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Security: abm9111/chamber

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting — the Security tab on this repository, then Report a vulnerability. That opens a private thread visible only to the maintainers.

Please do not open a public issue for a security bug. This project's whole subject is gates that are supposed to hold, so a public report is a working exploit against every install running that code.

There is no SLA. This is a pre-1.0 project maintained by one person; expect a first response in days, not hours, and say so in your report if the issue is being actively exploited.

What is in scope

Chamber's claim is that specific gates cannot be walked around. A report is in scope if it defeats one of them:

  • The sandbox. Model-authored or vendor-supplied code reading, writing, or reaching the network outside its confinement, or CHAMBER_SANDBOX_REQUIRED failing to refuse when nothing isolating is available.
  • The citation gate. A claim gaining verified support it did not earn — a pin that resolves without the cited document existing, a fabricated reference buying support from another row's content.
  • Citation debt. An assertion committing while a blocking debt against it is open, including by rewording.
  • Tamper evidence. Modifying, truncating or rolling back the audit chain, the Merkle checkpoint or the anchor log in a way chamber checkpoint verify reports as consistent.
  • MCP and skill import. Vendor-supplied manifest content becoming executable, or altering the artifact a human approves.
  • Secrets. Sealed values recoverable without the key; credentials reaching logs, exports, checkpoints or the corpus.

What is not in scope

  • Anything requiring an attacker who already has write access to the database file or the config directory. Chamber is local-first and single-operator; that attacker has already won, and the docs say so rather than pretending otherwise.
  • The anchor log defending against someone who can also rewrite the anchor log. It raises the cost of a rollback to two artefacts; it does not make tampering impossible, and src/anchor.ts states that limit in place.
  • Denial of service against your own machine.
  • Findings from a scanner with no reachable call path. A report that names the path it took is worth ten that name a rule id.

Supported versions

Only main. There are no releases and no backports yet.

What helps a report land

The reproduction, not the theory. This project has repeatedly found that a defect which is obvious in the code turns out to be unreachable, and that a gate which reads correctly fails on a machine nobody tested. If you can, include the command sequence, the platform, and what you expected the gate to do — and note that isolation behaviour cannot be reproduced on macOS, which has no bubblewrap.

There aren't any published security advisories