v1.2.3

• A contents row (a JSON-like column with declared contents) may carry
  its own rights block, on the derived column; data rights and
  data_flag on such a column no longer leave the block unread.

v1.2.2

• data rights. A human records an exemption (--exempt legal_obligation --note "..."), a declared gap (--missing --note) or clears an entry on
  one right of one personal item (or a Model.* glob) from the command
  line; until now only the agents' data_flag tool could write the
  rights block.

v1.2.1

• Rights on a JSON content are read, not orphaned. A reviewer's
  data_flag on <field>@json.<name> (a retention gap observed on one key
  of a blob) wrote an override row whose id names no column; check
  then reported it as a manual item lacking a description — an error the
  agents had no way to clear. The row is now the content's rights block:
  it lands on the declared content, needs the column's contents
  declaration (data-orphan otherwise), must name a declared content
  (data-ref-unknown) and a personal one (rights-on-non-personal).
• app set / app show and activities set. The !todo questions
  of the product row (description, large_scale, controller, processor)
  and of an activity (legal basis, consent record, interest, retention,
  data subjects, recipients...) are answered from the command line, like
  parties set; --todo FIELD reopens one, --clear FIELD drops an
  optional one. No more editing the database by hand.
• Docs: the add-to-project guide no longer says "edit the YAML" and
  explains that activity grouping is the second pass of touchpoints auto-review (--group), not a command of its own.

