Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 202: Server-side request forgery#131
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughEnhanced the session-cancellation flow by adding validation for the workspace ID derived from Changes
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Potential fix for https://github.com/PlanetaryOrbit/orbit/security/code-scanning/202
General fix: validate and constrain all user-derived URL components before building request paths. Never interpolate raw
router.queryvalues into request URLs.Best fix here (without changing functionality): in
components/sessioncard.tsx, normalizerouter.query.idto a single string and enforce a strict allowlist format (for example alphanumeric,_,-, length-bounded). If invalid, stop and show an error toast. Then use the validated value in the axios URL. This preserves the existing API call behavior for valid workspace IDs while blocking malicious/path-manipulating input.Changes needed in shown region:
handleCancelSession, beforeaxios.patch(...), extractworkspaceIdRawfromrouter.query.idsafely (handlestring | string[] | undefined).${router.query.id}with${workspaceId}in the URL.No new imports or dependencies are required.
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