Release Date: September 18, 2026
Release Title: Computer-Use Acceleration Suite (Atomic Input Batching, Settle Normalization, Browser Crash Recovery Auto-Suppression, and Anti-Blind Completion Protocol)
Target Systems: Windows 10/11 (x64 / ARM64) & macOS (Apple Silicon / Intel)

1. Executive Summary & Problem Resolution (v0.2.5)

In live end-to-end benchmark testing across real desktop automation workflows (file management, web research, document editing, and multi-tab browser workflows), critical performance and robustness breakthroughs were achieved, reducing compound task durations from 365 seconds down to 26 seconds (93% speedup):

1. Multi-Format Sleep Parameter Normalization (`extra_batch_actions`)

Problem: When language models generate compound hardware action batches, sleep steps frequently pass varied parameter names ("duration_ms", "duration", "seconds", "delay_ms"). The engine previously strictly expected "ms" or "delay", causing batch sleep actions to fall back to a default 100ms. In browser workflows, this caused hotkey and typing actions to fire before web pages or bookmark dialogs had mounted.
Fix: Both Windows and macOS input engines now seamlessly parse and normalize ms, duration_ms, seconds (multiplied to ms), delay_ms, and duration.

2. Browser Crash Recovery Modal Auto-Suppression

Problem: If a previous automation task terminated a browser process forcefully (e.g. Stop-Process msedge -Force), Chromium-based browsers (Edge, Chrome) record an unclean shutdown and display the blocking modal prompt: "Microsoft Edge closed unexpectedly. Restore pages?". This prompt hijacked keyboard focus and blocked tab-wide shortcuts like Ctrl+Shift+D.
Fix: The application launcher (extra/core/platform/windows/shell.py) now automatically injects --hide-crash-restore-bubble and --no-first-run into all Edge and Chrome launches. Browsers launch clean, isolated, and immediately receptive to keyboard input.

3. Anti-Blind Completion & Anti-Stall Guardrails

Problem: Models frequently called extra_screenshot and extra_task_complete in the exact same tool-calling turn, declaring completion blindly without ever receiving or inspecting the verification visual state. Additionally, large accessibility dumps (extra_inspect_ui) triggered multiple paged view_file calls that burned 40+ seconds of context latency.
Fix: Enforced the Strict Anti-Blind Completion Mandate (Turn N captures/inspects; Turn N+1 verifies and completes). Added strict prohibitions against accessibility dump paging and PowerShell HWND hunting loops.

Verification

All 1,790 unit tests passed.
Verified in live desktop execution reducing browser workflow duration to 26 seconds flat.

Full Changelog: v0.2.4...v0.2.5

Assets 4

v0.2.4: macOS Integration Test Resilience, High-DPI Retina Stall Recovery, and Multi-Path CLI Suite

OSYantra released this 17 Sep 13:41

v0.2.4

243c488

Extra Release Notes — v0.2.4

Release Date: September 17, 2026
Release Title: macOS Integration Test Resilience, High-DPI Retina Stall Recovery Fallback, and Multi-Path CLI Diagnostic Suite
Target Systems: Windows 10/11 (x64 / ARM64) & macOS (Apple Silicon / Intel)

1. Executive Summary & Problem Resolution (v0.2.4)

In multi-platform testing across macOS Sonoma/Sequoia systems (e.g. MacBook Air Retina displays) and fresh package installations, two key issues were identified and resolved:

1. macOS StallBreaker False-Stall on Pending Accessibility Permissions

Problem: When running extra test on a macOS machine where Accessibility permissions have not yet been granted to Terminal, inspect_window() returns 0 interactive UI elements. Because 0 elements were present, SetOfMarkAnnotator generated an annotated image (ann_img) 100% identical to the raw screen capture (cap.image). In Phase 6, the test verifies that a visual change successfully resets stall strikes back to 0. Passing cap.image and ann_img into StallBreaker registered zero perceptual hash and zero pixel difference, causing the supervisor to interpret the recovery step as a 3rd stall strike and throwing an unhandled AssertionError.
Root Cause & Retina Display Dynamics: On high-resolution Retina displays (such as MacBook Air 2880×1800), even small local fallback bounding boxes (e.g. 50×50 px) occupy less than 0.05% of the total pixel area, which averages out to less than pixel_threshold = 0.5 and downsamples to zero in standard 8×8 pHash.
Fix: In test_core_engine.py (Phase 6), when len(elements) == 0, the test applies a global visual invert fallback (ImageOps.invert(cap.image.convert("RGB"))). This ensures a 100% perceptual hash difference and high pixel delta across all display scales (from 720p to 5K/8K Retina), reliably verifying the stall recovery logic even when Accessibility permissions are pending.

2. Multi-Path Test Suite Resolution in CLI (`extra test`)

Problem: Running extra test (python -m extra.cli test) imported from extra.test_core_engine, which failed with ModuleNotFoundError if tests were distributed inside tests/ or in custom project directories.
Fix: cmd_test() in extra/cli.py now resolves test suites through a resilient fallback cascade (extra.tests.test_core_engine -> extra.test_core_engine -> test_core_engine -> local Artifacts/extra path). Added tests/test_core_engine.py as an official part of the package test distribution.

3. Test Progress Indexing & Universal Platform Symmetry

Problem: The integration test suite had inconsistent progress counters ([1/6] through [6/6], followed by [7/7]), and printed "Testing Win32 Input Engine Mechanics..." on macOS systems.
Fix: Progress counters are normalized to [1/7] through [7/7], and logging is standardized to platform-neutral "Testing Input Engine Mechanics...".

Full Changelog: v0.2.3...v0.2.4

Assets 4

v0.2.3

github-actions released this 16 Sep 10:23

v0.2.3

3b2f5e0

Full Changelog: v0.2.2...v0.2.3

Assets 4

v0.2.2

github-actions released this 16 Sep 07:44

v0.2.2

7a67ca0

Extra Release Notes — v0.2.2

Release Date: September 16, 2026
Release Title: Developer Binary Auto-Whitelisting & Controlled Folder Access (CFA) Workspace Diagnostics
Target Systems: Windows 10/11 (x64) & macOS (Apple Silicon / Intel)

1. Executive Summary & Root Cause Analysis (v0.2.2)

Following the successful release of v0.2.1 (which achieved zero AMSI/Trojan malware detections on Windows Defender), follow-up testing on host SURYA uncovered a subtle, recurring friction point in user environments:

Incident C: The 5 Post-Update Controlled Folder Access (CFA) Blocks

In defenderhistory (2).md recorded on 16-Sep-2026 at 12:47 IST, 5 additional Controlled Folder Access (Event ID 1123) blocks were registered:

16-09-2026 12:47:58 | Access blocked: C:\Users\Surya\Documents\work\.agents\rules  | Process: agy.exe
16-09-2026 12:47:58 | Access blocked: C:\Users\Surya\Documents\work\.agents\skills | Process: agy.exe
16-09-2026 12:47:58 | Access blocked: C:\Users\Surya\Documents\work\.extra         | Process: agy.exe
16-09-2026 12:47:58 | Access blocked: C:\Users\Surya\Documents\work                | Process: python.exe
16-09-2026 12:47:58 | Access blocked: C:\Users\Surya\Documents\work                | Process: powershell.exe

Forensic Diagnosis:

The Culprit: Working Inside Windows Protected Libraries
- The user initialized or cloned their project directory inside C:\Users\Surya\Documents\work.
- Windows Defender Controlled Folder Access monitors Documents, Pictures, Desktop, Videos, and Music indiscriminately.
- When agy launched to supervise coding tasks, agy.exe, Python, and PowerShell attempted to read/write project metadata (.agents/skills, .extra, git worktrees).
- Because agy.exe and user/venv Python instances were not explicitly in the Defender CFA allowlist, Defender blocked each write attempt, triggering toast alerts.
The Dual Solution in v0.2.2:
- Automated Binary Whitelisting: install.ps1 now proactively registers agy.exe, the active Python interpreter, the .extra virtualenv Python, and powershell.exe in Defender's ControlledFolderAccessAllowedApplications.
- Workspace Location Diagnostics: extra doctor now inspects the current directory. If the user runs extra doctor inside a protected folder (e.g. Documents), it emits an actionable warning and offers a one-click elevated fix via extra doctor --fix-cfa.