v1.2.0

• The gate installs the base's environment when the lock differs. A
  pull request that changes uv.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml used to leave the
  base worktree without a .venv / node_modules; uv run --no-sync
  then created an empty venv and introspection died with
  ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'django' — a tool error that
  failed the whole gate. The base's environment is now built from its own
  lock (uv sync --frozen --no-dev, pnpm install --frozen-lockfile,
  ...) inside the worktree; only when that is impossible does the base
  run approximate, with a warning.
• Storage moves from YAML to SQLite. Every declaration — the app, the
  parties, data overrides and reviews, touchpoint declarations, stores,
  activities, threat stamps, the findings register, custom vocabularies
  and actors — lives in one compliance.db at the repository root; the
  compliance/ folders are gone and snow.yml's compliance: block only
  names the discovery engine (dir is dropped). The database is tuned to
  diff well (WAL, no auto-vacuum, a checkpoint on close) and init adds
  its transient files to .gitignore. Cross-references (hosts, data refs,
  transfers, recipients, stamps, locks) are normalised tables queried with
  SQL rather than loaded and joined in Python. No migration from the YAML
  layout: it is a new system.
• The CODEOWNERS step of init (and its check diagnostic and flags)
  is removed.
• Marker subjects are <record>#<field> (parties/acme#address,
  activities/ordering#retention, app#description) instead of file
  names.
• The library takes the repository from a process-wide container set
  once per command (--root); no root= / shared= arguments.
• Duplicate parties are refused. party_add (and init) compare the
  new party with every declared one — normalised name (case, accents,
  punctuation, legal forms and a typo or an extra word ignored), shared
  registrable domain or setting name of the website / hosts, respelled
  id — and fail with the matching id when one looks the same. A party
  that names a store of the project (Sentry, "SMTP mail server", a
  host of EMAIL_HOST) is refused too: that is a store write. The
  refusal is final for agents; distinct_from is set by a human only.
  check reports coexisting lookalikes as a party-duplicate error.
• Duplicate stores are refused the same way: store_add compares the
  new store with the unit's visible ones (shared host / settings name,
  alike name, slug or config backend) and fails with the slug to reuse;
  check reports coexisting lookalikes as store-duplicate.
• parties CLI: list, show, add, set, remove [--force],
  merge ... --into, to-store <id> <unit:slug> (a party that was
  infrastructure becomes store writes), to-flow <id> (a party that was
  the project itself: its transfers go, the derived call stays),
  distinct, duplicates.
• Reach: who the code lets in, apart from who it serves. A finding's
  likelihood used to come from the touchpoint's scope, so a system
  webhook listing whose get_permissions() returned [] on the leader —
  readable by anyone on the internet — scored info (system, 0.01)
  instead of high (anonymous). Touchpoints now carry a reach
  (anonymous | subject | staff | system), inferred from the auth facts
  alone (no auth is anonymous whatever the scope says) and declared by the
  reviewer through touchpoint_set_data(reach=). The Django introspection
  reports auth_custom — DRF views overriding get_permissions,
  get_authenticators, dispatch… or using a hand-written authentication /
  permission class — and such a touchpoint is pending until a reviewer
  reads the override and declares its reach; the declaration is refused
  without it. Schema v4 adds touchpoints.reach.
• Severity buckets rebalanced. critical is an open buffet — anyone
  (or any account onto every other account's data) takes personal data in
  bulk, a confidential listing or a special-category record; high is
  what takes some work, or an account, to get at what is not yours;
  medium is what someone could do that they should not. Concretely: the
