Stellar Index v0.38.1

[v0.38.1] — 2026-08-18

Tested against Stellar protocol v23. No migration. Ops-only (compute-completeness).

Fixed

• Completeness reconcile no longer times out on factory-gated sources (#104).
  The -pass per-source projection re-derive streamed the entire ~6B-event CH lake
  for identity-gated sources with empty catalogue contractIDs (aquarius, phoenix),
  blowing the 120-min pass deadline (aquarius: projection: context deadline exceeded failed the whole pass on r1). For opted-in gated sources it now scopes
  the -ch re-derive to a guaranteed superset of the gated contract set (factory
  ∪ curated seed ∪ protocol_contracts children ∪ lake-announced children) via the
  contract-indexed contractIDs prefilter — counts-identical to the full stream
  (Matches() rejects non-gated contracts regardless), just orders of magnitude
  faster. Opt-in is pinned to {aquarius, phoenix}; defindex is excluded (its decode
  correlates events across contracts in a tx, which a contract prefilter would break).
  Fail-closed: a missing contract would under-count → a visible red, never a false green.

Security

• govulncheck gated behind a documented lib/pq accepted-risk allowlist (#105).
  The 2026-08 CVE-2026-56868..56874 batch surfaced 7 unpatched called
  vulnerabilities in github.com/lib/pq@v1.12.3 (the latest release of the now-
  unmaintained driver), failing CI on every PR. All require a malicious/compromised
  Postgres server or a pre-auth MITM; stellarindex connects only to its own Postgres
  over 127.0.0.1 (sslmode=disable, no GSS/.pgpass) → not exploitable in this
  deployment. A reviewed allowlist (scripts/ci/govulncheck-allow.txt + a JSON-mode
  wrapper that still reds CI on any other called vuln) documents the accepted risk;
  the durable fix (migrate to jackc/pgx) is tracked as a post-launch follow-up.