v0.1.3

What's new in v0.1.3

This release makes remote access noticeably faster, makes the proxy self-healing, hardens the
dsh auto-update path, and documents the requirements for putting an external TLS proxy in front.

Fixes & improvements

• gzip compression on the proxy — UI assets (~1.3 MB uncompressed) are now served
  gzip-compressed (~360 KB), cutting remote page loads to roughly a quarter of the bytes. SSE and
  WebSocket streams remain unbuffered (verified against Caddy 2.6: text/event-stream flushes
  immediately, WebSocket passes through untouched).
• Caddy crash self-healing — the entrypoint now watches the proxy and restarts it within
  seconds if it dies (zombie-safe liveness check); config errors still fail fast at startup, and a
  persistently broken proxy is surfaced by the container HEALTHCHECK.
• dsh auto-update only upgrades — dsh-update now compares versions with semver semantics and
  never downgrades a version pinned at build time; installs (build-time and runtime) explicitly
  allow install scripts, since npm approve-scripts does not support global installs and the
  previous allow-list line was dead code.
• --port validation — non-numeric --port values fail with a clear error instead of a
  confusing Caddy config dump.
• WORKDIR fix — the image no longer hardcodes /home/codespace/workspace, which broke
  docker exec on legacy 2.x base images.
• Caddyfile formatting — the generated config now matches caddy fmt style, removing the
  "Caddyfile input is not formatted" warning from startup logs.

CI

• The smoke test now exercises the real update path: uninstall dsh, run dsh-update (uid-1000
  global npm install including native-module install scripts), verify the version and idempotency.
  Previously only the "already up to date" no-op path was covered.
• Workflow permissions are read-only by default; packages/contents write scopes are granted
  only where needed; same-ref runs are serialized to avoid racing the latest tag.

Documentation

• New "External reverse proxy with TLS (WAN)" section in the deployment guide with a working
  nginx example: WebSocket upgrade headers (proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade /
  proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade"), proxy_buffering off, and raised idle timeouts.
  Proxies that strip these headers silently break the UI's event streams (426 Upgrade Required
  from dsh, periodic aborting with incomplete response in the journal) — the exact failure mode
  fixed in this cycle.
• README (EN/ZH), security notes, deployment guide, and the Compose/Quadlet examples synced with
  the above.

Upgrade notes

• No configuration changes required. If you use an external TLS proxy in front of port 3081,
  make sure it forwards the WebSocket upgrade headers and does not buffer or time out quiet
  streams (see the deployment guide).

v0.1.2

What's new in v0.1.2

This release replaces the socat forwarder with a Caddy reverse proxy that makes remote access
fully functional — including settings and credentials — and establishes the proxy as the security
boundary.

Fixes & improvements

• Caddy reverse proxy instead of socat — the container now runs a Caddy proxy on 0.0.0.0:3081
  that rewrites Host/Origin to loopback before forwarding to dsh web on 127.0.0.1:3080.
  dsh itself still listens on loopback only (both npm releases and upstream main reject
  --host 0.0.0.0 — an intentional upstream safety design; verified against the upstream source).
• Remote access now works for every endpoint — dsh's /api browser-trust fence checks HTTP
  headers only, so the loopback rewrite lets remote browsers pass everything, including
  settings.*, credentials.*, agentPreset.*, host.pickDirectory/host.openPath and
  llm.discoverModels, which upstream hard-pins to loopback. The
  transport failure for /api/settings.describe: HTTP 403 errors over remote access are gone.
• The proxy is the security boundary — because the rewrite bypasses the loopback pin, anyone
  who can reach port 3081 can read and modify all settings and credentials, not just drive the
  agent. Enable basic auth with DSH_PROXY_USER / DSH_PROXY_PASSWORD (recommended for any
  non-loopback deployment) and keep the port firewalled.
• DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS removed — the header rewrite makes trust configuration unnecessary; the
  compatibility layer is gone and the proxy is the one and only exposure path.
• Docs, examples, and CI aligned — README (EN + 中文), deployment and security guides,
  compose/Quadlet examples, the CI smoke test (settings.describe through the proxy returns 200;
  basic auth returns 401 without / 200 with credentials), and AGENTS.md all reflect the
  proxy-only design.

Breaking changes (vs v0.1.1)

• DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS / --trusted-host are no longer supported — remove them from your
  configuration (they are no longer needed).
• Exposure port stays 3081; port mappings are unchanged.
• Anyone reaching 3081 now also gets settings/credentials access — enable
  DSH_PROXY_USER/DSH_PROXY_PASSWORD for non-loopback deployments.

Upgrade note

Pull the new image and recreate the container. Remove DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS and, if you expose the
port beyond loopback, add DSH_PROXY_USER / DSH_PROXY_PASSWORD (basic auth).

v0.1.1

What's new in v0.1.1

This release fixes the /api browser-trust fence (HTTP 403) pain point for network access and
simplifies the port-exposure design.

Fixes & improvements

• DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS environment variable — declare the host[:port] authorities the /api
  browser-trust fence accepts (space- or comma-separated list; each entry is passed as
  --trusted-host to dsh web). Required when browsers reach the UI from a non-loopback address
  (LAN IP, domain name, or a Host-preserving reverse proxy); loopback access needs no configuration.
  This addresses the transport failure for /api/host.listDirectory: HTTP 403 errors seen when
  opening the UI over the network.
• Simplified port exposure — the socat forwarder now listens on 0.0.0.0:3081 inside the
  container and forwards to dsh's 127.0.0.1:3080. Because the two ports differ, the forwarder can
  bind the wildcard address directly, and the previous container-IP detection workaround is gone.
  The exposed port is now 3081 (update host mappings: compose "3081:3081", Quadlet
  PublishPort=3081:3081).
• DSH_WEB_HOST removed — the loopback-only toggle is gone. For loopback-only use, simply don't
  publish the port: the /api trust fence already only allows loopback hosts unless
  DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS declares otherwise.
• Home-based defaults — DSH_HOME now defaults to $HOME/dsh and the new DSH_WORKSPACE
  defaults to $HOME/workspace (/home/codespace/dsh and /home/codespace/workspace on the
  universal 6.x base). The entrypoint creates both and runs dsh from the workspace. Legacy 2.x
  base images (vscode user) automatically follow their own home.
• Docs & examples updated — README (EN + 中文), deployment and security guides, the
  compose/Quadlet examples, and the CI smoke test all reflect the new layout. Raw
  --trusted-host passthrough via command / Exec= still works alongside the env var.
• AGENTS.md added — guidelines for agents and contributors working on this repository.

Breaking changes (vs v0.1.0)

• Exposed port changed from 3080 to 3081; update your port mappings.
• DSH_WEB_HOST environment variable removed.

Upgrade note

Rebuild or pull the new image and recreate the container — the entrypoint, environment variables,
and exposed port have all changed.

v0.1.0

Full Changelog: https://github.com/NIyueeE/dsh-container/commits/v0.1.0