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This adds both ARCv2 (EM & HS families) as well as 64-bit ARCv3 support.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin@synopsys.com>
supported_oses = ['windows', 'freebsd', 'netbsd', 'openbsd', 'darwin', 'sunos', 'linux']
supported_cpus = ['ppc', 'ppc64', 's390x', 'riscv32', 'riscv64', 'x86', 'x86_64',
'arm', 'aarch64', 'mips', 'mips64', 'sparc', 'sparc64']
supported_cpus = ['ppc', 'ppc64', 's390x', 'sparc64', 'riscv32', 'riscv64', 'x86', 'x86_64',
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sparc64 is getting duplicated here and end of this list.

@abrodkin
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Right, was fixed a while ago by qemu@6125673
Thanks for the hint!

@galak
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galak commented Apr 19, 2021

This adds both ARCv2 (EM & HS families) as well as 64-bit ARCv3 support.

Is there a new arc64-softmmu target?

@abrodkin
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Indeed, for ARC64 we build a separate binary which is exactly qemu-system-arc64.
Configure with ./configure --target-list=arc-softmmu,arc64-softmmu.

@galak
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galak commented Apr 19, 2021

Indeed, for ARC64 we build a separate binary which is exactly qemu-system-arc64.
Configure with ./configure --target-list=arc-softmmu,arc64-softmmu.

I've hackishly pulled this in over at:

zephyrproject-rtos/sdk-ng#330

so we can get a build to test out.

@galak
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galak commented Apr 20, 2021

looks like the some of what we had in the current SDK for arc has gone away. Looking at file diffs in hw/arc/ and how sim-hs.c and nsim.c are missing.

@abrodkin
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@galak right, on upstreaming we switched simhs to virt and nsim is gone at all - that's all exepcted.
And we implement that simhs -> virt switch in zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr#34393 here:
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/pull/34393/files#diff-07aa04e54a3e51a12719e53aafc6805f88ce712b4a0fa473c1602b106c6a9987R18

stephanosio pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2021
In currently implementation there will be a memory leak when
nbd_client_connect() returns error status. Here is an easy way to
reproduce:

1. run qemu-iotests as follow and check the result with asan:
    ./check -raw 143

Following is the asan output backtrack:
Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f629688a560 in calloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc7560)
    #1 0x7f6295e7e015 in g_malloc0  (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x50015)
    #2 0x56281dab4642 in qobject_input_start_struct  /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qapi/qobject-input-visitor.c:295
    #3 0x56281dab1a04 in visit_start_struct  /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qapi/qapi-visit-core.c:49
    #4 0x56281dad1827 in visit_type_SocketAddress  qapi/qapi-visit-sockets.c:386
    #5 0x56281da8062f in nbd_config   /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1716
    #6 0x56281da8062f in nbd_process_options /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1829
    #7 0x56281da8062f in nbd_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1873

Direct leak of 15 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f629688a3a0 in malloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc73a0)
    #1 0x7f6295e7dfbd in g_malloc (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4ffbd)
    #2 0x7f6295e96ace in g_strdup (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x68ace)
    #3 0x56281da804ac in nbd_process_options /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1834
    #4 0x56281da804ac in nbd_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1873

Indirect leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f629688a3a0 in malloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc73a0)
    #1 0x7f6295e7dfbd in g_malloc (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4ffbd)
    #2 0x7f6295e96ace in g_strdup (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x68ace)
    #3 0x56281dab41a3 in qobject_input_type_str_keyval /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qapi/qobject-input-visitor.c:536
    #4 0x56281dab2ee9 in visit_type_str /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qapi/qapi-visit-core.c:297
    #5 0x56281dad0fa1 in visit_type_UnixSocketAddress_members qapi/qapi-visit-sockets.c:141
    #6 0x56281dad17b6 in visit_type_SocketAddress_members qapi/qapi-visit-sockets.c:366
    #7 0x56281dad186a in visit_type_SocketAddress qapi/qapi-visit-sockets.c:393
    #8 0x56281da8062f in nbd_config /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1716
    #9 0x56281da8062f in nbd_process_options /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1829
    #10 0x56281da8062f in nbd_open /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/nbd.c:1873

Fixes: 8f071c9
Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: qemu-stable <qemu-stable@nongnu.org>
Cc: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-Id: <1575517528-44312-3-git-send-email-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8198cf5)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
stephanosio pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2021
The virtqueue code sets up MemoryRegionCaches to access the virtqueue
guest RAM data structures.  The code currently assumes that
VRingMemoryRegionCaches is initialized before device emulation code
accesses the virtqueue.  An assertion will fail in
vring_get_region_caches() when this is not true.  Device fuzzing found a
case where this assumption is false (see below).

