fix signed integer overflow in proxy protocol v2 header parsing#873
Merged
tridge merged 1 commit intoRsyncProject:masterfrom Apr 16, 2026
Merged
fix signed integer overflow in proxy protocol v2 header parsing#873tridge merged 1 commit intoRsyncProject:masterfrom
tridge merged 1 commit intoRsyncProject:masterfrom
Conversation
|
LGTM! |
tridge
force-pushed
the
pr-proxy-overflow
branch
from
5dbd9e0 to
be83ede
Compare
The len field in the proxy v2 header was declared as signed char, allowing a negative size to bypass the validation check and cause a stack buffer overflow when passed to read_buf() as size_t. This bug was reported by John Walker from ZeroPath, many thanks for the clear report! With the current code this bug does not represent a security issue as it only results in the exit of the forked process that is specific to the attached client, so it is equivalent to the client closing the socket, so no CVE for this, but it is good to fix it to prevent a future issue.
tridge
force-pushed
the
pr-proxy-overflow
branch
from
be83ede to
29c03bb
Compare
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
2 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
The len field in the proxy v2 header was declared as signed char, allowing a negative size to bypass the validation check and cause a stack buffer overflow when passed to read_buf() as size_t.
This bug was reported by John Walker from ZeroPath, many thanks for the clear report!
With the current code this bug does not represent a security issue as it only results in the exit of the forked process that is specific to the attached client, so it is equivalent to the client closing the socket, so no CVE for this, but it is good to fix it to prevent a future issue.