



Red Hat

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 gnutls

version 3.7.6-074d015ce201f434

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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Prepared by:

atsec information security corporation

4516 Seton Center Parkway, Suite 250

Austin, TX 78759

www.atsec.com

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1 General

1.1 Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 3.7.6-074d015ce201f434 of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 gnutls cryptographic module. It has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP 800-140B] starting with section B.2.1 named “General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an Overall Security Level 1 module.

1.2 Security Levels

ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6. [Number Below]	FIPS 140-3 Section Title	Security Level
1	General	1
2	Cryptographic Module Specification	1
3	Cryptographic Module Interfaces	1
4	Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
5	Software/Firmware Security	1
6	Operational Environment	1
7	Physical Security	Not Applicable
8	Non-invasive Security	Not Applicable
9	Sensitive Security Parameter Management	1
10	Self-tests	1
11	Life-cycle Assurance	1
12	Mitigation of Other Attacks	1
Overall		1

Table 1 - Security Levels

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Description

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 gnutls cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a software library. The module is an open-source, general-purpose set of libraries designed to support cross-platform development of security-enabled client and server applications. The module is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module.

2.2 Version Information

The module version is 3.7.6-074d015ce201f434 of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 gnutls cryptographic module.

2.3 Operational Environments

The module has been tested on the following platforms with the corresponding module variants and configuration options with and without PAA:

#	Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processor	PAA/ Acceleration
1	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9	Dell PowerEdge R440	Intel® Xeon® Silver 4216	With PAA (AES-NI, SHA Extensions)
2	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9	Dell PowerEdge R440	Intel® Xeon® Silver 4216	Without PAA
3	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9	IBM z16 3931-A01	IBM z16	With PAI (CPACF)
4	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9	IBM z16 3931-A01	IBM z16	Without PAI
5	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 with PowerVM FW1040.00 with VIOS 3.1.3.00	IBM 9080-HEX	IBM POWER10	With PAI (ISA, AltiVec)
6	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 with PowerVM FW1040.00 with VIOS 3.1.3.00	IBM 9080-HEX	IBM POWER10	Without PAI

Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments

In addition to the configurations tested by the atsec CST laboratory, vendor-affirmed testing was performed on the following platforms for the module by F5, Inc.

#	Operating System	Hardware Platform
1	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9	Intel® Xeon® E5

Table 3 - Vendor Affirmed Operation Environments

Note: The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

Component	Description
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/usr/lib64/libgnutls.so.30 Note: libgmp is statically linked to libgnutls	Provides the API for the calling applications to request cryptographic services, and implements the TLS protocol, DRBG, RSA Key Generation, Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman.
/usr/lib64/libnettle.so.8	Provides the cryptographic algorithm implementations, including AES, SHA, HMAC, RSA Digital Signature, DSA and ECDSA.
/usr/lib64/libhogweed.so.6	Provides primitives used by libgnutls and libnettle to support the asymmetric cryptographic operations.
/usr/lib64/.libgnutls.so.30.hmac	The .hmac file contain the HMAC-SHA2-256 values of the libraries for integrity check during the power-up.

Table 4 – Cryptographic Module Components

2.4 Modes of Operations

When the module starts up successfully, after passing all the pre-operational and conditional cryptographic algorithms self-tests (CASTs), the module is operating in the approved mode of operation by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 10. Please see section 4 for the details on service indicator provided by the module that identifies when an approved service is called.

2.5 Approved Algorithms

The table below lists all security functions of the module, including specific key size(s) employed for approved or vendor-affirmed security functions, and implemented modes of operation.

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description/Key Size(s)/Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
Certs. #A4827, #A4828, #A4833, #A5572, #A5573, #A5574	AES FIPS197, SP800-38A	CBC	128, 192, 256-bit keys with 128-256 bits key strength	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
Cert. #A4842	AES FIPS197, SP800-38A	ECB	128, 192, 256-bit keys with 128-256 bits key strength	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
Certs. #A4827, #A5572, #A5573	AES SP800-38C	CCM	128, 256-bit keys with 128 or 256 bits key strength	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption; Authenticated encryption; Authenticated decryption
Certs. #A4830, #A4831, #A4836	AES FIPS197, SP800-38A	CFB8	128, 192, 256-bit keys with 128 or 256 bits key strength	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
Certs. #A4827, #A4828, #A4833, #A5572, #A5573	AES SP800-38B	CMAC	128, 256-bit keys with 128 or 256 bits key strength	Message authentication code (MAC); Message authentication code verification
Certs. #A4827, #A4828, #A4833, #A5572, #A5573, #A5574	AES SP800-38D	GCM	128, 256-bit keys with 128 or 256 bits key strength	Symmetric encryption and decryption in the context of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description/Key Size(s)/Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
Cert. #A4833	AES SP800-38D	GMAC	128, 256-bit keys with 128 or 256 bits key strength	Message authentication code (MAC); Message authentication code verification
Cert. #A4834	AES SP800-38E	XTS	256, 512-bit keys with 128 or 256 bits key strength	Symmetric encryption (for data storage); Symmetric decryption (for data storage)
Vendor Affirmed	CKG SP800-133rev2	Key pair generation (FIPS-186-4, SP800-56Arev3, SP800-90Arev1)	RSA: 2048, 3072, 4096-bit keys with 112-149 bits key strength ECDSA/ECDH: P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves with 128-256 bits key strength Safe Primes: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192-bit keys with 112-200 bits of key strength	Key pair generation
Cert. #A4833	DRBG SP800-90Arev1	CTR_DRBG: AES-256 without DF, without PR	256-bit keys with 256 bits key strength	Random number generation
Cert. #A4833	ECDSA FIPS186-4	ECDSA KeyGen (B.4.2 Testing Candidates)	P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves with 128-256 bits key strength	Key pair generation
		ECDSA KeyVer	P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves with 128-256 bits key strength	Public key verification
		SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves with 128-256 bits key strength	Digital signature generation
		SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves with 128-256 bits key strength	Digital signature verification
Certs. #A4828, #A4833, #A5575	HMAC FIPS198-1	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	112-524288 bit keys with 112-256 key strength	Message authentication code (MAC); Message authentication code verification
Cert. #A4833	KAS-ECC-SSC SP800-56Arev3	ECC Ephemeral Unified Scheme	P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves keys with 128-256 bits key strength	EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description/Key Size(s)/Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
Cert. #A4833	KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56Arev3	Safe Prime Groups: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192	2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192-bit keys with 112- 200 bits key strength	Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol
Cert. #A4832	KDA HKDF SP800-56Crev1	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512	Derived key with 112 to 256 bits of key strength	HKDF key derivation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol
Cert. #A4833	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 SP800-135rev1 (CVL)	TLS v1.2 with SHA-256, SHA-384	Derived key with 112 to 256 bits of key strength	TLS key derivation
Certs. #A4827, #A5572, #A5573	AES CCM SP800- 38C	KTS per IG D.G	128, 256-bit keys with 128 or 256 bits of key strength	Key wrapping; Key unwrapping (as part of the cipher suites in the TLS protocol)
Certs. #A4827, #A4828, #A4833, #A5572, #A5573, #A5574	AES GCM SP800- 38D	KTS per IG D.G	128, 256-bit keys with 128 or 256 bits of key strength	
AES Certs. #A4827, #A4828, #A4833, #A5572, #A5573, #A5574 HMAC Certs. #A4828, #A4833, #A5575	AES CBC and HMAC SP800-38A, FIPS198-1	KTS per IG D.G	128, 256-bit keys with 128 or 256 bits of key strength	
Cert. #A4833	PBKDF SP800-132	HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA- 224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC- SHA-512	112-256 bits 14-128 characters with password strength between 10^{14} and 10^{128}	Password-based key derivation
Cert. #A4833	RSA FIPS186-4 FIPS 140-3 IG C.F	RSA KeyGen (B.3.2 Random Provable Primes)	2048, 3072, 4096-bit keys with 112-149 bits key strength	Key pair generation
		RSA SigGen PKCS#1v1.5: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, SHA-512	2048, 3072, 4096-bit keys with 112-149 bits key strength	Digital signature generation
		RSA SigGen PSS: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	2048, 3072, 4096-bit keys with 112-149 bits key strength	

