Frontier PCIe Gen3 Gen4

PCIe Gen3 and Gen4: why they are still locked

What this page covers. Everything known about the PCIe generation wall above 5 GT/s on the CMP 170HX: the two independent lock layers (a pair of OTP fuses plus a five-byte edit in the signed DevInit image), why the Gen2 breakthrough of 2026-07-24 did not carry Gen3 with it, the exact registers the working Gen2 patch reads but never writes, a full catalogue of refuted approaches, and the remaining avenues ranked by cost.

The headline: no Gen3 or Gen4 link has ever trained on a CMP 170HX. As of 2026-07-28 no source in the corpus reports LnkSta: Speed 8GT/s or 16GT/s on this card. Gen3 advertisement was made to work on 2026-07-24 (LnkCap: Port #1, Speed 8GT/s, Width x4 and LnkCtl2: Target Link Speed: 8GT/s) while LnkSta stayed pinned at Speed 2.5GT/s, Width x4. The closing position on the record, stated by the maintainer on 2026-07-27, is that Gen3 needs a GSP-RM firmware patch: "Gen 3 doesn't work whatsoever, it's going to require a GSP patch" and "I haven't seen anybody at all get a working GSP patch."

Note

Open problem

This page describes unsolved work. Nothing here ships. Gen2 (5 GT/s) is solved in software and shipped in master on 2026-07-29: see PCIe Gen2.

Warning

Speed is not width

PCIe link speed (Gen1 to Gen2) and PCIe link width (x4 to x16) are two entirely separate problems on this card with two entirely separate fixes. Speed is firmware and fuses, the subject of this page. Width is a PCB depopulation fixed only by hand-soldering 24 AC-coupling capacitors, covered in physical mods. A Gen3 software unlock at the native x4 width is the community's stated next target precisely because it would need no soldering.

Status at a glance

Generation	Rate	Status on the 170HX	Mechanism
Gen1	2.5 GT/s	Stock, always trains at cold boot	Signed DevInit programs the CMP PCIe table
Gen2	5.0 GT/s	Solved in software, shipped in `master` since 2026-07-29	Combined register sequence through the SEC2 Booter plus a root-port retrain
Gen3	8.0 GT/s	Unsolved. Capability can be advertised; the link never trains	Stated on 2026-07-27 by the maintainer to need a GSP-RM patch, and no working GSP patch has been produced
Gen4	16.0 GT/s	Unsolved and untestable. No contributor has a Gen4 host	Fuse bit 25 `GEN4_SPEED_DISABLED` plus the suppressed DevInit block

Link-state fingerprints for reference:

State	LnkCap	LnkCap2	LnkCtl2	LnkSta
Stock (locked)	`0x00456101`	`0x00000002`	`0x0000`	`0x1041`
Unlocker installed, trained	`0x00456102`	`0x00000006`	`0x0002`	`0x1042`
Round-3 vector spoof	wrote `0x00457104` (width x16)	wrote `0x0180001E`; clipped back to `0x00456102` / `0x00000006`	not recorded	not recorded
Gen3 advertisement, 2026-07-24	`Port #1, Speed 8GT/s, Width x4`	not recorded	target 8GT/s accepted	stayed 2.5GT/s x4

These last two rows are two different experiments, never observed together, and their LnkCap values encode different widths (x16 versus x4). Do not read them as one run.

Why Gen2 fell and Gen3 did not

Before 2026-07-24 the prevailing model treated the supported-speeds vector as contiguous by specification (Gen4 requires Gen2 and Gen3), so Gen2, Gen3 and Gen4 were treated as one problem: "either the vector opens or nothing does". The vector then opened, and only to Gen2.

The Gen2 result works by opening a set of privilege-level masks through the SEC2 Booter payload write primitive, clearing the DIS_G2 chicken bit in CYA_0, forcing LINK_CONFIG_0 MAX_RATE to 2, driving the XP3G override slots and PRIV_MISC_1, and then having the upstream root port retrain the link. The endpoint's LnkCap/LnkCap2 are PHY reflections: once the Gen2 gates are open, they regenerate to 0x00456102 / 0x00000006 without anything writing them directly. They regenerate to Gen2 and no further, even when a spoof explicitly writes the Gen1-4 values:

round-3 spoof: 0x88084 <- 0x00457104   (A100 Max Link Speed = 4)
               0x880A4 <- 0x0180001E   (A100 supported vector, Gen1-4)
observed post: CAP=0x00456102 CAP2=0x00000006

The hardware clipped the write to Gen2. A researcher who then proved out the Gen2 half two days later summarised it as: "Lnkctrl2 is capped at gen2 with a direct hardware mask (which is why gen 3/4 is such a pain). But you can achieve gen2 with the correct register writes."

Two possibilities remain live and nothing in the corpus separates them:

the contiguity argument was simply wrong about this silicon, or
the Gen3 fuse is enforced independently, downstream of the supported-speeds vector.

