v0.9.0

[0.9.0] — 2026-07-13

Added

• Consent capture: request create --require-consent true gates signing on
  each signer attesting intent-to-sign and accepting the electronic-records
  (ESIGN) disclosure via approve --agree true --accept-disclosure true. The
  canonical statement texts are versioned (sign consent show) and recorded in
  the audit chain (request.consent_captured, request.esign_consent_captured)
  with their SHA-256 and timestamp.
• Signer email verification: request create --require-email-verification true gates signing on proof of mailbox control. New commands signer send-verification (6-digit code, hashed at rest, 15-min TTL, 5-attempt
  lockout, optional delivery via SIGN_VERIFICATION_WEBHOOK_URL) and signer verify-email; approve --verification-code redeems in one step. Audit
  events: request.signer_verification_issued, request.signer_email_verified.
• Identity-assurance records: signer record-identity --identity-assurance method:...,verifier:...,reference:... (also inline on approve) records how
  a signer's identity was checked out-of-band — the assertion, never the
  evidence — as request.identity_assurance_recorded.
• Both gates are enforced in the shared signing service, so the CLI sign
  command, MCP sign tool, and POST /v1/sign all honor them; combining them
  with --auto-approve is rejected. request show now includes a per-signer
  consent block. New docs: docs/reference/consent-and-identity.md.

Changed

• sign demo now showcases the consent flow. Both gates are enabled on the
  demo request; the demo drives real blocked sign attempts
  (EMAIL_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED, CONSENT_REQUIRED), verifies the signer
  email, captures the consent attestations + an identity-assurance record, then
  approves and signs through the token path (no more --auto-approve +
  provider auto-complete). The result gains a consent block; any configured
  SIGN_VERIFICATION_WEBHOOK_URL is ignored during the demo so codes never
  leave the machine.