ZNetwork Connect

ZNetwork — connect everyone securely?

Doctrine: data/grok16-znetwork-field-wire-doctrine.json

Short verdict: Yes in layers, not as one open directory today. Security-first; wire-speed when both ends are field computers; identity without cellphone is possible with sovereign receipts + invites — not with a public name→address phone book.

Field expansion down the wire

[Field computer A]  →  convert at egress  →  sealed field-io packet  →  wire  →  deconvert at ingress  →  [Field computer B]

• Egress: field-io-packet.py — one amplitude collapsed; only signed envelopes leave the machine. Never ship raw field files on the wire.
• Transit: HMAC-sealed field-io-packet/v1, 64 KB chunks; TLS 1.3 on untrusted hops.
• Ingress: Sovereign time + gatekeeper IFF + depth-0 join onto local 2D platform.

When both peers run field computers (Grok16 prefix + ZNetwork), they talk as belt peers — no OS field-on-field stack. If one peer rests on an existing field, defield first (AmmoCode rule).

Name + address without cellphone

What you asked for:

Want	Approach
Type name	Display label only — not root of trust
Type address	Wire-point token — opaque HMAC rotation, not plaintext street/IP in cloud
Auto-update	Sovereign receipt seals each publish; friends sync when both online
No phone	LAN beacon, invite URL, USB sovereign key file — no SMS OTP root

What we reject:

• Central searchable directory (theft magnet)
• Anonymous open WAN scan
• Storing plaintext home addresses in shared JSON

AmmoCode mesh: polite LAN discovery, friend/block lists, MITM beacon pins — ammocode-network-doctrine.json.

Anti-fake accounts

No username registry. Trust comes from:

• Truth gate — ironclad + field_sanity + g1id + voltage (all green)
• Connection gatekeeper — 10-axis IFF per flow
• Threat rating — block below 25; open network needs ≥60 or friend
• Manual invite or pinned LAN beacon

Sybil floods fail the gatekeeper, not a CAPTCHA.

Anti address theft

• Friends/blocks: local network-lists.json only
• Wire-points: opaque tokens, not raw IPs in a public DB
• Tunnel connect: beacon_pin + verify_beacon before tunnel_connect
• Receipt ledger: append-only local jsonl — no PII export

Throughput vs safety

Path	Speed	Safety
Field-to-field (both field PCs)	Wire-limited	Depth 0 + sealed envelopes
WebSocket collab :9556	Fast	Invite-only
HTTP tunnel fallback	~32 KB/s class	Firewall escape; pinned beacons
ZNetwork ACTIVE	OS handoff	Blocked until human review

Sustained wire load: use field_physics, token-bucket per peer — not field_opt heat debt.

ZNetwork modes today

Mode	Behavior
REVIEW_ONLY	Default — plan JSON, zero mutation
SHADOW	Read-only taps + receipts
ACTIVE	Needs checklist + ZNETWORK_REVIEW_APPROVED=1

AmmoCode: attach-only if ZNetwork already running — never double-field.

Safety concerns (continue watching)

1. Field files on wire — heats both ends → envelopes only
2. Central directory — scrape target → no central DB
3. Fake operators — Sybil → truth_gate + no open WAN
4. Thermal on max bandwidth — sustained field_opt → use field_physics
5. ACTIVE before review — OS handoff risk → REVIEW_ONLY default
6. MITM on open net — tunnel without pin → beacon_pin required