Security fixes are provided for the latest released version. No version has been released yet — this repository is currently a scaffold (see ROADMAP.md).
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| Latest | Yes (once released) |
| Older | Best effort |
Please report security issues privately using GitHub's private vulnerability reporting feature on this repository.
Include:
- Affected version or commit
- Reproduction steps
- Impact assessment
- Any suggested mitigation
Please do not open a public issue for suspected vulnerabilities until the issue has been reviewed.
agentic-sidecar intercepts an agent's proposed tool calls and decisions to
evaluate and gate them. That means, once implemented, it will routinely see
data the calling application considers sensitive:
- tool-call arguments (which may contain customer data, credentials passed through as parameters, or internal identifiers)
- the
IntentEnvelope(user identity, authorization scope, constraints) - any context injected into a Critic/Judge evaluation
Sensitive values should be redacted before being logged, narrated (Status
Interpreter), or sent to an external Judge model — this is a design
requirement for those modules, not an afterthought (see concept.md
§18).
The library itself is not designed to store long-lived credentials, proxy requests to external services, or execute arbitrary code on the caller's behalf. If a defect allows either (a) an action that should have been blocked to proceed, or (b) sensitive data to leak into a log, narration, or third-party Judge call without redaction, please report it as a vulnerability rather than a bug — both are security-relevant for this package's stated purpose.