fix(walletapi): prevent receiver panic from out-of-range sender index#20
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…anic The receiver decode paths used sender_idx <= RingSize against a 0-indexed Publickeylist of length RingSize, so a crafted byte equal to RingSize indexed one slot past the slice and panicked the receiving wallet during history processing. Tighten to < in both the CBOR and CBOR_V2 paths so valid indices are 0..RingSize-1.
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The sender-attribution index is an attacker-controlled byte in the decrypted payload, and the
<= RingSizecheck let it index one pastPublickeylistand panic a wallet during routine history sync. Tightens it to< RingSizein both decode paths; remotely triggerable, so worth a backport. (Companion to the receiver-honesty change in the next PR.)