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Security: abiroot/clyde

Security

SECURITY.md

Security

Threat model & guarantees

  • Credentials at rest: stored only in the OS-native secret store (macOS Keychain / Windows Credential Manager / Linux Secret Service) via the keyring crate. No tokens are written to plaintext files or logs.
  • Network surface: Clyde opens no listening socket. Its outbound requests go only to Anthropic: api.anthropic.com (usage + profile; overridable via CLYDE_UPSTREAM for testing) and platform.claude.com (OAuth token exchange / refresh). Browser sign-in opens claude.com in your default browser — Clyde never handles your password. There is no Clyde backend and no telemetry.
  • Claude Code's store: switching an account rewrites the Claude Code-credentials keychain entry and ~/.claude/.claude.json in place, preserving all other keys. Clyde also self-heals by removing any dead proxy integration an older version left in ~/.claude/settings.json.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please open a private security advisory on GitHub. Do not file public issues for security problems.

Include: affected version, reproduction steps, and impact. We aim to acknowledge within a few days.

Notes

The OAuth client id / endpoints used are public values mirroring Claude Code's flow; they are not secrets but are not a stable API either.

There aren't any published security advisories