The strongest on-silicon evidence favours (2). With the XP3G privilege-level mask opened (PLM[4] XP3G_PLM(0x8e1b0) reg=0xffffffff) the PHY rate register was forced to a Gen3-capable value and read back correctly, and the link still trained at Gen1:

XP3G rate=0x00340036 ovr0=0x4
lnksta=0x10410040 speed=1        # lspci: Speed 2.5GT/s

A second, weaker line of evidence: on Gen2-trained cards LnkSta2 reports EqualizationComplete- and EqualizationPhase1-, that is, the PHY equalization pass that Gen3 mandates has never run. The write-up phrasing that captures the community view is "Gen2 is a software lockout, Gen3 is a hardware fuse" (confidence: medium; no Gen3 force attempt with measured PHY behaviour was ever reported).

Lock layer 1: the OTP fuses

Three fuse-option registers form the fingerprint of the generation lock. All were read on both physical 170HX SKUs and compared against a 15-card Ampere cohort.

Register	Address	170HX	Comparison cohort	Notes
`FUSE_PCIE_GEN23_DIS` (`OPT_PCIE_BOOT_GEN23_DISABLE`)	`0x0082057c`	`0x00000001`	`0x00000000` on all three A100 SKUs, A10, A5000, A6000, RTX 3080/3080 Ti/3090/3090 Ti, an ES part, a Drive A100 and a GA10x control	The only one the Gen2 patch attempts to write
`FUSE_PCIE_GEN3_DIS` (`OPT_PCIE_BOOT_GEN3_DISABLE`)	`0x00820580`	`0x00000001`	`0x00000000` everywhere else	Never written by anyone
`FUSE_PCIE_MAGIC_D`	`0x00820520`	`0x16680000` (bit 25 set)	`0x00200000` on A100 SXM4 40G / PCIe 40G / PCIe 80G / Drive A100; `0x01a00000` on A10/A5000/A6000; `0x10a80000` on RTX 30-series	Bit 25 is documented `GEN4_SPEED_DISABLED`, referenced to NVIDIA bug 2220334

The three-register fingerprint of the lock is therefore 1 / 1 / 0x16680000.

Two supporting fuse facts matter for anyone planning an attack:

The lanes are clean. OPT_PCIE_LANE_DISABLE 0x00820394, CTRL_OPT_PCIE_LANE 0x0082082C and STATUS_OPT_PCIE_LANE 0x00820C2C all read 0x00000000. Only speed is fused. This is independent confirmation that the x4 width is a board issue.
The software-override path is fused shut. FUSE_EN_SW_OVERRIDE 0x00820040 = 0 and FUSE_DIS_SW_OVR 0x00820084 = 1. 0x00820148, the DevInit gate bit that would make DevInit write the A100 MAGIC_D value, is an OTP spare bit that reads 0 and can never be set from software. This is why the cleanest A/B in the whole project (2026-07-22) saw the XVE targets land and persist in the same boot in which 0x820520 stayed 0x16680000 and 0x820148 stayed 0.

`OPT_GEN3` and `OPT_MAGIC`: read, logged, never written

This is the single most important code-level fact on this page. The working Gen2 patch 0007-pcie-gen2.patch #defines all three fuse-option registers and prints all three, but its 23-entry Booter-routed write table contains exactly one of them:

/* from 0007-pcie-gen2.patch */
#define PCIE_GEN2_OPT_GEN23_ADDR   0x0082057cU   /* write attempted -> fails on silicon */
#define PCIE_GEN2_OPT_GEN3_ADDR    0x00820580U   /* read only */
#define PCIE_GEN2_OPT_MAGIC_ADDR   0x00820520U   /* read only */

The three values appear together in the NV_PRINTF argument lists with format OPT=%08x/%08x/%08x (GEN23 / GEN3 / MAGIC). On a Gen2-branch boot that print reads:

OPT=00000001/00000001/16680000

That line is a useful dmesg fingerprint on its own: a Gen1 build emits 34 SEC2_DEBUG lines, a Gen2 build emits 80.

Note

Line counts are not a reliable cross-build fingerprint

34 (Gen1 build) / 80 (Gen2 build) is recorded at high confidence, while a separate Gen2-branch 610.43.03 boot counted 152 at medium confidence. Do not read a mismatch as a failed install.

No code path in any branch, and none in the independent clean-room tool set, ever requests a target link speed above 2: constants.yaml in the Gen2 code pins target_gen: 2, TARGET_LINK_SPEED is written as 2, the LTSSM speed field is set to 2, and the success test is LnkCap2 & 0x4.

The `OPT_GEN23` write fails, and Gen2 works anyway

The one fuse write that is attempted does not land. Verbatim from an instrumented build, on both GPUs in the same boot:

NVRM: GPU0 _kgspBootGspRm: SEC2_DEBUG: PCIe xp3g booter OPT_GEN23(0x82057c)=0x00000000 \
  attempt=1 status=0xffff rd=0x00000001 OVR0=0x00000000 VAL0=0x00000000 \
  OVR3=0x00000000 VAL3=0x00000000
NVRM: GPU0 _kgspBootGspRm: SEC2_DEBUG: PCIe xp3g booter FAILED to set OPT_GEN23

A direct high-secure write logged PLM[4] OPT_GEN23(0x82057c) status=0xffff reg=0x1 (write FAILED). The register is a pure OTP fuse-sense reflection with no write port at any privilege level. Gen2 therefore works despite OPT_GEN23 never being cleared. The fuse shadow is not the lever; CYA_0, LINK_CONFIG_0, the XP3G overrides and PRIV_MISC_1 are.

