feat(inventory): publish introspected tool/permission inventory and honest cloud tiers - #66
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…est cloud tiers Add a trust artifact that exposes exactly what the agent can do, sourced live from the code so it never drifts: - `opendevops_core.agent.inventory.build_inventory()` introspects `ALL_TOOLS` (name, description, type-hinted params), the bash command allowlist, the AWS read-permission matrix, and per-provider capability tiers. - Read-only `GET /api/inventory` endpoint (SPA-safe `/api/` prefix). - Generated `apps/documentation/tool_inventory.md` via `scripts/gen_tool_inventory.py` (never hand-edited). To keep these non-drifting and behavior-preserving: - Promote the kubectl/docker allowlist sets to module constants in `bash_tool.py` (`_KUBECTL_SUBCOMMANDS`, `_DOCKER_SUBCOMMANDS`) — same values, single source. - Refactor `permissions.check_permissions()` to iterate a declarative `PERMISSION_PROBES` table — identical behavior, now introspectable. Honest multi-cloud positioning in README + the doc page: AWS complete (20 structured tools + CLI), Azure CLI + 4 runbook skills (no structured SDK tools, no event-driven/polling loop), GCP not implemented (stub returns no tools). Corrects stale tool counts (actual: 26 total / 20 AWS structured). Tests assert the endpoint reflects `ALL_TOOLS`, the allowlist constants, the permission probes, and the honest provider tiers. Frontend Settings/Trust panel deferred as a follow-up (large file, styling risk); endpoint + doc page cover the artifact. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The merged evidence pack (PR #67) added a `hypotheses: list[dict]` parameter to submit_investigation. The introspected inventory picks this up automatically; regenerate the generated doc page so it stays in sync with the merged tool surface. Confirms both changesets coexist. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Intent
Ship Phase 0 of round-2 feedback: a published tool/permission inventory (trust artifact) and honest multi-cloud positioning, with zero agent-behavior change.
Part A — inventory, sourced by INTROSPECTION so it never drifts (no hand-maintained list): new core module opendevops_core/agent/inventory.py (build_inventory) introspects ALL_TOOLS (name, docstring, type-hinted params), the bash command allowlist, the AWS read-permission matrix, and per-provider capability tiers. Exposed via a read-only GET /api/inventory endpoint (deliberately uses the /api/ prefix to avoid the SPA-fallback catch-all) and a GENERATED doc page apps/documentation/tool_inventory.md produced by scripts/gen_tool_inventory.py (header marks it do-not-edit-by-hand). To make the sources introspectable WITHOUT changing behavior, two deliberate behavior-preserving refactors: (1) promoted the kubectl/docker allowlist literals in bash_tool.py to module constants _KUBECTL_SUBCOMMANDS/_DOCKER_SUBCOMMANDS (identical values), and (2) rewrote permissions.check_permissions() to iterate a declarative PERMISSION_PROBES table (identical returned dict shape and identical boto3 calls). These two refactors are intentional and must not be flagged as accidental scope creep.
Part B — honest positioning in README + the doc page: AWS = complete (structured tools + CLI), Azure = CLI + 4 runbook skills with NO structured SDK tools and NO event-driven/polling loop, GCP = not implemented (stub returns no tools). Verified against providers/azure and providers/gcp. I deliberately corrected stale tool counts: the introspected reality is 26 total tools / 20 structured AWS tools (CloudWatch 6, CloudTrail 1, ECS 4, Lambda 3, EC2 2, RDS 2, IAM 2). The pre-existing README/CLAUDE.md '27/21' figures were wrong; the new numbers are intentional, not a regression.
Tests: added test_api/test_inventory.py (asserts the endpoint reflects ALL_TOOLS, the allowlist constants, the permission probes, and the honest provider tiers) and test_tools/test_permissions.py (locks the behavior-preserving probe refactor). Note: the repo has ~42 PRE-EXISTING bash-tool test failures and ~88 pre-existing lint findings unrelated to this change — they fail only because aws/kubectl/docker binaries are not installed in this environment; my changes add zero new failures or lint errors.
Frontend Settings/Trust UI panel was intentionally DEFERRED as a follow-up (758-line component, styling risk); the endpoint + generated doc fully cover the artifact for Phase 0. Durable knowledge recorded in AGENTS.md (CLAUDE.md was promoted to AGENTS.md + symlinked by tooling).
What Changed
opendevops_core/agent/inventory.py(build_inventory, memoized vialru_cache) that introspectsALL_TOOLS, the bash command allowlist, the AWS read-permission matrix, and per-provider capability tiers; exposed it via a new read-onlyGET /api/inventoryrouter and a generatedapps/documentation/tool_inventory.mdproduced byscripts/gen_tool_inventory.py(do-not-edit-by-hand header).bash_tool.pyto module constants, and rewrotepermissions.check_permissions()to iterate a declarativePERMISSION_PROBEStable (identical dict shape and boto3 calls).test_api/test_inventory.pyandtest_tools/test_permissions.py.Risk Assessment
✅ Low: The change is additive and well-tested, with the two refactors being provably behavior-preserving (lambda default-arg binding and ordering preserved) and locked by new tests; the only note is a benign latent footgun in the newly-added cache.
