Independent security audit: not completed yet.

PrivaMesh builds on well-studied primitives — X3DH, the Double Ratchet, AES-256-GCM, and ML-KEM-768 (via X-Wing) on iOS 26. Those are proven. This implementation of them has not been reviewed by a qualified third party.

The source is public so it can be audited. Until someone has, treat the project's security claims as unverified. When an audit is completed, this file and https://privamesh.org/security will carry the auditor, the report, the app version and the exact commit that was reviewed.

PrivaMesh requires iOS 26.5 or later and has shipped one major version, so there is no older branch to backport to. When that changes, the supported window will be stated here rather than implied.

Email privamesh@proton.me with security in the subject line.

Please include:

• the app version, your device model and your iOS version
• enough detail to reproduce the issue
• what you believe the impact is

Never include your recovery phrase. We will never ask for it, for any reason, in any context. Anyone who does is trying to steal the account.

Do not open a public GitHub issue for a vulnerability.

• Acknowledgement within 2 business days. If you do not hear back, assume the mail was lost and send it again.
• A fix or a plan within 30 days for anything that lets someone read messages, impersonate an account, or link a user to their activity.
• Credit if you want it, silence if you do not. We will not name you without asking first.
• No legal threats for good-faith research that does not target other people's accounts or data.

Confirmed findings are paid:

Payment happens on confirmation, not on fix.

Duplicates are paid to whoever reported first. The timestamp on the mail to privamesh@proton.me decides it, and nothing else does: not who wrote the better report, not who sent a patch, not who followed up. A second report of an issue already in hand is a duplicate even when it arrives before the fix ships, and even when it is the stronger write-up.

We do not publish which issues have been reported or fixed, or by whom. That means you cannot check a list before you send something, and it means a duplicate is possible through no fault of yours. We will tell you if yours is one, and when the first report arrived.

Already-documented issues are not eligible. See https://privamesh.org/limitations. That includes the session-opening message being recoverable from the recovery phrase, the absence of user-facing key verification, cover traffic being off by default, permanent on-chain ciphertext, and the RPC provider seeing your IP.

Full tiers, scope and exclusions: https://privamesh.org/bug-bounty

Source-level and local reproductions are enough, and are what we ask for. A finding is paid on the code, not on a hit against the live relay: if it is real in this repository we will reproduce it ourselves.

Not every path in this repository is enabled in production. That does not lower what a finding is worth - a defect in code we ship is a defect - and if whether something is live affects your severity estimate, ask and we will tell you privately.

In scope:

• the iOS client in this repository
• the on-chain protocol (stealth address derivation, prekey bundles, padding)
• the fee worker described at https://privamesh.org/architecture

Out of scope, though we still want to hear about it:

• Solana itself and third-party RPC providers
• Apple platform issues
• social engineering of users or the maintainer

These are documented rather than treated as findings. The full list is at https://privamesh.org/limitations — the highlights:

• ciphertext written to a public chain is permanent
• transaction timing is visible unless cover traffic is enabled, and it is off by default
• padding reveals which size bucket a message fell into
• the RPC provider sees your IP address
• message history cannot be recovered after a reinstall, by design