z Z	
	<u>Power-ON:</u>  Runs various self-tests to be performed at power-on ( POSTs, CASTs, Firmware Load test ) and generate / import some SSPs.	RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5 KBKDF  Entropy Source Hash_DRBG  HMAC-SHA2-256 AES256-CBC KTS	PubKey1  RKey System MAC Key System Enc Key DRBG Seed  DRBG Seed DRBG Internal Value System MAC Key  System Enc Key KDK PINs		W, E  E G G G E, Z G  E E W W	N/A

Note 1: "CKG(Hash\_DRBG)" means direct use of Hash\_DRBG output as a key.

Table 7 - Approved services

## Section 5 – Software/Firmware Security

Firmware Security of components in this CM is shown below.

ROM Code:

- Form of the executable code: ELF format
- Integrity verification method: 32bit CRC
- Method for integrity test on demand: Power cycling

Firmware image (User Code):

- Form of the executable code: ELF format
- Integrity verification method: Approved signature verification (RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1\_5, see table 3)
- Method for integrity test on demand: Power cycling

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<sup>6</sup> Need to input PSID, which is public drive-unique value used for the zeroisation service.

## Section 6 – Operational Environment

Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM does not employ operating systems and operates in a non-modifiable environment that is the CM cannot be modified and no code can be added or deleted. Any firmware/software loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a success of firmware load test and a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.

## Section 7 – Physical Security

The CM is a sub-chip enclosed in a single chip that is an opaque package. And the CM consists of production-grade components. Gathering information of the module's internal construction or components is impossible without forcing the package to open. In this case, it is confirmed package damage as a tamper-evidence. Operators of the CM can ensure that the physical security is maintained to confirm the package has no obvious attack damage. If the operator discovers tamper evidence, the CM should be removed.




Figure 1.1 - TC58NC1137GTC 0001 SoC




Figure 1.2 - TC58NC1138GTC 0001 SoC

Physical Security Mechanism	Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test	Inspection/Test Guidance Detail
Passivated opaque package	Every month or every two months	Confirmation that there is no visual damage

Table 8 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines

## Section 8 – Non-invasive security

The CM does not apply Non-invasive security.

## Section 9 – Sensitive security parameter management

The CM uses keys and SSPs in the following table.

Key/SSP Name/Type	Strength (bit)	Security Function and Cert Number	Generation	Import/Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroisation	Use & related keys
<b>Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)</b>								
RKey	256	KBKDF (#A2861)	Hash_DRBG (Method SP800-133 Rev.2 Section 4)	N/A	Manufacturing	Plaintext in OTP	<u>Explicit</u> Zeroisation service	Derivation of System Enc Key and System MAC Key
System Enc Key	256	AES-CBC (#A2837)	KDF in Counter Mode	N/A	Power-On	Plaintext in RAM	<u>Explicit</u> Zeroisation service	Data and Key Encryption / Decryption for KTS
							<u>Implicit</u> Power-Off	
System MAC Key	256	HMAC (#A2837)	KDF in Counter Mode	N/A	Power-On	Plaintext in RAM	<u>Explicit</u> Zeroisation service	Message Authentication Code generation and verification for KTS
							<u>Implicit</u> Power-Off	

DKK	256	KBKDF (#A2861)	Hash_DRBG (Method SP800-133 Rev.2 Section 4)  Exported by KTS (see Table 3)	Electric Imported and Exported by KTS (see Table 3)	Key update  services <sup>7</sup>	Plaintext in RAM  Encrypted in System  Area outside the module using the Approved KTS	<u>Explicit</u> Zeroisation service, Key update services	Derivation of MEKs
							<u>Implicit</u> Power-Off	
MEKs	256	AES-XTS (#A2837)	KDF in Counter Mode	N/A	Band Lock/Unlock service, Key update services	Plaintext in AES register	<u>Explicit</u> Zeroisation service, Key update services	Data Encryption / Decryption
							<u>Implicit</u> Power-Off	
PINs	Referred to in Section 4.1 (Table 6)	SHA2-256 (#A2837)	Electric input	Electric Imported and Exported by KTS (see Table 3)	Set PIN service	Hashed in RAM  Hashed + Encrypted  in System  Area outside the module using the Approved KTS	<u>Explicit</u> Zeroisation service	User authentication
							<u>Implicit</u> Power-Off	
Key Pair Private Key	192	ECDSA (#A2883)	Electric input	Electric Imported during	Signature Generation service	Plaintext in RAM	<u>Implicit</u> Immediately after use <sup>8</sup>	Signature generation for arbitrary data

