v3.3.0-rc3

Note: This version has not been audited.

Main theme: remediation of the Nethermind AuditAgent v3.3.0-rc2 automated review. Maintainer triage outcome: 12 fixed in code · 8 accepted as design (5 documented) · 4 rejected; no open item. Full per-finding dispositions in audit_agent_report_v3.3.0-rc2-feedback.md.

Smart contract

Fixed

• NM-15/17 — missing address(0) guard in _setFrozenTokens (ERC20EnforcementModuleInternal): an ERC20ENFORCER_ROLE holder could freeze tokens on the zero address and brick every mint path. A zero-address guard now rejects it.
• NM-3/8 — allowance revocation blocked while paused / frozen: setting an allowance to 0 is now always permitted. _canAuthorizeAllowanceByModuleAndRevert returns early when value == 0, so an owner can revoke a spender even while the contract is paused or a party is frozen/delisted.
• NM-22 — setTerms(bytes32,string) overload erased the terms document name: the overload now preserves the existing document name instead of silently clearing it (ERC7551Module / ExtraInformationModule).
• NM-24 — forcedTransfer allowance accounting: forcedTransfer now emits Spend(from, to, min(currentAllowance, value)) and the IERC20Allowance.Spend NatSpec was corrected.
• NM-5 — Light minter transfer: _minterTransferOverride now threads _msgSender() as the spender argument, aligning the Light variant with the other deployments.

Security

• NM-7/9/11/16/18 — reentrancy on the RuleEngine transferred callback: the transferred callback (invoked before balance effects) is now protected by a transient-storage reentrancy guard (OpenZeppelin ReentrancyGuardTransient, EIP-1153) on the deployment variants with bytecode headroom. _callRuleEngineTransferred is virtual and only guards when a RuleEngine is set; size-constrained variants can override, and the limitation is documented. Added a malicious reentrant RuleEngine mock (RuleEngineReentrantMock) to cover the attack.

Changed

• Raised the Solidity source pragma floor to ^0.8.24 across all contracts, required by the EIP-1153 transient storage used by the new reentrancy guard.

Testing

Added

• Malicious-engine reentrancy tests (test/common/ValidationModule/RuleEngineReentrancyCommon.js) plus per-variant wiring.
• Regression tests for the fixes above: zero-value permit/allowance revocation while paused or with a frozen owner/spender, setTerms name preservation, forcedTransfer Spend event, the Light minter-transfer spender.
• Coverage tests that a non-allowlisted minter can still mint, a frozen minter can still mint, and that freeze does not block mint/batchMint (standard + light).
• ERC-1643 document tests (test/common/DocumentModule/DocumentModuleCommon.js): event emission on setDocument / removeDocument, the zero-name case and the missing-document case, run against both the native DocumentERC1643Module and the external DocumentEngineModule variants.
• RuleEngine spender-dispatch tests (test/common/ValidationModule/RuleEngineSpenderDispatchCommon.js, wired for the standalone and proxy variants): assert through CMTAT that transferFrom routes to the spender-aware 4-argument transferred(spender, from, to, value) and forwards the real spender, while a direct transfer routes to the legacy 3-argument overload. Uses a new recording mock, RuleEngineSpenderRecorderMock, and kills the spender != address(0) dispatch mutant.
• doc/test/Test.md — a hand-maintained test catalogue (module × deployment-version matrix, per-module scenario reference) to make missing tests easy to find; its maintenance is now required by CLAUDE.md / AGENTS.md.

Fixed

• npm run coverage no longer fails with Transaction ran out of gas on the largest deployment variants (ERC1363, ERC7551, DebtEngine, HolderList). The Hardhat network defaults to the osaka hardfork, which enforces the EIP-7825 per-transaction gas cap of 2**24 (16,777,216 gas); solidity-coverage's instrumented bytecode exceeds it at deployment, and each failed beforeEach skipped its whole suite. hardhat.config.js now runs the coverage task on prague (overridable with HARDHAT_HARDFORK) while npm run test stays on osaka. Deployed contracts are unaffected — they use about a third of the cap (~5.7M gas). Full coverage run: 6108 passing, 0 failing.
• Flaky timestamp assertions in the snapshot scheduling and rescheduling suites (test/common/SnapshotModuleCommon/): CMTAT_SnapshotModule_SnapshotScheduledInThePast was checked against (await time.latest()) + 1 read while the reverting call was in flight, which resolved to a different block depending on run speed. The executing block's timestamp is now pinned with time.setNextBlockTimestamp.