CAVP Cert	Algorithm and Standard	Mode/Method	Description/Key Size(s)/Key Strength(s)	Use/Function
		RSA SigVer PKCS#1v1.5: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	2048, 3072, 4096-bit keys with 112-149 bits key strength	Digital signature verification
		RSA SigVer PSS: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	2048, 3072, 4096-bit keys with 112-149 bits key strength	
Cert. #A4833	Safe Primes Key Generation SP800-56Arev3	Safe Prime Groups: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192	2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192-bit keys with 112-200 bits key strength	Key pair generation
Certs. #A4829, #A4835	SHA-3 FIPS202 FIPS 140-3 IG C.C	SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512	N/A	Message digest
Certs. #A4828, #A4833, #A5575	SHA FIPS180-4	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	N/A	Message digest

Table 5 - Approved Algorithms

2.6 Non-Approved Algorithms

Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation:

The module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation.

Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed:

The module does not implement any non-Approved but Allowed algorithm in Approved mode of operation with no security claimed.

Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation:

The table below lists Non-Approved security functions that are not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation.

Algorithm/Functions	Use/Function
AES GCM not in the context of the TLS protocol	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
Blowfish	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
Camellia	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
CAST	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
ChaCha20	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
Chacha20 and Poly1305	Authenticated encryption; Authenticated decryption
DES	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption

Algorithm/Functions	Use/Function
Diffie-Hellman with keys generated with domain parameters other than safe primes	Key agreement; Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation
DSA	Key pair generation; Domain parameter generation; Digital signature generation; Digital signature verification
ECDSA with curves not listed in Table 5	Key pair generation; Public key verification; Digital signature generation; Digital signature verification
EC Diffie-Hellman with curves not listed in Table 5	Key agreement; EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation
GOST	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption; Message digest
HMAC with keys smaller than 112-bit	Message authentication code (MAC)
HMAC with GOST	Message authentication code (MAC)
MD2, MD4, MD5	Message digest; Message authentication code (MAC)
PBKDF with non-approved message digest algorithms	Password-based key derivation
RC2, RC4	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
RMD160	Message digest; Message authentication code (MAC)
RSA with keys smaller than 2048 bits or greater than 4096 bits.	Key pair generation; Digital signature generation
RSA with keys smaller than 1024 bits or greater than 4096 bits.	Digital signature verification
RSA encryption and decryption with any key sizes.	Key encapsulation; Key un-encapsulation
Salsa20	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
SM3	Message digest
Serpent	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
SHA-1	Digital signature generation
STREEBOG	Message digest; Message authentication code (MAC)
Triple-DES	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
Twofish	Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption
UMAC	Message authentication code (MAC)
Yarrow	Random number generation

Table 6 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation

2.7 Module Design and Components

The software block diagram below shows the module, its interfaces with the operational environment and the delimitation of its cryptographic boundary.




Figure 1 - Cryptographic Boundary

The module is implemented as a shared library. The cryptographic module boundary consists of 5 components:

- libgnutls
- libnettle
- libhogweed
- libgmp – statically linked
- gnutls hmac file

3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

The logical interfaces are the API through which the applications request services. The following table summarizes the logical interfaces:

Physical Port	Logical Interface ¹	Data that passes over port/interface
As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. Physical Ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which it runs.	Data Input	API input parameters
	Data Output	API output parameters
	Control Input	API function calls for control
	Status Output	API return codes, status parameters

Table 7 - Ports and Interfaces

The module does not output any control data to another cryptographic module.

¹ The module does not implement Control Output interface.

4 Roles, services, and authentication

The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the operator of the module when performing a service. The module does not support authentication.

4.1 Roles

Table below describes the authorized role(s) in which the service can be performed with specification of the service input parameters and associated service output parameters.

Role	Service	Input	Output
Crypto Officer (CO)	Authenticated encryption	Key, Plaintext, IV	Ciphertext, MAC tag
	Authenticated decryption	Key, Ciphertext, IV, MAC tag	Plaintext
	Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation	Private key, public key from peer	Shared secret
	Digital signature generation	Message, hash algorithm, private key	Digital signature
	Digital signature verification	Message, signature, hash algorithm, public key	Verification result
	Domain parameter generation	Domain parameters input	Generated domain parameters
	EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation	Private key, public key from peer	Shared secret
	HKDF key derivation	Shared secret	HKDF derived key
	Key pair generation	RSA key size, Diffie-Hellman Safe Prime or Elliptic Curve, enabled-curve ²	Key pair
	Key agreement	Private key, public key from peer	Derived key
	Key encapsulation	Key to be encapsulated, Key encapsulating key	Encapsulated key
	Key un-encapsulation	Encapsulated key, Key encapsulating key	Unencapsulated key
	Key wrapping	Key to be wrapped, Key wrapping key	Wrapped key
	Key unwrapping	Wrapped key, Key unwrapping key	Unwrapped key
	Message authentication code (MAC)	HMAC key or AES key, message	MAC tag
	Message authentication code verification	HMAC key or AES key, message, MAC tag	Pass/fail
	Message digest	Message	Digest of the message
	Password-based key derivation	Password or passphrase, salt, iteration count	PBKDF Derived key
	Public key verification	Key pair	Return codes/log messages
	Random number generation	Number of bits	Random number
	Self-tests	N/A	Result of self-test (pass/fail)
	Symmetric decryption	Key, Ciphertext	Plaintext
	Symmetric encryption	Key, Plaintext	Ciphertext
	Show module name and version	N/A	Name and version information

² The enabled-curve input parameter can be adjusted relying on the crypto-policies package provided as part of the RHEL OS. The usage of crypto-policies is discouraged by the vendor. Further info can be found at the vendor's documentation.

