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Security: Henoch4/Tars

Security

SECURITY.md

TARS Security Model & Threat Model

Status: Product feature, not compliance checkbox. This document is part of the deposit flow — depositors can read it at /depositor/security.

Assets Protected

Asset Custody Model Risk if Compromised
Depositor USDT (vault TVL) Pooled, ERC-4626 shares Total loss of depositor capital
Agent signing key (AGENT_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY) Custodial (env) — TradingVault agent EOA Full trading control, but bounded by RiskGate + MAX_TVL
Audit signer key (OnchainLogger) Custodial (env) → connect-wallet session key (planned) False audit entries, but no fund movement
Operator OKX API keys Custodial (env), read+trade only, no withdrawal Unauthorized trades, but bounded by RiskGate
X Layer RPC endpoints Public infrastructure Incorrect on-chain state, no fund loss

Adversaries Considered

Adversary Capability Mitigation
Malicious recipient Receives funds, tries to trigger reentrancy or confuse vault accounting Virtual shares + ERC-4626 virtual supply resists donation attack; nonReentrant on all mutating functions
Network-position adversary MITM on RPC, DNS hijack, BGP hijack Dual RPC endpoints with failover; chain ID + contract address pinned; kill switch check on every decision
Malicious dApp Phishing wallet connect, wallet_switchEthereumChain to malicious chain Chain ID pinned to 1952 (X Layer); contract address pinned in manifest; wallet connect shows exact contract address
Compromised local device storage Extracts .env or wallet private key Keys never in code; env vars only; connect-wallet session keys expire (planned); hardware wallet support planned
Malicious operator (insider) Tries to extract vault funds via fake attestTotalAssets, fake recordExecution onlyAgent modifier restricts to single EOA; MAX_ATTESTATION_DELTA_BPS caps per-attestation drift; on-chain dailyLoss + off-chain equity-delta cross-check
Compromised agent key Can submit arbitrary logDecision + recordExecution RiskGate enforces max_position_usd, max_daily_loss_usd, max_leverage, min_confidence_bps, max_slippage_pct; kill switch on-chain + off-chain
Network partition / RPC outage okx CLI calls fail, chain RPC fails Dual RPC endpoints with automatic failover; check_auth endpoint; dry_run mode blocks live calls

Known Gaps (Documented Upfront)

Gap Impact Remediation
Automated test coverage partial Some edge cases in RiskGate only hit in integration scripts/preflight_check.py blocks deploy if critical env missing
On-chain audit logger not yet audited Forensic mismatch possible src/audit_logger.py + TradeAuditTrail.sol have regression suite (test_signature_roundtrip.py)
No external audit Professional audit needed before real capital Budgeted Phase 4 ($15–30K lean)
On-chain reconciliation operator-attested Operator could misreport totalAssets Phase 2: price-pinged reconciliation; Phase 3: on-chain execution via vault-controlled sub-account
AGENT_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY in env Single point of failure for trade signing Rotation supported via proposeAgent/acceptAgent (timelocked); future: threshold sig / MPC
No formal fuzz testing State-space exploration limited src/execution has property tests for slippage/position size; more needed
Kill-switch alerting only webhook If webhook down, no page scripts/preflight_check.py validates ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL

Coordinated Disclosure

If you find a security issue, please report it privately:

  • Email: security@tars-trade.example (placeholder)
  • PGP: 0x... (placeholder)
  • Scope: All code in this repo, deployed contracts on X Layer (chain 1952), and off-chain agent

We commit to:

  • Acknowledge within 48 hours
  • Provide fix timeline within 7 days
  • Credit reporter (unless anonymous requested)
  • No legal action for good-faith research within scope

What Depositors Can Verify Themselves

Claim How to Verify
"Every trade is logged before execution" Call TradeAuditTrail.getRecentDecisions() — every entry has decisionId, agent, asset, signal, strategy, confidence, entryPrice, sizeUsd, timestamp, riskHash, signature
"Risk gate cannot be overridden" Read RiskGate contract: every check returns RiskCheckResult(approved=false, code, reason); no admin bypass
"Kill switch works" Read killSwitchActive[agent] + activateKillSwitch/deactivateKillSwitch events
"My money isn't diluted" ERC4626 share math + virtual shares prevents donation attack; MIN_DEPOSIT/MAX_TVL enforced inside deposit()
"I can get my money out" requestWithdraw → finalizeWithdraw (settlement window max 8h); expireWithdrawal if stuck

Asset List (Scope Boundary)

Only these assets are in the trading universe. Any asset outside this list is rejected by the risk gate (enforced by RiskGate._is_asset_allowed):

Asset Instrument Quote Cohort
BTC-USDT-SWAP Perp USDT majors
ETH-USDT-SWAP Perp USDT majors
SOL-USDT-SWAP Perp USDT majors
BNB-USDT-SWAP Perp USDT majors

Compliance Notes

  • No regulated securities: USDT perp swaps on OKX (unregulated offshore exchange).
  • No fiat on/off-ramp in v1: USDT only. Offramp is a separate optional module (see docs/offramp-module.md).
  • Jurisdiction: X Layer (chain 1952) — OKX-operated L2. No regulatory opinion expressed.
  • No investment advice: This is infrastructure code. Depositors decide their own risk.

There aren't any published security advisories