ci: pin third-party Actions to commit SHAs#131
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Connorrmcd6 merged 1 commit intoJun 15, 2026
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Pin every third-party Action to a full-length commit SHA with a version comment (Dependabot/Renovate keep these current). A mutable tag like @v6 lets the tag owner — or anyone who compromises their account — swap the code an Action runs, and these run in jobs holding contents: write (release upload) and id-token: write (npm provenance). SHAs make the supply chain reproducible and reviewable. actions/checkout@v6 -> df4cb1c... # v6 actions/setup-node@v6 -> 48b55a0... # v6 softprops/action-gh-release@v3 -> b430933... # v3 peter-evans/repository-dispatch@v4 -> 28959ce... # v4 rustsec/audit-check@v2 -> 69366f3... # v2.0.0 dependabot.yml already tracks the github-actions ecosystem, so these pins stay maintained. https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3Z35bgg6cvWzBDfyh6pQ8 (cherry picked from commit ae343f8)
Connorrmcd6
approved these changes
Jun 15, 2026
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Severity: MEDIUM — release-pipeline supply chain
Every third-party Action was referenced by a mutable major tag (
@v6,@v3,@v4,@v2). A tag can be re-pointed by its owner — or by anyone who compromises that account —to arbitrary code. That code runs in jobs that hold:
contents: write(release.ymlbuild→ uploads release assets viaaction-gh-release)id-token: write(release.ymlnpm-publish→ npm provenance OIDC)notify-site→repository-dispatch)so a swapped Action could tamper with the published binaries
install.shconsumes, mintprovenance, or exfiltrate the dispatch token.
Change
Pin each Action to a full-length commit SHA with a trailing version comment — the format
Dependabot and Renovate parse and keep updated:
actions/checkoutdf4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10actions/setup-node48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041esoftprops/action-gh-releaseb4309332981a82ec1c5618f44dd2e27cc8bfbfdapeter-evans/repository-dispatch28959ce8df70de7be546dd1250a005dd32156697rustsec/audit-check69366f33c96575abad1ee0dba8212993eecbe998SHAs resolved via
git ls-remoteagainst each upstream repo.dependabot.ymlalreadytracks the
github-actionsecosystem, so the pins stay maintained.🤖 Generated with Claude Code