This matters for planning, because the most frequently cited "cheap next step" for Gen3 is to write 0x00820580 = 0 through the same table that "already succeeds on 0x0082057c". That premise is wrong: the table's write to 0x0082057c is observed to fail on silicon. The experiment is still worth running (it costs one boot) but its prior should be low.

Lock layer 2: the DevInit config table

The PCIe speed restriction also lives in a PCIe configuration table inside the unencrypted DevInit falcon image in SPI flash, not in the legacy x86 VBIOS portion.

Item	CMP 170HX	A100
Table location, flash	`0x420ED` (mirror `0xA20ED`)	`0x408A0` (mirror `0xA08A0`)
Runtime DMEM base	`0xF1D`	`0xE50`
Five bytes at table `+0xC7..+0xCB`	`00 00 08 00 06` at flash `0x421B4-0x421B8`	`00 00 14 00 06` at flash `0x40967-0x4096B`
Suppress flag at table `+0x0F`	`0x01`	`0x00`
DevInit image	flash `0xDE00` (disasm base `0x8000`), duplicated in bank 2 at `+0x60000`	same layout
BIT tables (I, i, C, D, x, p, u, B, M)	byte-identical to A100	byte-identical to CMP

The suppress flag is the decisive byte. In the disassembly at 0x31B3F-0x31B92 the code reads it and branches away from the entire Gen4 programming block:

ld b8 r9, D[tab+0x0F]
bra ne -> skip whole block

When the block does run it computes two write-only registers:

0x88CE4 = (old & ((b1<<8) | b0)) | ((b3<<8) | b2)   ; reduces to byte [+0xC9] since b0=b1=b3=0
0x88CE0 = (old & ~0x3F) | (b4 & 0x3F)               ; b4 = 0x06 on both parts

Both 0x88CE0 and 0x88CE4 are write-only across the whole DevInit disassembly (one-shot Gen4 init config) and sit inside the XVE shadow of the Physical Layer 16.0 GT/s Extended Capability (PCIe capability ID 0x0026 at shadow 0x88C1C). The surrounding Gen4 sequence also writes LTSSM timeouts 0x8D1A0 = 0x1B1F2327 and 0x8D1A4 = 0x0B0F1317 (identical to live A100 values) and 0x88610 = 0x1001.

A symbolic mini-interpreter over the CMP DevInit disassembly later established that thirteen DevInit bytes differ in total, not five; eleven of the differing bytes were attributed to non-PCIe SKU features (HBM, NVLink, ECC). The PCIe-relevant consumers are [0xC9] to 0x88CE4 and 0x132B70, [0x1C-0x1F] to 0x8C2C0 plus the 0x918050/0x91C050/0x920050 series, and [0x3F] (0x00 on A100, 0x0C on CMP) to 0x8C040.

Caution

Reflashing is not a path

All five PCIe bytes fall 100 % inside the Davies-Meyer csecret(2) MAC range 0x2200-0x43C00. A keyless forge is a 2^128 second-preimage problem. The Ampere RSA signature check rejects an edited image and the card will not boot. Gen-cap bytes at 0x40B4B, 0x40F05-3D and 0x40FC5-CB are also inside the MAC. Do not attempt to flash a modified DevInit: see VBIOS and recovery.

The refuted intuition: the strap field is monotonic-restrictive

One of the most valuable corrections in the corpus. The intuitive direction of the community pcie_set_speed patch is exactly backwards. The devinit read-modify-write in the signed FWSEC is mov r9 0x14118f78; ld; and 0x3ff / or 0x400; st at VBIOS offset 0xE88C, with 26 references in every ROM; the 170HX-versus-A100 delta is the value written, not the code. The strap field is restrictive: 0 = all generations enabled, 3 = the 170HX setting (clears Gen2/3/4), 0xF = out of range / all disabled. Raising the ceiling requires a lower strap value, and no write port exists.

A related address-space claim was retracted on 2026-07-27: every 0x14xx.... constant in FWSEC falcon code is a BAR0 offset OR'd with aperture base 0x14000000, so 0x14118F78 is BAR0 offset 0x118F78, inside the ordinary 16 MB window, not on a separate ">16 MB Falcon PRIV bus". A host read of 0x118F78 with the driver loaded returns 0xbadf1100, NVIDIA's priv-poison pattern, so host reachability outside FWSEC context is still unproven.

Where the fuses are actually consumed

DevInit does not read the two Gen fuses at all. The complete list of 0x82xxxx accesses in the CMP DevInit disassembly is 0x820C14/0x820D38 (FBIO/FBP floorsweep), 0x820684 (FUSE_NVLINK_DIS), 0x82380C/0x823814, 0x820520, 0x820148, 0x8243xx, 0x8202xx, 0x8201xx, 0x82033C/0x82030C. Neither 0x82057C nor 0x820580 appears.

GSP-RM does read them, and those read sites are located:

Firmware	Address	Instruction evidence
`470.42.01 gsp.bin`	fuse-read jump table at `0x5D55834`	`li a2, 0x580` and `li a2, 0x57c`
`580.105.08 gsp_tu10x.bin`	`0x4DD9B00` (`jalr fuse_read`)	`li a2, 0x57c`

That pairing is why the current statement of requirement is "it needs a GSP patch". A full disassembly scan of gsp_tu10x.bin also established what GSP does not do: no writes were found anywhere to 0x88CE4, 0x88CE0, 0x88084, 0x880A4, 0x880A8, 0x820520 or 0x82057C. GSP touches PCIe only for link management (0x88088 read-modify-write of bits 0-1, speed reads with Gen1/2/3 branching where Gen4 falls into the default path, 0x8A088, internal reads 0x88A48/0x88A4C/0x88A64, and dynamic fuse-block access as 0x82000 | offset).

