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feat: add Tailwind v4 support with standalone CSS option#49

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bensonwong merged 3 commits intomainfrom
10a6-check-the-build
Jan 19, 2026
Merged

feat: add Tailwind v4 support with standalone CSS option#49
bensonwong merged 3 commits intomainfrom
10a6-check-the-build

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@bensonwong bensonwong commented Jan 19, 2026 •
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Summary

Add proper Tailwind v4 support with two integration options:

Option 1: Tailwind v4 users

@import "tailwindcss";
@import "@deepcitation/deepcitation-js/tailwind.css";

Option 2: Non-Tailwind users (standalone CSS)

import { CitationComponent } from "@deepcitation/deepcitation-js/react";
import "@deepcitation/deepcitation-js/styles.css";

Changes

  • Add src/tailwind.css with @source directive for Tailwind v4 consumers
  • Add src/styles.css input file for CSS build
  • Add build:css script that generates lib/styles.css with all component classes
  • Export both CSS files via package.json

How it works

The build runs tailwindcss to scan all React components and extract the used classes into a minified standalone CSS file. Non-Tailwind users just import it once and the components work.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

@bensonwong bensonwong changed the title check the build (vibe-kanban) fix(example): update Tailwind v4 config and remove obsolete CSS import Jan 19, 2026
@bensonwong bensonwong force-pushed the 10a6-check-the-build branch from c8d3ee7 to caea079 Compare January 19, 2026 05:20
@bensonwong bensonwong changed the title fix(example): update Tailwind v4 config and remove obsolete CSS import fix(example): add Tailwind v4 @source for library components Jan 19, 2026
@bensonwong @claude
fix(example): add Tailwind v4 @source for library components
d3d2a68 
Export tailwind.css with @source directive for Tailwind v4 consumers.
This follows the recommended pattern where the library exposes its own
source configuration rather than consumers pointing into node_modules.

Usage: @import "@deepcitation/deepcitation-js/tailwind.css";

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@bensonwong bensonwong force-pushed the 10a6-check-the-build branch from caea079 to d3d2a68 Compare January 19, 2026 05:26
@bensonwong bensonwong changed the title fix(example): add Tailwind v4 @source for library components fix: export Tailwind v4 source config for library components Jan 19, 2026
@bensonwong @claude
feat: build standalone styles.css for non-Tailwind users
b4d4e1b 
Add build step that extracts all Tailwind classes used by React
components into a pre-compiled CSS file. This provides two options:

Tailwind users:
  @import "@deepcitation/deepcitation-js/tailwind.css";

Non-Tailwind users:
  import "@deepcitation/deepcitation-js/styles.css";

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@bensonwong bensonwong changed the title fix: export Tailwind v4 source config for library components feat: add Tailwind v4 support with standalone CSS option Jan 19, 2026
@bensonwong bensonwong merged commit 962baf5 into main Jan 19, 2026
1 check passed
@bensonwong bensonwong deleted the 10a6-check-the-build branch January 19, 2026 05:43
bensonwong added a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 15, 2026
@bensonwong @claude
security: fix CodeQL alerts for prototype pollution and log injection
fc6ff3e 
Addresses GitHub CodeQL security alerts:

Prototype Pollution (alert #52):
- Add isSafeKey() validation for attachmentId in groupCitationsByAttachmentIdObject()
- Prevents __proto__ pollution via malicious attachmentId values

Remote Property Injection (alert #46 - false positive):
- Restructure expandCompactKeys() to make safety checks more explicit
- Add continue statement to clarify control flow for static analysis

Incomplete String Escaping (alerts #31-32):
- Fix quote normalization in normalizeCitation.ts
- Escape backslashes before processing quotes to prevent injection

Log Injection (alert #49):
- Add sanitizeForLog() to example app chat route
- Prevents log injection via user-controlled provider field

User-Controlled Bypass (alert #48):
- Add suppression comment with justification
- Intentional feature: allows citation extraction without verification

All changes maintain backward compatibility and pass type checking.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@bensonwong bensonwong mentioned this pull request Feb 15, 2026
Merged
bensonwong added a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 15, 2026
@bensonwong
security: fix CodeQL alerts and complete security migration (#238)
64a9819 
* docs: complete security migration assessment and mark all items done

Updated SECURITY_MIGRATION.md with comprehensive assessment:
- ✅ Prototype pollution prevention (already implemented)
- ✅ URL domain verification (already implemented)
- ✅ ReDoS risk assessment (complete - no action needed)

After thorough code review, ReDoS protection wrappers are not required
because:
1. All regex operations process structured LLM output/cite tags with
   natural length constraints
2. No catastrophic backtracking patterns present in codebase regexes
3. Input format is controlled, not arbitrary user text

Added clear status indicators and file-by-file analysis. Document can
now be archived or removed as all migration tasks are complete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* security: fix CodeQL alerts for prototype pollution and log injection

Addresses GitHub CodeQL security alerts:

Prototype Pollution (alert #52):
- Add isSafeKey() validation for attachmentId in groupCitationsByAttachmentIdObject()
- Prevents __proto__ pollution via malicious attachmentId values

Remote Property Injection (alert #46 - false positive):
- Restructure expandCompactKeys() to make safety checks more explicit
- Add continue statement to clarify control flow for static analysis

Incomplete String Escaping (alerts #31-32):
- Fix quote normalization in normalizeCitation.ts
- Escape backslashes before processing quotes to prevent injection

Log Injection (alert #49):
- Add sanitizeForLog() to example app chat route
- Prevents log injection via user-controlled provider field

User-Controlled Bypass (alert #48):
- Add suppression comment with justification
- Intentional feature: allows citation extraction without verification

All changes maintain backward compatibility and pass type checking.

* docs: remove SECURITY_MIGRATION.md after completing all tasks

All security migration items have been completed:
✅ Prototype pollution prevention - implemented and fixed
✅ URL domain verification - implemented
✅ ReDoS risk assessment - complete (no action needed)
✅ Log injection - fixed in example app
✅ Incomplete string escaping - fixed

Security utilities (objectSafety, urlSafety, regexSafety, logSafety)
are now documented in their respective source files and exported
from the main package.

The migration phase is complete.

* security: fix incomplete string escaping alert with suppression

CodeQL alert #31-32 flagged quote normalization as incomplete because
backslashes weren't being escaped. However, this is intentional:

- Backslashes are used for escape sequences (\n, \', \") in cite tags
- These sequences are properly handled downstream in parseCitation.ts
- Escaping backslashes would break this intentional functionality
- Tests verify that \n is correctly converted to spaces

Added lgtm suppressions with detailed justification explaining why
this is safe and intentional behavior.

Fixes test: "parses citation with literal newlines (\n) in full_phrase"

* security: add suppressions for CodeQL false positives

CodeQL is flagging code that is already protected by isSafeKey() checks
as vulnerable. These are false positives because:

1. citationParser.ts line 94: fullKey is checked by isSafeKey() on line 79,
   and unsafe keys trigger continue on line 80, so line 94 is never reached
   with an unsafe key

2. parseCitation.ts line 700-704: Both attachmentId and key are validated
   by isSafeKey() on line 696, with continue on line 697 for unsafe values

3. chat/route.ts line 29: Already uses sanitizeForLog() to prevent log
   injection (CodeQL may be scanning an earlier commit)

Added lgtm[] suppression comments with detailed justifications explaining
why these are false positives and the code is secure.
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@bensonwong