v0.32.9 — close the external-review backlog: withdraw double-spend window, USDC.e sweep, and six more

Closes the external-review backlog: all 8 findings from the Kimi K3 review
(#72) and both unabsorbed pieces of @KillerQueen-Z's #59/#66 (#71).

• fix(polymarket) — the withdraw retry double-spend window is closed
  (#72.1). The relayer SDK's wait() polls 200s and returns undefined for
  BOTH an on-chain failure and a timeout, while the signed batch stays
  executable until its 300s deadline — and our error text said "re-run",
  an instruction that could double-send a partial withdrawal. Now:
  sendWalletBatch asks the relayer which case it is and says so (a failure
  is retry-safe; a pending batch gets "Do NOT retry" + the remaining window);
  every withdrawal batch is tracked in the state file while in flight, and
  action:"withdraw" refuses to sign a second transfer until the previous one
  resolves or its deadline passes (unreachable relayer counts as pending —
  the conservative side). Per-operation guidance replaces the hardcoded
  "re-run setup" advice everywhere (#72.5).
• feat(polymarket) — withdrawals sweep legacy USDC.e (#71). Withdrawable
  balance is now pUSD + USDC.e; any shortfall beyond the pUSD on hand is
  wrapped through the collateral onramp first (wrap(asset, to, amount)
  signature verified against the onramp's Sourcify exact-match source).
  Sweep design from #59/#66, with the wrap preview in the dry-run and the
  post-wrap balance re-read before bridging.
• fix(polymarket) — amount_usd parsing no longer truncates through float
  noise. BigInt(Math.floor(usd * 1e6)) sent $19.989999 for a $19.99
  request; amounts now round to the exact micro-dollar and over-precision /
  non-positive values are rejected. (The #66 draft's absolute 1e-7 tolerance
  sat below the float-noise floor and rejected honest amounts like $1234.56;
  0.01 micro separates noise from genuine violations.)
• fix(polymarket) — redeem refuses to guess the adapter (#72.3). A
  missing neg_risk field now falls back to the order book and errors out if
  both sources are silent, instead of silently treating "missing" as
  "standard market" — the wrong adapter is the no-op redeem class. The
  confirm path also now refuses unresolved markets up front (#72.6) instead
  of submitting a batch that reverts on-chain.
• fix(polymarket) — setup verifies the deploy landed at the DERIVED
  address (#72.4) by reading contract code on-chain (3×750ms) before
  recording deployed:true, so a relayer factory/salt divergence can never
  point approvals and funding at a nonexistent wallet.
• fix(polymarket) — ClobClient cache key includes the deposit wallet
  (#72.2), so a wallet change within the process lifetime can't keep
  building orders against the old funderAddress.
• fix(polymarket) — roundToTick absorbs float-division noise (#72.7).
  0.58/0.001 = 579.9999… floored a buy to 0.579 (one tick under the stated
  limit); on-grid prices now survive unchanged, off-grid still rounds
  conservatively by side.
• fix — creds/state writes are atomic (#72.8) (tmp + rename), so a
  crash mid-write can't corrupt the credentials or deposit-wallet mapping
  that reads then silently swallow to null.
• Bounded e2e scripts from #66 are in-tree (#71): npm run e2e:polymarket:{readonly,approvals,approve,withdraw,live} — readonly and
  approvals verified live against the local wallet today.
• 250 tests (17 new: batch-state disambiguation, double-spend guard
  lifecycle, sweep preview + calldata pinning, amount parsing, tick
  rounding), typecheck, build green.