v0.4.1

A fix release driven by an adversarial end-to-end test pass across every adapter on real sessions. See TESTING.md for the method and coverage.

Fixed

• Security: bare hexadecimal secrets of 32 characters or more, a common shape for framework secret keys and HMAC signing keys, are now redacted. They were previously not detected and could reach a written artifact even with --redact-auto. A 40 character git commit hash is also redacted, which is the safe default for a privacy tool. Covered by a regression test and the leak self-test.
• Redaction no longer aborts on a single very large token. A multi-megabyte pasted blob used to overflow the regex stack and end the run with an internal error. The scan is now bounded.
• Security signal precision. A benign long flag such as --force-device-scale-factor and a user interface file named like semantic-tokens.ts no longer mint a high confidence credential signal. A single bare keyword with no corroborating evidence is down tiered below verified. Real credential files and secret-handling commands still verify.
• tree.json records the actual source tool (codex-rollout, chatgpt-export, gemini-cli, copilot-chat, cursor-export, grok-cli, claude-code-jsonl, transcript) instead of always reporting claude-code-jsonl.
• The handoff brief picks the latest accepted direction chronologically rather than by insertion order, so a multi-session export no longer names a stale topic.
• --from is honored together with --stdin.
• --analysis combined with --report writes both the analysis files and the reports instead of silently dropping the tree and reports.
• The Copilot and Cursor adapters fail gracefully on malformed or empty JSON instead of throwing a raw error.
• Markdown footers stamp the tool version, and command evidence inside code blocks is no longer HTML escaped.
• Grok format detection requires a Grok specific signal, so a Cursor style export is no longer at risk of being routed to the Grok parser.