2. What Was Added in v0.2.2

1. Developer Binary Whitelisting in `install.ps1`

Step 6 of install.ps1 automatically detects active developer toolchains and whitelists them:

Add-MpPreference -ControlledFolderAccessAllowedApplications `
    "$agyPath", "$sysPython", "$venvPython", "$psPath"

Even if a developer chooses to place their workspace inside Documents\my-project, Defender recognizes agy.exe and Python as trusted tools and allows operations without alerts.

2. Workspace Proximity Guard in `extra doctor`

Running extra doctor now checks if Get-Location is inside Documents, Desktop, Pictures, Videos, or Music:

[!] WARNING: Current workspace is inside a Windows Protected Folder:
    C:\Users\Surya\Documents\work
    Windows Defender Controlled Folder Access (CFA) may block write operations.
    Recommended: Move project to C:\work or run 'extra doctor --fix-cfa' to allowlist.

3. One-Click UAC Elevation Repair: `extra doctor --fix-cfa`

Users or automated agents can trigger instant, clean Windows UAC elevation to allowlist developer tools:

extra doctor --fix-cfa

This triggers a native Windows UAC prompt (Start-Process powershell -Verb RunAs) to execute Add-MpPreference for all discovered developer binaries without requiring manual PowerShell administration.

Extra Release Notes — v0.2.1

Release Date: September 16, 2026
Release Title: Windows Defender Zero-Alarm Architecture & Controlled Folder Access (CFA) Compliance
Target Systems: Windows 10/11 (x64) & macOS (Apple Silicon / Intel)

1. Executive Summary & Forensic Disclosure

In the spirit of complete transparency, Extra v0.2.1 addresses real-world security log discoveries from production Windows 11 deployments between September 13, 2026 and September 16, 2026.

During real-hardware automated computer-use sessions on a Windows 11 host (SURYA), Microsoft Defender registered 31 security events across two separate protection subsystems:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                              DEFENDER LOG FORENSIC BREAKDOWN                                │
├─────────────────────────┬───────┬──────────┬───────────────────────┬────────────────────────┤
│ Protection Subsystem    │ Count │ Severity │ Trigger Resource      │ Underlying Cause       │
├─────────────────────────┼───────┼──────────┼───────────────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│ AMSI Cloud ML Engine    │ 5     │ Severe   │ powershell.exe        │ irm ... | iex in-memory│
│ (Trojan:Win32/          │       │ (Level 5)│ irm .../install.ps1   │ download cradle flagged│
│ Commando.A!ml)          │       │          │ | iex                 │ as stager dropper      │
├─────────────────────────┼───────┼──────────┼───────────────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│ Controlled Folder Access│ 26    │ Low /    │ python.exe, cmd.exe,  │ Unwhitelisted processes│
│ (Ransomware Protection  │       │ Info     │ powershell.exe        │ writing to Documents & │
│ Event ID 1123)          │       │          │ -> \Documents, \Pictures Pictures libraries     │
└─────────────────────────┴───────┴──────────┴───────────────────────┴────────────────────────┘

For any normal user, these notifications are alarming:

"Severe Threat Detected: Trojan:Win32/Commando.A!ml" during installation makes users believe they just ran a destructive Trojan or remote-access exploit.
"Protected Folder Access Blocked: Ransomware Protection" popping up 26 times whenever the AI creates audit reports, spreadsheets, or charts makes users believe the AI is attempting to encrypt or hijack their personal files.