Note

Method note worth preserving

An early naive 4-byte constant search falsely reported "no XVE references" in the GSP image, because RISC-V builds these addresses dynamically via lui/addi. A full pattern scan was required. Encrypted GSP regions remain unreadable, so even the corrected scan is not exhaustive.

The register-level map of the speed capability

From RM disassembly, with the caveat that the working Gen2 result shows the practical picture is more permissive than this map implies (confidence: medium).

Register	Role	Access	Observed on 170HX
`0x85080`	Supported-speed source [23:20], jump-table index	RO, zero writers in 4.1 M lines of RM disassembly	`0xBADF1100` (poison) from the injection point
`0x85084`	Allowed-Gen mask [3:0], re-derived by GSP-RM every retrain	RO from reachable contexts	`0xBADF1100`
`0x88084`	`MAX_LINK_SPEED` [3:0]	PHY reflection, marked R-XVF	`0x00456101` stock
`0x8808C`	`SUPPORTED_LINK_SPEED` [7:1]	PHY reflection, marked R-EVF (no write port)	PROT-walled from host
`0x880A8`	`TARGET_LINK_SPEED`	RW but capped by SUPPORTED	`0x00000001` stock
`0x8841C`	`PRIV_MISC_1` CYA Gen2/3 override bits 11-16, 30, 31	RW under PLM	`0x20340500` to `0x20342d00`
`0x88610`	`VSEC_HIERARCHY`, bit 12 gates PRIV_MISC_1 reprogram	RW under PLM	live `0x00001001`
`0x8872C`	LTSSM trigger (write `6`)	RW under PLM	not a real retrain
`0x8C1C0`	`PL_LINK_RATE`, gen field [19:16]	RW under PLM	written `0x00240036` by 0007
`0x881C0`	`PPCI.UNK1C0`, [17:16] `LNK_CAP_SPEED`, [21:20] `SYSTEM_MAX_SPEED`	host reads blocked	`0xbadf5040`; A100 twin `0x8C1C0` reads `0x00040036`

Speed-vector encodings: Gen1 = 0x1, Gen1_2 = 0x3, Gen1_2_3 = 0x7, Gen1_2_3_4 = 0xF.

A forced-generation sweep on a reference A100 80GB pins where link rate actually lives, and is the cleanest control measurement available:

Forced gen	`0x88088` (speed at [19:16])	`0x880a8` (target at [3:0])	`0x88084`
Gen1	`0x11010140`	`0x001e0001`	`0x00456104` or `0x00457104`
Gen2	`0x11020140`	`0x001f0002`	unchanged, nibble always 4
Gen3	`0x11030140`	`0x001f0003`	unchanged
Native	`0x11040140`	`0x001f0004`	unchanged

What has been tried and failed

Register and configuration-space attacks

#	Approach	Why it was plausible	How it died	Date
1	`setpci` write to LnkCap2 (config `0x2C`) with all speeds set	It is literally the register that lists supported speeds	Silently dropped. Hardware read-only, marked `R-EVF` in NVIDIA's `dev_nv_xve3g_fn0` header: no write port at any privilege level, so opening a PLM cannot help	2026-07-24
2	Raise `TARGET_LINK_SPEED` (`0x880A8`) and retrain, alone	TARGET is genuinely writable	Link re-trains at Gen1; the endpoint re-advertises Gen1 in its TS1/TS2 ordered sets, bounded by the read-only SUPPORTED field	2026-07-24
3	Host BAR0 writes to `0x88070` / `0x8808C` / `0x88090`	Adjacent to the capability block	PROT-walled from the host: reads return 0, writes ignored	2026-07-24
4	High-secure XP3G PHY-rate override in isolation	PLM opened, override registers writable, rate read back Gen3-capable `0x00340036`	Link stayed Gen1. It did prove a positive: the `0x10B9` SEC2 CSB mailbox gadget reaches the XP3G/PCIe privilege block. Later became a component of the working Gen2 combination	2026-07-24
5	High-secure `FEAT_OVR` write plus retrain	The compute unlock works by exactly this route	`0x823800` read back `0xfffffe8e` (the write took), `OPT_GEN23` stayed `0x1`, link stayed Gen1, AER = 0. Conclusion drawn at the time: a PCIe override-enable fused off in FEAT_OVR, unlike `SM_SPD` which is fused on. Note the FEAT_OVR inventory lists no PCIe register in that block, so treat this as the probe outcome rather than a located register	2026-07-24
6	Direct write of `OPT_GEN23` (`0x82057C` <- 0)	Obvious lever	Fails from host, from HS-ROP, and through the Booter payload. Still attempted by the shipped Gen2 patch, still fails, Gen2 works anyway	2026-07-23
7	Set `VSEC_DEVICE` bit 0 through the Booter	Part of the published sequence	`pre=0x00000800 want=0x00000801`, failed twice with `rd=0x00000800`. Awkward for the "transient window" model, which blames window closure on RM clearing a bit the patch never set	2026-07-23
8	Write the derived allowed-Gen mask `0x85084` at postbl	"GSP writes `0x85084`" is true	Both `0x85080` and `0x85084` read `0xBADF1100` from the injection point and writes are dropped. GSP writes it at a privilege the injection point never reaches, and re-derives it every retrain anyway	2026-07-24
9	BAR0 `0x8872c` value sweep under VFIO/QEMU	LTSSM-adjacent	`0x6` is stable and leaves the LTSSM at Gen1 x4; `0x2` and `0xA` expose extra Gen2 behaviour but eventually wedge the VFIO/QEMU function. Shipping 0007 writes exactly `0x6` and its own log says "skip mid-boot retrain"	2026-07-12
10	`0x88084` `MAX_LINK_SPEED` as a writable cap	An analysis concluded there is no host-writable backing register	An HS write to a scratch register succeeded while the same write to the whole XP-PL `LINK_CONFIG` cluster (`0x8C044` / `0x8C048` / `0x8C04C`) was rejected. The relayer flagged the analysis as probably wrong, but the checked parts hold up: that cluster is genuinely distinct from `0x8C040`/`0x8C2C0`/`0x8C1C0`, which are the ones the working patch uses	2026-07-12
11	`0x8c044` (XP_PL) as the link-rate register	Named candidate `0x8c044/0x2`	Reads `0xbadf5040`, the priv-masked sentinel; the probe write-test skips it. Notably the same three registers read `0xbadf5040` at every generation on a reference A100	2026-07-20