	Show status	N/A	Return codes and/or log messages
	TLS key derivation	TLS pre-master secret	Derived key
	Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol	Cipher-suites, Digital Certificate, Public and Private Keys, Application Data	Return codes and/or log messages, Application data
	Zeroization	Context containing SSPs	N/A

Table 8 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output

4.2 Authentication

FIPS 140-3 does not require an authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the module does not implement an authentication mechanism for Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer role is authorized to access all services provided by the module (see Table - Approved Services and Table - Non-Approved Services below).

4.3 Services

The table below lists all approved services that can be used in the approved mode of operation.

The following convention is used to specify access rights to an SSP:

- **G = Generate:** The module generates or derives the SSP.
- **R = Read:** The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
- **W = Write:** The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
- **E = Execute:** The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
- **Z = Zeroize:** The module zeroizes the SSP.
- **N/A:** the calling application does not access any SSP or key during its operation.

The service indicator is invoked by calling the function "gnutls_fips140_get_operation_state()" and it returns "GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED" depending on whether the API invoked corresponds to an approved algorithm.

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs	Indicator
Cryptographic Services						
Symmetric encryption	Perform AES encryption	AES-CBC AES-ECB AES-CCM AES-CFB8 AES-CMAC AES-GMAC AES-XTS	AES key	CO	W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs	Indicator
Symmetric decryption	Perform AES decryption	AES-CBC AES-ECB AES-CCM AES-GCM AES-CFB8 AES-CMAC AES-GMAC AES-XTS	AES key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
Authenticated encryption	Encrypt a plaintext	AES-CCM	AES key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
Authenticated decryption	Decrypt a ciphertext	AES-CCM	AES key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
Key wrapping	Key wrapping (as part of the cipher suites in the TLS protocol)	AES-CCM AES-GCM	AES key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
		AES-CBC, HMAC	AES key, HMAC key		W, E	
Key unwrapping	Key unwrapping (as part of the cipher suites in the TLS protocol)	AES-CCM AES-GCM	AES key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
		AES-CBC, HMAC	AES key, HMAC key		W, E	
Key pair generation	Generate RSA, ECDSA/ECDH and DH key pairs	CKG DRBG ECDSA RSA Safe Primes Key generation	Module-generated RSA public key, Module generated RSA private key		G, E, R	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
			Module-generated ECDSA public key, Module generated ECDSA private key		G, E, R	
			Module-generated Diffie-Hellman public key, Module-generated Diffie-Hellman private keys		G, E, R	
			Module-generated EC Diffie-Hellman public key, Module-generated EC Diffie-Hellman private keys		G, E, R	
			"enabled-curve" parameter		W, E	
			DRBG internal state (V value, key)		W, E	
Digital signature generation	Generate RSA and ECDSA signature See Table 5 for SHA sizes	DRBG ECDSA SHA RSA	RSA private key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
			DRBG internal state (V value, key)			
			ECDSA private key			

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs	Indicator
Digital signature verification	Verify RSA, and ECDSA signature See Table 5 for SHA sizes	RSA ECDSA SHA	RSA public key ECDSA public key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
Public key verification	Verify ECDSA public key	ECDSA	ECDSA public key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
Random number generation	Generate random bitstrings	DRBG	Entropy input		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
			DRBG internal state (V value, key)		E, G	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
			DRBG seed		E, G	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
Message digest	Compute SHA hashes	SHA	None		N/A	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
Message authentication code (MAC)	Compute HMAC	Compute HMAC	HMAC key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
	Compute AES-based CMAC	CMAC with AES	AES key			
	Compute AES-based GMAC	GMAC with AES	AES key			
Message authentication code verification	Verify MAC tag	HMAC or GMAC with AES or CMAC with AES	AES key or HMAC key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation	Compute a shared secret	KAS-FFC-SSC	Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-Hellman private key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
			Diffie-Hellman Shared secret		G, R	
EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation	Compute a shared secret	KAS-ECC-SSC	EC Diffie-Hellman public key, EC Diffie-Hellman private key		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
			EC Diffie-Hellman Shared secret		G, R	
TLS key derivation	Perform TLS key derivation	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627	TLS pre-master secret		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
			TLS master secret		E, G	
			TLS derived key		G, R	
HKDF key derivation	Perform key derivation using HKDF (in the context of TLS 1.3)	KDA HKDF	Diffie-Hellman shared secret or EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
			HKDF derived key		G, R	
Password-based key derivation	Perform password-based key derivation	PBKDF	Password/passphrase		W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
			PBKDF derived key		G, R	

Service	Description	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs	Indicator
Network Protocol Service						
Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol	Establish TLS session	Supported cipher suites in FIPS-validated configuration (see Appendix A for the complete list of valid cipher suites)	RSA public key, RSA private key, ECDSA public key, ECDSA private key	CO	W, E	GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_APPROVED
			TLS pre-master secret, TLS master secret, Diffie Hellman private key, Diffie-Hellman public key, EC Diffie Hellman public key, EC Diffie-Hellman private key, TLS derived key, HKDF derived key		W, E, G	
Other FIPS-Related Services						
Show status	Show module status	N/A	None	CO	N/A	N/A
Self-tests	Perform self-tests	AES, Diffie-Hellman, EC Diffie-Hellman, ECDSA, DRBG, HMAC, RSA, SHS, HKDF, PBKDF, TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627	None		N/A	N/A
Show module name and version	Show module name and version	N/A	None		N/A	N/A
Zeroization	Zeroize SSPs	N/A	Any SSPs		All SSPs: Z	N/A

Table 9 - Approved Services

The table below lists all non-Approved services that can only be used in the non-Approved mode of operation.

