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MYT Machine v0.5.0 — Phase 4E Agent Reputation

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@MYT-Core MYT-Core released this 09 Sep 19:07
· 4 commits to main since this release

MYT Machine v0.5.0

Phase 4E - Agent Reputation

MYT Machine v0.5.0 completes Phase 4E, introducing an off-chain reputation evidence layer built around cryptographically attributable signed attestations, signed revocations, local settlement observations, and deterministic operator-defined policy.

What's New

  • Signed Agent Reputation attestations and revocations
  • Deterministic canonical reputation artifacts
  • Persistent local ReputationStore
  • Deterministic local ReputationPolicy
  • Explicit issuer allowlists and per-issuer contribution limits
  • Self-attestation rejection and replay/double-counting protection
  • Recipient-linked verified settlement observations
  • Read-only integration with Phase 4C Address Binding and Phase 4D payment verification
  • Additive myt-machine reputation CLI commands
  • Privacy-conscious local storage that avoids raw transaction IDs, proofs, invoice metadata, and addresses

Reputation Model

Phase 4E deliberately does not define a universal MYT trust score. It provides cryptographically attributable signed opinions, local verified settlement observations, and deterministic local policy output. Trust policy remains application- and operator-defined, and the default policy does not automatically trust arbitrary unknown issuers.

A Machine ID is a cryptographic identity, not proof of an independent person, company, or device. Multiple or colluding identities are not globally prevented. Local allowlists and contribution caps are safeguards, not global Sybil resistance.

Signed Attestations

A valid signed attestation proves that the controller of the issuer Machine Identity authorized the exact canonical attestation statement. It does not prove objective truth, service quality, successful fulfillment, legal or physical identity, unique human identity, issuer independence, absence of collusion, global trust, current key control, or trusted time.

Revocations

Signed revocations are supported. A valid revocation proves that the original issuer authorized the revocation statement. It does not provide trusted chronological ordering or guarantee that every offline verifier has received the revocation.

Settlement Evidence

Phase 4E can record a recipient-linked verified settlement observation for a correctly bound recipient Machine Identity. It uses existing native MYT payment verification read-only. MYT OutProofV2 does not identify the payer Machine Identity, and settlement does not prove service fulfillment or quality.

Local Reputation Policy

Policy output is deterministic and local. Operators select trusted issuers, age windows, per-issuer limits, and optional settlement linkage. Unknown issuers are not trusted by default, and payment, identity, wallet, or invoice data never automatically becomes a global score.

Security Model

Phase 4E introduces no automatic MYT spending, wallet seed handling, private-key export, wallet unlock flow, new custody, consensus changes, RandomX changes, HF17 changes, transaction-format changes, Wallet-RPC schema changes, or Phase 4F zero-knowledge system. Settlement integration uses read-only verification paths.

Security Review

Phase 4E underwent a separate adversarial release security review. The review identified two Low-severity diagnostic redaction issues, both fixed before release and protected by permanent regression tests. The final release candidate was rebuilt and retested from the corrected commit.

Validation

  • Repository tests: 424 / 424
  • Phase 4A regression: 66 / 66
  • Phase 4B regression: 62 / 62
  • Phase 4C regression: 47 / 47
  • Phase 4D regression: 143 / 143
  • Phase 4E tests: 106 / 106
  • Linux matrix: 6 runs, 424 / 424 each
  • Windows matrix: 6 runs, 415 passed and 9 documented Unix-specific skips each
  • Independent adversarial tests: Linux 35 / 35; Windows 34 passed and 1 Unix-specific skip
  • Final GitHub Actions: 14 / 14 successful
  • Ruff, Bandit, compileall, pip check, pip-audit, wheel, sdist, twine, and clean-wheel offline E2E: passed

Compatibility

Phases 4A through 4D remain backward compatible. The distribution remains myt-machine-settlement, the import package remains myt_machine, and the CLI remains myt-machine. Runtime requirement: cryptography>=50.0.0.

Known Limitations

  • The trusted local host and database remain trust anchors.
  • Native settlement observations require a trusted wallet and daemon.
  • Issuer allowlist quality is the operator's responsibility.
  • Colluding and Sybil identities are not globally prevented.
  • Signed issuer timestamps are claims, not trusted chronological proof.
  • Offline verifiers may not know about unseen revocations.
  • Reputation hashes and signatures can be linkable.
  • There is no continuous blockchain reorganization monitoring.
  • Settlement does not prove service quality or payer Machine Identity.
  • GitHub Actions currently use mutable major-version action references.

Upgrade

Download the wheel from this release and install it with:

python -m pip install ./myt_machine_settlement-0.5.0-py3-none-any.whl

Verify the downloaded files with SHA256SUMS.txt. This release is not published to PyPI.

Roadmap

  • 4A - Machine Settlement SDK: complete
  • 4B - Agent Identity: complete
  • 4C - Signed Address Binding: complete
  • 4D - Payment Requests / Invoices / API Billing: complete
  • 4E - Agent Reputation: complete
  • 4F - ZK Selective Disclosure: next / not started

Existing Phase 4D contributor attribution, including contributions by fallacyofall, remains preserved. Historical PR #1 remains superseded, closed, and not merged.