Firmware and signing attacks

#	Approach	How it died
12	Edit the VBIOS devinit Gen-strap bytes	5 bytes across 3 devinit sites (found by searching for references to Falcon register `0x14118F78`, byte pattern `78 8f 11 14`). Differing bytes versus A100 SXM4: hit #8 `0xBB` to `0xE2`, hit #10 `72 DE` to `52 DD`, hit #11 `97/59` to `95/39`. All five are inside the `csecret(2)` MAC range. CLOSED
13	Reflash an edited VBIOS (`nvflash` / CH341A)	Ampere RSA signature check rejects it; card will not boot
14	RAM-patch TOCTOU (patch signed firmware between load and verify)	Closed on Ampere: signature validation happens during the DMA into IMEM, so there is no load-versus-verify window. Generalises to any firmware-level attack on this part
15	`csigenc` ACL-`0x13` spill (leak an HS secret past the 1-bit boot oracle)	Dead offline. `envydis` shows the SEC2 booter secure body is ciphertext from `0x101` to `0x86FB` under `csecret(6)` AES, with zero SCP/crypto opcodes in the plaintext stub. No pinnable ROP address
16	Master-key signature bypass / arbitrary HS Falcon code	No flaw exists. The known timing hole yields data-only register pokes, not arbitrary Falcon code, because the body is AES-encrypted and unsignable. Plaintext ends at `0x101`. No HS-reachable Ampere CVE exists
17	Leaked production HULK certificate	In-ROM at `0xFE504`, `csecret(40)`, `STRICT_ID_MATCH=NO`. Gated by the `RmActivateHulk` fmodel flag, false on production silicon; requires the cert files; and on-card FEAT_OVR writes do not move `OPT_GEN23` anyway (see #5). Largely mooted
18	`csecret(6)`/`csecret(2)` fault injection (EM or voltage glitching)	Roughly $400-2k of equipment, weeks of work, no guarantee, and the part would still be fuse-bound for PCIe afterwards. Tooling validated offline, equipment never acquired. A ChipSHOUTER CW520 was proposed and never attempted

Hardware and platform attacks

#	Approach	How it died
19	Copy the A100's strap configuration onto a 170HX	Tried by a tester who already had Gen2 x16 working: card not detected at boot. Follow-up answers were blunt: "the straps don't do anything", "falcon is driving the rewrites", "there's no gen3 override register". Strap4 (`R999`/`R1000`, near `U808`) was mapped as `PCIE_CFG`. A second researcher independently found comparing strap profiles against a live A100 dump to be a dead end after two days
20	A plain PCIe redriver	A redriver only re-amplifies; the endpoint still sources its own fuse-capped TX rate. Only a retimer, which terminates the link and can advertise a different rate to each side, could forge TS1/TS2 Rate-ID. Named candidates: Astera Aries, TI DS160PR810-class. Never attempted
21	Full remove-and-rescan from inside the driver ("Option A")	Three caveats: the GSP boot hook runs inside `probe()`, so `pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device()` there is a use-after-free of its own context; after rescan the driver re-probes, GSP boots, the writes run and it rescans again (needs a module-global once-flag); and active CUDA clients are dropped. Option B (upstream-bridge retrain) shipped instead
22	Device-ID spoofing to present as an A100	`FUSE_DEVID_SW_OVR_DIS` `0x00820584` = `0x00000001` on every Ampere part probed. Writing the XVE config shadow dword0 `0x88000 = 0x208210de` changes only the host-visible ID while `MAGIC_D` bit 25, PPCI_2 SPEED and the suppressed `0x88CE4` all remain
23	Flash a genuine A100 80GB VBIOS to restore PCIe 4.0	Tested and failed, reported 2026-07-19: "Theyve tested that and it doesnt work. the pcie 4.0 bit at least."
24	VBIOS `CTRL_OPT` / HULK option regions as a PCIe lever	Structurally impossible: "CTRL_OPT is remove only, not add"

