feat(agents): add LSM compatibility checks to review and spike skills#1451
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mrunalp merged 1 commit intoMay 20, 2026
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Teach the principal-engineer-reviewer agent, build-from-issue skill, and create-spike skill to assess Linux Security Module impact. Code that touches /proc filesystem access, process identity, or binary execution can behave differently on SELinux-enforcing or AppArmor hosts — for example, readlink on /proc/<pid>/exe returns ENOENT across SELinux domain boundaries, breaking tests that fork+exec into system binaries. Signed-off-by: Derek Carr <decarr@redhat.com>
derekwaynecarr
requested review from
a team,
maxamillion and
mrunalp
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johntmyers
approved these changes
May 19, 2026
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Summary
Teach the principal-engineer-reviewer agent, build-from-issue skill, and create-spike skill to assess Linux Security Module impact. Code that touches /proc filesystem access, process identity, or binary execution can behave differently on SELinux-enforcing or AppArmor hosts — for example, readlink on /proc//exe returns ENOENT across SELinux domain boundaries, breaking tests that fork+exec into system binaries.
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Testing
mise run pre-commitpassesChecklist