  bulk degree weighs 2 (each degree doubles the last), critical starts
  at 4, high at 2, medium at 1; every reviewable threat in _mapping.yaml
  declares an effort (open walk in ×1, work a script or payload ×¾,
  chain another flaw or a victim ×½) that scales the likelihood, so a
  brute force on a login or a stored XSS is high, not critical; the
  ownership threats (AA03, AC01, AC07, AC12, DS05) are horizontal — a
  subject who can read every other subject's rows weighs like an anonymous
  caller; the oracle threats (DS01, INP18) are capped at one attribute
  and fingerprinting (DS03, HA03) at existence, whatever the touchpoint
  lists; escalation weighs like a disclosure of the data the touchpoint
  handles (floor 2) instead of a flat 4, so an unauthenticated webhook that
  creates one record is high and an unauthenticated confidential listing
  critical; a tampering on a touchpoint that only creates is one
  record; denial of service is a flat 1 whatever the data behind the
  endpoint (an outage is an incident, not a breach), so an unthrottled
  public endpoint is medium, not high. A touchpoint's write into an internal store of the project
  (own_store_write: database, files, cache, queue, search, realtime) no
  longer carries the leak cells DS06/DR01 — the response to the caller and
  the mail / monitoring / external flows keep them.
• Reach is derived through the front. A SvelteKit route with no auth
  of its own takes the reach of the api touchpoints it calls (the
  cookie is forwarded: whoever the api lets in) and of a parent
  +layout.server.ts that redirects unauthenticated callers to login (the
  introspection reports such a load as a login guard auth fact). The
  api.bizneo(fetch).opId() client-factory call style is now recognised,
  and DRF routes carry drf-spectacular's operation ids, so front routes
  link to the DRF endpoints they proxy.
• auto-review narrates each write once: the line comes from the activity
  log the MCP server appends to, no longer also from the tool-call stream
  (activities, parties and declarations were printed twice). Stores,
  undeclared-flow reports and challenges get a line too.
• A reported sink that names a store the way the party guard sees it
  (sdk-sentry-sdk, "Sentry error tracker", "the mail server") resolves
  to that store, so declaring the store write closes the report. Before,
  the sink stayed an unresolvable transfer: party_add refused the party
  (it IS the store) and the touchpoint could never leave pending.
• A relative fetch("/api/x") in a SvelteKit route is linked to the
  route of the project that serves it (a calls edge, like a generated
  client call) and leaves the outbound fetches: the project's own
  endpoints never show up as an unknown host to declare a party for.
  stores gains add, set, remove, merge, distinct.
• Outgoing email and error monitoring are built-in stores. Every
  Django unit has a mail-default store (type mail) claiming
  EMAIL_BACKEND / EMAIL_HOST, and an errors-sentry store (type
  monitoring) claiming sentry_sdk / SENTRY_DSN wherever the SDK is
  installed; a send_mail / EmailMessage / email_user call, or a
  capture_exception, is a write to them. How mail is sent and where
  events land (cloud, self-hosted) is infrastructure, so no distinction is
  made between backends: no more smtp-* stores or Sentry / mail provider
  parties declared by agents.
• load_declarations reads the parties even when the app row is
  missing, so parties list works before init.
• Fix: the unit's introspection no longer inherits VIRTUAL_ENV /
  PYTHONPATH / uv and poetry variables from the process running
  model-wtf. Under uv run model-wtf, poetry run in the unit honoured
  our VIRTUAL_ENV and imported the project in model-wtf's venv
  (No module named 'celery'), and uv run created a stray .venv and
  uv.lock in the unit.
• Schema migrations: compliance.db carries its schema version and is
  upgraded step by step (model_wtf.compliance.migrations) when a newer
  release opens it; a file from a newer release is refused.

