| Version | Security updates |
|---|---|
| 1.0.x | Yes |
| Earlier versions | No |
Please use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository. Do not open a public issue for vulnerabilities involving privacy boundaries, arbitrary code execution, permissions, signing, plugins, or recording data.
- Media, transcripts, plugin state, and clipboard-derived names remain local.
- Core product code does not contain analytics, cloud transcription, or upload clients.
- Completion hooks never invoke a shell and require absolute executables.
- Model inference requires verified local assets; missing assets must fail closed rather than silently downloading.
- Signed app artifacts use App Sandbox without incoming or outgoing network entitlements; CI checks both source calls and embedded entitlements.
- Explicit update checks use only Sparkle's sandboxed downloader service. Both the appcast and archive require Ed25519 signatures, and the archive also requires Developer ID signing and Apple notarization.
- FluidAudio is forced into offline mode before model preparation, and a test
requires its network surface to fail with
networkDisabled. - Third-party extensions do not execute inside the capture process.
- Session metadata and derived artifacts use atomic writes.
- Release workflows use least-privilege permissions, protected environments, pinned action commits, Developer ID signing, notarization, signed update feeds, checksums, and provenance attestations.
Application permissions must be explained at the point of use. Do not log captured content, transcript text, clipboard contents, credentials, or security-scoped bookmark data.