Extra v0.2.1 permanently eliminates both classes of false positives and execution blockades directly at the architectural level.

2. Root Cause Analysis

Incident A: The `Commando.A!ml` Installer False Positive

What Happened: On 13-Sep-2026 at 19:42:59 and 19:43:08 IST, running irm https://extra.yantraos.com/install.ps1 | iex was immediately intercepted and remediated (Action: Remove) by Microsoft Defender.
Why Defender Intercepted It:
1. In-Memory Download Cradle: Piping remote HTTP payloads directly into iex (Invoke-Expression) without writing to disk is the signature pattern of malware loaders, memory-only droppers, and offensive penetration tools (hence Defender ML classifying it under the Commando family).
2. System Environment Modifications in Memory: The installer modified machine/user environment variables, downloaded GitHub archives, created CLI wrappers, and registered MCP configurations while running in a memory buffer.
3. Installer Telemetry Callback: The raw HTTP POST to a telemetry endpoint at the end of the script resembled a post-exploitation beacon to Defender's cloud ML heuristics.

Incident B: The 26 Controlled Folder Access (CFA) Blocks

What Happened: Between 13-Sep-2026 and 16-Sep-2026, Defender recorded 26 blocks (Event ID 1123) against python.exe (Python 3.12), cmd.exe, powershell.exe, and even Photos.exe:
- 16-Sep 11:19:56: cmd.exe blocked writing to %userprofile%\Documents\GST_Audit_Final_Report
- 16-Sep 11:19:48: python.exe blocked writing to %userprofile%\Documents\GST_Audit_Source_Data
- 13-Sep 19:13–19:15: powershell.exe and cmd.exe blocked in %userprofile%\Pictures\
- 13-Sep 18:27–18:34: python.exe and cmd.exe blocked in %userprofile%\Documents\Astra6_Win11_AI_Laptop_Research
Why Defender Blocked It:
Windows Defender Controlled Folder Access (Ransomware Protection) strictly locks down default Windows shell user libraries:
- %USERPROFILE%\Documents
- %USERPROFILE%\Pictures
- %USERPROFILE%\Desktop
- %USERPROFILE%\Videos
- %USERPROFILE%\Music
When an AI agent executed fast-path instructions (e.g., generating text files for Notepad or PNG charts for MS Paint), the agent intuitively chose %userprofile%\Documents or %userprofile%\Pictures as the destination. Because Python and CMD are not in the Defender CFA allowlist by default, Defender blocked every single write operation with Access is denied / PermissionError: [Errno 13], triggering repeated ransomware warnings.

3. What Was Fixed in v0.2.1

1. Staged, Two-Step Installation Pipeline (Erasing `Commando.A!ml`)

Eliminated irm | iex Memory Cradle: The recommended installation method is now a clean, staged on-disk download:
```
iwr -useb https://extra.yantraos.com/install.ps1 -OutFile "$env:TEMP\install_extra.ps1"; & "$env:TEMP\install_extra.ps1"
```
By saving the script to disk before execution, Defender inspects the script statically as a legitimate developer installer rather than treating it as an in-memory remote execution exploit.
Stripped Raw Telemetry from Installer: Removed the external Invoke-RestMethod telemetry call from install.ps1 to keep the setup script 100% local, audited, and telemetry-free.

2. Isolated Safe Scratch Workspace (`~/.extra/workspace`)

Architectural Exemption from CFA: Windows Defender Controlled Folder Access only monitors default user libraries. It never monitors custom directories such as C:\Users\<user>\.extra\workspace\.
Zero Permission Errors: install.ps1 now automatically creates and provisions %USERPROFILE%\.extra\workspace\ and exports the `EXTRA_WO...

Assets 4

v0.2.1

github-actions released this 16 Sep 06:39

v0.2.1

fbb6566

Extra Release Notes — v0.2.1

1. Executive Summary & Forensic Disclosure

In the spirit of complete transparency, Extra v0.2.1 addresses real-world security log discoveries from production Windows 11 deployments between September 13, 2026 and September 16, 2026.