v1.2.0rc2

• Storage moves from YAML to SQLite. Every declaration — the app, the
  parties, data overrides and reviews, touchpoint declarations, stores,
  activities, threat stamps, the findings register, custom vocabularies
  and actors — lives in one compliance.db at the repository root; the
  compliance/ folders are gone and snow.yml's compliance: block only
  names the discovery engine (dir is dropped). The database is tuned to
  diff well (WAL, no auto-vacuum, a checkpoint on close) and init adds
  its transient files to .gitignore. Cross-references (hosts, data refs,
  transfers, recipients, stamps, locks) are normalised tables queried with
  SQL rather than loaded and joined in Python. No migration from the YAML
  layout: it is a new system.
• The CODEOWNERS step of init (and its check diagnostic and flags)
  is removed.
• Marker subjects are <record>#<field> (parties/acme#address,
  activities/ordering#retention, app#description) instead of file
  names.
• The library takes the repository from a process-wide container set
  once per command (--root); no root= / shared= arguments.
• Duplicate parties are refused. party_add (and init) compare the
  new party with every declared one — normalised name (case, accents,
  punctuation, legal forms and a typo or an extra word ignored), shared
  registrable domain or setting name of the website / hosts, respelled
  id — and fail with the matching id when one looks the same. A party
  that names a store of the project (Sentry, "SMTP mail server", a
  host of EMAIL_HOST) is refused too: that is a store write. The
  refusal is final for agents; distinct_from is set by a human only.
  check reports coexisting lookalikes as a party-duplicate error.
• Duplicate stores are refused the same way: store_add compares the
  new store with the unit's visible ones (shared host / settings name,
  alike name, slug or config backend) and fails with the slug to reuse;
  check reports coexisting lookalikes as store-duplicate.
• parties CLI: list, show, add, set, remove [--force],
  merge ... --into, to-store <id> <unit:slug> (a party that was
  infrastructure becomes store writes), to-flow <id> (a party that was
  the project itself: its transfers go, the derived call stays),
  distinct, duplicates.
• Reach: who the code lets in, apart from who it serves. A finding's
  likelihood used to come from the touchpoint's scope, so a system
  webhook listing whose get_permissions() returned [] on the leader —
  readable by anyone on the internet — scored info (system, 0.01)
  instead of high (anonymous). Touchpoints now carry a reach
  (anonymous | subject | staff | system), inferred from the auth facts
  alone (no auth is anonymous whatever the scope says) and declared by the
  reviewer through touchpoint_set_data(reach=). The Django introspection
  reports auth_custom — DRF views overriding get_permissions,
  get_authenticators, dispatch… or using a hand-written authentication /
  permission class — and such a touchpoint is pending until a reviewer
  reads the override and declares its reach; the declaration is refused
  without it. Schema v4 adds touchpoints.reach.
• Severity buckets rebalanced. critical is an open buffet — anyone
  (or any account onto every other account's data) takes personal data in
  bulk, a confidential listing or a special-category record; high is
  what takes some work, or an account, to get at what is not yours;
  medium is what someone could do that they should not. Concretely: the
  bulk degree weighs 2 (each degree doubles the last), critical starts
  at 4, high at 2, medium at 1; every reviewable threat in _mapping.yaml
  declares an effort (open walk in ×1, work a script or payload ×¾,
  chain another flaw or a victim ×½) that scales the likelihood, so a
  brute force on a login or a stored XSS is high, not critical; the
  ownership threats (AA03, AC01, AC07, AC12, DS05) are horizontal — a
  subject who can read every other subject's rows weighs like an anonymous
  caller; the oracle threats (DS01, INP18) are capped at one attribute
  and fingerprinting (DS03, HA03) at existence, whatever the touchpoint
  lists; escalation weighs like a disclosure of the data the touchpoint
  handles (floor 2) instead of a flat 4, so an unauthenticated webhook that
  creates one record is high and an unauthenticated confidential listing
  critical; a tampering on a touchpoint that only creates is one
  record; denial of service is a flat 1 whatever the data behind the
  endpoint (an outage is an incident, not a breach), so an unthrottled
  public endpoint is medium, not high. A touchpoint's write into an internal store of the project
  (own_store_write: database, files, cache, queue, search, realtime) no
  longer carries the leak cells DS06/DR01 — the response to the caller and
  the mail / monitoring / external flows keep them.
• Reach is derived through the front. A SvelteKit route with no auth
  of its own takes the reach of the api touchpoints it calls (the
  cookie is forwarded: whoever the api lets in) and of a parent
  +layout.server.ts that redirects unauthenticated callers to login (the
  introspection reports such a load as a login guard auth fact). The
  api.bizneo(fetch).opId() client-factory call style is now recognised,
  and DRF routes carry drf-spectacular's operation ids, so front routes
  link to the DRF endpoints they proxy.
• auto-review narrates each write once: the line comes from the activity
  log the MCP server appends to, no longer also from the tool-call stream
  (activities, parties and declarations were printed twice). Stores,
  undeclared-flow reports and challenges get a line too.
• A reported sink that names a store the way the party guard sees it
  (sdk-sentry-sdk, "Sentry error tracker", "the mail server") resolves
  to that store, so declaring the store write closes the report. Before,
  the sink stayed an unresolvable transfer: party_add refused the party
  (it IS the store) and the touchpoint could never leave pending.
• A relative fetch("/api/x") in a SvelteKit route is linked to the
  route of the project that serves it (a calls edge, like a generated
  client call) and leaves the outbound fetches: the project's own
  endpoints never show up as an unknown host to declare a party for.
  stores gains add, set, remove, merge, distinct.
• Outgoing email and error monitoring are built-in stores. Every
  Django unit has a mail-default store (type mail) claiming
  EMAIL_BACKEND / EMAIL_HOST, and an errors-sentry store (type
  monitoring) claiming sentry_sdk / SENTRY_DSN wherever the SDK is
  installed; a send_mail / EmailMessage / email_user call, or a
  capture_exception, is a write to them. How mail is sent and where
  events land (cloud, self-hosted) is infrastructure, so no distinction is
  made between backends: no more smtp-* stores or Sentry / mail provider
  parties declared by agents.
• load_declarations reads the parties even when the app row is
  missing, so parties list works before init.
• Fix: the unit's introspection no longer inherits VIRTUAL_ENV /
  PYTHONPATH / uv and poetry variables from the process running
  model-wtf. Under uv run model-wtf, poetry run in the unit honoured
  our VIRTUAL_ENV and imported the project in model-wtf's venv
  (No module named 'celery'), and uv run created a stray .venv and
  uv.lock in the unit.
• Schema migrations: compliance.db carries its schema version and is
  upgraded step by step (model_wtf.compliance.migrations) when a newer
  release opens it; a file from a newer release is refused.

