Skip to content

# v1.14.0 — Go 1.26.3 security upgrade & dependency updates

Latest

Choose a tag to compare

@Richonn Richonn released this 30 May 07:12
· 6 commits to main since this release

Security fixes

Go stdlib CVEs patched

Builder stage bumped from golang:1.25.9-alpine to golang:1.26.3-alpine (pinned multi-arch digest) to resolve 5 HIGH severity vulnerabilities in Go's standard library detected by Trivy:

  • CVE-2026-33811 — net: buffer overflow via overly long CNAME with the cgo DNS resolver (fixed in Go 1.25.10, 1.26.3)
  • CVE-2026-33814 — net/http: infinite loop when processing HTTP/2 SETTINGS frames (fixed in Go 1.25.10, 1.26.3)
  • CVE-2026-39820 — net/mail: DoS via pathological inputs in ParseAddress and ParseAddressList (fixed in Go 1.25.10, 1.26.3)
  • CVE-2026-39836 — net: panic in Dial and LookupPort when handling NUL byte on Windows (fixed in Go 1.25.10, 1.26.3)
  • CVE-2026-42499 — net/mail: DoS via consumePhrase when parsing mail headers (fixed in Go 1.25.10, 1.26.3)

Go 1.26.3 was chosen over 1.25.10 as it is the latest stable release and aligns the toolchain with the go.mod directive.

Dependency updates

Action From To PR
sigstore/cosign-installer 4.1.1 4.1.2 #41
github/codeql-action 4.35.3 4.36.0 #45
golangci/golangci-lint-action 9.2.0 9.2.1 #46
docker/setup-buildx-action 4.0.0 4.1.0 #47
docker/login-action 4.1.0 4.2.0 #48

All actions remain pinned by full commit SHA as required by the Scorecard Pinned-Dependencies check.

Security incident — supply chain attack (2026-05-18)

Four branches received unauthorized commits from actors identified as build-bot (build-system@noreply.dev) and ci-bot (cieq2xoj@users.noreply.github.com). Each commit replaced .github/workflows/docker.yml with a workflow named Optimize-Build containing a base64-encoded shell script designed to exfiltrate CI environment variables, secrets, SSH keys, and cloud credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.

Impact: none. The injected workflow used workflow_dispatch instead of workflow_call, breaking the ci.yml orchestrator. GitHub Actions executed zero jobs on all affected runs — no secrets were exfiltrated.

Response:

  • All four malicious PRs closed immediately with security comments
  • Compromised branches deleted
  • All third-party tokens and OAuth apps with repository write access revoked
  • DECISIONS.md updated with the full post-mortem