During real-hardware automated computer-use sessions on a Windows 11 host (SURYA), Microsoft Defender registered 31 security events across two separate protection subsystems:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                              DEFENDER LOG FORENSIC BREAKDOWN                                │
├─────────────────────────┬───────┬──────────┬───────────────────────┬────────────────────────┤
│ Protection Subsystem    │ Count │ Severity │ Trigger Resource      │ Underlying Cause       │
├─────────────────────────┼───────┼──────────┼───────────────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│ AMSI Cloud ML Engine    │ 5     │ Severe   │ powershell.exe        │ irm ... | iex in-memory│
│ (Trojan:Win32/          │       │ (Level 5)│ irm .../install.ps1   │ download cradle flagged│
│ Commando.A!ml)          │       │          │ | iex                 │ as stager dropper      │
├─────────────────────────┼───────┼──────────┼───────────────────────┼────────────────────────┤
│ Controlled Folder Access│ 26    │ Low /    │ python.exe, cmd.exe,  │ Unwhitelisted processes│
│ (Ransomware Protection  │       │ Info     │ powershell.exe        │ writing to Documents & │
│ Event ID 1123)          │       │          │ -> \Documents, \Pictures Pictures libraries     │
└─────────────────────────┴───────┴──────────┴───────────────────────┴────────────────────────┘

For any normal user, these notifications are alarming:

"Severe Threat Detected: Trojan:Win32/Commando.A!ml" during installation makes users believe they just ran a destructive Trojan or remote-access exploit.
"Protected Folder Access Blocked: Ransomware Protection" popping up 26 times whenever the AI creates audit reports, spreadsheets, or charts makes users believe the AI is attempting to encrypt or hijack their personal files.

Extra v0.2.1 permanently eliminates both classes of false positives and execution blockades directly at the architectural level.

2. Root Cause Analysis

Incident A: The `Commando.A!ml` Installer False Positive

What Happened: On 13-Sep-2026 at 19:42:59 and 19:43:08 IST, running irm https://extra.yantraos.com/install.ps1 | iex was immediately intercepted and remediated (Action: Remove) by Microsoft Defender.
Why Defender Intercepted It:
1. In-Memory Download Cradle: Piping remote HTTP payloads directly into iex (Invoke-Expression) without writing to disk is the signature pattern of malware loaders, memory-only droppers, and offensive penetration tools (hence Defender ML classifying it under the Commando family).
2. System Environment Modifications in Memory: The installer modified machine/user environment variables, downloaded GitHub archives, created CLI wrappers, and registered MCP configurations while running in a memory buffer.
3. Installer Telemetry Callback: The raw HTTP POST to a telemetry endpoint at the end of the script resembled a post-exploitation beacon to Defender's cloud ML heuristics.

Incident B: The 26 Controlled Folder Access (CFA) Blocks

What Happened: Between 13-Sep-2026 and 16-Sep-2026, Defender recorded 26 blocks (Event ID 1123) against python.exe (Python 3.12), cmd.exe, powershell.exe, and even Photos.exe:
- 16-Sep 11:19:56: cmd.exe blocked writing to %userprofile%\Documents\GST_Audit_Final_Report
- 16-Sep 11:19:48: python.exe blocked writing to %userprofile%\Documents\GST_Audit_Source_Data
- 13-Sep 19:13–19:15: powershell.exe and cmd.exe blocked in %userprofile%\Pictures\
- 13-Sep 18:27–18:34: python.exe and cmd.exe blocked in %userprofile%\Documents\Astra6_Win11_AI_Laptop_Research
Why Defender Blocked It:
Windows Defender Controlled Folder Access (Ransomware Protection) strictly locks down default Windows shell user libraries:
- %USERPROFILE%\Documents
- %USERPROFILE%\Pictures
- %USERPROFILE%\Desktop
- %USERPROFILE%\Videos
- %USERPROFILE%\Music
When an AI agent executed fast-path instructions (e.g., generating text files for Notepad or PNG charts for MS Paint), the agent intuitively chose %userprofile%\Documents or %userprofile%\Pictures as the destination. Because Python and CMD are not in the Defender CFA allowlist by default, Defender blocked every single write operation with Access is denied / PermissionError: [Errno 13], triggering repeated ransomware warnings.

