fix(configs): stop three presets opting into read exfiltration - #379
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Both presets set insecure_allow_read_exfiltration: true only because they
allowed GET /containers/** (and homepage GET /images/**). Those globs
swallow /containers/{id}/archive, /export, /logs, /attach/ws,
/services/{id}/logs, /tasks/{id}/logs and /images/{name}/get, so every
operator starting from these presets inherited a standing permission to
read arbitrary container files and pull whole rootfs and image tarballs.
Replace the globs with named paths taken from each client's source.
Traefik v3.7.12 pkg/provider/docker calls ContainerList, ContainerInspect,
NetworkList, ServiceList, TaskList, Events and ServerVersion. Homepage's
three dockerode call sites (service-helpers.js and the two
pages/api/docker routes) call listContainers, container.inspect,
container.stats, listServices, getService().inspect and listTasks.
The container-ID position is a single "*", which compiles to [^/]* and
matches one path segment, so it cannot absorb a trailing /archive or
/logs. Nothing denied before is allowed now; the change only removes
permission.
traefik v3.7.12 pswarm.go parseTasks calls NodeInspect for every task
carrying a NodeID, which moby/moby client v0.4.0 node_inspect.go:27 maps
to GET /nodes/{id}. The preset has never allowed /nodes, so the inspect
was denied, parseTasks returned an error, listTasks logged a warning and
skipped the task, and the service ended up with no endpoints.
This is a pre-existing gap, not a regression from f3e5861: the old
/containers/**, /networks/**, /services/** and /tasks/** globs never
covered /nodes either. Traefik added the call after v3.0.0.
The call is on the default path, not behind a config gate — listTasks is
the else branch of `if dData.ExtraConf.LBSwarm` and the
traefik.docker.lbswarm label defaults to false.
The rule is GET /nodes/*, a single segment, so node list stays denied
(traefik never calls NodeList) and so does POST /nodes/{id}/update, the
only node subpath moby registers. No node route is in
sensitiveExfilEndpoints, so this adds no exfiltration surface and the
preset still validates without insecure_allow_read_exfiltration.
Same accident as traefik and homepage in f3e5861: the flag was there only because the preset allowed GET /containers/** and GET /images/**, which swallow /containers/{id}/archive, /export, /logs, /attach/ws, /images/get and /images/{name}/get. Diun's entire Docker socket surface is three calls: ServerVersion (pkg/docker/client.go:60), ContainerList and ImageInspect (internal/provider/docker/container.go:37,46). IsLocalImage, IsDanglingImage and IsDigest are pure functions over the already-fetched inspect result. None of it is an exfiltration endpoint. Container inspect is denied now too; the Docker provider never calls it. Image inspect is /images/**/json, not /images/*/json. Docker registers the route as /images/{name:.*}/json and {name:.*} spans slashes, so a registry-qualified image arrives as GET /images/ghcr.io/org/app:tag/json and a single-segment "*" would deny every image that is not a bare library name. The literal /json suffix keeps the double-star narrow: /images/get, /images/{name}/get and /images/{name}/history do not end in /json. It does also admit GET /images/json, a metadata list Diun does not call and not an exfiltration endpoint. Diun's Swarm provider (ServiceList) is still not covered, as it never was.
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughDiun, Homepage, and Traefik presets now allow explicit Docker read endpoints instead of broad resource globs. Read-exfiltration acknowledgments were removed. Archive, export, logs, attach, image-download, and write routes remain denied. Conformance tests cover allowed calls, version-prefixed paths, denied routes, and flag removal. Preset documentation and Traefik examples now describe the narrowed rules, including Swarm node inspection. Suggested labels: Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to This change narrows three presets to the endpoints their clients need and adds the required Swarm node-inspect permission where applicable; no actionable merge-blocking risk remains after normal checks and review. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 2✅ Passed checks (2 passed)
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…narrowing # Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/content/docs/presets.mdx`:
- Around line 293-294: Update the Traefik endpoint description near the
allow-list entry so it accurately accounts for the metadata and event
exceptions: either limit the “named list or inspect endpoint” statement to
resource paths or explicitly mention events, ping, version, and info as
additional allowed endpoints. Preserve the documented allow list.
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3 participants
traefik.yaml,homepage.yamlanddiun.yamleach setinsecure_allow_read_exfiltration: true, and none of the three clients needs it. The flag was there becauseGET /containers/**swallows/archive,/export,/logsand/attach/ws, andGET /images/**swallows/images/{name}/get. So every operator starting from one of these presets inherited a standing permission they never evaluated, which is the opposite of the posture the project sells.Three commits, each doing one thing.
