v0.1.0-rc.1

First release candidate. Pin a verified release, run in monitor mode first, and read docs/threat-model.md.

Added

• OT/ICS guide (docs/ot-ics.md).
• Final threat model: trust boundaries, attacks on LogShield itself, what the evidence does and does not show, operator responsibilities.
• Prometheus alerting rules and Sigma rules over the JSON logs (examples/prometheus, examples/sigma), validated in CI.
• make lab-scripts: smoke test of the lab control script with a fake JDK and the real proxy, run in CI.
• Release engineering: reproducible release archives (scripts/build-release.sh), a tag-triggered release workflow with keyless cosign signatures, build provenance attestations and SPDX SBOM, a distroless non-root container image, OpenSSF Scorecard, Dependabot for Docker, docs/releasing.md (versioning policy and verification) and docs/deployment.md with hardened systemd, Kubernetes and nginx examples.
• Docs-consistency tests (rules and configuration keys must be documented), version information from Go build metadata, CITATION.cff, scripts/repo-settings.sh, and CI for shell, Python and workflow files.
• Hardened profile (examples/logshield.hardened.json: block mode plus block_suspicious), tested to load, and the measured cost and benefit of the stricter policy.
• Lab for differential validation against real Log4j 2.14.1: canary with a hermetic JNDI hook, logging-only listener, labrun, a verifying bundle script (lab/bundle.py) and docs/lab.md.
• Reverse proxy (internal/proxy, cmd/logshield): monitor and block modes,
  request normalization with a forwarded-equals-inspected guard, rejection of
  ambiguous requests, fail-closed/fail-open inspection errors, defanged
  structured logs, hardened server timeouts, graceful shutdown. See docs/proxy.md.
• engine.Config.Effective.
• Load and latency harness (make load, docs/load-report.md) with a CI smoke test of the 5 ms added-p99 budget; upstream failure tests (refused, silent, garbage, hung, dying mid-response) with slot and goroutine leak checks.
• -read-timeout, -client-write-timeout, -drain-delay settings.
• TLS termination with HTTP/2 (-tls-cert, -tls-key, -tls-min-version), certificate hot-reload, and verified https upstreams with a private CA or server-name override. HTTP/2 differentials are covered by raw-frame tests (ADR 0005).
• Configuration from a strict JSON file, LOGSHIELD_* environment variables and flags (-config, -check-config, -disable-rule); unknown keys and variables are reported. See docs/configuration.md.
• Prometheus metrics, /healthz and /readyz on a separate admin listener (-admin-listen), stdlib only (ADR 0004); -max-in-flight overload shedding (503 + Retry-After). See docs/observability.md.
• Proxy.WrapListener: requests refused by Go's HTTP server before the handler runs are now logged and observed (protocol-error).
• make integration and a CI job: the proxy in front of real Node.js, Python and JDK backends (smuggling, re-framing, pipelining, verbatim targets, blocked attacks never delivered).
• Proxy fuzz target FuzzNothingMaliciousLeaves; CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md, SUPPORT.md; README rewritten.

Fixed

• Slow-read protection: a client that stops reading a response no longer holds an in-flight slot and its buffers indefinitely (-client-write-timeout, default 60 s per stalled write).
• Proxy guard no longer depends on body identity, which Go 1.26 changes by wrapping bodies; it now sends the inspected buffer itself.
• Bounded multi-layer decoder (engine.Decode): gzip, percent, %uXXXX,
  backslash escapes, HTML entities, overlong UTF-8, fullwidth folding, with
  fail-closed budgets.
• Log4j lookup resolver (engine.Resolve): name-first substitution, :-
  defaults, lower/upper/date, environment-dependent lookups, Java-faithful
  case folding, re-expansion of results and of the assembled output, JNDI and
  possible-JNDI findings with scheme, key, obfuscation and exfiltration signals.
• Request inspection (engine.Inspect): request model with method, target,
  query, headers (names and values, duplicates kept), cookies, form and raw
  bodies, and base64 unwrapping of Basic and Bearer (JWT) credentials.
• Rule catalogue (engine.Rules) with stable IDs mapped to CVE-2021-44228,
  45046 and 45105, three-tier decisions (clean, suspicious, malicious), mandatory
  fail-closed budget rules, and per-rule disabling.
• engine.Defang for log-safe evidence that never contains ${.
• Multipart/form-data part inspection; NUL-strip (UTF-16/32), zlib and base64
  decode layers; EBCDIC-charset bodies; Config.Validate; JSON-friendly
  Decision/Severity; Verdict.RuleIDs.
• Corpora with provenance (corpus/): hand-curated bypass and benign sets,
  100,000 generated benign requests, a loader that rejects non-inert hosts, and
  an evaluation harness that enforces the targets and keeps
  docs/eval/report.md in sync (make eval).
• Property tests (obfuscation, encoding chains, embedding, monotonicity, defang
  round-trip, decode invariants), corpus-seeded mutation fuzzing, a weekly long
  fuzz workflow that uploads crashers, a latency guard, a benchmark baseline
  (docs/performance.md), and a benchmark smoke job in CI.
• Coverage ratchet: 97% total and 98% for the engine package.
• Fuzz targets, benchmarks, and an obfuscation test matrix.
• CI: lint, race tests with a coverage floor, cross-OS and cross-architecture
  builds, go mod tidy check, govulncheck, fuzz smoke, CodeQL, dependency review.
• depguard rule enforcing the engine purity constraint (ADR 0002).
• Early threat model.

Image: ghcr.io/turlafsb/logshield@sha256:a819dbf8711bf3898d3b919e0e71dce73eb818333cd2c24cf0f737ec72870401

Verify: see docs/releasing.md.