Context
A maintainer review-stack × Autonomous Miner System (AMS) integration audit (2026-07-09) found that the review stack's only per-actor AI-cost/abuse throttle is scoped per-repo, so a fleet identity spreading submissions thinly across many repos in one install never trips it.
Evidence
src/review/submitter-reputation.ts:144-152 — DEFAULT_REPUTATION_CONFIG (minSample 5, windowDays 90); getSubmitterReputation's query (lines ~223-258) filters WHERE project = ? AND submitter = ? — repo-scoped.src/review/reputation-wire.ts:35-36 — REPUTATION_BURST_SUBMISSION_FLOOR=8 / REPUTATION_BURST_MAX_MERGED=1, evaluated against that one repo's rows only.src/queue/processors.ts (submitter-reputation call sites) all pass project: args.repoFullName — confirmed repo-scoped everywhere it's called.- By contrast,
src/review/unlinked-issue-guardrail.ts's hasRecentAuditEventForOtherTarget (via src/db/repositories.ts) already does the equivalent cross-repo, actor-keyed lookup for a different feature — proving the pattern already exists in this codebase, just wasn't applied here.
migrations/0012_official_miner_detection_cache.sql — official_miner_detections is keyed login TEXT PRIMARY KEY, i.e. genuinely global per install, but has zero references from submitter-reputation.ts/reputation-wire.ts.
Why this matters for the Autonomous Miner System
A single fleet identity that spreads a handful of gate-passing-but-low-value PRs across dozens of repos in the same self-hosted install never accumulates enough same-repo samples to read as "burst" or "low" anywhere — so the reputation defense never fires for it, and every one of its submissions burns full paid AI-review spend indefinitely. This is exactly the "built for occasional single-repo human abuse, not a coordinated, thinly-spread, machine-paced submitter" gap the AMS roadmap's own "slop-at-scale paradox" concern anticipates.
Deliverables
Surfaced by a maintainer review-stack × AMS integration audit (2026-07-09). Related: #2345 (miner-side self-plagiarism throttle across the miner's own repos — same "install-wide, not per-repo" theme, opposite direction), #2350 (fleet-wide anti-farming detector).
Context
A maintainer review-stack × Autonomous Miner System (AMS) integration audit (2026-07-09) found that the review stack's only per-actor AI-cost/abuse throttle is scoped per-repo, so a fleet identity spreading submissions thinly across many repos in one install never trips it.
Evidence
src/review/submitter-reputation.ts:144-152—DEFAULT_REPUTATION_CONFIG(minSample 5, windowDays 90);getSubmitterReputation's query (lines ~223-258) filtersWHERE project = ? AND submitter = ?— repo-scoped.src/review/reputation-wire.ts:35-36—REPUTATION_BURST_SUBMISSION_FLOOR=8/REPUTATION_BURST_MAX_MERGED=1, evaluated against that one repo's rows only.src/queue/processors.ts(submitter-reputation call sites) all passproject: args.repoFullName— confirmed repo-scoped everywhere it's called.src/review/unlinked-issue-guardrail.ts'shasRecentAuditEventForOtherTarget(viasrc/db/repositories.ts) already does the equivalent cross-repo, actor-keyed lookup for a different feature — proving the pattern already exists in this codebase, just wasn't applied here.migrations/0012_official_miner_detection_cache.sql—official_miner_detectionsis keyedlogin TEXT PRIMARY KEY, i.e. genuinely global per install, but has zero references fromsubmitter-reputation.ts/reputation-wire.ts.Why this matters for the Autonomous Miner System
A single fleet identity that spreads a handful of gate-passing-but-low-value PRs across dozens of repos in the same self-hosted install never accumulates enough same-repo samples to read as "burst" or "low" anywhere — so the reputation defense never fires for it, and every one of its submissions burns full paid AI-review spend indefinitely. This is exactly the "built for occasional single-repo human abuse, not a coordinated, thinly-spread, machine-paced submitter" gap the AMS roadmap's own "slop-at-scale paradox" concern anticipates.
Deliverables
unlinked-issue-guardrail.tsofficial_miner_detectionscache, or by aggregating across repos for any actor once presence is detected in enough distinct repos in a short windowSurfaced by a maintainer review-stack × AMS integration audit (2026-07-09). Related: #2345 (miner-side self-plagiarism throttle across the miner's own repos — same "install-wide, not per-repo" theme, opposite direction), #2350 (fleet-wide anti-farming detector).