Documentation

• Documented the accepted-as-design findings: NM-4 (raw msg.sender bridge gate and the CROSS_CHAIN_ROLE forwarder constraint), NM-6 (permissionless zero-value transferred callbacks in the IRuleEngine NatSpec), NM-20 (the ERC20Burn pause note — burnFrom / burn(value) carry the pause check as cross-chain/third-party operations), NM-21 (setName does not update the EIP-712 domain; signers must read eip712Domain()), and an allowance-spend-event technical note (NM-24).
• Expanded doc/README.md: ERC-2771 per-deployment support table; split of the ERC-1404 version-support row into base (detectTransferRestriction) and reworked-only Extension (detectTransferRestrictionFrom); native DocumentERC1643Module vs external DocumentEngineModule; inheritance schemas for ERC-1363, Light, Debt, DebtEngine, Permit and Allowlist; a per-tool security-tools overview; and a CMTAT-Confidential entry under official implementations.
• Renamed guideline-new-blockchain.md → cmtat-specification-analyse.md (rescoped to a CMTAT-specification-vs-implementation comparison); porting now points to the external CMTAT-equivalency-assessment repository. Removed the ERC-1450 links from the Technical Guides.
• Corrected holder-list.md (the gas cost of a transfer between existing holders, and off-chain balance-at-a-block via eth_call).
• ERC-1404 predictor scope — detectTransferRestriction and detectTransferRestrictionFrom describe the holder transfer path (transfer / transferFrom) only. The address(0) encoding of the ERC-1404 rework draft (mint as from == address(0), burn as to == address(0)) is not supported, because CMTAT's pause rule differs between entry points of the same operation — MINTER_ROLE mint and BURNER_ROLE burn proceed while paused, while crosschainMint, crosschainBurn, burnFrom and burn(uint256) do not — and the ERC-1404 signature carries no entry-point discriminator. CMTAT therefore designates no ERC-1404 predictor for supply-changing operations and designates canTransfer / canTransferFrom instead. Documented in ValidationModuleERC1404 NatSpec, doc/README.md, doc/technical/ruleengine-integration.md and doc/modules/core/Pause/pause.md.
• RuleEngine authoring obligations (doc/technical/ruleengine-integration.md): an engine must return a non-empty messageForTransferRestriction string for every code it can return — never one denoting the absence of a restriction for a non-zero code — and must implement IRuleEngineERC1404 when the token exposes ERC-1404. The token forwards both the code and the message verbatim by design (trusted, DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE-set engine; bytecode headroom), which is now recorded as an explicit design choice.
• Documented that forcedTransfer / forcedBurn intentionally remain available after deactivation (ERC-8343 named privileged operations, e.g. to sweep a frozen or migrated position), and corrected the absolute "no operation after deactivation" wording in doc/README.md / doc/technical/stablecoin.md and in the 0_CMTATBaseCore / ERC20EnforcementModuleInternal NatSpec.
• Corrected misleading access-control NatSpec: the cross-chain burn(uint256) is gated by onlySelfBurn (BURNER_SELF_ROLE), not the burner role, and EnforcementModule's onlyEnforcer gates the address freeze.
• doc/README.md: refreshed the DocumentEngine version table (CMTAT v3.3.0 → DocumentEngine v0.4.0; v3.0.0–v3.2.0 marked as not developed) and added Permit (ERC-2612), Multicall (ERC-6357) and Holder List to the optional-features list.
• Regenerated the Surya schema for rc3 — call graphs, inheritance graphs and reports for all 129 contracts, picking up ReentrancyGuardTransient in the deployment-variant inheritance and the two new RuleEngine mocks — and re-synced the per-module report copies under doc/modules/** with the canonical set (74 files, two ghosts from the deployment-filenames rename dropped, 13 missing reports added).
• Documented the coverage hardfork in doc/USAGE.md (with doc/README.md pointing to it): why the coverage run uses prague while the test run uses osaka, and the measured deployment gas of the largest variants against the EIP-7825 cap, showing that the cap constrains the instrumented build only and not the deployed contracts.
• Refreshed the Slither and Aderyn reports and maintainer feedback against the rc3 source: Slither 158 results (0 High; calls-loop rises 28 → 76 purely because the RuleEngine hook was factored into the virtual _callRuleEngineTransferred, not from any new external call), Aderyn unchanged at 2 High / 10 Low with identical instance counts (3736 → 3826 nSLOC). Nothing to fix in either; see AUDIT.md.

Dependencies

• Update the pinned Solidity compiler from 0.8.34 to 0.8.36 in hardhat.config.js and foundry.toml.
• Bump the npm devDependency to ^12.0.1.