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Pentest Mode
Dipanshu Kamboj edited this page Aug 31, 2026
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Pentest Mode is the harness's professional operating standard for authorized engagements: a permission posture, tool policy, and documentation habit that make a session behave like a professional engagement, not a loose terminal.
| Layer | Setting |
|---|---|
| Sandbox |
read-only for recon, workspace-write for scoped work — see Sandbox & Safety Rails
|
| Tools | Only what the engagement needs; hide the rest per profile |
| Approvals | On — mutating calls surface a card, nothing auto-escalates |
| Secrets | Credential references only; the store never leaks literals into logs |
1. workspace → one directory per engagement (reports, notes, evidence)
2. read-only → recon, enumeration, discovery sweeps
3. escalate → workspace-write when you start writing reports/payloads
4. subagents → parallel scoped hunts (recon / JS secrets / API surface)
5. background → long scans as jobs; schedule re-checks with schedule_create
6. report → findings into the workspace; sessions replay for evidence
Every step is a durable session event — the transcript is the evidence trail.
One lead, several scoped hunters:
- Lead:
spawn_teammate(orsubagent) with a complete standalone prompt per hunter. - Each hunter owns one surface: subdomains, JavaScript secrets, API endpoints.
- Long-running probes run as background jobs; the lead polls
job_output. - Coordination via
send_message; the Lead's journal keeps delivery durable. - Findings land on the shared task board (
team_task_*with compare-and-set updates).
- Scope first. Name the target, the authorization basis, and the allowed techniques before the first tool call.
- One surface per agent. A scoped child beats a omniscient one — cleaner context, cheaper tokens, replayable findings.
-
Checkpoints over vibes.
create_goalfor the campaign;todo_writefor the current phase; schedules for time-boxed follow-ups. -
Denials are answers.
[sandbox: … denied]is the policy speaking, not a bug — escalate through the approval path, never by disabling containment mid-hunt.
- It does not authorize targets for you — authorization comes from you and the program you're working with.
- It is not a evasion toolkit: the harness stays transparent in what it runs, and the approval layer records who approved what.
- It is not a substitute for report writing — it makes the evidence durable so writing the report is fast.
# $DSH_HOME/cordis.patch.yml — engagement seat
# tools: keep bash, fs, web, subagent, jobs
# sandbox default: workspace-write, workspaceRoot = the engagement directoryStart conservative. Escalate on evidence, with a human on every approval.