[v3-2-test] Redact secret-looking query parameters in HTTP access log (#67498)#67631
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jason810496 merged 2 commits intoMay 29, 2026
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…apache#67498) The HTTP access log middleware logged the raw query string without passing it through ``secrets_masker.redact()``. The decorator-layer audit log already masks request data; the access-log layer did not. A secret inadvertently passed as a query parameter (e.g. ``?password=foo`` or ``?token=bar``) was therefore written to the access log in plaintext. Parse the query string into ``(key, value)`` pairs and call ``secrets_masker.redact(value, key)`` per pair before logging. This matches the pattern already used in ``logging/decorators.py``: keys whose names are flagged sensitive by ``secrets_masker`` (``password``, ``token``, ``api_key``, …) have their values replaced with ``***``; values previously registered via ``mask_secret()`` are caught too. Non-sensitive keys are unchanged, blank values are preserved so log readers still see the parameter was present, and malformed query strings fall back to raw logging rather than silently dropping diagnostic information. (cherry picked from commit aa3b7d4) Co-authored-by: Jarek Potiuk <jarek@potiuk.com>
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…#67498) (#67631) The HTTP access log middleware logged the raw query string without passing it through ``secrets_masker.redact()``. The decorator-layer audit log already masks request data; the access-log layer did not. A secret inadvertently passed as a query parameter (e.g. ``?password=foo`` or ``?token=bar``) was therefore written to the access log in plaintext. Parse the query string into ``(key, value)`` pairs and call ``secrets_masker.redact(value, key)`` per pair before logging. This matches the pattern already used in ``logging/decorators.py``: keys whose names are flagged sensitive by ``secrets_masker`` (``password``, ``token``, ``api_key``, …) have their values replaced with ``***``; values previously registered via ``mask_secret()`` are caught too. Non-sensitive keys are unchanged, blank values are preserved so log readers still see the parameter was present, and malformed query strings fall back to raw logging rather than silently dropping diagnostic information. (cherry picked from commit aa3b7d4) Co-authored-by: Jarek Potiuk <jarek@potiuk.com>
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The HTTP access log middleware logged the raw query string without passing it through
secrets_masker.redact(). The decorator-layer audit log already masks request data; the access-log layer did not. A secret inadvertently passed as a query parameter (e.g.?password=fooor?token=bar) was therefore written to the access log in plaintext.Parse the query string into
(key, value)pairs and callsecrets_masker.redact(value, key)per pair before logging. This matches the pattern already used inlogging/decorators.py: keys whose names are flagged sensitive bysecrets_masker(password,token,api_key, …) have their values replaced with***; values previously registered viamask_secret()are caught too.Non-sensitive keys are unchanged, blank values are preserved so log readers still see the parameter was present, and malformed query strings fall back to raw logging rather than silently dropping diagnostic information.
(cherry picked from commit aa3b7d4)