Service	Description	Algorithms Accessed	Role
Cryptographic Services			
Symmetric encryption	Compute the cipher for encryption	AES GCM not in the context of the TLS protocol Blowfish Camellia CAST ChaCha20 DES GOST RC2, RC4 Salsa20 Serpent Triple-DES Twofish	CO

Service	Description	Algorithms Accessed	Role
Cryptographic Services			
Symmetric decryption	Compute the cipher for decryption	AES GCM not in the context of the TLS protocol Blowfish Camellia CAST ChaCha20 DES GOST RC2, RC4 Salsa20 Serpent Triple-DES Twofish	
Key pair generation	Generate RSA, DSA, and ECDSA key pairs	DSA ECDSA with curves not listed in Table 5 RSA with keys smaller than 2048 bits or greater than 4096 bits	
Digital signature generation	Sign RSA, DSA, and ECDSA signatures	DSA ECDSA with curves not listed in Table 5 RSA with keys smaller than 2048 bits or greater than 4096 bits	
Digital signature verification	Verify RSA, DSA, and ECDSA signatures	DSA ECDSA with curves not listed in Table 5 RSA with keys smaller than 1024 bits or greater than 4096 bits	
Domain parameter generation	Generate domain parameter	DSA	
Message digest	Compute message digest	GOST MD2, MD4, MD5 RMD160 SM3 STREEBOG	
Message authentication code (MAC)	Compute HMAC	HMAC with keys smaller than 112-bit HMAC with GOST MD2, MD4, MD5 RMD160 STREEBOG UMAC	
Key agreement	Perform key agreement	Diffie-Hellman with keys generated with domain parameters other than safe primes EC Diffie-Hellman with curves not listed in Table 5	
Key encapsulation	Perform RSA key encapsulation	RSA encryption and decryption with any key sizes	
Key un-encapsulation	Perform RSA key un-encapsulation	RSA encryption and decryption with any key sizes	
Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation	Perform DH shared secret computation	Diffie-Hellman with keys generated with domain parameters other than safe primes	

Service	Description	Algorithms Accessed	Role
Cryptographic Services			
EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation	Perform ECDH shared secret computation	EC Diffie-Hellman with curves not listed in Table 5	
Password-based key derivation	Perform password-based key derivation	PBKDF using non-approved message digest algorithms	
Public key verification	Verify ECDSA public key	ECDSA with curves not listed in Table 5	
Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol	Establish non-supported TLS channel	Non-supported cipher suite (see Appendix A for the complete list of valid cipher)	

Table 10 - Non-Approved Services

5 Software/Firmware security

5.1 Integrity Techniques

The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA2-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC value stored in the .hmac file that was computed at build time for each software component of the module listed in section 2. The .hmac file has HMAC value for libgnutls, libnettle and libhogweed listed in section 2. If the HMAC values do not match, the test fails, and the module enters the error state.

Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests.

5.2 On-Demand Integrity Test

The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand which includes the pre-operational test (i.e., integrity test) and the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). The Self-Tests service can be called on demand by invoking the `gnutls_fips140_run_self_tests()` function which will perform integrity tests and the cryptographic algorithms self-tests. Additionally, the Self-Test service can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and no data output is possible.

5.3 Executable Code

The module consists of executable code in the form of libgnutls, libnettle, libgmp and libhogweed shared libraries as stated in section 2.

6 Operational Environment

6.1 Applicability

The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specification: the module executes on a general-purpose operating system (Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9), which allows modification, loading, and execution of software that is not part of the validated module.

6.2 Tested operational Environments

See Section 2.3.

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which include but are not limited to:

- Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS
- Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform
- Red Hat OpenStack Platform
- Red Hat OpenShift
- Red Hat Gluster Storage
- Red Hat Satellite

Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binaries are found unchanged.

6.3 Policy and Requirements

The module shall be installed as stated in Section 11. If properly installed, the operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented.

There are no concurrent operators.

The module does not have the capability of loading software or firmware from an external source.

Instrumentation tools like the `ptrace` system call, `gdb` and `strace`, userspace live patching, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as `ftrace` or `systemtap`, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-validated operational environment.

7 Physical Security

The module is comprised of software only and therefore this section is Not Applicable (N/A).

8 Non-invasive Security

This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism and therefore this section is Not Applicable (N/A).

9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

Table 11 summarizes the SSPs that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module.

Key / SSP Name / Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import/Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroization	Use & related keys
AES key	AES-XTS: 128, 256 bits; Other modes: 128, 192, 256 bits	AES-CBC, AES-CCM, AES-CFB8, AES-CMAC, AES-ECB, AES-GCM, AES-GMAC, AES-XTS, Certs. #A4827, #A4828, #A4830, #A4831, #A4833, #A4834, #A4836, #A4842, #A5572, #A5573, #A5574	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_cipher_deinit() gnutls_aead_cipher_deinit()	Use: Symmetric encryption; Symmetric decryption; Message authentication code (MAC); Message authentication code verification; Authenticated encryption; Authenticated decryption; Key wrapping; Key unwrapping Related SSPs: N/A
HMAC key	112-256 bits	HMAC Certs. #A4828, #A4833, #A5575	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_hmac_deinit()	Use: Message Authentication Code (MAC); Message authentication code verification; Key wrapping; Key unwrapping Related SSPs: N/A
Module-generated RSA public key	112 to 256 bits	DRBG, RSA: Cert. #A4833	Generated using the FIPS 186-4 key generation method; the random value used in key generation is obtained from the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG.	MD/EE Import: None Export: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format.	N/A	RAM	gnutls_privkey_deinit() gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit() gnutls_rsa_params_deinit()	Use: Key pair generation Related SSPs: DRBG internal state (V value, key); Module-generated RSA private key
Module-generated RSA private key	112 to 256 bits	DRBG, RSA: Cert. #A4833	Generated using the FIPS 186-4 key generation method; the random value used in key generation is obtained from the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG.	MD/EE Import: None Export: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format.	N/A	RAM	gnutls_privkey_deinit() gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit() gnutls_rsa_params_deinit()	Use: Key pair generation Related SSPs: DRBG internal state (V value, key); Module-generated RSA public key