Virtqueue guest RAM addresses can also be changed from a vCPU thread
while an IOThread is accessing the virtqueue.  This breaks the same
assumption but this time the caches could become invalid partway through
the virtqueue code.  The code fetches the caches RCU pointer multiple
times so we will need to validate the pointer every time it is fetched.

Add checks each time we call vring_get_region_caches() and treat invalid
caches as a nop: memory stores are ignored and memory reads return 0.

The fuzz test failure is as follows:

  $ qemu -M pc -device virtio-blk-pci,id=drv0,drive=drive0,addr=4.0 \
         -drive if=none,id=drive0,file=null-co://,format=raw,auto-read-only=off \
         -drive if=none,id=drive1,file=null-co://,file.read-zeroes=on,format=raw \
         -display none \
         -qtest stdio
  endianness
  outl 0xcf8 0x80002020
  outl 0xcfc 0xe0000000
  outl 0xcf8 0x80002004
  outw 0xcfc 0x7
  write 0xe0000000 0x24 0x00ffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffab5cffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffab0000000001
  inb 0x4
  writew 0xe000001c 0x1
  write 0xe0000014 0x1 0x0d

The following error message is produced:

  qemu-system-x86_64: /home/stefanha/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:286: vring_get_region_caches: Assertion `caches != NULL' failed.

The backtrace looks like this:

  #0  0x00007ffff5520625 in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #1  0x00007ffff55098d9 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #2  0x00007ffff55097a9 in _nl_load_domain.cold () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #3  0x00007ffff5518a66 in annobin_assert.c_end () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #4  0x00005555559073da in vring_get_region_caches (vq=<optimized out>) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:286
  #5  vring_get_region_caches (vq=<optimized out>) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:283
  #6  0x000055555590818d in vring_used_flags_set_bit (mask=1, vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:398
  #7  virtio_queue_split_set_notification (enable=0, vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:398
  #8  virtio_queue_set_notification (vq=vq@entry=0x5555575ceea0, enable=enable@entry=0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:451
  #9  0x0000555555908512 in virtio_queue_set_notification (vq=vq@entry=0x5555575ceea0, enable=enable@entry=0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:444
  #10 0x00005555558c697a in virtio_blk_handle_vq (s=0x5555575c57e0, vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/block/virtio-blk.c:775
  #11 0x0000555555907836 in virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq (vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2244
  #12 0x0000555555cb5dd7 in aio_dispatch_handlers (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55555671a420) at util/aio-posix.c:429
  qemu#13 0x0000555555cb67a8 in aio_dispatch (ctx=0x55555671a420) at util/aio-posix.c:460
  qemu#14 0x0000555555cb307e in aio_ctx_dispatch (source=<optimized out>, callback=<optimized out>, user_data=<optimized out>) at util/async.c:260
  qemu#15 0x00007ffff7bbc510 in g_main_context_dispatch () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
  qemu#16 0x0000555555cb5848 in glib_pollfds_poll () at util/main-loop.c:219
  qemu#17 os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:242
  qemu#18 main_loop_wait (nonblocking=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:518
  qemu#19 0x00005555559b20c9 in main_loop () at vl.c:1683
  qemu#20 0x0000555555838115 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, envp=<optimized out>) at vl.c:4441

Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Cc: Michael Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200207104619.164892-1-stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit abdd16f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
stephanosio pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2021
v->vq forgot to cleanup in virtio_9p_device_unrealize, the memory leak
stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 14336 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
  #0 0x7f819ae43970 (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)  ??:?
  #1 0x7f819872f49d (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)  ??:?
  #2 0x55a3a58da624 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c14624)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2327
  #3 0x55a3a571bac7 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2a55ac7)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/9pfs/virtio-9p-device.c:209
  #4 0x55a3a58e7bc6 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c21bc6)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3504
  #5 0x55a3a5ebfb37 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x31f9b37)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:876

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200117060927.51996-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9580d60)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
stephanosio pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2021
If we call the qmp 'query-block' while qemu is working on
'block-commit', it will cause memleaks, the memory leak stack is as
follow:

Indirect leak of 12360 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f80f0b6d970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f80ee86049d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55ea95b5bb67 in qdict_new /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qobject/qdict.c:29
    #3 0x55ea956cd043 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6427
    #4 0x55ea956cc950 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6399
    #5 0x55ea956cc950 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6399
    #6 0x55ea956cc950 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6399
    #7 0x55ea958818ea in bdrv_block_device_info /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/qapi.c:56
    #8 0x55ea958879de in bdrv_query_info /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/qapi.c:392
    #9 0x55ea9588b58f in qmp_query_block /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/qapi.c:578
    #10 0x55ea95567392 in qmp_marshal_query_block qapi/qapi-commands-block-core.c:95

Indirect leak of 4120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f80f0b6d970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f80ee86049d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55ea95b5bb67 in qdict_new /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/qobject/qdict.c:29
    #3 0x55ea956cd043 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6427
    #4 0x55ea956cc950 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6399
    #5 0x55ea956cc950 in bdrv_refresh_filename /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:6399
    #6 0x55ea9569f301 in bdrv_backing_attach /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:1064
    #7 0x55ea956a99dd in bdrv_replace_child_noperm /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:2283
    #8 0x55ea956b9b53 in bdrv_replace_node /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:4196
    #9 0x55ea956b9e49 in bdrv_append /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block.c:4236
    #10 0x55ea958c3472 in commit_start /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/block/commit.c:306
    #11 0x55ea94b68ab0 in qmp_block_commit /mnt/sdb/qemu-4.2.0-rc0/blockdev.c:3459
    #12 0x55ea9556a7a7 in qmp_marshal_block_commit qapi/qapi-commands-block-core.c:407

Fixes: bb808d5
Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-id: 20200116085600.24056-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit cb89561)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
stephanosio pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2021
Similar to other virtio-deivces, ctrl_vq forgot to delete in virtio_crypto_device_unrealize, this patch fix it.
This device has aleardy maintained vq pointers. Thus, we use the new virtio_delete_queue function directly to do the cleanup.

The leak stack:
Direct leak of 10752 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f4c024b1970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f4c018be49d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55a2f8017279 in virtio_add_queue /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
    #3 0x55a2f8057035 in virtio_crypto_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c:814
    #4 0x55a2f8005d80 in virtio_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
    #5 0x55a2f8497d1b in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891
    #6 0x55a2f8b48595 in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:2238
    #7 0x55a2f8b54fad in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #8 0x55a2f8b4de2c in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:1390
    #9 0x55a2f80609c9 in virtio_crypto_pci_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto-pci.c:58

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Cc: "Gonglei (Arei)" <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200225075554.10835-5-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d56e1c8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
stephanosio pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2021
virtio queues forgot to delete in unrealize, and aslo error path in
realize, this patch fix these memleaks, the leak stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 114688 byte(s) in 16 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f24024fdbf0 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xcabf0)
    #1 0x7f2401642015 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x50015)
    #2 0x55ad175a6447 in virtio_add_queue /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2327
    #3 0x55ad17570cf9 in vhost_user_blk_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/block/vhost-user-blk.c:419
    #4 0x55ad175a3707 in virtio_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3509
    #5 0x55ad176ad0d1 in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:876
    #6 0x55ad1781ff9d in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:2080
    #7 0x55ad178245ae in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #8 0x55ad17821eb4 in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:1338
    #9 0x55ad177aeed7 in virtio_pci_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:1801

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200224041336.30790-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 13e5468)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
stephanosio pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2021
There is a use-after-free possible: bdrv_unref_child() leaves
bs->backing freed but not NULL. bdrv_attach_child may produce nested
polling loop due to drain, than access of freed pointer is possible.

I've produced the following crash on 30 iotest with modified code. It
does not reproduce on master, but still seems possible:

    #0  __strcmp_avx2 () at /lib64/libc.so.6
    #1  bdrv_backing_overridden (bs=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:6350
    #2  bdrv_refresh_filename (bs=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:6404
    #3  bdrv_backing_attach (c=0x55c9d48e5520) at block.c:1063
    #4  bdrv_replace_child_noperm
        (child=child@entry=0x55c9d48e5520,
        new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:2290
    #5  bdrv_replace_child
        (child=child@entry=0x55c9d48e5520,
        new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:2320
    #6  bdrv_root_attach_child
        (child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060,
        child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing",
        child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>,
        ctx=<optimized out>, perm=<optimized out>, shared_perm=21,
        opaque=0x55c9d3c5a3d0, errp=0x7ffd117108e0) at block.c:2424
    #7  bdrv_attach_child
        (parent_bs=parent_bs@entry=0x55c9d3c5a3d0,
        child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060,
        child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing",
        child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>,
        errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd117108e0) at block.c:5876
    #8  in bdrv_set_backing_hd
        (bs=bs@entry=0x55c9d3c5a3d0,
        backing_hd=backing_hd@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060,
        errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd117108e0)
        at block.c:2576
    #9  stream_prepare (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at block/stream.c:150
    #10 job_prepare (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:761
    #11 job_txn_apply (txn=<optimized out>, fn=<optimized out>) at
        job.c:145
    #12 job_do_finalize (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:778
    qemu#13 job_completed_txn_success (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:832
    qemu#14 job_completed (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:845
    qemu#15 job_completed (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:836
    qemu#16 job_exit (opaque=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:864
    qemu#17 aio_bh_call (bh=0x55c9d471a160) at util/async.c:117
    qemu#18 aio_bh_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55c9d3c46720) at util/async.c:117
    qemu#19 aio_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55c9d3c46720,
        blocking=blocking@entry=true)
        at util/aio-posix.c:728
    qemu#20 bdrv_parent_drained_begin_single (poll=true, c=0x55c9d3d558f0)
        at block/io.c:121
    qemu#21 bdrv_parent_drained_begin_single (c=c@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0,
        poll=poll@entry=true)
        at block/io.c:114
    qemu#22 bdrv_replace_child_noperm
        (child=child@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0,
        new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300) at block.c:2258
    qemu#23 bdrv_replace_child
        (child=child@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0,
        new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300) at block.c:2320
    qemu#24 bdrv_root_attach_child
        (child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300,
        child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing",
        child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>,
        ctx=<optimized out>, perm=<optimized out>, shared_perm=21,
        opaque=0x55c9d3cc2060, errp=0x7ffd11710c60) at block.c:2424
    qemu#25 bdrv_attach_child
        (parent_bs=parent_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060,
        child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300,
        child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing",
        child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>,
        errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd11710c60) at block.c:5876
    qemu#26 bdrv_set_backing_hd
        (bs=bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060,
        backing_hd=backing_hd@entry=0x55c9d3d27300,
        errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd11710c60)
        at block.c:2576
    qemu#27 stream_prepare (job=0x55c9d495ead0) at block/stream.c:150
    ...

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-Id: <20200316060631.30052-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6e57963)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
stephanosio pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2021
PCI resource reserve capability should use LE format as all other PCI
things. If we don't then seabios won't boot:

=== PCI new allocation pass #1 ===
PCI: check devices
PCI: QEMU resource reserve cap: size 10000000000000 type io
PCI: secondary bus 1 size 10000000000000 type io
PCI: secondary bus 1 size 00200000 type mem
PCI: secondary bus 1 size 00200000 type prefmem
=== PCI new allocation pass #2 ===
PCI: out of I/O address space

This became more important since we started reserving IO by default,
previously no one noticed.

Fixes: e2a6290 ("hw/pcie-root-port: Fix hotplug for PCI devices requiring IO")
Cc: marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com
Fixes: 226263f ("hw/pci: add QEMU-specific PCI capability to the Generic PCI Express Root Port")
Cc: zuban32s@gmail.com
Fixes: 6755e61 ("hw/pci: add PCI resource reserve capability to legacy PCI bridge")
Cc: jing2.liu@linux.intel.com
Tested-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0e464f7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
stephanosio pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2021
Without the previous commit, when running 'make check-qtest-i386'
with QEMU configured with '--enable-sanitizers' we get:

  AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
  =================================================================
  ==287878==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000344
  ==287878==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access.
  ==287878==Hint: address points to the zero page.
      #0 0x564b2e5bac27 in blk_inc_in_flight block/block-backend.c:1346:5
      #1 0x564b2e5bb228 in blk_pwritev_part block/block-backend.c:1317:5
      #2 0x564b2e5bcd57 in blk_pwrite block/block-backend.c:1498:11
      #3 0x564b2ca1cdd3 in fdctrl_write_data hw/block/fdc.c:2221:17
      #4 0x564b2ca1b2f7 in fdctrl_write hw/block/fdc.c:829:9
      #5 0x564b2dc49503 in portio_write softmmu/ioport.c:201:9

Add the reproducer for CVE-2021-20196.