False claims worth recording

A fork advertised as reaching PCIe Gen 4 was debunked within an hour on 2026-07-19 ("This is BS, didn't work for me at all"). Both testers' hosts were limited to Gen3 anyway, so a Gen4 result could not have been observed. Retracted 2026-07-21.
"PCIe Gen 3 is actually working" via AI-driven experimentation (2026-07-24). No measurement, no register write and no link-status output was ever posted. The claim came in a joking register and was immediately followed by discussion still treating Gen3 and Gen4 as unsolved.
A public rental listing advertising a 170HX at "PCIe 3.0" was judged incorrect reporting by the platform; the OPT_GEN23 write failure was logged the same day.
"Gen 3.0 and 4.0 is a dead end due to fused blockers in the die" was rebutted in-channel: "the fuses are signals used by the firmware to control function", "they're not hard efuses that actually destroy functionality". The rebuttal is better supported, because the Gen2 unlock proves at least one fused gen limit is firmware-mediated and defeatable. Unsettled, leaning rebuttal.

The Gen4 shadow experiment and its boot loop

A separate clean-room patch, 0007-pcie-gen4-shadow.patch (not to be confused with the cmpunlocker 0007-pcie-gen2.patch, which is a different patch with the same number), was abandoned to a boot loop and remains the most interesting unfinished Gen4 artefact.

Caution

This experiment bricks the boot cycle until the module is removed

Upstream patches 0001-0006 use 4 Booter payload runs per boot and boot fine. The Gen4 shadow patch raised that to 7-11 runs including fuse and retrain attempts. The real BooterLoad then failed with mailbox0 != 0 (status 0xffff), after which RM retried _kgspBootGspRm endlessly, with wprStart sliding down the frame buffer on each retry (per-retry WPR allocation) and eventually wrapping.

One cause was eliminated: the loop persisted with CMP_PCIE_RETRAIN=0, ruling out the in-driver retrain. Two hypotheses survived and were never decided:

H-COUNT. Too many Booter / priv-sequencer executions immediately before the real boot exhaust sequencer state. Note kgspExecuteBooterLoad_TU102 does kflcnReset(SEC2) before every run, so SEC2 accumulates no state, but the priv sequencer is separate hardware that is not reset, and the WPR2/PLM registers and XVE writes also survive.
H-WRITE. A specific write disturbs the PCIe block over exactly the link the Booter uses to DMA its signature from sysmem. Prime suspects: 0x8C2C0 (LTSSM config) then 0x8C040 (SPEED).

The bisection harness already exists as compile-time switches: CMP_PCIE_ONCE=1 (apply once per module lifetime, since the writes persist, so a failed first cycle is followed by a clean second cycle with values already applied), CMP_PCIE_ATTEMPTS=1, and the groups CMP_PCIE_XVE_LTSSM_WRITES, CMP_PCIE_VECTOR_SPOOF, CMP_PCIE_UNK1C0_WRITE, CMP_PCIE_XVE_PHY_WRITES. The prescribed bisection order is LTSSM first, then vector spoof, then UNK1C0, then PHY last. The outcome was never recorded.

The most promising remaining avenues

Ranked by cost, cheapest first. None of these has been done.

1. Write `0x00820580 = 0` through the xp3g table, then request TLS = 3

Cost: one boot. FUSE_PCIE_GEN3_DIS has never been written by anyone. The table mechanism already exists in 0007-pcie-gen2.patch; adding one entry and raising target_gen is a few-line change. Expected result, given #6 above, is a booter FAILED to set line and rd=0x00000001, but the negative is worth having on record. The decisive observation is whether LnkCap2 ever reaches 0x0000000E.

2. Is `FUSE_PCIE_MAGIC_D` writable? Read, write `0x00200000`, read back

Cost: five minutes, never published. The evidence is genuinely contradictory. One analysis annotates bit 25 GEN4_SPEED_DISABLED and marks the register explicitly "(writable)", contrasting it with GEN23_DIS which "needs no write". An independent clean-room chain script records writing 0x00820520 = 0x00200000 (the A100 / Drive reference value) as part of a working Gen2 chain. But the PCIe field manual lists 0x820580 / 0x820520 as read-only fuse- option shadows, and 0007 only ever reads 0x00820520. Since Gen4 is untestable, this has never been exercised.

3. Read `0x85080` / `0x85084` / `0x881C0` from inside the SEC2 high-secure context

Cost: one instrumented build. All three read poison from the host and from the injection point. 0x8e1b0 and 0x823800 have already been shown reachable from HS, so the read is feasible. This is the only route to locating the strap layer that actually sources the supported-speeds vector.

4. Test the second feature-override group at `0x823830`-`0x82383C`

Cost: one HS write-then-readback. Reads from PL0 return 0xbadf5040; HS reads return real values. No manual PLM covers the group and an HS write-then-readback has never been performed. Explicitly listed under "writability still unknown / worth testing".