Key / SSP Name / Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import/Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroization	Use & related keys
RSA public key	112 to 256 bits	RSA Cert. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_privkey_deinit() gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit() gnutls_rsa_params_deinit()	Use: Digital signature verification; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related SSPs: RSA private key
RSA private key	112 to 256 bits	RSA Cert. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_privkey_deinit() gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit() gnutls_rsa_params_deinit()	Use: Digital signature generation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related SSPs: RSA public key
Module-generated ECDSA public key	112, 192, 256 bits	DRBG, ECDSA: Cert. #A4833	Generated using the FIPS 186-4 key generation method; the random value used in key generation is obtained from the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG.	MD/EE Import: None Export: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format.	N/A	RAM	gnutls_privkey_deinit() gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit() gnutls_rsa_params_deinit()	Use: Key pair generation Related SSPs: DRBG internal state (V value, key); Module-generated ECDSA private key
Module-generated ECDSA private key	112, 192, 256 bits	DRBG, ECDSA: Cert. #A4833	Generated using the FIPS 186-4 key generation method; the random value used in key generation is obtained from the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG.	MD/EE Import: None Export: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format.	N/A	RAM	gnutls_privkey_deinit() gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit() gnutls_rsa_params_deinit()	Use: Key pair generation Related SSPs: DRBG internal state (V value, key); Module-generated ECDSA public key
ECDSA public key	128, 192, 256 bits	ECDSA Cert. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_privkey_deinit() gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit() gnutls_rsa_params_deinit()	Use: Digital signature verification; Public key verification; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related SSPs: DRBG internal state (V value, key); ECDSA private key

Key / SSP Name / Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import/Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroization	Use & related keys
ECDSA private key	128, 192, 256 bits	ECDSA Cert. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_privkey_deinit() gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit() gnutls_rsa_params_deinit()	Use: Digital signature generation; Public key verification; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related SSPs: DRBG internal state (V value, key); ECDSA public key
Module-generated Diffie-Hellman public key	112-200 bits	KAS-FFC-SSC DRBG Cert. #A4833	Generated using the SP 800-56Arev3 Safe Primes key generation method; random values are obtained from the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG.	MD/EE Export: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Import: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_dh_params_deinit() gnutls_pk_params_clear()	Use: Key pair generation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related SSPs: Module-generated Diffie-Hellman private key; DRBG internal state (V value, key); TLS pre-master secret
Module-generated Diffie-Hellman private key	112-200 bits	KAS-FFC-SSC DRBG Cert. #A4833	Generated using the SP 800-56Arev3 Safe Primes key generation method; random values are obtained from the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG.	MD/EE Export: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Import: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_dh_params_deinit() gnutls_pk_params_clear()	Use: Key pair generation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related SSPs: Module-generated Diffie-Hellman public key; DRBG internal state (V value, key); TLS pre-master secret
Diffie-Hellman public key	112-200 bits	KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_dh_params_deinit() gnutls_pk_params_clear()	Use: Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related keys: Diffie-Hellman private key; Diffie-Hellman shared secret
Diffie-Hellman private key	112-200 bits	KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters	N/A	RAM	gnutls_dh_params_deinit() gnutls_pk_params_clear()	Use: Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related keys: Diffie-Hellman

Key / SSP Name / Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import/Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroization	Use & related keys
				in plaintext (P) format. Export: None				public key; Diffie-Hellman shared secret
Module-generated EC Diffie-Hellman public key	128, 192, 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SSC DRBG Cert. #A4833	Generated internally by the module using the ECDSA key generation method compliant with [FIPS186-4] and [SP800-56Arev3]; the random value used in key generation is obtained from the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG	MD/EE Export: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Import: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_pk_params_clear()	Use: Key pair generation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related keys: Module-generated EC Diffie-Hellman private key; DRBG internal state (V value, key); TLS pre-master secret
Module-generated EC Diffie-Hellman private key	128, 192, 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SSC DRBG Cert. #A4833	Generated internally by the module using the ECDSA key generation method compliant with [FIPS186-4] and [SP800-56Arev3]; the random value used in key generation is obtained from the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG	MD/EE Export: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Import: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_pk_params_clear()	Use: Key pair generation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related keys: Module-generated EC Diffie-Hellman public key; DRBG internal state (V value, key); TLS pre-master secret
EC Diffie-Hellman public key	128, 192, 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_pk_params_clear()	Use: EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related keys: EC Diffie-Hellman private key; EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret
EC Diffie-Hellman private key	128, 192, 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API	N/A	RAM	gnutls_pk_params_clear()	Use: EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol

Key / SSP Name / Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import/Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroization	Use & related keys
				parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None				Related keys: EC Diffie-Hellman public key; EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret
Diffie-Hellman shared secret	112 to 200 bits	KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format.	Generated during the Diffie-Hellman key agreement and shared secret computation per SP800-56Arev3.	RAM	zeroize_key()	Use: Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation; HKDF key derivation Related keys: Diffie-Hellman public key; Diffie-Hellman private key
EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret	112 to 256 bits	KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format.	Generated during the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement and shared secret computation per SP800-56Arev3.	RAM	zeroize_key()	Use: EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation; HKDF key derivation Related keys: EC Diffie-Hellman public key; EC Diffie-Hellman private key
PBKDF password or passphrase	Password strength 10^{14} - 10^{128}	PBKDF Cert. #A4833	N/A (key material is entered via API parameters)	MD/EE Import: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None	N/A	RAM	Internal PBKDF state is zeroized automatically when function returns.	Use: Password-based key derivation Related keys: PBKDF derived key
PBKDF derived key	112-256 bits	PBKDF Cert. #A4833	Derived during the PBKDF	MD/EE Import: None Export: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in	N/A	RAM	zeroize_key()	Use: Password-based key derivation Related keys: PBKDF password or passphrase

Key / SSP Name / Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import/Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroization	Use & related keys
				plaintext (P) format.				
HKDF derived key	112 to 256 bits	KDA HKDF Cert. #A4832	Derived (as part of TLSv1.3) with KDA HKDF	MD/EE Import: None Export: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format.	N/A	RAM	gnutls_deinit()	Use: HKDF key derivation; Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related keys: Diffie-Hellman shared secret, EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret
Entropy input IG D.L compliant	112 to 337 bits	DRBG Cert. #A4833 ESV Cert. #E47	Obtained from the SP 800-90B compliant Non-Physical Entropy Source	Import: None Export: None it remains within the cryptographic boundary.	N/A	RAM	gnutls_global_deinit()	Use: Random number generation Related keys: DRBG seed
DRBG internal state (V value, key) IG D.L compliant	128 to 256 bits	DRBG Cert. #A4833	Generated from the DRBG seed as defined in SP800-90Arev1	Import: None Export: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_global_deinit()	Use: Random number generation Related keys: DRBG seed, Module-generated ECDSA public key, Module-generated ECDSA private key, Module-generated RSA public key, Module-generated RSA private key, Module-generated Diffie-Hellman public key, Module-generated Diffie-Hellman private key, Module-generated EC Diffie-Hellman public key, Module-generated EC Diffie-Hellman private key
DRBG seed IG D.L compliant	128 to 256 bits	DRBG Cert. #A4833 ESV Cert. #E47	Derived from entropy input as defined in SP800-90Arev1	Import: None Export: None it remains within the cryptographic boundary.	N/A	RAM	gnutls_global_deinit()	Use: Random number generation Related keys: Entropy input; DRBG internal state (V value, key)

