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TaiChiOS 0.1.0-mvp.5

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@github-actions github-actions released this 30 Aug 04:34
· 7 commits to main since this release
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TaiChiOS 0.1 MVP prerelease 5

本预发布版把 TaiChiOS 从可启动、可安装的系统基线推进到具备可审计控制面契约、事务式托管文件变更、独立 Guardian 控制通道和可信 Recovery 路径的候选系统。它只适用于隔离的 x86_64 虚拟机,不适用于生产设备。

验收合同

发布流水线从同一标签构建二进制 ISO 与对应源码 ISO,并在发布前验证:

  • 固定的 Cordis、DeepSeek Harness、Node.js 与 dsh-TUI 组合可离线启动;
  • BIOS 与 UEFI 均可在无网络环境启动 Live 系统;
  • BIOS 与 UEFI 均可执行整盘安装,移除 Live 介质并断网后可从硬盘启动;
  • 安装器、首次启动和 Recovery 不会与普通 Harness supervision 竞争;
  • Guardian 能检测 Harness 崩溃、过期心跳和 tty1 丢失,并通过 root-only 控制通道请求重启、Safe Profile 或 Recovery;
  • Recovery 在宣布 ready 前验证构建时封存的可信文件清单;
  • 托管文件 Change Set 覆盖 Dry Run、授权拒绝、候选激活、摘要验证、提交、回滚和 rollback-failed;
  • 生成包/源码清单、SHA-256 校验和、发布元数据、构建环境记录与 GitHub 构建来源证明。

请下载 taichios-0.1-amd64.hybrid.iso 并使用 SHA256SUMS 验证。Release 同时提供对应源码 ISO、源码/包清单、构建环境与机器可读兼容性元数据。

相比 mvp.4 的系统变化

  • 新增 Organization、Human User、Working Agent、Service Principal、非放大委托、Provider 调用、单次 Secret Grant 与审计归属的稳定 schema 和 TypeScript 参考契约。
  • taichios-change 实现事务式托管文件生命周期,并为 /opt/taichios 的原子 system-update 指针提供真实激活、验证和回滚语义;不支持的 adapter 不再报告虚假成功。
  • 新增独立 taichios-guardian.service、每个 Harness supervisor 的持续心跳、tty1 恢复,以及 root-only taichios-guardianctl 控制通道。
  • Safe Profile 会隔离损坏的普通或第三方 Profile;独立 Recovery target 不依赖 Guardian、Harness 或普通 Profile,并验证可信文件清单。
  • 安装器和首次启动路径与运行时监督隔离,避免整盘安装、Recovery 或首次启动被 Guardian/Harness 竞争。
  • GitHub Actions 固定到第 7 代 checkout/setup-node/upload-artifact;网站工具链的高风险 major 更新被隔离为独立 Dependabot 边界。
  • AGENTS.md 现在按完整 Debian 衍生操作系统的构建、启动、安装、恢复、供应链和发布风险约束 Agent,而不是按普通 Web 应用约束。

控制面 TypeScript 包是用于固定 0.2 跨包契约和安全语义的内存型参考实现,尚未装入 0.1 Live 镜像;本版本不会将其描述为生产身份或 Provider 服务。

迁移、失败与恢复

  • 从 mvp.4 升级没有自动的跨版本原地迁移器;推荐在隔离虚拟机中全新安装 mvp.5。
  • 托管文件和 /opt/taichios system-update 可使用已记录 Rollback Point 恢复;缺少回滚点或恢复失败会保留 rollback-failed 证据,不会伪装成功。
  • Guardian/Harness 故障可回退到 Safe Profile 或独立 Recovery;Recovery 不提供任意 Debian 包状态的跨版本完整回滚。
  • 如 mvp.5 无法满足需求,可重新安装经校验的 mvp.4 镜像;用户数据迁移仍需人工备份与恢复。

限制

  • 工厂凭据只用于开发验收;尚未实现生产凭据注册。
  • 默认 Provider 是离线 mock;尚未实现持久身份、加密 Secret 存储、配额、健康检查和生产 Provider adapter。
  • 固定镜像策略仍禁用 Secure Boot 与额外固件。
  • 社区插件尚未具备生产级来源验证、授权和强制执行隔离。
  • 本预发布版没有生产安全 SLA。请通过 GitHub Security Advisories 报告漏洞。

English

This prerelease advances TaiChiOS from its bootable and installable baseline to a candidate system with auditable control-plane contracts, transactional managed-file changes, an independent Guardian control channel, and a trusted Recovery path. It is intended for isolated x86_64 virtual machines, not production devices.