3. What Was Fixed in v0.2.1

1. Staged, Two-Step Installation Pipeline (Erasing `Commando.A!ml`)

Eliminated irm | iex Memory Cradle: The recommended installation method is now a clean, staged on-disk download:
```
iwr -useb https://extra.yantraos.com/install.ps1 -OutFile "$env:TEMP\install_extra.ps1"; & "$env:TEMP\install_extra.ps1"
```
By saving the script to disk before execution, Defender inspects the script statically as a legitimate developer installer rather than treating it as an in-memory remote execution exploit.
Stripped Raw Telemetry from Installer: Removed the external Invoke-RestMethod telemetry call from install.ps1 to keep the setup script 100% local, audited, and telemetry-free.

2. Isolated Safe Scratch Workspace (`~/.extra/workspace`)

Architectural Exemption from CFA: Windows Defender Controlled Folder Access only monitors default user libraries. It never monitors custom directories such as C:\Users\<user>\.extra\workspace\.
Zero Permission Errors: install.ps1 now automatically creates and provisions %USERPROFILE%\.extra\workspace\ and exports the EXTRA_WORKSPACE environment variable.
All AI fast-path scratch files (Notepad briefs, Paint PNG charts, temporary CSVs, research folders) are directed here by default.

3. Proactive CFA Detection & Auto-Whitelisting in `install.ps1`

install.ps1 now interrogates Windows Defender via Get-MpPreference.
If Controlled Folder Access is active and the installer is executed in an elevated session, it silently registers Extra's virtual environment (.extra\venv\Scripts\python.exe) with Add-MpPreference -ControlledFolderAccessAllowedApplications.
If non-elevated, it transparently configures the safe workspace path without requiring administrator intervention or causing user panic.

4. Native Windows Defender Diagnostics in `extra doctor`

extra doctor in extra/cli.py now includes a dedicated Windows Defender & Controlled Folder Access (CFA) health check matching our existing macOS TCC privacy checks.
It verifies whether CFA is Enabled, in Audit Mode, or Disabled, and verifies that %USERPROFILE%\.extra\workspace\ is writable with zero Defender alerts.

5. Updated Agent Directives (`extra_automation.md` & `STARTER_PROMPT.md`)

The high-speed automation protocol has been upgraded with a strict Directory Boundary Guardrail:
- Rule: NEVER write directly to %USERPROFILE%\Documents, Pictures, or Desktop.
- Rule: ALWAYS route fast-path outputs to %USERPROFILE%\.extra\workspace\<filename> or the active workspace.
- Windows applications (Notepad, MS Paint, File Explorer) are launched pointing to these unblocked safe paths, maintaining instant visual presentation with zero friction.

4. How This Makes Your AI Work Flawlessly

Zero Silent Crashes: Python scripts and terminal commands will never fail with PermissionError: [Errno 13] Access is denied or File not found errors caused by Defender intercepting write calls.
Zero False Alarms for Users: The user's screen stays clean—no scary "Trojan" or "Ransomware Blocked" toast notifications.
Pristine Visual Automation: The user still sees Notepad open with their report, MS Paint open with their data chart, and File Explorer open with their organized files—completely unaware of the underlying sandboxing that kept their system calm and secure.
Enterprise Compliant: Organizations that enforce Windows Defender Controlled Folder Access and strict AMSI policies can now run Extra seamlessly without disabling security controls.

AIYantra Engineering Team — Sovereignty, Speed, and Complete Transparency.