Key / SSP Name / Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import/Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroization	Use & related keys
TLS pre-master secret	DH 112 to 256 bits ECDH 112 to 256 bits	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 Certs. #A4833	N/A	MD/EE Import: CM to TOEPP Path. Passed to the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format. Export: None	Key agreement for Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman and shared secret computation per SP800-56Arev3	RAM	gnutls_deinit()	Use: TLS key derivation, Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related keys: TLS master secret
TLS master secret	112 to 256 bits	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 Certs. #A4833	Derived from TLS pre-master secret using TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 per SP800-135rev1.	MD/EE Import: None Export: None	N/A	RAM	gnutls_deinit()	Use: TLS key derivation, Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related keys: TLS pre-master secret, TLS derived key
TLS derived key	112 to 256 bits	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 Certs. A4833	Derived from TLS master secret using TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 per SP800-135rev1.	MD/EE Import: None Export: CM from TOEPP Path. Passed from the module via API parameters in plaintext (P) format.	N/A	RAM	gnutls_deinit()	Use: TLS key derivation, Transport Layer Security (TLS) network protocol Related keys: TLS pre-master secret, TLS master secret

Table 11 - SSPs

9.1 Random bit Generator

The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90Arev1] for the generation of random value used in asymmetric keys, and for providing a RNG service to calling applications. The approved DRBG provided by the module is the CTR_DRBG with AES-256. The DRBG does not employ prediction resistance or a derivation function. The module uses an SP800-90B-compliant Entropy Source specified in the table below to seed the DRBG.

Entropy Source	Minimum number of bits of entropy	Details
SP 800-90B compliant Non-Physical Entropy Source (ESV cert. E47)	225 bits of entropy in the 256-bit output	Userspace CPU Jitter 2.2.0 entropy source with LFSR as the non-vetted conditioning component is located within the physical perimeter of the module but outside the cryptographic boundary of the module.

Table 12 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

The module generates SSPs (e.g., keys) whose strengths are modified by available entropy.

9.2 SSP generation

In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys according to section 5.1 and 5.2 of [SP800-133rev2] according to section 6.1 of [SP800-133rev2] (vendor affirmed) by obtaining a random bit string directly from an approved [SP800-90Arev1] DRBG and that can support the required security strength requested by the caller (without any V, as described in Additional Comments 2 of IG D.H).

- For generating RSA and ECDSA keys, the module implements asymmetric cryptographic key generation (CKG) services compliant with [FIPS186-4].
- The public and private keys used in the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes are generated internally by the module using the ECDSA key generation method compliant with [FIPS186-4] and [SP800-56Arev3].
- The public and private keys used in the Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme are also compliant with [SP800-56Arev3]. The module generates keys using safe primes defined in RFC7919 and RFC3526, as described in the next section.

The module provides the following SSP generation methods with associated SSP sizes and strengths:

- RSA [FIPS186-4] B.3.2 Random Provable Primes - 2048, 3072, 4096-bit keys with 112-149 bits of key strength
- ECDH/ECDSA [FIPS186-4] B.4.2 Testing Candidates - P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves with 128-256 bits of key strength
- Safe Primes Key Generation [SP800-56Arev3] - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192-bit keys with 112-200 bits of key strength

The module supports the following key derivation methods according to [SP800-135rev1]:

- KDF for the TLS protocol, used as pseudo-random functions (PRF) for TLSv1.2 (RFC7627)

The module supports the following key derivation methods according to [SP800-56Cr1]:

- HKDF for the TLS protocol TLSv1.3.

The module also supports password-based key derivation (PBKDF). The implementation is compliant with option 1a of [SP800-132]. Keys derived from passwords or passphrases using this method can only be used in storage applications

Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized after processing the service.

9.3 SSP entry and output

SSPs are provided to the module via API input parameters in plaintext form and output via API output parameters in plaintext form within the physical perimeter of the operational environment. This is allowed by [FIPS140-3 IG] IG 9.5.A, according to the “CM Software to/from App via TOEPP Path” entry on the Key Establishment Table. The module does not support entry or output of cryptographically protected SSPs.

9.4 SSP establishment

The module provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation compliant with SP800-56Arev3, in accordance with scenario 2 (1) of IG D.F and used as part of the TLS protocol key exchange in accordance with scenario 2 (2) of IG D.F; that is, the shared secret computation (KAS-FFC-SSC and KAS-ECC-SSC) followed by the derivation of the keying material using SP800-135rev1 KDF and SP800-56Crev1 KDF.

For Diffie-Hellman, the module supports the use of safe primes from RFC7919 for domain parameters and key generation, which are used in the TLS key agreement implemented by the module.

- TLS (RFC7919)
 - ffdhe2048 (ID = 256)
 - ffdhe3072 (ID = 257)
 - ffdhe4096 (ID = 258)
 - ffdhe6144 (ID = 259)
 - ffdhe8192 (ID = 260)

The module also supports the use of safe primes from RFC3526, which are part of the Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups that can be used for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Note that the module only implements key generation and verification, and shared secret computation using safe primes, but no part of the IKE protocol.

- IKEv2 (RFC3526)
 - MODP-2048 (ID=14)
 - MODP-3072 (ID=15)
 - MODP-4096 (ID=16)
 - MODP-6144 (ID=17)
 - MODP-8192 (ID=18)

The module also provides the following key transport mechanisms:

- Key wrapping using AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and AES-CBC with HMAC, used in the context of the TLS protocol cipher suites (in compliance with IG D.G).

According to Table 2: Comparable strengths in [SP 800-57rev5], the key sizes of AES, Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman provides the following security strength in Approved mode of operation:

- AES key wrapping using AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and AES in CBC mode and HMAC, provides between 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength.
- Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation provides between 112 and 200 bits of security strength.
- EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of security strength.

9.5 SSP storage

Symmetric keys, public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling application via API input parameters and are destroyed by the module when invoking the appropriate API function calls.

The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs. The SSPs are temporarily stored in the RAM in plaintext form. SSPs are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate zeroization function calls.

9.6 SSP Zeroization

The memory occupied by SSPs is allocated by regular memory allocation operating system calls. The application that is acting as the CO is responsible for calling the appropriate zeroization

functions provided in the module's API and listed in Table 11. Calling the `gnutls_deinit()` will zeroize the SSPs stored in the TLS protocol internal state and also invoke the corresponding API functions listed in Table 11 to zeroize SSPs. The zeroization functions overwrite the memory occupied by SSPs with “zeros” and deallocate the memory with the regular memory deallocation operating system call. The completion of a zeroization routine(s) will indicate that a zeroization procedure succeeded. All data output is inhibited during zeroization.

