This project is designed for a trusted local development machine. It is not a production security design and should not be exposed to a LAN or the internet.

The v1 configuration reduces accidental exposure by:

• publishing HTTP only on 127.0.0.1;
• leaving Traefik's insecure API mode disabled;
• serving the dashboard through api@internal on the loopback-bound web entrypoint;
• setting exposedByDefault=false and requiring traefik.enable=true;
• selecting the fixed localghost network for backend traffic;
• pinning Traefik to an exact image version; and
• disabling anonymous usage reporting and automatic version checks.

These controls limit network exposure and accidental routing. They do not make the Docker API or an untrusted container safe.

Traefik needs Docker metadata and events for label-based discovery. V1 mounts /var/run/docker.sock read-only into the Traefik container.

Read-only is a filesystem mount property, not a complete authorization boundary for the Docker API. The API reveals sensitive information about containers, images, networks, labels, mounts, and host configuration. A vulnerability in Traefik or its dependencies could expose that metadata and create a serious trust problem.

Only run reviewed Traefik versions on machines where every user able to modify Docker container labels or images is already trusted. A restricted Docker socket proxy is a possible future hardening layer, but v1 does not promise one.

A CLI package that starts Compose is executable host-level instruction. The bundled Compose file can request privileged containers, Docker socket access, arbitrary host bind mounts, and published ports.

Before first use or an upgrade:

1. Read the release notes.
2. Inspect the matching compose.yaml and repository history.
3. Confirm the package belongs to the expected project.
4. Use a reviewed package version when stronger immutability is required.

For example:

uvx localghost@1.0.0

An unpinned uvx localghost invocation may reuse a cached release. Use uvx --refresh localghost when you intentionally want the newest published release. Dependency update pull requests should be reviewed and pass the integration suite before release.

Opting into Traefik makes a container reachable from local browsers through the proxy. Applications remain responsible for trusted hosts, CSRF, CORS, callback URLs, authentication, cookies, and safe handling of development data.

The shared Docker network also permits network connections between attached containers. Do not attach sensitive or untrusted workloads casually. Keep databases and internal dependencies only on application-private networks unless they specifically need the shared network.

HTTPS is an explicit local-development opt-in. localghost trust asks mkcert to install one public development root into the system and NSS stores; it prints the root fingerprint and explains the scope before the operating system asks for authorization. The private root and intermediate signing keys are never passed to mkcert or written to the host state directory.

The command keeps HTTP available when trust setup cannot complete. localghost trust --remove first disables the HTTPS listener, then removes the exact root selected by its fingerprint. Browser trust anchors are powerful: enable this only on a machine where you trust the installed package and its local Docker users.

Removing host trust does not delete the private CA Docker volumes or the public root copy in Localghost's host state directory. This is intentional so a later opt-in can reuse the same root, but it means localghost down and localghost trust --remove are not complete data removal. Follow the complete-removal procedure after removing the public root from host trust stores.

V1 does not include public ACME, non-.localhost certificates, authentication for the dashboard, or a restricted socket proxy. The CLI's scaffolding is limited to local Compose integration.

The optional host bridge uses a pinned Caddy image and connects to host.docker.internal. A host application must listen on a Docker-reachable interface; binding it to 0.0.0.0 may also expose that application port to the LAN. Prefer a Docker-specific host interface where available and use a host firewall on untrusted networks.

The foreground run command executes detected Django runners and Vite package scripts with the checkout user's normal host permissions. Review application scripts as you would when running them directly.

Managed host runs store their checkout path in a Docker label so the proxy's route listing can identify their location. Anyone with Docker inspection access can read that label; do not use a sensitive checkout path.

Broader features require separate designs and threat analysis rather than ad hoc production adaptation of this local configuration.