Testing
Baseline: the new test files run green (
pytest tests/test_api/test_inventory.py tests/test_tools/test_permissions.py, 6 passed). For end-user evidence I exercised the actual product surface: I called the realGET /api/inventoryendpoint through the FastAPI app and captured its JSON, which shows the introspected reality — 26 total tools, 20 structured AWS tools, and the honest per-cloud capability tiers (AWS full, Azure CLI-only with no event/polling, GCP no-tool/no-CLI stub). I then ran the doc generator and confirmed it reproduces the committedtool_inventory.mdbyte-for-byte, demonstrating the documentation is generated from the same introspection (no drift, no hand-maintained list). The endpoint also returns JSON (not the SPA index.html), confirming the/api/prefix correctly avoids the SPA-fallback catch-all. No screenshot was needed since the Phase-0 deliverables are an API response and a generated markdown doc, both captured as artifacts; the deferred Settings/Trust UI panel is explicitly out of scope. The pre-existing bash-tool failures noted in the intent are environmental (missing aws/kubectl/docker binaries) and unrelated to this change. All evidence consistent with intent; no new failures introduced.Evidence: Live GET /api/inventory response (introspected trust artifact)
STATUS 200 active_provider: aws tool_count: 26 providers: {'name': 'aws', 'active': True, 'structured_tools': 20, 'cli_access': True, 'event_driven_and_polling': True} {'name': 'azure', 'active': False, 'structured_tools': 0, 'cli_access': True, 'event_driven_and_polling': False} {'name': 'gcp', 'active': False, 'structured_tools': 0, 'cli_access': False, 'event_driven_and_polling': False} aws_permission_matrix services: ['cloudwatch','cloudtrail','ecs','lambda','ec2','rds','iam','sqs','events'] kubectl subcommands: ['describe','get','logs'] docker subcommands: ['inspect','logs','ps']Evidence: Generated tool_inventory.md doc page (regenerates byte-identical to committed)
# Tool & Permission Inventory > Generated file — do not edit by hand. ... ## Capability by cloud | Cloud | Structured SDK tools | CLI access (bash tool) | Event-driven + polling | | AWS (active) | 20 | yes | yes | | AZURE | 0 | yes | no | | GCP | 0 | no | no | Active provider: aws · total registered tools: 26.Pipeline
Updates from git push no-mistakes
✅ **intent** - passed
✅ No issues found.
✅ **Rebase** - passed
✅ No issues found.
apps/core/src/opendevops_core/agent/inventory.py:127- _provider_capabilities() calls AzureProvider().tools() and GcpProvider().tools() on every request to build the inventory. Both stub implementations emit logger.warning("... provider not yet implemented ..."). Since GET /api/inventory is public and unauthenticated, each hit produces two WARNING log lines that falsely imply something is wrong, and could flood logs if the endpoint is polled (e.g. by a UI). Consider counting structured tools via a path that doesn't trigger the stub warnings, or demoting those provider stub logs to debug.apps/core/src/opendevops_core/agent/inventory.py:118- structured_tools is introspected, but cli_access and event_driven_and_polling are hand-coded boolean literals in the per-provider tuple. This is the one part of the 'inventory never drifts' artifact that is not sourced from live code, so e.g. adding az/kubectl support for GCP, or an Azure event loop, would silently leave these flags stale. Acceptable for Phase 0 since these aren't trivially introspectable, but worth a comment noting they're manually maintained.🔧 Fix: memoize build_inventory and document manual provider flags
1 info still open:
apps/core/src/opendevops_core/agent/inventory.py:140- build_inventory() is memoized with functools.lru_cache(maxsize=1) and returns the same dict instance on every call. It is handed straight back from the public GET /api/inventory endpoint and to the doc generator. No current caller mutates it, so this is safe today, but because the cached object is a shared mutable dict exposed directly, any future in-place mutation by a consumer (e.g. adding a field before returning) would silently poison the cache for all subsequent requests. Cheap guard: return a deep copy, or document that callers must treat the result as read-only.✅ **Test** - passed
✅ No issues found.
uv run pytest tests/test_api/test_inventory.py tests/test_tools/test_permissions.py— 6 passedHit the live endpoint via ASGITransportGET /api/inventory(status 200) and saved the full JSON responseConfirmed honest tiers from the live response: AWS structured_tools=20/cli/event-driven, Azure=0 structured/cli-only/no-events, GCP=0 structured/no-cli (stub), total tool_count=26Verified permission matrix and kubectl/docker allowlist constants are reflected in the endpoint payloadRanuv run python scripts/gen_tool_inventory.pyand diffed against the committedapps/documentation/tool_inventory.md— empty diff, proving the doc is generated and in syncConfirmed worktree left clean (regenerated doc restored via git checkout)✅ **Document** - passed
✅ No issues found.
✅ **Lint** - passed
✅ No issues found.
✅ **Push** - passed
✅ No issues found.