Suggested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20211124161536.631563-4-philmd@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit cc20926)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
stephanosio pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 27, 2021
libFuzzer found using 'qemu-system-i386 -M q35':

qemu: hardware error: e1000e: PSRCTL.BSIZE0 cannot be zero
CPU #0:
EAX=00000000 EBX=00000000 ECX=00000000 EDX=00000663
ESI=00000000 EDI=00000000 EBP=00000000 ESP=00000000
EIP=0000fff0 EFL=00000002 [-------] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0
ES =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
CS =f000 ffff0000 0000ffff 00009b00
SS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
DS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
FS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
GS =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
LDT=0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008200
TR =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008b00
GDT=     00000000 0000ffff
IDT=     00000000 0000ffff
CR0=60000010 CR2=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000000
DR0=00000000 DR1=00000000 DR2=00000000 DR3=00000000
DR6=ffff0ff0 DR7=00000400
EFER=0000000000000000
FCW=037f FSW=0000 [ST=0] FTW=00 MXCSR=00001f80
FPR0=0000000000000000 0000 FPR1=0000000000000000 0000
FPR2=0000000000000000 0000 FPR3=0000000000000000 0000
FPR4=0000000000000000 0000 FPR5=0000000000000000 0000
FPR6=0000000000000000 0000 FPR7=0000000000000000 0000
XMM00=00000000000000000000000000000000 XMM01=00000000000000000000000000000000
XMM02=00000000000000000000000000000000 XMM03=00000000000000000000000000000000
XMM04=00000000000000000000000000000000 XMM05=00000000000000000000000000000000
XMM06=00000000000000000000000000000000 XMM07=00000000000000000000000000000000
==1988== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal
    #6 0x7fae4d3ea894 in __GI_abort (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x22894)
    #7 0x563f4cc59a1d in hw_error (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xe8ca1d)
    #8 0x563f4d7c93f2 in e1000e_set_psrctl (qemu-fuzz-i386+0x19fc3f2)
    #9 0x563f4d7b798f in e1000e_core_write (qemu-fuzz-i386+0x19ea98f)
    #10 0x563f4d7afc46 in e1000e_mmio_write (qemu-fuzz-i386+0x19e2c46)
    #11 0x563f4cc9a0a7 in memory_region_write_accessor (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xecd0a7)
    #12 0x563f4cc99c13 in access_with_adjusted_size (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xeccc13)
    qemu#13 0x563f4cc987b4 in memory_region_dispatch_write (qemu-fuzz-i386+0xecb7b4)

It simply sent the following 2 I/O command to the e1000e
PCI BAR #2 I/O region:

  writew 0x0100 0x0c00 # RCTL =   E1000_RCTL_DTYP_MASK
  writeb 0x2170 0x00   # PSRCTL = 0

2813 static void
2814 e1000e_set_psrctl(E1000ECore *core, int index, uint32_t val)
2815 {
2816     if (core->mac[RCTL] & E1000_RCTL_DTYP_MASK) {
2817
2818         if ((val & E1000_PSRCTL_BSIZE0_MASK) == 0) {
2819             hw_error("e1000e: PSRCTL.BSIZE0 cannot be zero");
2820         }

Instead of calling hw_error() which abort the process (it is
meant for CPU fatal error condition, not for device logging),
log the invalid request with qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR)
and return, ignoring the request.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit fda43b1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
@stephanosio
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Closing obsolete PR.

nashif pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 16, 2025
ASAN detected a leak when running the ahci-test
/ahci/io/dma/lba28/retry:

Direct leak of 35 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 in malloc
    #1 in __vasprintf_internal
    #2 in vasprintf
    #3 in g_vasprintf
    #4 in g_strdup_vprintf
    #5 in g_strdup_printf
    #6 in object_get_canonical_path ../qom/object.c:2096:19
    #7 in blk_get_attached_dev_id_or_path ../block/block-backend.c:1033:12
    #8 in blk_get_attached_dev_path ../block/block-backend.c:1047:12
    #9 in send_qmp_error_event ../block/block-backend.c:2140:36
    #10 in blk_error_action ../block/block-backend.c:2172:9
    #11 in ide_handle_rw_error ../hw/ide/core.c:875:5
    #12 in ide_dma_cb ../hw/ide/core.c:894:13
    qemu#13 in dma_complete ../system/dma-helpers.c:107:9
    qemu#14 in dma_blk_cb ../system/dma-helpers.c:129:9
    qemu#15 in blk_aio_complete ../block/block-backend.c:1552:9
    qemu#16 in blk_aio_write_entry ../block/block-backend.c:1619:5
    qemu#17 in coroutine_trampoline ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:175:9

Plug the leak by freeing the device path string.

Signed-off-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20241111145214.8261-1-farosas@suse.de>
[PMD: Use g_autofree]
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20241111170333.43833-3-philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 23ea425)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
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3 participants