<sup>7</sup> The following service are applicable, Cryptographic Erase, Cryptographic Erase for Band of Single User Mode, Cryptographic Erase and Initialize Band State, Set Band Position and Size, Set Band Position and Size for Band of Single User Mode, Revert, Sanitize, Format Namespace, Namespace Create/Delete and Band Set Enable.

				Signature Generation Service				
DRBG Internal Value	V: 440 bits	Hash_DRBG (#A2862)	SP800-90A Instantiation of Hash_DRBG	N/A	Power-On	Plaintext in RAM	<u>Explicit</u> Zeroisation service	Random number generation
	C: 440 bits						<u>Implicit</u> Power-Off	
DRBG Seed	Entropy Input String and Nonce: 1024 bits	Hash_DRBG (#A2862)	Entropy collected from Entropy Source at instantiation (Minimum entropy of 8 bits: 5.67)	N/A	Power-On	Plaintext in RAM	<u>Implicit</u> Immediately after use <sup>8</sup>	Random number generation
<b>Public Security Parameters (PSPs)</b>								
PubKey1	128	RSA (#A2837)	Electric input	Electric Imported during FW load.	Power-on FW Download service	Plaintext in RAM Hashed in OTP	<u>Implicit</u> Power-Off (Data in RAM)	Signature verification.
Key Pair Public Key	192	ECDSA (#A2883)	Electric input	Electric Imported during Signature Verification Service	Signature Verification service	Plaintext in RAM	<u>Implicit</u> Immediately after use <sup>8</sup>	Signature verification for arbitrary data

Table 9 - SSPs

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<sup>8</sup> Zeroised after input to related algorithm.

Entropy source	Minimum number of bits of entropy	Details
Entropy Source <sup>9</sup>	Minimum entropy of 8 bits is 5.67.	Hardware RNG used to seed the approved Hash_DRBG.

Table 10 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

For the Entropy Source listed in the table above, self-tests are performed each time before data is obtained (see Section 10 for details of these self-tests). When these tests detect that the Entropy Source cannot generate the sufficient amount of entropy, the CM is transient to error state. The CM can be recovered from the error state by rebooting the module, and the obtaining of Entropy data is attempted again. If the CM continuously enters in error state in spite of several trials of reboot, the CM may be sent back to factory to recover from error state.

## Section 10 – Self Tests

The CM runs self-tests in the following table.

Function	Self-Test Type	Execution Condition	Abstract	Failure Behavior
AES256-CBC	Conditional	Power-On	Encrypt and Decrypt KAT	Enters Boot Error State. (Indicated Error Code: 0x24)
AES256-XTS	Conditional	Power-On	Encrypt and Decrypt KAT	Enters Boot Error State. (Indicated Error Code: 0x23)
SHA2-256/ SHA2-384	Conditional	Power-On	Digest KAT	Enters Boot Error State. (Indicated Error Code: 0x25)
HMAC-SHA2-256	Conditional	Power-On	Digest KAT	Enters Boot Error State. (Indicated Error Code: 0x26)
Hash_DRBG	Conditional	Power-On	DRBG KAT	Enters Boot Error State. (Indicated Error Code: 0x18/0x19)
RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5	Conditional	Power-On	Signature verification KAT	Enters Boot Error State. (Indicated Error Code: 0x27)
ECDSA	Conditional	Before first use	Signature generation KAT	Enters Error State (Indicated Error Code: 0x36)

<sup>9</sup> The Entropy Source is a hardware module inside the CM boundary. The Entropy Source supplies the Hash\_DRBG with 1024 bits entropy input. From Table 10 this input contains about 725 bits of entropy, which is sufficient entropy to obtain 256 bits of security strength.