5. Dump `LnkSta2` equalization fields during a forced Gen3 attempt

Cost: one boot with instrumentation. The counter-hypothesis is that GEN3_DIS might be latched at boot into a re-writable PHY/strap config register rather than consumed directly by the analog PHY, in which case a post-boot register to overwrite would exist. The proposer bet against their own idea. The measurement that would decide it is whether equalization Phase 1 is ever entered.

6. The GSP-RM patch

The stated requirement as of 2026-07-27, and the reason nobody has delivered: "I haven't seen anybody at all get a working GSP patch." The concrete starting point is the pair of fuse-read sites above (0x5D55834 in 470.42.01 gsp.bin, 0x4DD9B00 in 580.105.08 gsp_tu10x.bin). The question is whether that consumption can be diverted the way the Gen2 overrides divert the Gen2 path. Encrypted GSP regions remain unreadable, which is the standing obstacle.

7. A signed or otherwise accepted flash with `[+0x0F] = 0x00` and `[+0xC9] = 0x14`

This is the only experiment that would settle whether the DevInit five-byte edit alone would restore Gen4. The fuse reference gist asserts "PCIe double-locked: FUSE_PCIE_GEN23_DIS = 0x1 (fuse) + devinit (5 bytes). Firmware-only patch insufficient", but that conclusion is an inference from the fuse values, not the outcome of an attempted firmware patch. Nobody has ever flashed a modified DevInit table, and nobody can without a signing key.

8. A wire-level retimer

Equipment-and-board-work gated. Someone with the parts and board-fab capability would need to build an interposer that forges TS1/TS2 Rate-ID. Named candidates: Astera Aries, TI DS160PR810-class. Nothing attempted.

9. Find a Gen4 host

Blocked on hardware before it is blocked on technique. The researcher working on Gen4 stated plainly: "I can't do PCIe Gen 4 because I don't have a computer that supports it", and separately that "devinit routes are genuinely horrible to try to work on".

Low-priority leads

A researcher flagged Mellanox-ConnectX-5-PCIe-Gen-4-Enablement as an analogous "shipped-downgraded part" case, explicitly "not expecting much". Nothing was attempted.

The moving-target problem in the record

The Gen3 route changed direction four times inside a span of about 40 hours, which is worth knowing before reading any single quote as the project's position:

Timestamp	Position
2026-07-26 06:38	"a devinit route might be the only way"
2026-07-26 14:25	"My current fix doesn't use devinit, and it's a dead end"
2026-07-26 14:42	"We need to use devinit"
2026-07-27 22:57	"Gen 3 doesn't work whatsoever, it's going to require a GSP patch" / "I haven't seen anybody at all get a working GSP patch"

The last of these is the state as of 2026-07-28.

The earlier "four-layer wall" field manual (dated 2026-07-24) concluded that all four layers (runtime register writes, register semantics, durable firmware, silicon fuse) were empirically closed, verified on two surfaces: a 4032-run offline firmware fuzz sweep (126 function-register pairs drawn from 66 functions, each swept over 32 single-bit values) and on-silicon direct-write probing. Its own section 6 contains the reason it was wrong for Gen2: "The full community Gen2 sequence ... as a single combined write was not run: every component is individually proven inert, so it is a low-odds combination." The low-odds combination worked. The Gen3 half of that conclusion still stands.

If you are testing a Gen3 claim

Warning

Verify with LnkSta, never LnkCap

LnkCap is the advertised capability and can read a higher generation while the link is still training at Gen1. That trap is the stated source of most "it works" claims that do not hold up. The Gen3 advertisement result of 2026-07-24 is exactly this case.

# the three honest fields
sudo lspci -vvs <bdf> | grep -E 'LnkCap:|LnkCap2:|LnkSta:'
cat /sys/bus/pci/devices/<bdf>/current_link_speed
nvidia-smi --query-gpu=pcie.link.gen.gpucurrent --format=csv

Two known false signals on this card:

On a Gen2-trained 170HX, /sys/.../max_link_speed still reads 2.5 GT/s while current_link_speed reads 5.0 GT/s. Diagnose from config space, not from the sysfs attribute.
nvidia-smi has reported PCIe Generation Max : 2 on a stock card since 2023 while Device Current and Device Max both read 1 and LnkCap2 lists only 2.5 GT/s. Useful only as a fingerprint.

ASPM is a genuine false-negative trap on other platforms (many idle the link down to Gen1), but the 170HX itself advertises ASPM not supported in its own LnkCap, so it is a first diagnostic rather than a likely cause here.

