🔒 Fix command injection in campaign_v6.py

[alfieprojectsdev]

This PR fixes a critical command injection vulnerability in analysis/01 RINEX conversion/campaign_v6.py.

The os.system function was used to execute teqc with user-provided arguments (mo, at, pe, teqc), allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary commands.

This change replaces os.system with subprocess.run using a list of arguments, which prevents the shell from interpreting the arguments as commands.

Verified by creating a reproduction script to confirm the vulnerability and a verification script to ensure the fix correctly handles the inputs without injection.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 15765682862018274902 started by @alfieprojectsdev

[google-labs-jules]

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[alfieprojectsdev]

Closing: Only fixes 1 of 2 os.system calls in this local research script. The second (line 20, runpkr00) is left unfixed. Additionally, this is a standalone analysis script where the 'attacker' is the person running it — there is no privilege escalation vector. Low priority.

[google-labs-jules]

Closing: Only fixes 1 of 2 os.system calls in this local research script. The second (line 20, runpkr00) is left unfixed. Additionally, this is a standalone analysis script where the 'attacker' is the person running it — there is no privilege escalation vector. Low priority.

Thank you for the review. I have now also replaced the os.system call for runpkr00 with subprocess.run to be consistent and eliminate all shell injection risks in this script, even if the risk profile is low.