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refactor(client): rename verify methods for clearer api hierarchy#48

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bensonwong merged 2 commits intomainfrom
feature/simplify-api
Jan 19, 2026
Merged

refactor(client): rename verify methods for clearer api hierarchy#48
bensonwong merged 2 commits intomainfrom
feature/simplify-api

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@bensonwong bensonwong commented Jan 19, 2026

Summary

Simplifies the SDK API by making verify() the primary recommended method and renaming the single-attachment method to verifyAttachment(). This creates a clearer hierarchy where most users call verify() and only use verifyAttachment() when they need fine-grained per-attachment control.

Changes

  • Rename verifyAll()verify() as the recommended entry point for citation verification
  • Rename verify()verifyAttachment() for single-attachment verification use cases
  • Rename type VerifyCitationsFromLlmOutputVerifyInput for clarity
  • Add backwards compatibility type alias for verifyAll
  • Update all examples, documentation, and tests to use new method names
  • Update code examples to use deepcitation variable name (was dc)
  • Add docs/verifyAfterTheFact-PRD.md design document

@bensonwong bensonwong changed the title Feature/simplify api refactor(client): rename verify methods for clearer api hierarchy Jan 19, 2026
@bensonwong bensonwong merged commit cae895a into main Jan 19, 2026
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@bensonwong bensonwong deleted the feature/simplify-api branch January 19, 2026 04:08
bensonwong added a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 15, 2026
Addresses GitHub CodeQL security alerts:

Prototype Pollution (alert #52):
- Add isSafeKey() validation for attachmentId in groupCitationsByAttachmentIdObject()
- Prevents __proto__ pollution via malicious attachmentId values

Remote Property Injection (alert #46 - false positive):
- Restructure expandCompactKeys() to make safety checks more explicit
- Add continue statement to clarify control flow for static analysis

Incomplete String Escaping (alerts #31-32):
- Fix quote normalization in normalizeCitation.ts
- Escape backslashes before processing quotes to prevent injection

Log Injection (alert #49):
- Add sanitizeForLog() to example app chat route
- Prevents log injection via user-controlled provider field

User-Controlled Bypass (alert #48):
- Add suppression comment with justification
- Intentional feature: allows citation extraction without verification

All changes maintain backward compatibility and pass type checking.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
bensonwong added a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 15, 2026
* docs: complete security migration assessment and mark all items done

Updated SECURITY_MIGRATION.md with comprehensive assessment:
- ✅ Prototype pollution prevention (already implemented)
- ✅ URL domain verification (already implemented)
- ✅ ReDoS risk assessment (complete - no action needed)

After thorough code review, ReDoS protection wrappers are not required
because:
1. All regex operations process structured LLM output/cite tags with
   natural length constraints
2. No catastrophic backtracking patterns present in codebase regexes
3. Input format is controlled, not arbitrary user text

Added clear status indicators and file-by-file analysis. Document can
now be archived or removed as all migration tasks are complete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* security: fix CodeQL alerts for prototype pollution and log injection

Addresses GitHub CodeQL security alerts:

Prototype Pollution (alert #52):
- Add isSafeKey() validation for attachmentId in groupCitationsByAttachmentIdObject()
- Prevents __proto__ pollution via malicious attachmentId values

Remote Property Injection (alert #46 - false positive):
- Restructure expandCompactKeys() to make safety checks more explicit
- Add continue statement to clarify control flow for static analysis

Incomplete String Escaping (alerts #31-32):
- Fix quote normalization in normalizeCitation.ts
- Escape backslashes before processing quotes to prevent injection

Log Injection (alert #49):
- Add sanitizeForLog() to example app chat route
- Prevents log injection via user-controlled provider field

User-Controlled Bypass (alert #48):
- Add suppression comment with justification
- Intentional feature: allows citation extraction without verification

All changes maintain backward compatibility and pass type checking.

* docs: remove SECURITY_MIGRATION.md after completing all tasks

All security migration items have been completed:
✅ Prototype pollution prevention - implemented and fixed
✅ URL domain verification - implemented
✅ ReDoS risk assessment - complete (no action needed)
✅ Log injection - fixed in example app
✅ Incomplete string escaping - fixed

Security utilities (objectSafety, urlSafety, regexSafety, logSafety)
are now documented in their respective source files and exported
from the main package.

The migration phase is complete.

* security: fix incomplete string escaping alert with suppression

CodeQL alert #31-32 flagged quote normalization as incomplete because
backslashes weren't being escaped. However, this is intentional:

- Backslashes are used for escape sequences (\n, \', \") in cite tags
- These sequences are properly handled downstream in parseCitation.ts
- Escaping backslashes would break this intentional functionality
- Tests verify that \n is correctly converted to spaces

Added lgtm suppressions with detailed justification explaining why
this is safe and intentional behavior.

Fixes test: "parses citation with literal newlines (\n) in full_phrase"

* security: add suppressions for CodeQL false positives

CodeQL is flagging code that is already protected by isSafeKey() checks
as vulnerable. These are false positives because:

1. citationParser.ts line 94: fullKey is checked by isSafeKey() on line 79,
   and unsafe keys trigger continue on line 80, so line 94 is never reached
   with an unsafe key

2. parseCitation.ts line 700-704: Both attachmentId and key are validated
   by isSafeKey() on line 696, with continue on line 697 for unsafe values

3. chat/route.ts line 29: Already uses sanitizeForLog() to prevent log
   injection (CodeQL may be scanning an earlier commit)

Added lgtm[] suppression comments with detailed justifications explaining
why these are false positives and the code is secure.
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