10 Self-tests

The module performs the pre-operational self-test and CASTs automatically when the module is loaded into memory. Pre-operational self-test ensure that the module is not corrupted, and the CASTs ensure that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. While the module is executing the self-tests, the module services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. The module is not available for use by the calling application until the pre-operational self-test and the CASTs are completed successfully. After the pre-operational test and the CASTs succeed, the module becomes operational. If any of the pre-operational test or any of the CASTs fail an error message is returned, and the module transitions to the error state.

10.1 Pre-operational Software Integrity Test

The module performs the following pre-operational tests: the integrity test of the shared libraries that comprise the module using HMAC-SHA2-256. The details of integrity test are provided in section 5.1. Prior the first use, a CAST is executed for the algorithms used in the Pre-operational Self-Tests.

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The following sub-sections describe the conditional self-tests supported by the module. If one of the conditional self-tests fail, the module transitions to the 'Error' state and a corresponding error indication is given.

The entropy source performs its required self-tests; those are not listed here, as the entropy source is not part of the cryptographic boundary of the module.

10.2.1 Conditional Cryptographic algorithm tests

The module performs cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs) on all approved cryptographic algorithms. The CASTs consist of Known Answer Tests for all the approved cryptographic algorithms.

Algorithm	Test
AES	KAT AES CBC mode with 128-bit and 256-bit keys, encryption and decryption (separately tested) KAT AES CFB8 mode with 256-bit key, encryption and decryption (separately tested) KAT AES GCM mode with 256-bit key, encryption and decryption (separately tested) KAT AES XTS mode with 256-bit keys, encryption and decryption (separately tested) KAT AES-CMAC with 256-bit key size MAC generation
Diffie-Hellman	Primitive "Z" Computation KAT with ffdhe3072
DRBG	KAT CTR_DRBG with AES with 256-bit keys without DF, without PR
DRBG	Health tests according to section 11.3 of [SP800-90Arev1]
EC Diffie-Hellman	Primitive "Z" Computation KAT with P-256 curve
ECDSA	KAT ECDSA with P-256 using SHA-256, P-384 using SHA-384, and P-521 using SHA-512, signature generation and verification (separately tested)
HKDF KDA	KAT with SHA-256
HMAC	KAT HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512
PBKDF KDF	KAT with SHA-256 with 4096 iterations and 288-bit salt
RSA	KAT RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with 2048-bit key using SHA-256, signature generation and verification (separately tested)
SHA-3	KAT SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512

Algorithm	Test
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627	KAT with SHA-256

Table 13 - Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests

10.2.2 Conditional Pairwise Consistency Test

The module performs the Pair-wise Consistency Tests (PCT) shown in the following table. If any of the tests fails, the module returns an error code and enters the Error state. When the module is in the Error state, no data is output, and cryptographic operations are not allowed.

Algorithm	Test
ECDSA key generation	PCT using SHA-256, signature generation and verification.
RSA key generation	PCT using PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256, signature generation and verification
Diffie-Hellman key generation	PCT according to section 5.6.2.1.4 of [SP800-56Arev3]
EC Diffie-Hellman key generation	Covered by ECDSA PCT as allowed by IG 10.3.A additional comment 1

Table 14 - Pairwise Consistency Test

10.2.3 Periodic/On-Demand Self-Test

The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand which includes the pre-operational test (i.e., integrity test) and the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs). The Self-Tests service can be called on demand by invoking the `gnutls_fips140_run_self_tests()` function which will perform integrity tests and the cryptographic algorithms self-tests. Additionally, the Self-Test service can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available, and no data output is possible.

10.3 Error States

When the module fails any pre-operational self-test or conditional test, the module will return an error code to indicate the error and enters error state. Any further cryptographic operations and the data output via the data output interface are inhibited. The calling application can obtain the module state by calling the `gnutls_fips140_get_operation_state()` API function. The function returns `GNUTLS_FIPS140_OP_ERROR` if the module is in the Error state.

The following table shows the error codes and the corresponding condition:

Error State	Cause of Error	Status Indicator
Error State	When the integrity tests or KAT fail at power-up.	GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR (-400)
	When the KAT of DRBG fails during pre-operational tests	GNUTLS_E_RANDOM_FAILED (-206)
	When the new generated key pair fails the PCT	GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR (-403)
	When the module is in error state and caller requests cryptographic operations	GNUTLS_E_LIB_IN_ERROR_STATE (-402)

Table 15 - Error States

Self-test errors transition the module into an error state that keeps the module operational but prevents any cryptographic related operations. The module must be restarted and perform the per-

operational self-test and the CASTs to recover from these errors. If failures persist, the module must be re-installed.

11 Life-cycle assurance

11.1 Delivery and Operation

The module is distributed as a part of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 (RHEL 9) package in the form of:

- gnutls-3.7.6-21.el9_2.1.x86_64 RPM package for x86 systems.
- gnutls-3.7.6-21.el9_2.1.s390x RPM package for IBM z systems.
- gnutls-3.7.6-21.el9_2.1.ppc64le RPM package for IBM POWER systems.

11.1.1 End of Life Procedure

For secure sanitization of the cryptographic module, the module needs first to be powered off, which will zeroize all keys and CSPs in volatile memory. Then, for actual deprecation, the module shall be upgraded to a newer version that is FIPS 140-3 validated.

The module does not possess persistent storage of SSPs, so further sanitization steps are not needed.

11.2 Crypto Officer Guidance

The binaries of the 'Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 gnutls version 3.7.6-074d015ce201f434' are contained in the RPM packages for delivery listed below.

Before the 'Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 gnutls' RPM packages are installed, the RHEL 9 system must operate in Approved mode. This can be achieved by:

- Starting the installation in Approved mode. Add the `fips=1` option to the kernel command line during the system installation. During the software selection stage, do not install any third-party software. More information can be found at [the vendor documentation](#).
- Switching the system into Approved mode after the installation. Execute the `fips-mode-setup --enable` command. Restart the system. More information can be found at [the vendor documentation](#).

In both cases, the Crypto Officer must verify the RHEL 9 system operates in Approved mode by executing the `fips-mode-setup --check` command, which should output "FIPS mode is enabled."

