



Cisco Systems, Inc.

Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 1000 Series)

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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1 General

1.1 Overview

This is Cisco Systems, Inc. non-proprietary security policy for the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (FPR 1000 Series) (hereinafter referred to as ASA or Module), version 9.20. The following details how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 2 Hardware cryptographic module.

The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic module interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; software/firmware security; operational environment; physical security; non-invasive security; sensitive security parameter management; self-tests; life-cycle assurance; and mitigation of other attacks. The following table indicates the actual security levels for each area of the cryptographic module.

1.2 Security Levels

Section	Title	Security Level
1	General	2
2	Cryptographic module specification	2
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	2
4	Roles, services, and authentication	3
5	Software/Firmware security	2
6	Operational environment	N/A
7	Physical security	2
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	2
10	Self-tests	2
11	Life-cycle assurance	2
12	Mitigation of other attacks	N/A
	Overall Level	2

Table 1: Security Levels

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Description

Purpose and Use:

This module is a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module deployed under the Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) with Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA). The module is operated in a limited operational environment.

ASA delivers enterprise-class firewall for businesses, improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and throughput for demanding enterprise data centers. The ASA solution offers the combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content

security and secure unified communications, HTTPS/TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3 and Cryptographic Cipher Suite B using the ASA Cryptographic Module.

Module Type: Hardware

Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand

Module Characteristics:

Cryptographic Boundary:

The module's cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire chassis unit's physical perimeter encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," "rear" and "bottom" surfaces of the case, and shown in the figures below and in the Physical Security section. The FPR 1010 has a unique exterior appearance whereas the FPR 1120, FPR 1140 and FPR 1150 all have the same exterior appearance. Where they differ is in Firewall throughput, IPS throughput, IPsec VPN throughput and number of VPN peers allowed.



Figure 1: FPR 1010



Figure 2: FPR 1120, FPR 1140 and FPR 1150

2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

Tested Module Identification – Hardware:

Model and/or Part Number	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Processors	Features
FPR 1010	FPR-1010	9.20	Intel Atom C3558 (Goldmont)	
FPR 1120	FPR-1120	9.20	Intel Atom C3858 (Goldmont)	
FPR 1140	FPR-1140	9.20	Intel Atom C3958 (Goldmont)	
FPR 1150	FPR-1150	9.20	Intel Atom C3958 (Goldmont)	

Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware

Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):

N/A for this module.

Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:

N/A for this module.

Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

N/A for this module.

Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

N/A for this module.

2.3 Excluded Components

N/A for this module.

2.4 Modes of Operation

Modes List and Description:

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved Mode of Operation	The module is always in the approved mode of operation after initial operations are performed.	Approved	Approved mode indicator: "FIPS is currently enabled."

Table 3: Modes List and Description

The module has one approved mode of operation and is always in the approved mode of operation after initial operations are performed (See Section 11). The module does not claim implementation of a degraded mode of operation. Section 4 provides details on the service indicator implemented by the module.

2.5 Algorithms

Approved Algorithms:

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A4446	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A4446	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal	SP 800-38D

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
		IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 192, 256	
Counter DRBG	A4446	Prediction Resistance - Yes Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	A4446	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	A4446	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	A4446	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-4
HMAC-SHA-1	A4446	Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A4446	Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A4446	Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A4446	Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A4446	Key Length - Key Length: 256-448 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A4446	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A4446	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-4096 Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDF IKEv2 (CVL)	A4446	Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 2048 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 3072 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF SNMP (CVL)	A4446	Password Length - Password Length: 256, 64	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL)	A4446	Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)	A4446	Key Generation Mode - B.3.4 Modulo - 2048, 3072 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256 Private Key Format - Standard	FIPS 186-4

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)	A4446	Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 2048, 3072	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)	A4446	Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS Modulo - 2048, 3072	FIPS 186-4
Safe Primes Key Generation	A4446	Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-4096	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
SHA-1	A4446	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A4446	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A4446	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A4446	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A4446	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL)	A4446	Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1

Table 4: Approved Algorithms

Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:

Name	Properties	Implementation	Reference
CKG	Key Type:Asymmetric	N/A	SP 800-133r2 Section 4, Method 1

Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

2.6 Security Function Implementations

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
KAS-ECC-KeyGen (SSHv2)	KAS-KeyGen CKG	KAS ECC keygen used in SSHv2 service	Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 128 and 256 bits encryption strength	Counter DRBG: (A4446) CKG: ()
KAS-FFC-KeyGen (SSHv2)	KAS-KeyGen CKG	KAS FFC keygen used in SSHv2 service	Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 112 and 152 bits encryption strength	Counter DRBG: (A4446) Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4446) Safe Prime Groups: modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-4096 CKG: ()
KAS-ECC-KeyGen (TLSv1.2)	KAS-KeyGen CKG	KAS ECC keygen used in TLSv1.2 service	Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 128 and 256 bits encryption strength	Counter DRBG: (A4446) CKG: ()
KAS-FFC-KeyGen (TLSv1.2)	KAS-KeyGen CKG	KAS FFC keygen used in TLSv1.2 service	Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 112 and 152 bits encryption strength	Counter DRBG: (A4446) Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4446) Safe Prime Groups: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 CKG: ()
KAS-ECC-KeyGen (IKEv2)	KAS-KeyGen CKG	KAS ECC keygen used in TLSv1.2 service	Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 128 and 256 bits encryption strength	Counter DRBG: (A4446) CKG: ()
KAS-FFC-KeyGen (IKEv2)	KAS-KeyGen CKG	KAS FFC keygen used in TLSv1.2 service	Bit-strength Caveat:Provides between 112 and 152 bits encryption strength	Counter DRBG: (A4446) Safe Primes Key Generation: (A4446) Safe Prime Groups: modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				4096 CKG: ()
KAS-ECC (SSHv2)	KAS-Full	KAS-ECC for SSHv2 service	Bit-strength Caveat: Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength	KDF SSH: (A4446) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446)
KAS-FFC (SSHv2)	KAS-Full	KAS-FFC SSHv2 service	Bit-strength Caveat: Provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength	KDF SSH: (A4446) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446) Domain Parameter Generation Method: modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-4096
KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2)	KAS-Full	KAS-ECC for TLSv1.2 service	Bit-strength Caveat: Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A4446) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446)
KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)	KAS-Full	KAS-FFC for TLSv1.2 service	Bit-strength Caveat: Provides between 112 to 152 bits of encryption strength	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A4446) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446) Domain Parameter Generation Method: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
KAS-ECC (IKEv2)	KAS-Full	KAS-ECC for IKEv2 Service	Bit-strength Caveat: Provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength	KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446) KDF IKEv2: (A4446)
KAS-FFC (IKEv2)	KAS-Full	KAS-FFC for IKEv2 service	Bit-strength Caveat: Provides between 112 and 152 bits of	KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A4446) KDF IKEv2:

