v1.0.1

[1.0.1] - 2026-08-12

Security

• search_posts fences the author's headline. It fenced the post body but
  returned author_headline raw, so the tool that surfaces posts from strangers
  was the one place untrusted free text still reached the model unmarked. Fenced
  on both the structural row path and the selector fallback, with a 220 character
  limit matching LinkedIn's own headline cap. Contributed by @adity982 in #15,
  closing #13.

• get_company fences the tagline. It fenced the about blurb but returned
  tagline with only whitespace normalisation. A tagline is prose the company
  writes about itself, so it is untrusted in the same sense as a profile
  headline, and search_companies returns companies the user has no relationship
  with. Closes #18.

  name stays plain, and a test now pins that: it is a short identifier callers
  match on, not prose, so the asymmetry reads as a decision rather than another
  missed field.

Added

• A structural guard for the fencing promise. Every other fencing test named
  one field, so the README's "fencing on all scraped free text" was enforced by
  attention rather than by the suite. Three fields had already slipped through
  that way: headline (#6), author_headline (#13) and company.tagline (#18),
  each found by reading code rather than by a failing test.

  tests/test_fencing_coverage.py walks the tool modules and fails if any
  prose-shaped key is returned without a fence, against an explicit allowlist of
  structural keys. Adding to that allowlist is a visible decision in review.
  Verified by reverting all three historical fixes in turn: the guard catches
  every one. Closes #19.

Changed

• Breaking, patch-level: tagline is now a fenced string rather than a raw
  value. Callers matching on exact content must match on containment. Treated as
  a patch because the README already promised this field would be fenced; the
  code was not honouring its own documented contract.