Guard private browser navigation targets - #353
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Visual regression✅ No visual drift. Every state renders identically to the committed baselines. 📸 Browse the visual gallery — 46 baseline screens (light + dark) as of this commit. |
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Summary
Security model
The guard combines target classification, exact live-document probes, committed navigation checks, durable tab custody, and tab-scoped browser network rules. Popup handling is bound to the browser-identified source and child tab.
Firefox adds a temporary blocking listener for the exact child while custody and durable rules settle. The listener blocks private, denylisted, HTTP, and WebSocket requests. If denylist policy has not loaded, open-web requests and init pause instead of treating an empty policy as permission.
Chrome and Firefox can block a request through durable browser rules before the temporary Firefox listener observes it. In that case the block is intentionally silent. When the temporary listener does observe the block, the source actor receives a fixed URL-free receipt.
The remaining documented limits are DNS rebinding after lexical classification, service-worker suspension before an observer can run, and browser behavior outside the exact tabs peerd controls.
UX review
Validation
Closes #331
Closes #276