Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 232: Server-side request forgery#138
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAdds input validation for workspace IDs in mass action operations. A new Changes
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Potential fix for https://github.com/PlanetaryOrbit/orbit/security/code-scanning/232
General fix: never interpolate raw
router.queryvalues directly into request URLs. Normalize query params to a single string and validate against a strict allowlist/pattern (and reject arrays/invalid characters) before building the path.Best targeted fix in
pages/workspace/[id]/views.tsx:router.query.idas a path-safe workspace ID.massAction, resolveworkspaceIdonce via the helper; if invalid, show an error and abort.router.query.idwithworkspaceId(safe validated value).This preserves functionality while removing tainted direct flow into axios URL construction.
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