Limitations

Mirrored from docs/limitations.md in the repository, 2026-08-05. The repo copy is authoritative for anything CI-cited (exact commands, workflow files, versions) — this page exists so the wiki is self-contained, but re-sync it from the source if the two drift.

Known limitations

Troubleshooting

• "binary is not executable": chmod 0755 service, then rebuild with CGO_ENABLED=0.
• Unsupported architecture: pass -arch amd64 or -arch arm64 and build the binary for the same target.
• Output already exists: select a new output directory; it is intentionally never overwritten.
• Registry publication fails: use the workflow artifact; confirm repository Actions permissions allow packages:write before retrying.

What this project does not do

This corrects an older claim (until 2026-08-04, the README said this project was "not a registry client, image signer, SBOM generator" — true in v1, no longer true since v3's native supply-chain path shipped). Current, verified limitations instead:

• verify-release doesn't fetch a published image; it verifies local artifacts. internal/registry.Client gained GetManifest/GetBlob on 2026-08-04, but nothing in the shipped CLI calls them yet — there is no platform-factory pull. See the maturity matrix.
• Does not prove an executable is static. Use the static build command in the README, or -extra-file for a binary that genuinely can't be statically linked.
• Not a Dockerfile interpreter. There is no Dockerfile parsing or build-instruction execution; inputs are an already-built executable plus explicit extra files.
• The native VMM host process's self-sandboxing is partial. KVM guest isolation is real and unaffected. As of 2026-08-05, internal/hypervisor/sandbox is wired into cmd/platform-factory-runtime's startup path: no_new_privs applies unconditionally, and PID/IPC/UTS namespace isolation, cgroup limits, and capability bounding-set dropping apply whenever the host has the privilege they need, probe-gated so a host without it still launches guests rather than failing closed. Mount and network namespace isolation, full BPF seccomp filtering, and a capset(2)-based drop of the process's already-effective capabilities remain unimplemented. See the Threat Model's T22 and the maturity matrix.
• MicroVM on Linux/arm64 and Windows (WHPX) are untested. Only Linux/amd64 (KVM) and macOS/arm64 (HVF) boot a real guest in CI. See the compatibility matrix.
• Windows and macOS are not supported image targets. They are supported hosts for running the platform-factory CLI itself (ci-reproducibility.yml tests all three), but the stable builder only produces Linux amd64/arm64 images.
• Per-tenant quota/priority/fairness is opt-in. A control-plane deployment that doesn't explicitly enable internal/quota gets none of its enforcement.
• Will not make you coffee.