The following RPM packages contain the FIPS validated module:

Processor Architecture	RPM Packages
Intel 64-bit	gnutls-gnutls-3.7.6-21.el9_2.1.x86_64.rpm nettle-3.8-3.el9_0.x86_64.rpm
IBM z16 64-bit	gnutls-3.7.6-21.el9_2.1.s390x.rpm nettle-3.8-3.el9_0.s390x.rpm
IBM POWER10 64-bit	gnutls-3.7.6-21.el9_2.1.ppc64le.rpm nettle-3.8-3.el9_0.ppc64le.rpm

Table 16 - RPM packages

11.2.1 TLS

The TLS protocol implementation provides both server and client sides. In order to operate in the approved mode, digital certificates used for server and client authentication shall comply with the

restrictions of key size and message digest algorithms imposed by [SP800-131Arev2]. In addition, as required also by [SP800-131Arev2], Diffie-Hellman with keys smaller than 2048 bits must not be used.

The TLS protocol lacks the support to negotiate the used Diffie-Hellman key sizes. To ensure full support for all TLS protocol versions, the TLS client implementation of the module accepts Diffie-Hellman key sizes smaller than 2048 bits offered by the TLS server.

For complying with the requirement to not allow Diffie-Hellman key sizes smaller than 2048 bits, the Crypto Officer must ensure that:

- in case the module is used as a TLS server, the Diffie-Hellman parameters must be 2048 bits or larger;
- in case the module is used as a TLS client, the TLS server must be configured to only offer Diffie-Hellman keys of 2048 bits or larger.

11.2.2 AES XTS

The AES algorithm in XTS mode can be only used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices, as specified in [SP800-38E]. The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2^{20} AES blocks, that is 16MB of data.

The module implements a check that ensures, before performing any cryptographic operation, that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical (in compliance with IG C.I).

Note: AES-XTS shall be used with 128 and 256-bit keys only. AES-XTS with 192-bit keys is not an Approved service.

11.2.3 AES GCM IV

The module implements AES GCM for being used in the TLS v1.2 and v1.3 protocols. AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with [FIPS140-3_IG] IG C.H for both protocols as follows:

- For TLS v1.2, IV generation is in compliance with scenario 1.a of IG C.H and [RFC5288]. The module supports acceptable AES-GCM ciphersuites from section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52rev2].
- For TLS v1.3, IV generation is in compliance with scenario 5 of IG C.H and [RFC8446]. The module supports acceptable AES-GCM ciphersuites from section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52rev2].

The IV generated in both scenarios is only used within the context of the TLS protocol implementation. The `nonce_explicit` part of the IV does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. The design of the TLS protocol in this module implicitly ensures that the `nonce_explicit`, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values. In case the module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall be redistributed.

The Crypto Officer can use the module's API to perform AES GCM encryption using internal IV generation. These IVs are always 96 bits and generated using the approved DRBG internal to the module's boundary. This is in compliance with Scenario 2 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H.

11.2.4 Key Derivation using SP 800-132 PBKDF

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF), compliant with SP800-132 and IG D.N. The module supports option 1a from section 5.4 of [SP800-132], in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK).

In accordance with [SP800-132], the following requirements shall be met.

- Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The Master Key (MK) shall not be used for other purposes. The length of the MK or DPK shall be of 112 bits or more (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved).
- A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved), shall be generated randomly using the SP800-90Arev1 DRBG,
- The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The minimum value shall be 1000 (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved).
- Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF, shall not be used as cryptographic keys.
- The length of the password or passphrase shall be of at least 14 characters (this is verified by the module to determine the service is approved), and shall consist of lower-case, upper-case and numeric characters. The probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 10^{-14} (assuming all digits)

The calling application shall also observe the rest of the requirements and recommendations specified in [SP800-132].

11.2.5 Compliance to SP 800-56ARev3 assurances

To comply with the assurances listed in section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56ARev3, the module shall be used together with an application that implements the "TLS protocol" and the following steps shall be performed.

1. The entity using the module, must use the module's "Key pair generation" service for generating DH/ECDH ephemeral keys. This meets the assurances required by key pair owner defined in the section 5.6.2.1 of SP 800-56ARev3.
2. As part of the module's shared secret computation (SSC) service, the module internally performs the public key validation on the peer's public key passed in as input to the SSC function. This meets the public key validity assurance required by the sections 5.6.2.2.1/5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56ARev3.

The module does not support static keys therefore the "assurance of peer's possession of private key" is not applicable.

12 Mitigation of other attacks

RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA decryption or signature operations, blinding is always used to protect the RSA operation from that attack.

The internal API function of `rsa_blind()` and `rsa_unblind()` are called by the module for RSA signature generation and RSA decryption operations. The module generates a random blinding factor and include this random value in the RSA operations to prevent RSA timing attacks.

Appendix A. TLS Cipher Suites

The module supports the following cipher suites for the TLS protocol version 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, compliant with section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52rev2]. Each cipher suite defines the key exchange algorithm, the bulk encryption algorithm (including the symmetric key size) and the MAC algorithm.

Cipher Suite	ID	Reference
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x31 }	RFC3268
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x33 }	RFC3268
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x37 }	RFC3268
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x39 }	RFC3268
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0x3F }	RFC5246
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0x67 }	RFC5246
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0x69 }	RFC5246
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0x6B }	RFC5246
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x8C }	RFC4279
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x8D }	RFC4279
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0x9E }	RFC5288
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0x00, 0x9F }	RFC5288
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0xA0 }	RFC5288
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0x00, 0xA1 }	RFC5288
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x04 }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x05 }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x09 }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x0A }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x0E }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x0F }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x13 }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x14 }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x23 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x24 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x25 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x26 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x27 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x28 }	RFC5289

Cipher Suite	ID	Reference
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x29 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x2A }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x2B }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x2C }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x2D }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x2E }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x2F }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x30 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x31 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x32 }	RFC5289
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM	{ 0xC0, 0x9E }	RFC6655
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM	{ 0xC0, 0x9F }	RFC6655
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8	{ 0xC0, 0xA2 }	RFC6655
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8	{ 0xC0, 0xA3 }	RFC6655
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0x13, 0x01 }	RFC8446
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0x13, 0x02 }	RFC8446
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256	{ 0x13, 0x04 }	RFC8446
TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256	{ 0x13, 0x05 }	RFC8446

Appendix B. Glossary and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI	Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CKG	Cryptographic Key Generation
CMAC	Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPACF	CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter Mode
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DF	Derivation Function
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB	Electronic Code Book
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FFC	Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
GMAC	Galois Counter Mode Message Authentication Code
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
KAS	Key Agreement Scheme
KAT	Known Answer Test
KW	AES Key Wrap
MAC	Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Science and Technology
PAA	Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PAI	Processor Algorithm Implementation
PBKDF2	Password-based Key Derivation Function v2
PKCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PCT	Pairwise Consistency Test
PR	Prediction Resistance
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS	Secure Hash Standard

Appendix C. References

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