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			encryption strength	(A4446) Domain Parameter Generation Method: modp-2048, modp-3072, modp-4096
KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC)	KTS-Wrap	KTS via TLSv1.2 service by using AES and HMAC	Bit-strength Caveat: Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength	AES-CBC: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 HMAC-SHA-1: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4446) SHA-1: (A4446) SHA2-256: (A4446) SHA2-384: (A4446)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES-GCM)	KTS-Wrap	KTS via TLSv1.2 service by using AES-GCM	Bit-strength Caveat: Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength	AES-GCM: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256
KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC)	KTS-Wrap	KTS via SSHv2 service by using AES and HMAC	Bit-strength Caveat: Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength	AES-CBC: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 HMAC-SHA-1: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4446) SHA-1: (A4446) SHA2-256: (A4446)
KTS (SSHv2 with AES-GCM)	KTS-Wrap	KTS via SSHv2 service by using AES-GCM	Bit-strength Caveat: Provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength	AES-GCM: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256
RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen CKG	RSA KeyGen for SSHv2,		RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A4446)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
		TLSv1.2, and IKEv2 services		Counter DRBG: (A4446) CKG: ()
ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2)	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen CKG	ECDSA KeyGen for TLSv1.2 and IKEv2 services		ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A4446) Counter DRBG: (A4446) CKG: ()
RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	DigSig-SigGen	RSA SigGen for SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2 services		RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A4446)
ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2)	DigSig-SigGen	ECDSA SigGen for TLSv1.2, and IKEv2 services		ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A4446)
RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2)	DigSig-SigVer	RSA SigVer for SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2 services		RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A4446)
ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2)	DigSig-SigVer	ECDSA SigVer for TLSv1.2 and IKEv2 services		ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A4446)
Block Cipher (SSHv2)	BC-Auth BC-UnAuth	Block Cipher for SSHv2 service		AES-CBC: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 AES-GCM: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256
Block Cipher (TLSv1.2)	BC-Auth BC-UnAuth	Block Cipher for TLSv1.2 service		AES-GCM: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256 AES-CBC: (A4446) Key Length: 128, 256
Block Cipher (IPSec/IKE)	BC-Auth BC-UnAuth	Block Cipher for IPSec/IKEv2 service		AES-CBC: (A4446) AES-GCM: (A4446)
Block Cipher (SNMPv3)	BC-UnAuth	Block Cipher for SNMPv3 service		AES-CBC: (A4446) KDF SNMP: (A4446)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
MAC (SSHv2)	MAC	MAC for SSHv2 service		HMAC-SHA-1: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4446) SHA-1: (A4446) SHA2-256: (A4446)
MAC (TLSv1.2)	MAC	Message Authentication for TLSv1.2 services		HMAC-SHA-1: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4446) SHA-1: (A4446) SHA2-256: (A4446) SHA2-384: (A4446)
MAC (IPSec/IKEv2)	MAC	Message Authentication for IPSec/IKEv2 services		HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A4446) SHA2-256: (A4446) SHA2-384: (A4446) SHA2-512: (A4446)
MAC (SNMPv3)	MAC	Message Authentication for SNMPv3 service		HMAC-SHA-1: (A4446) SHA-1: (A4446) KDF SNMP: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4446) SHA2-256: (A4446) SHA2-384: (A4446) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A4446) SHA2-224: (A4446)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
Firmware Load Test	MAC	MAC for firmware load test		HMAC-SHA2-512: (A4446)

Table 6: Security Function Implementations

2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

- The module's AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2 handshake process (client_write_key and server_write_key) are compared and the module aborts the session if the key values are identical. In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
- The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. Two keys established by IKEv2 for one security association (one key for encryption in each direction between the parties) are not identical and abort the session if they are. In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
- The module was algorithm tested based on the FIPS 186-4 standard for Digital Signatures. According to IG C.K, this module is 186-5 compliant as all 186-4 CAVP tests performed are mathematically identical to the 186-5 CAVP tests. The Module does not support 186-4 DSA or RSA X9.31 for Signature Generation or Signature Verification.

2.8 RBG and Entropy

Cert Number	Vendor Name
E3	Cisco Systems, Inc.

Table 7: Entropy Certificates

Name	Type	Operational Environment	Sample Size	Entropy per Sample	Conditioning Component
Cisco Jitter Entropy Source	Non-Physical	Intel Atom C3558 (Goldmont), Intel Atom C3858 (Goldmont), Intel Atom C3958 (Goldmont)	256 bits	Full Entropy	A2810 (SHA3-256)

Table 8: Entropy Sources

The module implements one approved DRBGs based on SP800-90Ar1, including CTR_DRBG with Algo Cert. #A4446.

This DRBG is used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys, seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions).

The DRBG is seeded by the entropy source described in the table above. The CTR_DRBG (AES-128/192/256) enables Derivation Function capability. The DRBG is instantiated with a 384-bits long entropy input (corresponding to 384 bits of entropy) and provides at least 256 bits security strength for the following cryptographic keys generation.

The Cisco JENT entropy source implementation generates an output that is considered to have full entropy. More information can be found in the public use document for ESV cert #E3.

2.9 Key Generation

The module generates RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DH asymmetric key pairs compliant with FIPS 186-4, using NIST SP 800-90Arev1 DRBG for random number generation. In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs CKG for asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved DRBG. The random bit string supports the required security strength requested by the calling application (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H.).

2.10 Key Establishment

The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of operation:

- KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation:
 - The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength.
 - The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 4419 (SSH), RFC 7919 (TLS) and RFC 3526 (IKE).

SSH (RFC 4419):
 MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
 MODP-3072 (ID = 15)
 MODP-4096 (ID = 16)

TLS (RFC 7919):
ffdhe2048 (ID = 256)
ffdhe3072 (ID = 257)
ffdhe4096 (ID = 258)

IKE (RFC 3526):
MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
MODP-3072 (ID = 15)
MODP-4096 (ID = 16)

- KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation:
 - The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

2.11 Industry Protocols

The module supports SSHv2, TLS v1.2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 industrial protocols. Please refer to the Security Function Implementations Table for more information. No parts of IPsec/IKEv2, SNMPv3, SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

3.1 Ports and Interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
Ethernet Port, SFP port, and Console Port	Data Input	Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 service data.
Ethernet Port, SFP port, and Console Port	Data Output	Data output from the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 service data.
Ethernet Port, SFP port, Console Port and RESET	Control Input	Control Data input into the module for all the services defined in Approved Services Table, including TLSv1.2, SSHv2, SNMPv3 and IPsec/IKEv2 service data.
Ethernet Port, SFP port, Console Port and LEDs	Status Output	Status Information output from the module.
N/A	Control Output	N/A
Power	Power	Provide the Power Supply to the module.

