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@github-actions github-actions released this 21 Oct 17:03
· 24 commits to main since this release
v0.8.2
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ndipebot Ebot Ndip-Agbor
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Learn about vigilant mode.
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Learn about vigilant mode.

NVCRE v0.8.2

The NVIDIA Cluster Readiness Engine (NVCRE) is a Kubernetes controller that certifies GPU clusters before production use. It runs real training and communication workloads across topology-aware node groups, measures goodput and bandwidth, detects hardware failures, and reports every failed node with a reason. See the README for the full feature list.

Install nvcrectl

The installer is signed. Download it with its bundle, verify, then run — piping it into a shell executes it before anything has checked it.

REL=https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/releases/download/v0.8.2

curl -fsSLO "${REL}/installer"
curl -fsSLO "${REL}/installer.sigstore.json"

cosign verify-blob-attestation \
  --bundle installer.sigstore.json \
  --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 \
  --certificate-identity "https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/.github/workflows/attest.yml@refs/tags/v0.8.2" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  installer

bash installer -v v0.8.2
Without cosign 
curl -fsSL https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/releases/download/v0.8.2/installer | bash -s -- -v v0.8.2

This runs the installer before anything verifies it. TLS proves you reached GitHub; it proves nothing about the asset if the release itself was tampered with. Use it only where installing cosign first is genuinely impractical.

# newest stable release; `releases/latest` never resolves to a pre-release
curl -fsSL https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/releases/latest/download/installer | bash

Helm Chart

This release's chart is published at digest sha256:75458557b0ff2610c7eea01e0b315ae0355cc6b2baa816756a2dba0c0c2387a4. The signature covers that digest; the version tag is mutable, so verify and install the same digest rather than verifying a digest and installing a tag.

CHART=ghcr.io/nvidia/cluster-readiness-engine
DIGEST=sha256:75458557b0ff2610c7eea01e0b315ae0355cc6b2baa816756a2dba0c0c2387a4

# 1. Verify the chart. Requires cosign; the package is public, so no login is needed.
cosign verify \
  --certificate-identity "https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/.github/workflows/attest.yml@refs/tags/v0.8.2" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  "${CHART}@${DIGEST}"

# 2. Pull that exact digest, then install the file you just verified.
helm pull "oci://${CHART}@${DIGEST}"
helm install nvcre ./cluster-readiness-engine@${DIGEST/:/-}.tgz \
  --namespace nvcre --create-namespace

Installing with --version v0.8.2 instead resolves the tag at install time, which is not provably the digest you verified.

helm install --verify does not check this signature. That flag looks for a PGP .prov file, a mechanism unrelated to Sigstore, and we publish no .prov files.

Controller image

A different artifact from the chart, verified separately. The release built and signed these exact digests:

Subject Digest
index (multi-platform) sha256:c5de16ddb95bd923c6b04d04d7ff9754a7d7b83d18fa400baa33e7ae72fc593d
linux/amd64 sha256:4988efaa7d8ee44ec5a40b8ef20b4a9456c3b76955ebe3cba229f5603d18460c
linux/arm64 sha256:e2ababeb6adb4c5a8eb2a1760c630d149835af4ed7b6f764d24e192104b9ecc0

The index carries the signature and the SLSA provenance; each platform digest carries a signature and its own CycloneDX SBOM. Pin the index digest rather than the tag:

IMAGE=ghcr.io/nvidia/cluster-readiness-engine/manager
INDEX=sha256:c5de16ddb95bd923c6b04d04d7ff9754a7d7b83d18fa400baa33e7ae72fc593d

cosign verify \
  --certificate-identity "https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/.github/workflows/attest.yml@refs/tags/v0.8.2" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  "${IMAGE}@${INDEX}"

nvcrectl CLI

Download the binary for your platform from the assets below and place it on your $PATH.

Platform Binary
Linux amd64 nvcrectl-linux-amd64
Linux arm64 nvcrectl-linux-arm64
macOS amd64 nvcrectl-darwin-amd64
macOS arm64 (Apple Silicon) nvcrectl-darwin-arm64

Verify your download

Every asset ships with a Sigstore bundle, <asset>.sigstore.json, carrying a SLSA Build Provenance v1 statement. Verify the artifact itself, not a checksum served from the same place as the artifact:

REL=https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/releases/download/v0.8.2
ASSET=nvcrectl-linux-amd64   # or installer, or any published asset

# The bundle is a separate asset; fetch both.
curl -fsSLO "${REL}/${ASSET}"
curl -fsSLO "${REL}/${ASSET}.sigstore.json"

cosign verify-blob-attestation \
  --bundle "${ASSET}.sigstore.json" \
  --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 \
  --certificate-identity "https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/.github/workflows/attest.yml@refs/tags/v0.8.2" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  "${ASSET}"

Each nvcrectl-* binary also ships a CycloneDX SBOM, <binary>.cyclonedx.json. There are two bundles involving it, one segment apart in name, and they prove different things:

Bundle Proves
<binary>.cyclonedx.json.sigstore.json the SBOM file is the one we published and was not altered
<binary>.cyclonedx.sigstore.json the SBOM describes that binary — it is bound to the binary as its subject

Before feeding an SBOM to a scanner, check both. The binding proves an SBOM describes the binary; it says nothing about the bytes of the file on your disk, which is a separate download.

cosign verify-blob-attestation \
  --bundle "${ASSET}.cyclonedx.sigstore.json" \
  --type cyclonedx \
  --certificate-identity "https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/.github/workflows/attest.yml@refs/tags/v0.8.2" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  "${ASSET}"

# 2. the SBOM file you downloaded is the one that was published
cosign verify-blob-attestation \
  --bundle "${ASSET}.cyclonedx.json.sigstore.json" \
  --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 \
  --certificate-identity "https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/.github/workflows/attest.yml@refs/tags/v0.8.2" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  "${ASSET}.cyclonedx.json"

Only the first would let a tampered local .cyclonedx.json reach your scanner: the binding attestation carries its own copy of the SBOM and never looks at your file.

checksums.txt is still published and still works, but it is not the verification story: it is served from the same origin as the assets and is itself unsigned, so it detects corruption rather than tampering.

sha256sum --check --ignore-missing checksums.txt

Third-Party Notices

Third-party Go module licenses are listed in THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md and attached as a release asset.

Support

What's Changed

Other Changes

  • chore(fern): register v0.8.1 by @github-actions[bot] in #536
  • fix(catalog): render imagePullSecrets in every entry, launcher included by @ndipebot in #535
  • build: upgrade Go 1.27.2 → 1.27.3 for GO-2026-6809 by @kangclzjc in #540

New Contributors

Full Changelog: v0.8.1...v0.8.2

Contributors

ndipebot and kangclzjc
Assets 27
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