v1.2.0rc1

• Storage moves from YAML to SQLite. Every declaration — the app, the
  parties, data overrides and reviews, touchpoint declarations, stores,
  activities, threat stamps, the findings register, custom vocabularies
  and actors — lives in one compliance.db at the repository root; the
  compliance/ folders are gone and snow.yml's compliance: block only
  names the discovery engine (dir is dropped). The database is tuned to
  diff well (WAL, no auto-vacuum, a checkpoint on close) and init adds
  its transient files to .gitignore. Cross-references (hosts, data refs,
  transfers, recipients, stamps, locks) are normalised tables queried with
  SQL rather than loaded and joined in Python. No migration from the YAML
  layout: it is a new system.
• The CODEOWNERS step of init (and its check diagnostic and flags)
  is removed.
• Marker subjects are <record>#<field> (parties/acme#address,
  activities/ordering#retention, app#description) instead of file
  names.
• The library takes the repository from a process-wide container set
  once per command (--root); no root= / shared= arguments.
• Duplicate parties are refused. party_add (and init) compare the
  new party with every declared one — normalised name (case, accents,
  punctuation, legal forms and a typo or an extra word ignored), shared
  registrable domain or setting name of the website / hosts, respelled
  id — and fail with the matching id when one looks the same. A party
  that names a store of the project (Sentry, "SMTP mail server", a
  host of EMAIL_HOST) is refused too: that is a store write. The
  refusal is final for agents; distinct_from is set by a human only.
  check reports coexisting lookalikes as a party-duplicate error.
• Duplicate stores are refused the same way: store_add compares the
  new store with the unit's visible ones (shared host / settings name,
  alike name, slug or config backend) and fails with the slug to reuse;
  check reports coexisting lookalikes as store-duplicate.
• parties CLI: list, show, add, set, remove [--force],
  merge ... --into, to-store <id> <unit:slug> (a party that was
  infrastructure becomes store writes), to-flow <id> (a party that was
  the project itself: its transfers go, the derived call stays),
  distinct, duplicates.
• auto-review narrates each write once: the line comes from the activity
  log the MCP server appends to, no longer also from the tool-call stream
  (activities, parties and declarations were printed twice). Stores,
  undeclared-flow reports and challenges get a line too.
• A reported sink that names a store the way the party guard sees it
  (sdk-sentry-sdk, "Sentry error tracker", "the mail server") resolves
  to that store, so declaring the store write closes the report. Before,
  the sink stayed an unresolvable transfer: party_add refused the party
  (it IS the store) and the touchpoint could never leave pending.
• A relative fetch("/api/x") in a SvelteKit route is linked to the
  route of the project that serves it (a calls edge, like a generated
  client call) and leaves the outbound fetches: the project's own
  endpoints never show up as an unknown host to declare a party for.
  stores gains add, set, remove, merge, distinct.
• Outgoing email and error monitoring are built-in stores. Every
  Django unit has a mail-default store (type mail) claiming
  EMAIL_BACKEND / EMAIL_HOST, and an errors-sentry store (type
  monitoring) claiming sentry_sdk / SENTRY_DSN wherever the SDK is
  installed; a send_mail / EmailMessage / email_user call, or a
  capture_exception, is a write to them. How mail is sent and where
  events land (cloud, self-hosted) is infrastructure, so no distinction is
  made between backends: no more smtp-* stores or Sentry / mail provider
  parties declared by agents.
• load_declarations reads the parties even when the app row is
  missing, so parties list works before init.
• Fix: the unit's introspection no longer inherits VIRTUAL_ENV /
  PYTHONPATH / uv and poetry variables from the process running
  model-wtf. Under uv run model-wtf, poetry run in the unit honoured
  our VIRTUAL_ENV and imported the project in model-wtf's venv
  (No module named 'celery'), and uv run created a stray .venv and
  uv.lock in the unit.
• Schema migrations: compliance.db carries its schema version and is
  upgraded step by step (model_wtf.compliance.migrations) when a newer
  release opens it; a file from a newer release is refused.

v1.0.0rc1

The first release. compliance init scaffolds a repository; the four
inventories (data, touchpoints, flows, stores) are introspected from the
code and reviewed by agents or humans; activities, rights coverage and the
threat model are derived; check is the to-do list and ghate the gate on
every pull request, with a challenger agent that re-opens the reviews a
change undermines.

• Data inventory from Django models with rules, reviews, JSON contents and
  overrides (KFF-194–199).
• Touchpoints from Django URL confs, task registries and SvelteKit trees;
  declarations with ops, scope, transfers and store writes (stores: for
  the project's own second-tier stores, declared with hosts); activities and legal bases;
  rights coverage derived from ops × scope (KFF-200–208).
• The gate: ghate compares base and head by finding identity; the
  challenger re-opens data items, touchpoint declarations and threat stamps
  from the diff (KFF-205, KFF-210, KFF-217).
• Threats: pytm's 114 threats mapped, deterministic dismissal rules, a
  matrix over touchpoints, stores, parties and flows, stamps in the
  manifests, severity from effect × degree × sensitivity × actor, stable
  finding ids, a per-topic reviewer swarm (KFF-211–215).
• Flows as an inventory with kinds and statuses; undeclared transfers by
  construction from the hosts the code calls (KFF-216).
• CODEOWNERS entries at init (KFF-204); the documentation site
  (KFF-218); this release machinery (KFF-219).