Table 9: Ports and Interfaces

The module's physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in Table 2. The module provides physical ports which are mapped to logical interfaces provided by the module (data input, data output, control input, control output and status output) as above. The module's data output interface will be disabled when performing pre-operational self-tests, loading new firmware, zeroizing keys, or when in an error state.

4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1 Authentication Methods

Method Name	Description	Security Mechanism	Strength Each Attempt	Strength per Minute
Password	The minimum length is eight (8) characters (94 possible characters). The configuration supports at most ten failed attempts to authenticate in a one-minute period.	Password Based	The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is $1/(94^8)$ which is less than 1/1,000,000.	The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within one minute is $10/(94^8)$, which is less than 1/100,000.
RSA-Based Certificate	The modules support RSA public-key based authentication mechanism using a minimum of RSA 2048 bits, which provides 112 bits of security strength. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is $1/(2^{112})$ which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is $17,000 * 60 =$	RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446)	The probability that a random attempt will succeed is $1/(2^{112})$. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details	the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is $17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^{112})$. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details

Method Name	Description	Security Mechanism	Strength Each Attempt	Strength per Minute
	1,020,000/(2^112), which is less than 1/100,000.			
ECDSA-Based Certificate	The modules support ECDSA public-key based authentication mechanism using a minimum of curve P-256, which provides 128 bits of security strength. The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^128) which is less than 1/1,000,000. For multiple attacks during a one-minute period, as the module at its highest can support at most 17,000 new sessions per second to authenticate in a one-minute period, the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^128), which is less than 1/100,000.	ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446)	The probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1/(2^128) which is less than 1/1,000,000. Please refer to Description section in this table for more details	the probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 17,000 * 60 = 1,020,000/(2^128). Please refer to Description section in this table for more details

Table 10: Authentication Methods

The module implements identity-based authentication. The module supports Crypto Officer role and the User role. The module also allows the concurrent operators.

4.2 Roles

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer	Identity	CO	Password RSA-Based Certificate ECDSA-Based Certificate
User	Identity	User	Password RSA-Based Certificate ECDSA-Based Certificate

Table 11: Roles

4.3 Approved Services

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Show Status	Provide Module's current status (return codes and/or syslog messages)	N/A	Command used to show Module's Status	Module's Operational Status	None	Crypto Officer User
Show Version	Provide Module's name and version information	N/A	Command to show version	Module's ID and versioning information	None	Crypto Officer User
Perform Self-Tests	Perform Self-Tests (Pre-operational self-test and Conditional Self-Tests)	Global Indicator or syslog message	Command to trigger Self-Test	Status of the self-tests results	None	Crypto Officer User Unauthenticated
Perform Zeroization	Perform Zeroization	Syslog message	Command to zeroize the module	Status of the SSPs zeroization	None	Crypto Officer - DRBG Entropy Input: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - DRBG Internal State Value: Z - DRBG Key: Z - User Password: Z - Crypto Officer Password: Z - RADIUS Secret: Z - TACACS+ Secret: Z

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Firmware Load Test Key: Z - SSH DH Private Key: Z - SSH DH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer DH Public Key: Z - SSH DH Shared Secret: Z - SSH ECDH Private Key: Z - SSH ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: Z - SSH RSA Private Key: Z - SSH RSA Public Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Private Key: Z - SSH ECDSA Public Key: Z - SSH Session Encryption Key: Z - SSH Session Authentication

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - n Key: Z - TLS DH Private Key: Z - TLS DH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer DH Public Key: Z - TLS DH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDH Private Key: Z - TLS ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: Z - TLS ECDSA Private Key: Z - TLS ECDSA Public Key: Z - TLS RSA Private Key: Z - TLS RSA Public Key: Z - TLS Master Secret: Z - TLS Session Encryption Key: Z - TLS Session Authentication

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						n Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: Z - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: Z - SKEYSEED:

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Z - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: Z - IPSec/IKE Authentication Key: Z - SNMPv3 Shared Secret: Z - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: Z - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: Z
Configure Network	Configure Module's Network	None	Commands to configure the network	Status of the completion of network configuration status	None	Crypto Officer
Account Management	Manage User Account	N/A	Commands to create User account	Account status	None	Crypto Officer
Crypto Officer Authentication	CO Role Authentication	N/A	CO Authentication Request	Status of the CO authentication	None	Crypto Officer - Crypto Officer Password: W,Z
User Authentication	User Role Authentication	N/A	User role authentication request	Status of the User role authentication	None	User - User Password: W,Z
Configure Bypass Capability	Sets the Bypass capability	None	CLI Bypass commands	Status of the completion of Bypass capability configuration	None	Crypto Officer
Configure SSHv2 Function	Configure SSHv2 Function	Global Indicator and	Commands to	Status of the completion	KAS-ECC-KeyGen (SSHv2)	Crypto Officer - SSH DH

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	SSHv2 configuration success status message	configure SSHv2		of the SSHv2 configuration	KAS-FFC-KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) KTS (SSHv2) with AES and HMAC KTS (SSHv2) with AES-GCM RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Block Cipher (SSHv2)	Private Key: G,W,E - SSH DH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E - SSH RSA Public Key: G,R,W - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - SSH Session Authentication Key: G,W,E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					MAC (SSHv2)	- DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State Value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E - RADIUS Secret: W - TACACS+ Secret: W
Configure HTTPS over TLSv1.2 Function	Configure HTTPS over TLSv1.2 Function	Global Indicator and HTTPS over TLSv1.2 configuration success status message	Commands to configure TLSv1.2	Status of the completion of TLSv1.2 configuration	KAS-ECC-KeyGen (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC-KeyGen (TLSv1.2) KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES-GCM) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2,	Crypto Officer - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E - TLS DH Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer DH Public Key: W,E - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - TLS ECDSA Private Key:

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Block Cipher (TLSv1.2) MAC (TLSv1.2)	G,W,E - TLS ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W,E - TLS RSA Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Master Secret: G,W,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - TLS Session Authenticatio n Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E
Configure IPsec/IKEv2 Function	Configure IPSec/IKEv2 Function	Global Indicator with IPsec/IKE v2 configuration success status message	Commands to configure IPsec/IKEv2	Status of the completion of IPsec/IKEv2 configuration	KAS-ECC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-ECC (IKEv2) KAS-FFC (IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2,	Crypto Officer - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Block Cipher (IPSec/IKE) MAC (IPSec/IKE v2)	DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E - SKEYSEED: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE Authenticatio n Key: G,W,E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State Value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E
Configure SNMPv3 Function	Configure SNMPv3 Function	Global Indicator and SNMPv3 configuration success status message	Commands to configure SNMPv3	Status of the completion of SNMPv3 configuration	Block Cipher (SNMPv3) MAC (SNMPv3)	Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Shared Secret: W,E - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: G,W,E
Run SSHv2 Function	Execute SSHv2 Function	Global Indicator and successful SSHv2 log message	Initiate SSHv2 tunnel establishment	Status of SSHv2 tunnel establishment	KAS-ECC-KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-FFC-KeyGen (SSHv2) KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2) KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (SSHv2 with AES-GCM) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	Crypto Officer - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH DH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key:

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Block Cipher (SSHv2) MAC (SSHv2)	W,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH RSA Private Key: G,W,E Public Key: G,R,W - SSH ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - SSH Session Authentication Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State Value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E - RADIUS Secret: W,E - TACACS+ Secret: R,E User - SSH DH Private Key: G,W,E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SSH DH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer DH Public Key: W,E - SSH DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - SSH Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - SSH ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - SSH RSA Private Key: E - SSH RSA Public Key: R - SSH ECDSA Private Key: E - SSH ECDSA Public Key: R - SSH Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - SSH Session Authentication Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State V value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E - RADIUS Secret: E - TACACS+ Secret: R,E
Run HTTPS over TLSv1.2 Function	Execute HTTPS over TLSv1.2 function	Global Indicator and successfu l HTTPS over TLSv1.2 log message	Initiate TLSv1.2 tunnel establishm ent request	Status of TLSv1.2 tunnel establishm ent	KAS-ECC- KeyGen (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (TLSv1.2) KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC) KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES- GCM) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	Crypto Officer - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E - TLS DH Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer DH Public Key: W,E - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - TLS ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - TLS ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E - TLS

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Block Cipher (TLSv1.2) MAC (TLSv1.2)	ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W - TLS RSA Private Key: G,W,E - TLS RSA Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Master Secret: G,W,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - TLS Session Authentication Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State Value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E User - TLS DH Private Key: G,W,E - TLS DH Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer DH Public Key: W,E - TLS DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - TLS ECDH

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Private Key: G,W,E - TLS ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - TLS ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - TLS ECDSA Private Key: E - TLS ECDSA Public Key: R - TLS RSA Private Key: E - TLS RSA Public Key: R - TLS Master Secret: G,W,E - TLS Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - TLS Session Authentication Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State Value: - DRBG

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E
Run IPsec/IKEv2 Function	Execute IPsec/IKEv2 Function	Global Indicator and successful IPsec/IKE v2 log message	Initiate IPsec/IKEv2 tunnel establishment request	Status of IPsec/IKE v2 tunnel establishment	KAS-ECC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-FFC- KeyGen (IKEv2) KAS-ECC (IKEv2) KAS-FFC (IKEv2) RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2) ECDSA SigGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2) RSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) ECDSA SigVer (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, and IKEv2) Block Cipher (IPSec/IKE) MAC	Crypto Officer - IPsec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKE DH Public Key: G,R,W - IPsec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: W,E - IPsec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPsec/IKE ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKE ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - IPsec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPsec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPsec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: G,R,W - IPsec/IKE RSA Private Key: G,W,E - IPsec/IKE RSA Public

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					(IPSec/IKE v2)	Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E - SKEYSEED: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE Authentication Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal State Value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E User - IPSec/IKE DH Private Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Public Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					ECDH Public Key: G,R,W - IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key: W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key: E - IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key: R - IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key: E - IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key: R - IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,W,E - SKEYSEED: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key: G,W,E - IPSec/IKE Authentication Key: G,W,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,W,E - DRBG Seed: G,W,E - DRBG Internal	

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						State V value: G,W,E - DRBG Key: G,W,E
Run SNMPv3 Function	Execute SNMPv3 Function	Global Indicator and successful SNMPv3 log message	Initiate SNMPv3 tunnel establishment request	Status of SNMPv3 tunnel establishment	Block Cipher (SNMPv3) MAC (SNMPv3)	Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Shared Secret: W,E - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: G,W,E User - SNMPv3 Shared Secret: W,E - SNMPv3 Encryption Key: G,W,E - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: G,W,E
Firmware Update	Update the existing firmware image	Global indicator and successful Firmware Loading status message	Commands to load new firmware image	Outcome of the Firmware Load Test	Firmware Load Test	Crypto Officer - Firmware Load Test Key: R

Table 12: Approved Services

4.4 Non-Approved Services

N/A for this module.

4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded

The module supports the firmware load test by using HMAC-SHA2-512 (HMAC Cert. #A4446) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test Key was preloaded to the module's binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate to the module before loading the firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be rejected if the verification fails.

4.6 Bypass Actions and Status

The module implements alternating Bypass service. Traffic output from the module's data output interface can be cryptographically protected via IPSec/IKE VPN, or passed as plaintext (Bypass state), depending on the VPN tunnel establishment on the dedicated data output interface. The operator shall assume Crypto Officer role so as to configure IPSec/IKE VPN capability. If no IPSec/IKE VPN was configured, Module would enter the Bypass state.

Before the module executes the Bypass service (sending out plaintext traffic via the data output interface), the module would conduct two independent internal actions to prevent the inadvertent bypass of plaintext data due to a single error. The Crypto Officer can use commands "show access-list" and "show crypto ipsec sa" to verify the module's Bypass status. In Bypass tests fail, the module would enter an error state, and drop the traffic.

4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status

The module implements Self-initiated cryptographic output capability without external operator request. The Crypto Officer shall configure self-initiated cryptographic output capability. Prior to executing the self-initiated cryptographic output capability, the module conducts two independent internal actions to activate the capability to prevent the inadvertent output due to a single error.

4.8 Additional Information

The module supports unauthenticated service. The unauthenticated User/Operators can trigger the self-test service by power-cycling the module, and is able to observe the module's LEDs status.

5 Software/Firmware Security

5.1 Integrity Techniques

The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure firmware security, the module is protected by RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-512 (RSA Cert. #A4446) algorithm. A Firmware Integrity Test Key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module's binary at the factory and used for firmware integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. The module uses the RSA 2048 bits modulus public key to verify the digital signature. If the firmware integrity test fails, the module would enter to an Error state with all crypto functionality inhibited.