ECDSA	Conditional	Before first use	Signature verification KAT	Enters Error State (Indicated Error Code: 0x36)
KDF in Counter Mode	Conditional	Power-On	KDF KAT	Enters Boot Error State (Indicated Error Code: 0x28)
Entropy Source (Health tests of noise source at startup.)	Conditional	Power-On	Verify not deviating from the intended behavior of the noise source by Repetition Count Test and Adaptive Proportion Test specified in SP800-90B.	Enters Boot Error State (Indicated Error Code: 0x2C/0x2D)
Entropy Source (Continuous noise source health tests during operation.)	Conditional	Entropy output request	Verify not deviating from the intended behavior of the noise source by Repetition Count Test and Adaptive Proportion Test specified in SP800-90B.	Enters Error State. (Indicated Error Code: 0x2C/0x2D)
Firmware load test	Conditional <sup>10</sup>	Power-On	Verify signature of loaded firmware image by RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5	Enters Power Up Load Test Error State (Indicated Error Code: 0x13)
		FW download	Verify signature of downloaded firmware image by RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5	Enters Conditional Load Test Error State. After reporting Error code, transition from error state to normal state and continue to operate with FW before download. (Indicated Error Code: 0x13)
Firmware integrity test	Pre-operational	Power-On	Verify ROM code integrity with 32bit CRC.	Enters Boot Error State (Implicit error reporting by stopping the startup sequence)

Table 11 - Self Tests

As shown in the table above, self-tests are performed automatically at the CM startup and before execution certain security functions. Operator can also initiate self-test on-demand for periodic testing by using the Reset service which is automatically invoked when the module is powered-off and powered-on (rebooted).

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<sup>10</sup> Firmware load test is also run at the time of Power-up, and the integrity of the Firmware loaded into the CM can be confirmed.

If the self-tests fail, the CM reports error status and enters to the error state. In this case, the CM must be powered-off to clear error condition. When power-on is executed again, self-tests are also executed like an on-demand operator reset. If the CM continuously enters in error state in spite of several trials of reboot, the CM may be sent back to factory to recover from error state.

## Section 11 – Life-cycle Assurance

In the SSD's manufacturing process, installation is executed as below:

1. The Firmware described in Section 2.1 is downloaded into the CM.
2. Initial SSPs are generated.
3. Initial authentication information is set to the CM.
4. System area including SSPs generated in Step2 and Step3 are encrypted and calculated message authentication code.

Initial operations to setup this CM are following:

1. Load Firmware into the CM.
2. Load system area including SSPs into the CM.
3. Execute range state setting method.
4. Execute download port setting method.
5. Execute service execution state setting method.
6. Execute namespace setting method.

The CM switches to approved mode after the initial operation success. When the initial operation succeeds, the CM indicates success on the Status Output interface. Operators can confirm that the CM is in approved mode by executing Show Status service and checking that the startup is successfully completed.

For secure operation, the following settings must be maintained:

- Data Locking Protection is Enabled
- Each Band is set to be locked when power-on. Bands that are not configured are considered unprotected or plaintext.

(Refer to SSD setting procedure<sup>11)</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> For maintaining secure condition, the SSD needs several setting at least.

Owners of the SSD that embeds the CM must use it securely according to the followings:

1. TCG LockingSP is enabled by Activate method.
2. Both ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled are set to "True" for each band (included GlobalRange) and it must not be modified.

As described in Section 2, the CM is used by being embedded in SSDs. Therefore, there are no maintenance requirements for the CM alone. More detailed guidance for this module is provided to the SSDs developers that embed the CM.

## **Section 12 – Mitigation of Other Attack**

The CM does not mitigate other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3 requirements.

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3. For each band, "Power Cycle" of LockOnReset setting is not change.
  4. If the LockingSP has been made disabled, the Activate method is re-executed before PowerCycle is performed.