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Security and Trust Model

github-actions[bot] edited this page Sep 12, 2026 · 1 revision

Security and Trust Model

Token Terminator intentionally stores exact evidence locally because exact recovery is part of its product contract.

Private data

By default plugin-owned files live under:

<HERMES_HOME>/token-terminator/

The artifact vault may contain raw tool artifacts, tool arguments, provenance, observations, exposure records, temporal state, bounded working state, and request-reduction metrics.

The separate experiment ledger stores content-free accounting and salted prompt fingerprints. It does not store prompt text, command strings, or tool contents.

The plugin itself does not upload this private data.

Transformation safety

  • RTK is invoked with an argument array and shell=False.
  • Remote terminal backends are disabled by default.
  • Native compression requires successful exact write + read-back.
  • The complete provider-visible payload must be smaller.
  • Exact-tokenizer expansion vetoes a character-saving candidate.
  • Request compilation works on copies.
  • Unsupported or unsafe states fail open.
  • Token Terminator does not replace the host memory/context engine.

RTK executable trust boundary

If TOKEN_TERMINATOR_RTK_PATH is unset, executable discovery uses the host process PATH. A shadowed malicious rtk executable can influence rewrite decisions.

Security-sensitive deployments should pin the expected binary:

TOKEN_TERMINATOR_RTK_PATH=/absolute/path/to/rtk

Protect the binary and its parent directory from untrusted writes.

Recovery-safe retention

Automatic vault GC is allowed to reclaim abandoned evidence under capacity pressure, but not evidence already promised through accepted recovery receipts/exposures or active temporal references.

This distinction is essential: disk management must not silently break the model's recovery contract.

Reporting vulnerabilities

Use a private GitHub security advisory rather than a public issue.

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