5.2 Initiate on Demand

Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the firmware integrity test on-demand.

6 Operational Environment

6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

Type of Operational Environment: Limited

7 Physical Security

7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required

Mechanism	Inspection Frequency	Inspection Guidance
Tamper labels (4 or 10) with Part number: AIR-AP-FIPSKIT=	Recommend 30 Days	Visible inspection of platform for residual evidence of tampering
Opacity shield (1) with Part number: 800-106088-01 or FPR1K-RM-FIPS-KIT	Recommend 30 Days	Visible inspection of platform for evidence of tampering, removal or access
Production grade components	N/A	N/A

Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required

The module utilizes a production-grade enclosure and removable cover along with tamper evidence labels as the physical security mechanisms.

Appling Tamper Evidence Labels

Step 1: Turn off and unplug the module.

Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, oil or any other material other than the surface coating from manufacture before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.

Step 3: Apply a label to cover the module as shown in the figures below.

The tamper evident labels are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive backing. Any attempt to open the module will damage the tamper evident labels or the material of the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident labels have non-repeated serial numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident labels can also be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word "FIPS" may appear if the label was peeled back.

7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals

Number: Four (4) or Ten (10)

FPR-1010 Placement:



Figure 3: FPR-1010 Front view



Figure 4: FPR-1010 Back view




Figure 5: FPR-1010 Left view




Figure 6: FPR-1010 Right view



Figure 7: FPR-1010 Top View



Figure 8: FPR-1010 Bottom view

FPR-1120/1140/1150 Placement:



Figure 9: FPR-1140 Front View




Figure 10: FPR-1140 Rear View




Figure 11: FPR-1140 Left View



Figure 12: FPR-1140 Right View






Figure 14: FPR-1140 Bottom View

Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels. Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.

Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: It is recommended seals be stored in a secure location under controlled access

Part Numbers: AIR-AP-FIPSKIT=


7.3 Filler Panels

FPR1010 Opacity Shield

800-106088-01

Step 1: Slide the 1010 into the opacity case


Step 2: Add three screws to bottom of opacity into the 1010 or 1010E.




FPR1120, 1140 and 1150 Opacity Shield

FPR1K-RM-FIPS-KIT


Step 1: Attach the Slide Rail Locking Bracket, #2 in diagram to the Side of the Chassis using the countersink screws #3 in diagram.




Step 2: Attach the Cable Management Bracket (#1) to the Slide Rail Locking Bracket (#2) using the countersink screws (#3)



Step 3: Route the Cables through the Cable Management Brackets



Step 4: Attach the FIPS Opacity Shield (#1) to the Cable Management Brackets (#3) using the countersink screws (#2)



8 Non-Invasive Security

N/A for this module.

9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

9.1 Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
DRAM	Volatile Memory	Dynamic
Flash	Non-Volatile Memory	Static

Table 14: Storage Areas

9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
Peer Public Key Input	External (Outside)	Module	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
	of the Module's Boundary)					
Module Public Key Output	Module	External (Outside of the Module's Boundary)	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	
Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM	External (Outside of the Module's Boundary)	Module	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS (SSHv2 with AES-GCM)
Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC	External (Outside of the Module's Boundary)	Module	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS (SSHv2 with AES and HMAC)
Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM	External (Outside of the Module's Boundary)	Module	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES-GCM)
Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC	External (Outside of the Module's Boundary)	Module	Encrypted	Automated	Electronic	KTS (TLSv1.2 with AES and HMAC)

Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods

9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Zeroization Command	CO issues zeroization service	the zeroization command will erase all SSPs stored in the DRAM or in the Flash of the module.	CO issues command 'configure factory-default'

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Session termination	Zeroization upon session termination	Session termination will automatically zeroize all session based temporary SSPs	Terminate session
Reboot	Zeroization upon rebooting the module	Reboot to zeroize all temporary SSPs stored in Module's DRAM	Reboot

Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods

Please note that the Firmware Load Test Key is only used for Firmware Load Test Authentication and not subject to the zeroization requirement.

9.4 SSPs

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
DRBG Entropy Input	Used to seed the DRBG	384 bits - at least 256 bits	Entropy Input - CSP			Counter DRBG (A4446)
DRBG Seed	Used in DRBG Generation	256 bits - 256 bits	DRBG Seed - CSP			Counter DRBG (A4446)
DRBG Internal State V value	Used in DRBG Generation	256 bits - 256 bits	DRBG Internal State V value - CSP			Counter DRBG (A4446)
DRBG Key	Used in DRBG Generation	256 bits - 256 bits	DRBG Key - CSP			Counter DRBG (A4446)
User Password	User authentication	8-30 Characters - 8-30 Characters	Authentication Data - CSP			
Crypto Officer Password	Crypto Officer authentication	8-30 Characters - 8-30 Characters	Authentication Data - CSP			
RADIUS Secret	RADIUS Server Authentication	16 Characters - 16 Characters	Authentication Data - CSP			
TACACS+ Secret	TACACS+ Authentication	16 Characters - 16 Characters	Authentication Data - CSP			

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
		Characters				
Firmware Load Test Key	Used for Firmware Load Test	112 bits - 112 bits	Public Key - CSP			Firmware Load Test
SSH DH Private Key	Used to derive the SSH DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112-152 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-FFC-KeyGen (SSHv2)		KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)
SSH DH Public Key	Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112-152 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-FFC-KeyGen (SSHv2)	
SSH Peer DH Public Key	Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112-152 bits	Public Key - PSP			KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)
SSH DH Shared Secret	Used to derive SSH Session Encryption Keys, SSH Session Authentication Keys	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112-152 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)	KDF SSH (A4446)
SSH ECDH Private Key	Used to derive the SSH ECDH Shared Secret	Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-ECC-KeyGen (SSHv2)		KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)
SSH ECDH Public Key	Used to derive SSH ECDHE Shared Secret	Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128-256 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-ECC-KeyGen (SSHv2)	

