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Security: DeepAgentLabs/agentic-sidecar

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Security fixes are provided for the latest released version. No version has been released yet — this repository is currently a scaffold (see ROADMAP.md).

Version Supported
Latest Yes (once released)
Older Best effort

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately using GitHub's private vulnerability reporting feature on this repository.

Include:

  • Affected version or commit
  • Reproduction steps
  • Impact assessment
  • Any suggested mitigation

Please do not open a public issue for suspected vulnerabilities until the issue has been reviewed.

Scope

agentic-sidecar intercepts an agent's proposed tool calls and decisions to evaluate and gate them. That means, once implemented, it will routinely see data the calling application considers sensitive:

  • tool-call arguments (which may contain customer data, credentials passed through as parameters, or internal identifiers)
  • the IntentEnvelope (user identity, authorization scope, constraints)
  • any context injected into a Critic/Judge evaluation

Sensitive values should be redacted before being logged, narrated (Status Interpreter), or sent to an external Judge model — this is a design requirement for those modules, not an afterthought (see concept.md §18).

The library itself is not designed to store long-lived credentials, proxy requests to external services, or execute arbitrary code on the caller's behalf. If a defect allows either (a) an action that should have been blocked to proceed, or (b) sensitive data to leak into a log, narration, or third-party Judge call without redaction, please report it as a vulnerability rather than a bug — both are security-relevant for this package's stated purpose.

There aren't any published security advisories