fix(selfhost): stop client-spoofed cf-connecting-ip from bypassing rate limits

[RealDiligent]

Summary

• Root cause: Self-host binds Redis RATE_LIMITER, but clientIp() trusts cf-connecting-ip. On Node that header is attacker-controlled (Caddy only sets X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For).
• Fix: At the Node serve({ fetch }) edge, overwrite cf-connecting-ip via withTrustedClientIp + peerRemoteAddress (documented @hono/node-server HttpBindings | Http2Bindings shape, unit-tested). Behind a private peer prefer X-Real-IP / XFF; on a public peer use the TCP address.
• Impact: Self-host auth/webhook rate limits bind to the real client again.

Supersedes closed #6547 (CI + linked-issue requirements). Maintainer: contributors cannot open issues on this repo (CreateIssue denied); please open/label a gittensor:bug tracking issue so this PR can Closes #N.

Test plan

• Unit tests: spoof rejection, Caddy hop, peerRemoteAddress shape, IPv4-mapped peers
• fetch typed as HttpBindings | Http2Bindings
• CI validate-code / codecov/patch green before merge

Risk / tradeoffs

• Assumes Caddy on a private compose network is the public front (matches shipped Caddyfile).

[superagent-security]

Superagent didn't find any vulnerabilities or security issues in this PR.

[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 95.82%. Comparing base (593959a) to head (dd36ad8).
⚠️ Report is 6 commits behind head on main.

Additional details and impacted files

@@            Coverage Diff             @@
##             main    #6550      +/-   ##
==========================================
+ Coverage   93.59%   95.82%   +2.22%     
==========================================
  Files         673      591      -82     
  Lines       67687    47170   -20517     
  Branches    18618    15020    -3598     
==========================================
- Hits        63354    45200   -18154     
+ Misses       3360     1176    -2184     
+ Partials      973      794     -179     

Flag	Coverage Δ
rees	?
shard-1	43.97% <100.00%> (-0.01%)	⬇️
shard-2	37.07% <0.00%> (+0.14%)	⬆️
shard-3	32.40% <0.00%> (-0.10%)	⬇️
shard-4	34.86% <0.00%> (-0.01%)	⬇️
shard-5	31.28% <0.00%> (+0.12%)	⬆️
shard-6	45.67% <0.00%> (+0.22%)	⬆️

Flags with carried forward coverage won't be shown. Click here to find out more.

Files with missing lines	Coverage Δ
src/selfhost/trusted-client-ip.ts	100.00% <100.00%> (ø)

... and 83 files with indirect coverage changes

[loopover-orb]

Caution

🛑 LoopOver review result - reject/close recommended

_{Review updated: 2026-07-16 13:47:21 UTC}

4 files · 1 AI reviewer · 1 blocker · CI green · clean

🛑 Suggested Action - Reject/Close

Review summary
This adds a Node-only trusted-client-ip resolver that overwrites cf-connecting-ip at the serve({fetch}) edge using the TCP peer or, behind a private hop (Caddy), X-Real-IP/XFF, closing the spoof vector where a Node client can set cf-connecting-ip directly. The core logic in trusted-client-ip.ts is sound and well-tested for the cases shown (IPv4/IPv6 validation, IPv4-mapped stripping, private/link-local classification, header precedence). The main concrete issue is the failing codecov/patch gate (73.21% vs 99% target), and the design still hinges on the untested assumption that the deployed Caddy is always the sole private-network hop in front of the app — if a public interface is ever reachable directly while Caddy is also used, IP determination could be manipulated, but that's a deployment-topology risk already acknowledged in the PR description rather than a code defect.

Nits — 5 non-blocking

• The `isPrivateOrLinkLocal` and IPv4/IPv6 validation functions use many bare numeric literals (4, 8, 127, 192, 168, 172, 16, 31, 169, 254) without named constants, which the external brief flags — consider extracting octet-range constants for readability (src/selfhost/trusted-client-ip.ts:100-108).
• codecov/patch failed at 73.21% vs the 99% target for this PR — worth checking which branches in trusted-client-ip.ts or server.ts:895-899 are uncovered before merge.
• src/server.ts is already at ~905 lines (long-file smell); not introduced by this diff, but the new fetch-wrapping logic adds more surface to an already large file worth extracting review-wise.
• The withTrustedClientIp doc comment says 'never trust cf-connecting-ip on Node' but doesn't mention what happens to other Cloudflare-only headers (e.g., cf-ray) that might also be spoofable — outside this PR's scope but worth a follow-up note.
• Consider adding an integration-level test (or at least a comment) confirming server.ts:899's `withTrustedClientIp(request, peerRemoteAddress(nodeEnv))` call site is exercised by the boot smoke test, since unit tests only cover the pure functions in isolation.

Why this is blocked

• No linked issue detected — If this PR is intended to solve an issue, link it explicitly in the PR body.

📋 Copy for AI agents — paste into your coding agent

Fix the following blocker(s) from this PR review:

1. No linked issue detected — If this PR is intended to solve an issue, link it explicitly in the PR body.

Decision drivers

• ❌ Code review — 1 blocker (1 reviewer)
• ❌ Gate result — Blocking (Repo-configured hard blocker found.)

Context & advisory signals — never blocks the verdict

Signal	Result	Evidence
Linked issue	✅ Linked	#6547
Related work	✅ No active overlap found	No same-issue or scoped active PR overlap found.
Change scope	✅ 20/20	Low review scope from cached public metadata (1 linked issue).
Validation posture	✅ 25/25	PR body includes validation/test evidence.
Contributor workload	✅ 10/10	Author activity: 342 registered-repo PR(s), 166 merged, 31 issue(s).
Contributor context	✅ Confirmed Gittensor contributor	RealDiligent; Gittensor profile; 342 PR(s), 31 issue(s).
Improvement	✅ Minor	risk: clean · value: minor · LLM: significant

Review context

• Author: RealDiligent
• Role context: outside_contributor
• Public audience mode: oss maintainer
• Lane context: Repository is configured for direct PR review.
• Public profile languages: Python, JavaScript, Ruby, Svelte, TypeScript, Markdown, MDX
• Official Gittensor activity: 342 PR(s), 31 issue(s).
• PR-specific overlap: none found.

Contributor next steps

• Keep the PR focused and include validation evidence before maintainer review.

Signal definitions

• Related work = same linked issue, overlapping active PRs, or title/path similarity.
• Change scope = cached public metadata such as size labels, draft state, and review-burden hints.
• Validation posture = whether the PR provides enough public validation/test evidence for maintainer review.
• Contributor workload = public contributor activity and cleanup pressure, not a repo-wide quality failure.
• Contributor context = public GitHub/Gittensor identity context; non-Gittensor status is not a blocker.

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_{🟩 Safe / merged · 🟦 Advisory · 🟨 Held for review · 🟥 Blocked / closed}

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[loopover-orb]

LoopOver is closing this pull request on the maintainer's behalf (No linked issue detected). This is an automated maintenance action — to pursue this change, please open a new pull request with the issues resolved. Closed PRs may be analyzed later to improve review accuracy, but they are not automatically reopened or re-reviewed.