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
SSH Peer ECDH Public Key	Used to derive SSH DH Shared Secret	Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits	Public Key - PSP			KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)
SSH ECDH Shared Secret	Used to derive SSH Session Encryption Keys, SSH Session Authentication Keys	Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)	KDF SSH (A4446)
SSH RSA Private Key	Used for SSH session authentication	Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112-128 bits	Private Key - CSP	RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)		RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446)
SSH RSA Public Key	Used for SSH sessions aiuthentication	Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112-128 bits	Public Key - PSP		RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	
SSH ECDSA Private Key	Used for SSH session authentication	Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits	Private Key - CSP	ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2)		ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446)
SSH ECDSA Public Key	Used for SSH sessions aiuthentication	Curves: 256, 384, 521 bits - 128 to 256 bits	Public Key - PSP		ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446)	
SSH Session Encryption Key	Used for SSH Session confidentiality protection	128-256 bits - 128-256 bits	Session Key - CSP		KAS-ECC (SSHv2) KAS-FFC (SSHv2)	Block Cipher (SSHv2)
SSH Session Authentication Key	Used for SSH Session integrity protection	At least 160 bits - At least 160 bits	Session Key - CSP		KAS-ECC (IKEv2) KAS-FFC (IKEv2)	MAC (SSHv2)
TLS DH Private Key	Used to Derive TLS DH Shared Secret	ffdhe2048 - 112 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-FFC-KeyGen		KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
				(TLSv1.2)		56Ar3 (A4446)
TLS DH Public Key	Used to Derive TLS DH Shared Secret	ffdhe2048 - 112 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-FFC-KeyGen (TLSv1.2)	
TLS Peer DH Public Key	Used to derive TLS DH Shared Secret	ffdhe2048 - 112 bits	Public Key - PSP			KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)
TLS DH Shared Secret	Used to Derive TLS Session Encryption Key and TLS Session Authentication Key	ffdhe2048 - 112 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A4446)
TLS ECDH Private Key	Used to Derive TLS ECDH Shared Secret	Curves P-256, P-384, and P-521 - 128-256 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-ECC-KeyGen (TLSv1.2)		KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)
TLS ECDH Public Key	Used to Derive TS ECDH Shared Secret	Curves P-256, P-384, and P-521 - 128-256 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-ECC-KeyGen (TLSv1.2)	
TLS Peer ECDH Public Key	Used to derive IKE ECDH Shared Secret	Curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits	Public Key - PSP			KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)
TLS ECDH Shared Secret	Used to Derive TLS Session Encryption Key and TLS Session Authentication Key	Curves p-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A4446)

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
TLS ECDSA Private Key	Used to support CO and Admin HTTPS interfaces	Curves P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits	Private Key - CSP	ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2)		ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446)
TLS ECDSA Public Key	Used to support CO and User HTTPS Interfaces	Curves P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits	Public Key - PSP		ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2)	
TLS RSA Private Key	Used to support CO and Admin HTTPS Interfaces	Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112-128 bits	Private Key - CSP	RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)		RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446)
TLS RSA Public Key	Used to support CO and User HTTPS interfaces	Modulus 2048 and 3072 bits - 112-128 bits	Public Key - PSP		RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	
TLS Master Secret	Used to protect HTTPS Session. Pre-master secret	At least 112 bits - At least 112 bits	Master Secret - CSP			TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A4446)
TLS Session Encryption Key	Used to protect HTTPS Session. TLS Master secret	128-256 bits - 128-256 bits	Session Key - CSP		KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)	Block Cipher (TLSv1.2)
TLS Session Authentication Key	Used to protect HTTPS Session. TLS master secret	at least 112 bits - at least 112 bits	Session Key - CSP		KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2)	MAC (TLSv1.2)
IPSec/IKE DH Private Key	Used to derive IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112-152 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-FFC-KeyGen (IKEv2)		KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
IPSec/IKE DH Public Key	Used to derive IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112-152 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-FFC-KeyGen (IKEv2)	
IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key	Used to derive IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112-152 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)	
IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret	Used to derive IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Keys, IPSec/IKE Authentication Keys	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096 - 112-152 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)	KDF IKEv2 (A4446)
IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key	Used to derive IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secrets	Curves P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits	Private Key - CSP	KAS-ECC-KeyGen (IKEv2)		KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)
IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key	Used to derive IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secrets	Curves P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits	Public Key - PSP		KAS-ECC-KeyGen (IKEv2)	
IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key	Used to derive IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secrets	Curves P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits	Public Key - PSP			KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)
IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret	Used to derive IPSec/IKE ECDH	Curves P-256, P-384, P-521 -	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4446)	KDF IKEv2 (A4446)

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
	Shared Secrets	128-256 bits				
IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key	Used for IPSec/IKE peer authentication	Curves P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits	Private Key - CSP	ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2)		ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446)
IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key	Used for IPSec/IKE peer authentication	Curves P-256, P-384, P-521 - 128-256 bits	Public Key - PSP		ECDSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2 and IKEv2)	
IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key	Used for IPSec/IKE peer authentication	Modulus 2048 or 3072 - 112 or 128 bits	Private Key - CSP	RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)		RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A4446)
IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key	Used for IPSec/IKE peer authentication	Modulus 2048 or 3072 - 112 or 128 bits	Public Key - PSP		RSA KeyGen (SSHv2, TLSv1.2, IKEv2)	
IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret	Used for IPSec/IKE peer authentication	16-32 bytes characters - 16-32 bytes characters	shared secret - CSP			
SKEYSEED	Keying material used to derive the IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key and IPSec/IKE Authentication Key	160 bits - 160 bits	Keying Material - CSP			KDF IKEv2 (A4446)
IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key	Used to secure IPSec/IKEv2 session confidentiality	128-256 bits - 128-256 bits	Session Key - CSP		KAS-ECC (IKEv2) KAS-FFC (IKEv2)	Block Cipher (IPSec/IKE)

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
IPSec/IKE Authentication Key	Used to secure IPSec/IKEv2 session integrity	at least 160 bits - at least 160 bits	Session Key - CSP		KAS-ECC (IKEv2) KAS-FFC (IKEv2)	MAC (IPSec/IKEv2)
SNMPv3 Shared Secret	Used for SNMPv3 user authentication	8-32 characters - N/A	Authentication Secret - CSP			
SNMPv3 Encryption Key	Used to protect SNMPv3 traffic confidentiality	128 bits - 128 bits	Encryption Key - CSP		KDF SNMP (A4446)	Block Cipher (SNMPv3)
SNMPv3 Authentication Key	Used to secure SNMPv3 traffic integrity	At least 112 bits - At least 112 bits	Authentication Key - CSP		KDF SNMP (A4446)	MAC (SNMPv3)

Table 17: SSP Table 1

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
DRBG Entropy Input		DRAM:Plaintext	Until Reboot	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Seed		DRAM:Plaintext	Until Reboot	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Internal State V value		DRAM:Plaintext	Until Reboot	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	DRBG Entropy Input:Used With DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Key:Used With
DRBG Key		DRAM:Plaintext	Until Reboot	Zeroization	DRBG Entropy Input:Used With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
				Command Session terminatio n Reboot	DRBG Seed:Used With DRBG Internal State V value:Used With
User Password	Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC	Flash:Encrypt ed		Zeroizatio n Command	
Crypto Officer Password	Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC	Flash:Encrypt ed		Zeroizatio n Command	
RADIUS Secret	Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted	Flash:Encrypt ed		Zeroizatio n Command	