Measured values

Quantity	Value	Conditions	Confidence
`FUSE_PCIE_GEN23_DIS` `0x0082057c`	`0x00000001`	both 170HX SKUs, two physical units, read twice each; `0x00000000` on 13 comparison parts	high
`FUSE_PCIE_GEN3_DIS` `0x00820580`	`0x00000001`	same	high
`FUSE_PCIE_MAGIC_D` `0x00820520`	`0x16680000` (bit 25 set)	170HX; A100 family `0x00200000`	high
`OPT_PCIE_LANE_DISABLE` `0x00820394`	`0x00000000`	170HX	high
`CTRL_OPT_PCIE_LANE` `0x0082082c`	`0x00000000`	170HX	high
`STATUS_OPT_PCIE_LANE` `0x00820c2c`	`0x00000000`	170HX	high
`FUSE_EN_SW_OVERRIDE` `0x00820040`	`0x00000000`	170HX and all datacenter GA100; `0x00000001` on consumer parts	high
`FUSE_DIS_SW_OVR` `0x00820084`	`0x00000001`	all cards	high
`0x00820148` (DevInit MAGIC_D gate)	`0x00000000`	OTP spare bit, never settable from software	high
`OPT=` triple in Gen2 dmesg	`00000001/00000001/16680000`	GEN23 / GEN3 / MAGIC after a full Gen2 run	high
XP3G rate after PLM open	`0x00340036`, `ovr0 = 0x4`	writes take, link stays Gen1 (`lnksta=0x10410040`, speed 1)	high
`0x85080` / `0x85084`	`0xBADF1100` (poison)	read from the injection point	high
`0x881C0` host read	`0xbadf5040`	priv-blocked pattern	high
`0x8C1C0` on A100	`0x00040036`	PPCI_2 UNK1C0 reference	high
`A100 0x8C044` / `0x8C048` / `0x8C04C`	`0xbadf5040` at every generation	masked even on the reference card	high
CMP `0x88CE4`	`0x0000003F`	versus A100 `0x00000014`	high
CMP `0x88CE0` low 6 bits	`0x02`	versus A100 `0x06`	high
CMP `0x8C040` `PPCI_2.CONFIG_LINK`	`0x800C4C00` (SPEED = 3)	BAR0 mmap, no driver; A100 `0x80004C00` (SPEED = 0)	high
CMP `0x8C2C0`	`0x068731B7`	versus A100 `0x060711B2`	high
CMP `0x880A8`	`0x00000001`	versus A100 `0x001F0004`	high
CMP `0x88084` / `0x880A4`	`0x00456101` / `0x00000002`	versus A100 `0x00457104` / `0x0180001E`	high
`0x118F78` / `0x132B70`	`0` / `0` on both CMP and A100	BAR0 mmap, no driver loaded (the same address returns `0xbadf1100` on a host read with the driver up); identical values cannot encode a SKU restriction	high
`0x132B30` / `0x132B6C` / `0x132B50`	`0x00000400` / `0x08000020` / `0x03780000` on both	idle, no driver	high
LTSSM timeouts `0x8D1A0` / `0x8D1A4`	`0x1B1F2327` / `0x0B0F1317`	identical CMP and A100	high
Booter payload runs per boot	4 (patches 0001-0006, boots fine) vs 7-11 (Gen4 experiment, boot loop)	GSP boot	high
Booter payload run status	`0xffff` on every run, even when the write lands	register readback is the only valid verdict	high
SEC2_DEBUG dmesg line count	29 (archived single-card capture), 34 (Gen1 build), 80 (Gen2 build), 134 (archived two-card Gen2-branch 610.43.03 log), 152 (`pcielink.sh` on two two-card Gen2 rigs)	not a reliable cross-build fingerprint; do not read a mismatch as a failed install	high
Gen3 advertisement result	`LnkCap Speed 8GT/s`, `LnkCtl2 Target 8GT/s`, `LnkSta Speed 2.5GT/s`	2026-07-24	high

Home

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Hardware

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Procedures

Operations

Frontier

History

Appendix

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Frontier PCIe Gen3 Gen4

PCIe Gen3 and Gen4: why they are still locked

Status at a glance

Why Gen2 fell and Gen3 did not

Lock layer 1: the OTP fuses

OPT_GEN3 and OPT_MAGIC: read, logged, never written

The OPT_GEN23 write fails, and Gen2 works anyway

Lock layer 2: the DevInit config table

The refuted intuition: the strap field is monotonic-restrictive

Where the fuses are actually consumed

The register-level map of the speed capability

What has been tried and failed

Register and configuration-space attacks

Firmware and signing attacks

Hardware and platform attacks

False claims worth recording

The Gen4 shadow experiment and its boot loop

The most promising remaining avenues

1. Write 0x00820580 = 0 through the xp3g table, then request TLS = 3

2. Is FUSE_PCIE_MAGIC_D writable? Read, write 0x00200000, read back

3. Read 0x85080 / 0x85084 / 0x881C0 from inside the SEC2 high-secure context

4. Test the second feature-override group at 0x823830-0x82383C

5. Dump LnkSta2 equalization fields during a forced Gen3 attempt

6. The GSP-RM patch

7. A signed or otherwise accepted flash with [+0x0F] = 0x00 and [+0xC9] = 0x14

8. A wire-level retimer

9. Find a Gen4 host

Low-priority leads

The moving-target problem in the record

If you are testing a Gen3 claim

Measured values

See also

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`OPT_GEN3` and `OPT_MAGIC`: read, logged, never written

The `OPT_GEN23` write fails, and Gen2 works anyway

1. Write `0x00820580 = 0` through the xp3g table, then request TLS = 3

2. Is `FUSE_PCIE_MAGIC_D` writable? Read, write `0x00200000`, read back

3. Read `0x85080` / `0x85084` / `0x881C0` from inside the SEC2 high-secure context

4. Test the second feature-override group at `0x823830`-`0x82383C`

5. Dump `LnkSta2` equalization fields during a forced Gen3 attempt

7. A signed or otherwise accepted flash with `[+0x0F] = 0x00` and `[+0xC9] = 0x14`