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As of 2026-07-28, "passkey" returns zero results on support.claude.com and the feature is absent from release notes through July 24. The feature's UI name appears to be Trusted devices (claude.ai/settings/account#trusted-devices).
Current behavior below was confirmed by Fin (Anthropic's support AI agent) on 2026-07-28; a parallel escalation to a human agent has been requested through support.
Summary
Claude Desktop for Windows (MSIX) recently began offering passkey enrollment at sign-in. I enrolled successfully using a hardware FIDO2 security key (resident/discoverable credential, verified present on the key).
Per Fin, enrollment is single-device / replace-only: to use a second authenticator, I must remove the currently trusted device at Settings > Account > Trusted devices and re-enroll with the other key at next sign-in. Between full sign-ins, biometric step-up (Windows Hello / Face ID / Touch ID) refreshes the session.
This makes a backup hardware key impossible in practice. A backup that must be pre-activated by disabling the primary is not a backup.
Request
Support multiple concurrently enrolled authenticators per account (primary + backup/travel key) — standard practice for hardware-key users and supported by every major relying party (Google, GitHub, Microsoft).
Provide a credential management UI: list, rename, and revoke individual enrolled authenticators, not only whole-device removal.
Publish documentation. The login article (13189465) still describes only Google and email-link sign-in; "Trusted devices" and the passkey prompt are undocumented.
Because hardware-key enrollment writes a discoverable credential to the key itself, the remove-and-re-enroll swap orphans a resident credential on the removed key each cycle. It fails at sign-in and occupies one of the key's limited discoverable-credential slots until manually deleted via vendor tooling. Replace-only semantics multiply these over time.
Why it matters
A single enrolled authenticator with no backup path creates lockout risk; the email magic link becomes the sole fallback.
Hardware-key users specifically adopt the two-key pattern to survive loss, damage, and travel.
Shipping enrollment ahead of multi-credential support, management UI, and docs leaves early adopters unable to follow FIDO2 best practice.
Environment
Claude Desktop for Windows (MSIX), version: 1.24012.9.0
Windows 11 Pro, version 25H2 (OS build 26200.8875)
Authenticator: external hardware FIDO2 security key, USB
Preflight
Summary
Claude Desktop for Windows (MSIX) recently began offering passkey enrollment at sign-in. I enrolled successfully using a hardware FIDO2 security key (resident/discoverable credential, verified present on the key).
Per Fin, enrollment is single-device / replace-only: to use a second authenticator, I must remove the currently trusted device at Settings > Account > Trusted devices and re-enroll with the other key at next sign-in. Between full sign-ins, biometric step-up (Windows Hello / Face ID / Touch ID) refreshes the session.
This makes a backup hardware key impossible in practice. A backup that must be pre-activated by disabling the primary is not a backup.
Request
Additional pain point: orphaned resident credentials
Because hardware-key enrollment writes a discoverable credential to the key itself, the remove-and-re-enroll swap orphans a resident credential on the removed key each cycle. It fails at sign-in and occupies one of the key's limited discoverable-credential slots until manually deleted via vendor tooling. Replace-only semantics multiply these over time.
Why it matters
Environment
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