EGD Finance Exploit Reproduction

This PoC is built from the attacker's on-chain call trace, analyzed with Phalcon for a clearer step-by-step view of the transaction. Replaying those steps in a Foundry fork test was used as the method to reproduce the attacker's path and isolate the root cause below.

Root Cause: Spot-Price Oracle Manipulation via Flash Swap

getEGDPrice() derives the EGD/USDT exchange rate directly from a single PancakeSwap V2 pair's live token balances:

price = USDT.balanceOf(pair) * 1e18 / EGD.balanceOf(pair)

This is an unprotected spot price: there's no TWAP, no minimum-liquidity check, and no defense against being read mid-transaction. PancakeSwap V2's swap() supports flash swaps (withdraw now, repay before the call ends), so any caller can temporarily skew the pair's reserves and have this function report a manipulated price, all within one atomic transaction.

Exploitation path

1. Flash-borrow ~424,456 USDT from the EGD/USDT pair, draining its USDT side to near-zero while leaving the EGD side untouched. This collapses getEGDPrice()'s output, so EGD now looks far cheaper in USDT terms than it actually is.
2. While the price is depressed, trigger EGD Finance's reward-claim logic, which converts the caller's USDT-denominated reward quota into EGD using this manipulated price, minting/transferring a vastly inflated EGD amount (~5.6M EGD) for what should have been a modest reward.
3. Repay the flash-borrowed USDT (plus pool fee) before the transaction ends, restoring the pair's reserves and leaving no trace of manipulation post-tx.
4. Swap the illegitimately claimed EGD back to USDT through the router and a second pool (USDT/WBNB) to realize the profit before the price can correct.

Why it's exploitable

Any single-block, single-tx price derived purely from balanceOf reads on one AMM pair is only as trustworthy as that pair's instantaneous liquidity, and instantaneous liquidity is exactly what a flash swap lets you rewrite for the duration of your call.