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
	by GCM Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC				
TACACS+ Secret	Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC	Flash:Encrypted		Zeroization Command	
Firmware Load Test Key		Flash:Plaintext		N/A	
SSH DH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session terminatio n Reboot	SSH DH Public Key:Paired With SSH Peer DH Public Key:Used With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
SSH DH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SSH DH Private Key:Paired With
SSH Peer DH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SSH DH Private Key:Used With
SSH DH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SSH DH Private Key:Derived From SSH DH Public Key:Derived From
SSH ECDH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SSH ECDH Public Key:Paired With SSH Peer ECDH Public Key:Used With
SSH ECDH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SSH ECDH Private Key:Paired With
SSH Peer ECDH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SSH ECDH Private Key:Used With
SSH ECDH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination	SSH ECDH Private Key:Derived From SSH ECDH Public Key:Derived From

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
				n Reboot	
SSH RSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	SSH RSA Public Key:Paired With
SSH RSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	SSH RSA Private Key:Paired With
SSH ECDSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	SSH ECDSA Public Key:Paired With
SSH ECDSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	SSH ECDSA Private Key:Paired With
SSH Session Encryption Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SSH Session Authentication Key:Used With
SSH Session Authentication Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SSH tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SSH Session Encryption Key:Used With
TLS DH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	TLS DH Public Key:Paired With TLS Peer DH Public Key:Used With
TLS DH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	TLS DH Private Key:Paired With
TLS Peer DH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	while TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination	TLS DH Private Key:Used With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
				n Reboot	
TLS DH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	TLS ECDH Private Key:Derived From TLS Peer ECDH Public Key:Derived From
TLS ECDH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	TLS ECDH Public Key:Paired With TLS Peer ECDH Public Key:Used With
TLS ECDH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	TLS ECDH Private Key:Paired With
TLS Peer ECDH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	while TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	TLS ECDH Private Key:Used With
TLS ECDH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	TLS ECDH Private Key:Derived From TLS Peer ECDH Public Key:Derived From
TLS ECDSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	TLS ECDSA Public Key:Paired With
TLS ECDSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	TLS ECDSA Private Key:Paired With
TLS RSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	TLS RSA Public Key:Paired With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
TLS RSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	TLS RSA Private Key:Paired With
TLS Master Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	TLS ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From
TLS Session Encryption Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	TLS Session Authentication Key:Used With
TLS Session Authentication Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While TLS tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	TLS Session Encryption Key:Used With
IPSec/IKE DH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	IPSec/IKE DH Public Key:Paired With IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key:Used With
IPSec/IKE DH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	IPSec/IKE DH Private Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE Peer DH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	while IPSec/IKE tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	IPsec/IKE DH Private Key:Used With
IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPSec/IKE	Zeroization Command	SKEYSEED:Used With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
			v2 tunnel is on	Session termination Reboot	
IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key:Paired With IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key:Used With
IPSec/IKE ECDH Public Key	Module Public Key Output	DRAM:Plaintext	While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE Peer ECDH Public Key	Peer Public Key Input	DRAM:Plaintext	While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	IPSec/IKE ECDH Private Key:Used With
IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SKEYSEED:Used With
IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE ECDSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	IPSec/IKE ECDSA Private Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key		Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE RSA Public Key	Module Public Key Output	Flash:Plaintext		Zeroization Command	IPSec/IKE RSA Private Key:Paired With
IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret	Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by	Flash:Encrypted	While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session	SKEYSEED:Derived to

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
	GCM Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC			termination Reboot	
SKEYSEED		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE Pre-shared Secret:Derived From
IPSec/IKE Session Encryption Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From
IPSec/IKE Authentication Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While IPSec/IKE v2 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	IPSec/IKE DH Shared Secret:Derived From IPSec/IKE ECDH Shared Secret:Derived From
SNMPv3 Shared Secret	Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by GCM	Flash:Encrypted	While SNMPv3 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command	SNMPv3 Encryption Key:Derive To SNMPv3

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
	Password/Secret Input via TLS encrypted by AES and HMAC Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by GCM Password/Secret Input via SSHv2 encrypted by AES and HMAC				Authentication Key:Derive To
SNMPv3 Encryption Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SNMPv3 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SNMPv3 Shared Secret:Derived From
SNMPv3 Authentication Key		DRAM:Plaintext	While SNMPv3 tunnel is on	Zeroization Command Session termination Reboot	SNMPv3 Shared Secret:Derived From SNMPv3 Encryption Key:Used With

Table 18: SSP Table 2

9.5 Transitions

- SHA-1: The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031. At this time, the user should move to SHA2, which is available in this module.
- FIPS 186-4/186-5: As of February 5, 2024, the CMVP does not accept module submissions that implement DSA or RSA X9.31 in the approved mode, other than for signature verification which is approved for legacy use. This module does not implement DSA or RSA X9.31 for signature generation and therefore is unaffected by the current transition from 186-4 to 186-5. As detailed in section 2.7, the CAVP testing performed on the 186-4 algorithms is mathematically similar to the testing performed on the 186-5 algorithms and therefore this module claims compliance with 186-5. This means that no

timeline exists in which any of the implemented algorithms will transition from approved to non-approved.

10 Self-Tests

10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446)	RSA SigVer 2048 bits with SHA2-512	KAT	SW/FW Integrity	Module is in normal state	RSA SigVer
Pre-Operational Bypass Test	N/A	N/A	Bypass	Module is in normal state	N/A

Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The module performs the following self-tests, including the pre-operational self-tests and Conditional self-tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-operational self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs). If anyone of the self-tests fails, the module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the module's status output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the operational state.