1. Narrow traefik and homepage, drop the flag
The call sets were established from source, not guessed. Traefik v3.7.12's
pkg/provider/dockergivesServerVersion,Events,ContainerList,ContainerInspect,ServiceList,NetworkList,TaskList,Ping. Homepage imports dockerode in exactly three non-test files, and across all three it callslistContainers,container.inspect,container.stats,listServices,getService().inspectandlistTasks. It makes zero image, event, network, version, info or ping calls, checked with control positives so a silent search failure would show up.*cannot span/, verified rather than assumed:ToRegexStringemits[^/]*, and a pattern with no**takespathMatcherSegmentGlob, which splits on/and requires an exact segment count. So/containers/*/jsoncan't absorb a trailing/archiveand no explicit terminal patterns were needed.The resulting traefik rule set is identical to the already-shipping
examples/compose/traefik/sockguard.yaml, which was written for exactly this. Both files' prose claimed the example was "tighter than the bundled preset", which stopped being true here, so both were corrected.2. Allow node inspect in the traefik swarm preset
Separate commit because it widens rather than narrows, and it's a pre-existing bug rather than fallout from commit 1.
Traefik's Swarm path calls
NodeInspectfor every task carrying aNodeID, and no version of this preset has ever allowed/nodes. It isn't behind a flag:listTasksis the default path, since it's theelsebranch ofLBSwarmand that comes from a label defaulting to false. The task filter isdesired-state=running, so tasks are node-assigned by construction.parseTaskserrors,listTaskslogs a warning and drops the task, so every task drops and the service ends up with zero endpoints without anything failing loudly. Traefik added the call after v3.0.0.Route confirmed in the module Traefik actually pins,
github.com/moby/moby/client v0.4.0, wherenode_inspect.go:27issuesGET /nodes/{id}. Moby registers four node routes and none is exfiltration-adjacent, so the preset still validates without the flag.3. Narrow diun, drop the flag
Diun's Docker provider calls
ContainerListandImageInspectonly, so container inspect is denied now too. Its Swarm provider callsServiceList, which this preset never covered and still doesn't; that's stated in the header.Image inspect needs
/images/**/json, not/images/*/json, because moby routes it asGET /images/{name:.*}/jsonand{name:.*}spans slashes. A single-segment glob would deny every image that isn't a bare library name, which is most real deployments. There are test cases fordocker.io/library/nginxandghcr.io/crazy-max/diun:latest.One consequence worth naming rather than leaving to be found:
/images/**/jsonalso admitsGET /images/json, because/**compiles to(/.*)?and can match nothing. Diun doesn't call it and it isn't an exfiltration endpoint. Removing it would mean enumerating segment counts, which breaks on the next registry path shape, so it's pinned by a test named for the fact.The other presets
Not touched, but classified so nobody re-files them.
readonly.yamlandportainer.yamlare load-bearing by design.homarr.yamlis partially load-bearing: it really does call container logs, so the flag stays, though the globs still hand it archive, export, attach/ws and image-get that it never calls.watchtower.yamllooks like the same glob accident, but that read was four files deep in an archived repo, so treat it as provisional.Eleven presets still carry the flag, down from fourteen.
Testing
New conformance tests for all three presets go through
filter.MiddlewareWithOptionsagainst the realconfig.Loaded YAML, so they assert what the shipped files do rather than what a hand-built rule list does. Each asserts both sides: every needed endpoint allows, every exfiltration endpoint denies, andInsecureAllowReadExfiltration == falseso the flag can't come back quietly.go build ./...,go test ./...across 37 packages andgolangci-lint runclean before each commit. Mutations checked and reverted per commit, including re-widening each glob (six deny cases fail, and the startup validator independently fails naming the exposed endpoints) and widening/nodes/*to/nodes/**, which admitsGET /nodes/abc/updateand is the direct proof that*doesn't cross a slash.Changelog
🔒 Removed
insecure_allow_read_exfiltration: truefrom the Traefik, Homepage, and Diun presets.🔒 Replaced broad Docker API globs with explicit required endpoints.
✨ Added Traefik Swarm access to
GET /nodes/*.✨ Added conformance tests for allowed, denied, write, and exfiltration endpoints.
🔧 Updated preset and Traefik example documentation.
🗑️ Reduced presets using the flag from fourteen to eleven.
🔧 Verified builds, tests, linting, and mutation checks.
Confirm that all required Docker API endpoints remain allowed.
Confirm that archive, export, logs, attach, image-download, and write endpoints remain denied.
Confirm that documentation matches the shipped preset rules.