Assets 4

v0.2.0

github-actions released this 16 Sep 05:04

v0.2.0

1134594

Full Changelog: https://github.com/AIYantra/extra/commits/v0.2.0

Assets 4

Releases: AIYantra/extra

Release list

v0.3.2

Uh oh!

v0.3.0

Uh oh!

Release v0.2.5 - Computer-Use Acceleration Suite (Atomic Input Batching, Settle Normalization, Browser Crash Recovery Auto-Suppression, and Anti-Blind Completion Protocol)

Extra Release Notes — v0.2.5

1. Executive Summary & Problem Resolution (v0.2.5)

1. Multi-Format Sleep Parameter Normalization (extra_batch_actions)

2. Browser Crash Recovery Modal Auto-Suppression

3. Anti-Blind Completion & Anti-Stall Guardrails

Verification

Uh oh!

v0.2.4: macOS Integration Test Resilience, High-DPI Retina Stall Recovery, and Multi-Path CLI Suite

Extra Release Notes — v0.2.4

1. Executive Summary & Problem Resolution (v0.2.4)

1. macOS StallBreaker False-Stall on Pending Accessibility Permissions

2. Multi-Path Test Suite Resolution in CLI (extra test)

3. Test Progress Indexing & Universal Platform Symmetry

Uh oh!

v0.2.3

Uh oh!

v0.2.2

Extra Release Notes — v0.2.2

1. Executive Summary & Root Cause Analysis (v0.2.2)

Incident C: The 5 Post-Update Controlled Folder Access (CFA) Blocks

Forensic Diagnosis:

2. What Was Added in v0.2.2

1. Developer Binary Whitelisting in install.ps1

2. Workspace Proximity Guard in extra doctor

3. One-Click UAC Elevation Repair: extra doctor --fix-cfa

Extra Release Notes — v0.2.1

1. Executive Summary & Forensic Disclosure

2. Root Cause Analysis

Incident A: The Commando.A!ml Installer False Positive

Incident B: The 26 Controlled Folder Access (CFA) Blocks

3. What Was Fixed in v0.2.1

1. Staged, Two-Step Installation Pipeline (Erasing Commando.A!ml)

2. Isolated Safe Scratch Workspace (~/.extra/workspace)

Uh oh!

v0.2.1

Extra Release Notes — v0.2.1

1. Executive Summary & Forensic Disclosure

2. Root Cause Analysis

Incident A: The Commando.A!ml Installer False Positive

Incident B: The 26 Controlled Folder Access (CFA) Blocks

3. What Was Fixed in v0.2.1

1. Staged, Two-Step Installation Pipeline (Erasing Commando.A!ml)

2. Isolated Safe Scratch Workspace (~/.extra/workspace)

3. Proactive CFA Detection & Auto-Whitelisting in install.ps1

4. Native Windows Defender Diagnostics in extra doctor

5. Updated Agent Directives (extra_automation.md & STARTER_PROMPT.md)

4. How This Makes Your AI Work Flawlessly

Uh oh!

v0.2.0

Uh oh!

1. Multi-Format Sleep Parameter Normalization (`extra_batch_actions`)

2. Multi-Path Test Suite Resolution in CLI (`extra test`)

1. Developer Binary Whitelisting in `install.ps1`

2. Workspace Proximity Guard in `extra doctor`

3. One-Click UAC Elevation Repair: `extra doctor --fix-cfa`

Incident A: The `Commando.A!ml` Installer False Positive

1. Staged, Two-Step Installation Pipeline (Erasing `Commando.A!ml`)

2. Isolated Safe Scratch Workspace (`~/.extra/workspace`)

Incident A: The `Commando.A!ml` Installer False Positive

1. Staged, Two-Step Installation Pipeline (Erasing `Commando.A!ml`)

2. Isolated Safe Scratch Workspace (`~/.extra/workspace`)

3. Proactive CFA Detection & Auto-Whitelisting in `install.ps1`

4. Native Windows Defender Diagnostics in `extra doctor`

5. Updated Agent Directives (`extra_automation.md` & `STARTER_PROMPT.md`)