🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix SSRF bypass via unspecified IPs#699
Conversation
- Updated `_is_safe_ip` in `main.py` to check and return `False` for `ip.is_unspecified`. - Added critical learning to `.jules/sentinel.md` regarding `ip.is_global` and `0.0.0.0` loopback resolution. Co-authored-by: abhimehro <84992105+abhimehro@users.noreply.github.com>
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😎 Merged directly without going through the merge queue, as the queue was empty and the PR was up to date with the target branch - details. |
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Pull request overview
This PR mitigates an SSRF filter bypass where domains resolving to unspecified IPs (e.g., 0.0.0.0 / ::) could incorrectly pass the existing _is_safe_ip check due to ipaddress.ip_address(...).is_global evaluating to True for those addresses.
Changes:
- Block unspecified IP addresses explicitly in
_is_safe_ipviaip.is_unspecified. - Add a Sentinel security note documenting the vulnerability and mitigation.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 2 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated 1 comment.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| main.py | Adds an explicit ip.is_unspecified check to prevent SSRF bypass via unspecified IPs. |
| .jules/sentinel.md | Documents the SSRF bypass scenario and the prevention guidance. |
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Code Review
This pull request addresses an SSRF vulnerability by explicitly blocking unspecified IP addresses in the _is_safe_ip function. The reviewer identified an additional security risk regarding IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses and provided a code suggestion to recursively unwrap and validate these addresses to ensure comprehensive filtering.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Gates Passed
6 Quality Gates Passed
See analysis details in CodeScene
Quality Gate Profile: Pay Down Tech Debt
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🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The SSRF prevention function
_is_safe_iprelied on theip.is_globalproperty. However, in Python'sipaddressmodule,IPv4Address("0.0.0.0").is_globalevaluates toTrue. When passed to standard socket implementations on Linux,0.0.0.0connects to the local loopback interface (127.0.0.1). This allowed an attacker to bypass SSRF filters and access internal or local resources by using a domain that resolves to0.0.0.0.🎯 Impact: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) allowing unauthorized access to internal resources or local services.
🔧 Fix: Added an explicit check for
ip.is_unspecifiedin_is_safe_ipto block0.0.0.0and::immediately, overriding theis_globalevaluation.✅ Verification: Verified that existing unit tests pass, and specifically that the
test_domain_resolving_to_unspecified_ipcase intests/test_ssrf_enhanced.pypasses successfully, correctly identifying0.0.0.0as blocked.PR created automatically by Jules for task 13452951382544854245 started by @abhimehro