Security

Security

SpecRoute is markdown content — templates, prompts, agent definitions, runtime layouts — not a runtime application. The threat model is narrow but real.

Full policy: SECURITY.md.

In scope

We treat the following as security issues:

• Malicious shell in hook templates or runtime examples. Hook scripts (hooks/claude/*.sh, runtimes/.claude/hooks/*.sh) and any executable shipped here run on contributor and consumer machines. A backdoor or command injection affects every consumer who copies them.
• Supply-chain risk in tooling. Scripts under tools/ (sync-skills.py, MCP renderers in runtimes/mcp/render/) execute on consumer machines. Vulnerabilities here — arbitrary file write, code execution from untrusted YAML — qualify.
• Prompt-injection vectors in templates. A template that, when filled in with adversarial input, causes the consumer's agent CLI to leak credentials or execute unintended commands.
• Sanitization bypass. A change that lets private upstream terms or secrets evade .claude/hooks/pre-bash-sanitize.sh, /sanitize, or /audit. See Sanitization.
• Insecure default configurations in runtimes/.<vendor>/ templates that consumers are likely to copy verbatim (e.g. an MCP server config exposing filesystem to / instead of the project root).

Out of scope

• Vulnerabilities in the agent CLIs themselves (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Kiro, Cursor, Windsurf). Report upstream.
• Vulnerabilities in MCP servers SpecRoute references but doesn't ship. Report upstream.
• Generic prompt-injection in third-party content a consumer feeds into their agent CLI.
• Security of consumer-extracted artifacts after they fork/copy templates — the responsibility shifts at extraction time.

Reporting

Report suspected vulnerabilities privately before opening a public issue:

• Email: security@enovatr.com (primary), chika@enovatr.com (fallback).
• GitHub: open a private security advisory.
• Subject line: [SpecRoute SECURITY] <short description>.

Include:

• Affected file(s) and version (commit SHA or tag).
• Reproduction steps or PoC.
• Impact assessment.
• Suggested fix, if you have one.

Do not open a public GitHub issue describing the vulnerability before we've responded, or disclose details on social media during the embargo.

Response commitment

Step	Target time
Acknowledge receipt	within 3 business days
Initial assessment	within 7 business days
Fix or mitigation released (for confirmed issues)	typically within 30 days
Public disclosure	after fix is merged and consumers have had time to update

For critical issues we coordinate with you on disclosure timing.

Hardening practices for contributors

When contributing hooks, scripts, or runtime templates:

• Quote shell variables — "$var", not $var.
• Avoid eval / bash -c "$user_input" — never interpolate untrusted input into shell strings.
• Set set -u in shell scripts to catch unset variables.
• Use Python's json.load (not eval) when parsing JSON.
• Pin MCP server versions in runtimes/mcp/servers.yaml — @latest invites supply-chain surprises.
• Default to least privilege — skill allowed-tools should be the minimum set; hooks should fail closed; example MCP filesystem configs should scope to the project, not /.

The template-quality-reviewer agent and the /audit command flag obvious violations. See Hooks for the full hardening checklist.

Recognition

We're happy to credit reporters in the security advisory and release notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous. SpecRoute does not currently offer a paid bug bounty.

See also

• Sanitization — the narrower content-leak threat model
• Hooks — script hardening practices
• MCP Integration — secure defaults for MCP server configs