### **Chapter 6: Intrusion Detection**


Information Security
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#### Goals

- Distinguish among various types of intruder behavior patterns.
- Understand the basic principles of and requirements for intrusion detection.
- Discuss the key features of host-based intrusion detection.
- Discuss the key features network-based intrusion detection.
- Define the intrusion detection exchange format.
- Explain the purpose of honeypots.
- Present an overview of Snort.

# Defense in Depth

Multiple layers of defense mechanisms



#### Intruder

- Who is likely intruder?
  - May be outsider who got thru firewall
  - May be evil insider
- What do intruders do?
  - Launch well-known attacks
  - Launch variations on well-known attacks
  - Launch new/little-known attacks
  - "Borrow" system resources
  - Use compromised system to attack others. etc.

# Example of intrusion

- Remote root compromise
- Web server defacement
- Guessing/cracking passwords
- Copying databases containing credit card numbers
- Viewing sensitive data without authorization
- Running a packet sniffer
- Distributing pirated software
- Using an unsecured modem to access internal network
- Impersonating an executive to get information
- Using an unattended workstation

#### Intruder behavior

- Target acquisition and information gathering
- Initial access
- Privilege escalation
- Information gathering or system exploit
- Maintaining access
- Covering tracks

# Example of Intruders behavior

• Student read textbook p.271, 272

#### **Intrusion Detection**

- In spite of intrusion prevention, bad guys will sometime get in.
- Intrusion detection systems (IDS)
  - Detect attacks in progress (or soon after)
  - Look for unusual or suspicious activity
- IDS evolved from log file analysis.
- IDS is currently a hot research topic.
- How to respond when intrusion detected?

# **Intrusion Detection System**

 As attack techniques become more sophisticated, IDS will become less effective.
 For example, attackers can blend attack traffic with normal activities so that it is very hard to detect such attacks.

**Effective** 

Known, less sophisticated

Sophisticated Targeted attacks

New, zero-day exploits

Not effective

# **IDS - Logical Components**

#### Sensors:

- Sensors are responsible for collecting data. The input for a sensor may be any part of a system that could contain evidence of an intrusion.
- Types of input to a sensor includes network
   packets, log files, and system call traces.
   Sensors collect and forward this information to the analyzer.

# **IDS - Logical Components**

#### **Analyzers:**

- receive input from one or more sensors or from other analyzers.
- The output of this component is an indication or include evidence supporting the conclusion that an intrusion occurred.
- The analyzer may provide guidance about what actions to take as a result of the intrusion.

# **IDS - Logical Components**

#### **User interface:**

The user interface to an IDS enables a user to view output from the system or control the behavior of the system.


In some systems, the user interface may equate to a manager, director, or console component

#### HIDS vs NDIS

- Host-based IDS: monitor single host activity
- Network-based IDS: monitor network traffic
- Distributed or hybrid: Combines information from a number of sensors, often both host and network based, in a central analyzer that is able to better identify and respond to intrusion activity

# **IDS Basic Principles**

# Assumption: intruder behavior differs from legitimate users



# **IDS** requirements

- Run continually with minimal human supervision
- Be fault tolerant: recover from crashes
- Resist subversion: monitor itself from change by intruder
- Impose a minimal overhead on system
- Configured according to system security policies
- Adapt to changes in systems and users
- Scale to monitor large numbers of systems
- Provide graceful degradation of service: if one component fails, others should continue to work
- Allow dynamic reconfiguration

# **Detection techniques**

- Anomaly (behavior) detection
- Signature/heuristic detection

# Signature/heuristic detection

- Uses a set of known malicious data patterns or attack rules that are compared with current behavior
- Also known as misuse detection
- Can only identify known attacks for which it has patterns or rules (signature)
  - Very similar to anti-virus (requires frequent updates)
  - Rule-based penetration identification
    - rules identify known penetrations/weaknesses
    - often by analyzing attack scripts from Internet (CERTs)

# Example of rules in a signature detection IDS

- Users should not be logged in more than one session
- Users do not make copies of system, password files
- Users should not read in other users' directories
- Users must not write other users' files
- Users who log after hours often access the same files they used earlier
- Users do not generally open disk devices but rely on high-level OS utilities


#### **Rule-based Detection**

- Use of rules for identifying known penetrations or penetrations that would exploit known weaknesses.
- Rules can also be defined that identify suspicious behavior.
- SNORT is an example of a rule-based NIDS

# **Network Based IDS (NDIS)**

- Monitor traffic at a selected point in a network or subnet in real or close to real time so that it can react to intrusions in a timely manner.
- NDIS can analyze traffic in multiple layers of the network stack. A network IDS can include a number of sensors.

### **Network-Based IDS**




#### **Inline Sensors**


- The primary motivation for using inline sensors is to enable them to block an attack, when being detected.
- An inline sensor performs both intrusion detection and intrusion prevention.
- For an inline sensor to be effective, it must be placed at a network point where traffic must pass through it.

#### **Passive Sensors**

- A passive sensor only takes a copy of the traffic.
- That is, the traffic continues to reach its destination without passing through the device.



# **Host Based IDS (HIDS)**



# Logging of alerts (for all types)

#### Typical information logged by a NIDS sensor:

- Timestamp,
- Connection or session ID,
- Event or alert type,
- Rating,
- Network, transport, and application layer protocols,
- Source and destination IP addresses,
- Source and destination ports, ICMP types and codes,
- Number of bytes transmitted over the connection,
- Decoded payload data, such as application requests and responses,
- State-related information.

#### Firewall vs. Network IDS

#### **Firewall**


- Active filtering
- Fail-close

#### **Network IDS**

- Passive monitoring
- Fail-open

#### **Snort IDS**

- Lightweight IDS
  - Open source (rule-based)
  - Real-time packet capture and rule analysis
  - Passive or inline
  - Components: decoder, detector, logger, alerter



#### **SNORT Rules**

- Use a simple, flexible rule definition language
- Fixed header and zero or more options
- Header includes: action, protocol, source IP, source port, direction, dest IP, dest port
- Many options
- Example rule to detect TCP SYN-FIN attack:

```
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any \
(msg: "SCAN SYN FIN"; flags: SF, 12; \
reference: arachnids, 198; classtype: attempted-recon;)
```

detects an attack at the TCP level; \$strings are variables with defined values; any source or dest port is considered; checks to see if SYN and FIN bits are set

### Honeypots

- Decoy systems
  - Filled with fabricated info and instrumented with monitors/event loggers
  - Lure a potential attacker away from critical systems
  - Collect information about the attacker's activity
  - Encourage the attacker to stay on the system long enough for administrators to respond
  - Divert and hold attacker to collect activity info without exposing production systems
- Initially were single systems
- More recently are/emulate entire networks

# Honeypot classification

#### Low interaction honeypot

- Consists of a software package that emulates particular IT services or systems well enough to provide a realistic initial interaction, but does not execute a full version of those services or systems
- Provides a less realistic target
- Often sufficient for use as a component of a distributed
   IDS to warn of imminent attack


#### High interaction honeypot

- A real system, with a full operating system, services and applications, which are instrumented and deployed where they can be accessed by attackers

# Honeypot deployment

3. Full internal honeypot; can detect internal attacks

2. In DMZ; must make sure the other systems in the DMZ are secure; firewalls may block traffic to the honeypot



# Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)