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (A4446)	256 bits	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Encrypt	Power Up
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (A4446)	256 bits	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Decrypt	Power Up
AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4446)	256 bits	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Authenticated Encrypt	Power Up
AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4446)	256 bits	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Authenticated Decrypt	Power Up
Counter DRBG	AES-128	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Instantiate KAT	Power Up

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
Instantiate KAT (A4446)						
Counter DRBG Generate KAT (A4446)	AES-128	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Generate KAT	Power Up
Counter DRBG Reseed KAT (A4446)	AES-128	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Reseed KAT	Power Up
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446)	P-256 curve with SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	ECDSA SigGen KAT	Power Up
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446)	P-256 curve with SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	ECDSA SigVer KAT	Power Up
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A4446)	SHA-1	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	HMAC-SHA-1	Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A4446)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	HMAC-SHA2-256	Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT (A4446)	SHA2-384	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	HMAC-SHA2-384	Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT (A4446)	SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	HMAC-SHA2-512	Power Up
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KAT (A4446)	P-256 Curve	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Primitive Z KAT	Power Up
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KAT (A4446)	MODP-2048	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Primitive Z KAT	Power Up
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446)	2048 bit modulus with SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	RSA SigGen KAT	Power Up
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446)	2048 bit modulus with SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	RSA SigVer KAT	Power Up

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4446)	N/A	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power Up
KDF SNMP KAT (A4446)	N/A	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power Up
KDF SSH KAT (A4446)	N/A	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power Up
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT (A4446)	N/A	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power Up
SHA-1 KAT (A4446)	N/A	KAT	CAST	Module is in normal state	N/A	Power Up
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4446)	Curve P-256 with SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Module is in normal state	ECDSA	Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operational use.
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4446)	2048 bit Modulus	PCT	PCT	Module is in normal state	RSA	Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operational use.
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 PCT (A4446)	Curve P-256 with SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Module is in normal state	N/A	Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
						first operational use.
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 PCT (A4446)	MODP-2048	PCT	PCT	Module is in normal state	N/A	Performs all required pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs before the first operational use.
Firmware Load Test	HMAC-SHA2-512	KAT	SW/FW Load	Module is in normal state	N/A	When firmware has been uploaded to the module
Conditional Bypass	N/A	N/A	Bypass	Module is in normal state	N/A	Performs conditional bypass test before first operational use of bypass service
Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition Count Test (RCT)	Repetition Count Test	RCT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Designed to quickly detect catastrophic failures that cause the noise source to become "stuck" on a single output value for a long period of time	Power Up
Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)	Adaptive Proportion Test	APT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Designed to detect a large loss of entropy that might occur as a result of some physical failure or environmental	Power Up

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
					change affecting the noise source	
Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition Count Test (RCT)	Repetition Count Test	RCT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Designed to quickly detect catastrophic failures that cause the noise source to become "stuck" on a single output value for a long period of time	Entropy data is generated from the Entropy Source - Continuous
Entropy 90B Continuous Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)	Adaptive Proportion Test	APT	CAST	Module is in normal state	Designed to detect a large loss of entropy that might occur as a result of some physical failure or environmental change affecting the noise source	Entropy data is generated from the Entropy Source - Continuous

Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests

The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.

10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4446)	KAT	SW/FW Integrity	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
Pre-Operational Bypass Test	N/A	Bypass	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot

Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
AES-GCM Authenticated Encrypt KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
AES-GCM Authenticated Decrypt KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
Counter DRBG Instantiate KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
Counter DRBG Generate KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
Counter DRBG Reseed KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KDF IKEv2 KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KDF SNMP KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KDF SSH KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
SHA-1 KAT (A4446)	KAT	CAST	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4446)	PCT	PCT	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) PCT (A4446)	PCT	PCT	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 PCT (A4446)	PCT	PCT	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 PCT (A4446)	PCT	PCT	Recommend 60 Days	Reboot
Firmware Load Test	KAT	SW/FW Load	N/A	N/A
Conditional Bypass	N/A	Bypass	N/A	N/A
Entropy 90B Start-up Repetition Count Test (RCT)	RCT	CAST	N/A	N/A
Entropy 90B Start-up Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)	APT	CAST	N/A	N/A
Entropy 90B Continuous Repetition Count Test (RCT)	RCT	CAST	N/A	N/A
Entropy 90B Continuous	APT	CAST	N/A	N/A

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)				

Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information

10.4 Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Error State	If self-test tests fail, the module is put into an error state	Self-test failure	Reboot the module	System Halt

Table 23: Error States

If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the self-tests, including the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational firmware integrity test and the conditional CASTs.

11 Life-Cycle Assurance

11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

The validated module firmware was installed onto the respective test platforms listed in Table 2 above. Any firmware loaded into the module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation. The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps.

Step 1: The Crypto Officer must install opacity shields as described in section 7 above.

Step 2: The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in section 7 above.

Step 3: The Crypto Officer must securely store any unused tamper evidence labels.

Note: Each module has a Type A USB 2.0 port, but it is considered to be disabled once the Crypto Officer has applied the TEL #8.

Step 4: Crypto Officer performs the following configurations:

ciscoasa# configure terminal

Note, the Crypto Officer needs to connect the platform to cisco.com to obtain the license for ASA from Cisco.

ciscoasa(config)# license smart register idtoken [token data]
ciscoasa(config)#license smart

```
ciscoasa(config-smart-lic)# show license all  
Smart Licensing Status  
=====  
Smart Licensing is ENABLED
```

-OR-

Step 5. Crypto officer shall perform zeroization operation if the module was previously used before the approved mode configuration.

```
ciscoasa(config-smart-lic)# show license summary  
Smart Licensing is ENABLED
```

Step 6: Enable “Approved Mode” to allow the module to startup the cryptographic module, such as run power-on self-tests and bypass test by using the following command:

```
ciscoasa(config)# fips enable
```

Note: Startup operational mode will not take effect until you save configuration and reboot the device

Rebooting the device will force new self-test

Step 7: Crypto Officer can verify the version installed and running

```
ciscoasa(config)# show version
```

Step 8: Crypto Officer will need to configure ASA

```
ciscoasa> en  
ciscoasa# conf t  
ciscoasa(config)#
```

Step 9: Assign users a Privilege Level of 1.

Step 10: Configure IP address for unit and all distant endpoints.

Step 11: Define RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long and secure traffic between the security module and the RADIUS/TACACS+ server via secure (IPSec, TLS) tunnel.

Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS/TACAS+ is configured, otherwise skip over and proceed to next step.

Step 12: Configure the security module so that any remote connections via Telnet are secured through IPSec.

Step 13: Configure the security module so that only approved algorithms are used for IPsec tunnels.

Step 14: Configure the security module so that error messages can only be viewed by Crypto Officer.

Step 15: Disable the TFTP server.

Step 16: Disable HTTP for performing system management in approved mode of operation. HTTPS with TLS should always be used for Web-based management.

Step 17: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using approved algorithms.

11.2 Administrator Guidance

Specific Admin guidance can be found in the ASA 9.20 VPN CLI configuration guide:
<https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/asa920/configuration/vpn/asa-920-vpn-config.html>

11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

Specific Non-Admin guidance can be found in the Firepower 1000 Series Datasheet and the Firepower 1100 Series Hardware Installation Guide:
<https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/security/firepower-1000-series/datasheet-c78-742469.html> and <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/1100/hw/guide/hw-install-1100/overview.html>

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

N/A for this module.