Acceptance contract

The release workflow builds the binary ISO and corresponding-source ISO from the same tag, then gates publication on:

  • offline startup of the pinned Cordis, DeepSeek Harness, Node.js, and dsh-TUI combination;
  • BIOS and UEFI Live boot without networking;
  • whole-disk installation under BIOS and UEFI, followed by disk boot without the Live medium or networking;
  • isolation of installer, first-boot, and Recovery paths from normal Harness supervision;
  • Guardian handling of Harness crashes, stale heartbeats, and tty1 loss, with root-only restart, Safe Profile, and Recovery requests;
  • verification of the build-sealed trusted-file manifest before Recovery declares readiness;
  • managed-file Change Set coverage for dry run, authorization rejection, candidate activation, digest verification, commit, rollback, and rollback-failed;
  • package/source manifests, SHA-256 checksums, release metadata, build-environment recording, and GitHub build-provenance attestation.

Download taichios-0.1-amd64.hybrid.iso and verify it with SHA256SUMS. The Release also contains the corresponding-source ISO, source/package manifests, build environment, and machine-readable compatibility metadata.

System changes since mvp.4

  • Adds stable schemas and TypeScript reference contracts for Organizations, Human Users, Working Agents, Service Principals, non-amplifying delegation, Provider invocation, single-use Secret Grants, and audit attribution.
  • Implements a transactional managed-file lifecycle in taichios-change, including truthful activation, verification, and rollback semantics for the atomic /opt/taichios system-update pointer. Unsupported adapters no longer report false success.
  • Adds an independent taichios-guardian.service, continuous heartbeat supervision per Harness supervisor, tty1 recovery, and the root-only taichios-guardianctl channel.
  • Makes Safe Profile isolate broken normal or third-party Profiles. The independent Recovery target does not depend on Guardian, Harness, or normal Profiles and verifies a trusted-file manifest.
  • Isolates installer and first-boot paths from runtime supervision so Guardian/Harness cannot race whole-disk installation, Recovery, or first boot.
  • Pins GitHub Actions to generation 7 for checkout, setup-node, and upload-artifact, while isolating risky website tooling major updates behind a separate Dependabot boundary.
  • Rewrites AGENTS.md around Debian-derivative build, boot, installation, recovery, supply-chain, and release risks instead of ordinary web-application assumptions.

The control-plane TypeScript packages are in-memory reference implementations for the 0.2 cross-package contracts and security semantics. They are not installed in the 0.1 Live image and are not presented as production identity or Provider services.

Migration, failure, and recovery

  • There is no automated in-place cross-version migrator from mvp.4; use a clean mvp.5 installation in an isolated virtual machine.
  • Managed files and the /opt/taichios system-update pointer can use a recorded Rollback Point. A missing rollback point or failed restore retains rollback-failed evidence instead of claiming success.
  • Guardian/Harness failures can fall back to Safe Profile or independent Recovery. Recovery does not provide arbitrary cross-version rollback of Debian package state.
  • If mvp.5 is unsuitable, reinstall the verified mvp.4 image; user-data migration still requires manual backup and restore.

Limitations

  • Factory credentials remain development-only; production credential enrollment is not implemented.
  • The default Provider is an offline mock. Persistent identity, encrypted Secret storage, quotas, health checks, and production Provider adapters are not implemented.
  • Secure Boot and additional firmware remain disabled by the pinned image policy.
  • Community plugins do not yet have production-grade provenance validation, authorization, or enforced execution isolation.
  • This prerelease has no production security SLA. Report vulnerabilities through GitHub Security Advisories.